

APPENDIX PA
ATTACHMENT SCR

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1 **ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

2	AMWTP	Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Plant
3	BNL	Brookhaven National Laboratory
4	CAG	Compliance Application Guidance
5	CARD	Compliance Application Review Document
6	CCA	Compliance Certification Application
7	CCDF	complementary cumulative distribution function
8	CDF	cumulative distribution function
9	CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
10	CH	contact-handled
11	CRA	Compliance Recertification Application
12	DBDSP	Delaware Basin Drilling Surveillance Program
13	DFR	driving force ratio
14	DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
15	DP	disturbed performance
16	DRZ	disturbed rock zone
17	EDTA	ethylene diamine tetra-acetate
18	EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
19	EP	event and process
20	ERMS	Electronic Record Management System
21	FEP	feature, event, and process
22	FGE	fissile gram equivalent
23	FLAC	Fast Lagrangian Analysis of Continua
24	FMT	Fracture-Matrix Transport
25	FSU	Florida State University
26	H	human
27	HC	historical and current human activities
28	HCN	historic, current and near future human activities
29	LWA	Land Withdrawal Act
30	MB	marker bed
31	MgO	magnesium oxide
32	MPI	Mississippi Potash Inc.
33	N	natural
34	NMBMMR	New Mexico Bureau of Mines and Mineral Resources
35	NORM	naturally occurring radioactive material
36	PA	performance assessment
37	PAVT	performance assessment verification test
38	RH	remote-handled
39	RTC	Response to Comments Document
40	SKI	Statens Kärnkraftinspektion
41	SMC	Salado mass concrete
42	SNL	Sandia National Laboratories
43	SO-C	screened-out consequence
44	SO-P	screened-out probability
45	SO-R	screened-out regulatory
46	T	transmissivity

1	TDS	total dissolved solids
2	TRU	transuranic
3	TSD	Technical Support Document
4	TWBIR	Transuranic Waste Baseline Inventory Report
5	UP	undisturbed performance
6	VOC	volatile organic compound
7	W	waste and repository-induced
8	WIPP	Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
9	WPO	WIPP Project Office

SCR-1.0 INTRODUCTION

The United States Department of Energy (DOE) has developed the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in southeastern New Mexico for the disposal of transuranic wastes generated by defense programs. In May of 1998, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) certified that the WIPP would meet the disposal standards (EPA 1998a) established in Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 191, Subparts B and C (EPA 1993), thereby allowing the WIPP to begin waste disposal operations. This certification was based on performance assessment (PA) calculations that were included in the DOE’s Compliance Certification Application (CCA). These calculations demonstrate that the cumulative releases of radionuclides to the accessible environment will not exceed those allowed by the EPA standard.

The WIPP Land Withdrawal Act (LWA) (U.S. Congress 1992) requires the WIPP to be recertified (demonstrate continued compliance with the disposal standards) every five years. As such, the DOE has prepared a Compliance Recertification Application (CRA-2004) which demonstrates that the WIPP continues to comply with EPA’s requirements for radioactive waste disposal. The CRA-2004 includes any changes to the WIPP long-term compliance baseline since the CCA.

To assure that PA calculations account for important aspects of the disposal system, features, events, and processes (FEPs) considered to be potentially important to the disposal system are identified. These FEPs are used as a tool for determining what phenomena and components of the disposal system can and should be dealt with in PA calculations. For the WIPP CCA, a systematic process was used to compile, analyze, screen, and document FEPs for use in PA. The FEP screening process used in the CCA has also been used for the CRA-2004 and is described in detail in Section 6.2. For the CRA-2004, this process focused on evaluating any new information that may have impacts or present inconsistencies to those screening arguments and decisions presented in the CCA. Changes and updates as a result of this evaluation are described in the *FEPs Reassessment for Recertification Report* (Wagner et al. 2003).

Wagner et al. (2003) concluded that of the original 237 FEPs included in the CCA, 106 have not changed, 120 FEPs required updates to their FEP descriptions and/or screening arguments, and seven of the original baseline FEPs screening decisions required a change from their original screening decision. Four of the original baseline FEPs have been deleted or combined with other closely related FEPs. Finally, two new FEPs have been added to the baseline. These two FEPs were previously addressed in an existing FEP; they have been separated for clarity. Table SCR-1 summarizes the changes in the FEP baseline since the CCA.

Table SCR-1. FEPs Change Summary Since CCA

EPA FEP I.D.	FEP Name	Summary of Change
FEPs Combined with other FEPs		
N17	Lateral <i>Dissolution</i>	Combined with N16, <i>Shallow Dissolution</i> . N17 removed from baseline.

34

Table SCR-1. FEPs Change Summary Since CCA - Continued

EPA FEP I.D.	FEP Name	Summary of Change
N19	<i>Solution Chimneys</i>	Combined with N20, <i>Breccia Pipes</i> . N19 removed from Baseline.
H33	<i>Flow Through Undetected Boreholes</i>	Combined with H31, <i>Natural Borehole Fluid Flow</i> . H33 removed from baseline.
W38	<i>Investigation Boreholes</i>	Addressed in H31, <i>Natural Borehole Fluid Flow</i> , and H33, " <i>Flow Through Undetected Boreholes</i> ." W38 removed from baseline.
FEPs With Changed Screening Decisions		
W50	<i>Galvanic Coupling</i>	SO-P to SO-C
W68	<i>Organic Complexation</i>	SO-C to UP
W69	<i>Organic Ligands</i>	SO-C to UP
H27	<i>Liquid Waste Disposal</i>	SO-R to SO-C
H28	<i>Enhanced Oil and Gas Production</i>	SO-R to SO-C
H29	<i>Hydrocarbon Storage</i>	SO-R to SO-C
H41	<i>Surface Disruptions</i>	SO-C to UP (HCN)
New FEPs for CRA		
H58	<i>Solution Mining for Potash</i>	Separated from H13, <i>Potash Mining</i> .
H59	<i>Solution Mining for Other Resources</i>	Separated from H13, <i>Potash Mining</i> .

SCR-2.0 BASIS FOR FEATURES, EVENTS, AND PROCESSES SCREENING PROCESS

SCR-2.1 Requirement for Features, Events, and Processes

The origin of FEPs is related to the EPA's radioactive waste disposal standard's requirement to use PA methodology. The DOE was required to demonstrate that the WIPP complied with the Containment Requirements of 40 CFR § 191.13 (EPA 1993). These requirements state that the DOE must use PA to demonstrate that the probabilities of cumulative radionuclide releases from the disposal system during the 10,000 years following closure will fall below specified limits. The PA analyses supporting this determination must be quantitative and must consider uncertainties caused by all *Significant Processes and Events* that may affect the disposal system, including inadvertent human intrusion into the repository during the future. The scope of PA is further defined by EPA at 40 CFR § 194.32 (EPA 1996a), which states:

Any compliance application(s) shall include information which:

- (1) Identifies all potential processes, events or sequences and combinations of processes and events that may occur during the regulatory time frame and may affect the disposal system;

1 (2) Identifies the processes, events or sequences and combinations of processes and
2 events included in performance assessments; and

3 (3) Documents why any processes, events or sequences and combinations of
4 processes and events identified pursuant to paragraph (e)(1) of this section were
5 not included in performance assessment results provided in any compliance
6 application.

7 Therefore, the PA methodology includes a process that compiles a comprehensive list of the
8 FEPs that are relevant to disposal system performance. Those FEPs shown by screening analysis
9 to have the potential to affect performance are represented in scenarios and quantitative
10 calculations using a system of linked computer models to describe the interaction of the
11 repository with the natural system, both with and without human intrusion. For the CCA, the
12 DOE first compiled a comprehensive list of FEPs which was then subjected to a screening
13 process that eventually lead to the set of FEPs used in PA to demonstrate WIPP's compliance
14 with the long-term disposal standards.

15 **SCR-2.2 Features, Events, and Processes List Development for the CCA**

16 As a starting point, the DOE assembled a list of potentially relevant FEPs from the compilation
17 developed by Stenhouse et al. (1993) for the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate Statens
18 Kärnkraftinspektion (SKI). The SKI list was based on a series of FEP lists developed for other
19 disposal programs and is considered the best-documented and most comprehensive starting point
20 for the WIPP. For the SKI study, an initial raw FEP list was compiled based on nine different
21 FEP identification studies.

22 The compilers of the SKI list eliminated a number of FEPs as irrelevant to the particular disposal
23 concept under consideration in Sweden. These FEPs were reinstated for the WIPP effort, and
24 several FEPs on the SKI list were subdivided to facilitate screening for the WIPP. Finally, to
25 ensure comprehensiveness, other FEPs specific to the WIPP were added based on review of key
26 project documents and broad examination of the preliminary WIPP list by both project
27 participants and stakeholders. The initial unedited list is contained in Appendix SCR,
28 Attachment 1. The initial unedited FEP list was restructured and revised to derive the
29 comprehensive WIPP FEP list used in the CCA. The number of FEPs was reduced to 237 in the
30 CCA to avoid the ambiguities caused by the use of a generic list. Restructuring the list did not
31 remove any substantive issues from the discussion. As discussed in more detail in Attachment 1,
32 the following steps were used to reduce the initial unedited list to the appropriate WIPP FEP list
33 used in the CCA.

- 34 • References to subsystems were eliminated because the SKI subsystem classification was
35 not appropriate for the WIPP disposal concept. For example, in contrast to the Swedish
36 disposal concept, canister integrity does not have a role in post-operational performance
37 of the WIPP, and the terms near-field, far-field, and biosphere are not unequivocally
38 defined for the WIPP site.
- 39 • Duplicate FEPs were eliminated. Duplicate FEPs arose in the SKI list because individual
40 FEPs could act in different subsystems. FEPs had a single entry in the CCA list whether
41 they were applicable to several parts of the disposal system or to a single part only, for

1 example, the FEP *Gas Effects*. Disruption appears in the seals, backfill, waste, canister,
 2 and near-field subsystems in the initial FEP list. These FEPs are represented by the
 3 single FEP, *Disruption Due to Gas Effects*.

- 4 • FEPs that are not relevant to the WIPP design or inventory were eliminated. Examples
 5 include FEPs related to high-level waste, copper canisters, and bentonite backfill.
- 6 • FEPs relating to engineering design changes were eliminated because they were not
 7 relevant to a compliance application based on the DOE's design for the WIPP. Examples
 8 of such FEPs are *Design Modifications: Canister and Design Modification: Geometry*.
- 9 • FEPs relating to constructional, operational, and decommissioning errors were
 10 eliminated. The DOE has administrative and quality control procedures to ensure that the
 11 facility will be constructed, operated, and decommissioned properly.
- 12 • Detailed FEPs relating to processes in the surface environment were aggregated into a
 13 small number of generalized FEPs. For example, the SKI list includes the biosphere
 14 FEPs *Inhalation of Salt Particles, Smoking, Showers and Humidifiers, Inhalation and*
 15 *Biotic Material, Household Dust and Fumes, Deposition (Wet and Dry), Inhalation*
 16 *and Soils and Sediments, Inhalation and Gases and Vapors (Indoor and Outdoor), and*
 17 *Suspension in Air*, which are represented by the FEP *Inhalation*.
- 18 • FEPs relating to the containment of hazardous metals, volatile organic compounds
 19 (VOCs), and other chemicals that are not regulated by 40 CFR Part 191 were not
 20 included.
- 21 • A few FEPs have been renamed to be consistent with terms used to describe specific
 22 WIPP processes (for example, *Wicking, Brine Inflow*).

23 These steps resulted in a list of 237 WIPP-relevant FEPs retained for further consideration in the
 24 first certification PA. The 237 were screened to determine which would be included in the PA
 25 models and scenarios for the CCA.

26 **SCR-2.3 Criteria for Screening of Features, Events, and Processes and Categorization of**
 27 **Retained Features, Events, and Processes**

28 The purpose of FEP screening is to identify those FEPs that should be accounted for in PA
 29 calculations, and those FEPs that need not be considered further. The DOE's process of
 30 removing FEPs from consideration in PA calculations involved the structured application of
 31 explicit screening criteria. The criteria used to screen out FEPs are explicit regulatory exclusions
 32 (SO-R), probability (SO-P), or consequence (SO-C). All three criteria are derived from
 33 regulatory requirements. FEPs not screened as SO-R, SO-P, or SO-C were retained for inclusion
 34 in PA calculations and are classified as either undisturbed performance (UP) or disturbed
 35 performance (DP) FEPs.

1 **SCR-2.3.1 Regulation (SO-R)**

2 Specific FEP screening criteria are stated in 40 CFR Part 191 and Part 194. Such screening
3 criteria relating to the applicability of particular FEPs represent screening decisions made by the
4 EPA. That is, in the process of developing and demonstrating the feasibility of the 40 CFR Part
5 191 standard and the 40 CFR Part 194 criteria, the EPA considered and made conclusions on the
6 relevance, consequence, and/or probability of occurrence of particular FEPs. In so doing, it
7 allowed some FEPs to be eliminated from consideration.

8 **SCR-2.3.2 Probability of Occurrence of a Feature, Event, and Process Leading to**
9 **Significant Release of Radionuclides (SO-P)**

10 Low-probability events can be excluded on the basis of the criterion provided in 40 CFR
11 § 194.32(d), which states, “performance assessments need not consider processes and events that
12 have less than one chance in 10,000 of occurring over 10,000 years” (EPA 1996a). In practice,
13 for most FEPs screened out on the basis of low probability of occurrence, it has not been possible
14 to estimate a meaningful quantitative probability. In the absence of quantitative probability
15 estimates, a qualitative argument was used.

16 **SCR-2.3.3 Potential Consequences Associated with the Occurrence of the Features,**
17 **Events, and Processes (SO-C)**

18 The DOE recognizes two uses for this criterion:

- 19 1. FEPs can be eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of insignificant consequence.
20 Consequence can refer to effects on the repository or site or to radiological consequence.
21 In particular, 40 CFR § 194.34(a) states: “The results of performance assessments shall
22 be assembled into ‘complementary, cumulative distribution functions’ (CCDFs) that
23 represent the probability of exceeding various levels of cumulative release caused by all
24 significant processes and events” (EPA 1996a). The DOE has omitted events and
25 processes from PA calculations where there is a reasonable expectation that the
26 remaining probability distribution of cumulative releases would not be significantly
27 changed by such omissions.
- 28 2. FEPs that are potentially beneficial to subsystem performance may be eliminated from
29 PA calculations if necessary to simplify the analysis. This argument may be used when
30 there is uncertainty as to exactly how the FEP should be incorporated into assessment
31 calculations or when incorporation would incur unreasonable difficulties.

32 In some cases, the effects of the occurrence of a particular event or process, although not
33 necessarily insignificant, can be shown to lie within the range of uncertainty of another FEP
34 already accounted for in the PA calculations. In such cases, the event or process may be
35 considered to be included in PA calculations implicitly, within the range of uncertainty
36 associated with the included FEP.

37 Although some FEPs could be eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of more than one
38 criterion, the most practical screening criterion was used for classification. In particular, a
39 regulatory screening classification was used in preference to a probability or consequence

1 screening classification. FEPs that have not been screened out based on any of the three criteria
2 were included in the PA.

3 ***SCR-2.3.4 Undisturbed Performance (UP) Features, Events, and Processes***

4 FEPs classified as UP are accounted for in calculations of undisturbed performance of the
5 disposal system. Undisturbed performance is defined in 40 CFR § 191.12 as “the predicted
6 behavior of a disposal system, including consideration of the uncertainties in predicted behavior,
7 if the disposal system is not disrupted by human intrusion or the occurrence of unlikely natural
8 events” (EPA 1993). The UP FEPs are accounted for in the PA calculations to evaluate
9 compliance with the Containment Requirements in 40 CFR § 191.13. Undisturbed PA
10 calculations are also used to demonstrate compliance with the individual and groundwater
11 protection requirements of 40 CFR § 191.15 and 40 CFR 191 Subpart C, respectively.

12 ***SCR-2.3.5 Disturbed Performance (DP) Features, Events, and Processes***

13 The FEPs classified as DP are accounted for only in assessment calculations for disturbed
14 performance. The DP FEPs that remain following the screening process relate to the potential
15 disruptive effects of future drilling and mining events in the controlled area. Consideration of
16 both DP and UP FEPs is required to evaluate compliance with 40 CFR § 191.13.

17 **SCR-2.4 Features, Events, and Processes Categories and Timeframes**

18 In the following sections, FEPs are discussed under the categories Natural (N) FEPs, Human-
19 Initiated (H) Events and Processes (EPs), and Waste- and Repository-Induced (W) FEPs. The
20 FEPs are also considered within time frames during which they may occur. Due to the
21 regulatory requirements concerning human activities, two time periods were used when
22 evaluating Human-Initiated EPs. These timeframes were defined as Historical, Current, and
23 Near-Future Human Activities (HCN) and Future Human Activities (Future). These time frames
24 are also discussed in the following section.

25 ***SCR-2.4.1 Description of Natural Features, Events, and Processes***

26 Natural FEPs are those that relate to hydrologic, geologic, and climate conditions that have the
27 potential to affect long-term performance of the WIPP disposal system over the regulatory
28 timeframe. These FEPs do not include the impacts of other human related activities such as the
29 effect of boreholes on FEPs related to natural changes in groundwater chemistry. Only natural
30 events and processes are included within the screening process.

31 Consistent with 40 CFR § 194.32(d), the DOE has screened out several natural FEPs from PA
32 calculations on the basis of a low probability of occurrence at or near the WIPP site. In
33 particular, natural events for which there is no evidence indicating that they have occurred within
34 the Delaware Basin have been screened on this basis. For FEPs analysis, the probabilities of
35 occurrence of these events are assumed to be zero. Quantitative, nonzero probabilities for such
36 events, based on numbers of occurrences, cannot be ascribed without considering regions much
37 larger than the Delaware Basin, thus neglecting established geological understanding of the
38 events and processes that occur within particular geographical provinces.

1 In considering the overall geological setting of the Delaware Basin, the DOE has eliminated
2 many FEPs from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence. Events and processes that
3 have had little effect on the characteristics of the region in the past are expected to be of low
4 consequence for the regulatory time period.

5 ***SCR-2.4.2 Description of Human-Initiated Events and Processes***

6 Human-Initiated EPs (Human EPs) are those associated with human activities in the past,
7 present, and future. The EPA provided guidance in their regulations concerning which human
8 activities are to be considered, the severity, and the manner in which to include them in the
9 future predictions.

10 The scope of PAs is clarified with respect to human-initiated events and processes in 40 CFR §
11 194.32. At 40 CFR § 194.32(a), the EPA states:

12 Performance assessments shall consider natural processes and events, mining, deep drilling, and
13 shallow drilling that may affect the disposal system during the regulatory time frame.

14 Thus, PAs must include consideration of human EPs relating to mining and drilling activities that
15 might take place during the regulatory time frame. In particular, PAs must consider the potential
16 effects of such activities that might take place within the controlled area at a time when
17 institutional controls cannot be assumed to completely eliminate the possibility of human
18 intrusion.

19 Further criteria concerning the scope of PAs are provided at 40 CFR § 194.32(c):

20 Performance assessments shall include an analysis of the effects on the disposal system of any
21 activities that occur in the vicinity of the disposal system prior to disposal and are expected to
22 occur in the vicinity of the disposal system soon after disposal. Such activities shall include, but
23 shall not be limited to, existing boreholes and the development of any existing leases that can be
24 reasonably expected to be developed in the near future, including boreholes and leases that may be
25 used for fluid injection activities.

26 In order to implement the criteria in 40 CFR § 194.32 relating to the scope of PAs, the DOE has
27 divided human activities into three categories: (1) human activities that are currently taking
28 place and those that took place prior to the time of the compliance application; (2) human
29 activities that might be initiated in the near future after submission of the compliance application;
30 and (3) human activities that might be initiated after repository closure. The first two categories
31 of EPs are considered under undisturbed performance, and EPs in the third category lead to
32 disturbed performance conditions. A description of these three categories follows.

- 33 1. Historical and current human activities (HC) include resource extraction activities that
34 have historically taken place and are currently taking place outside the controlled area.
35 These activities are of potential significance insofar as they could affect the geological,
36 hydrological, or geochemical characteristics of the disposal system or groundwater flow
37 pathways outside the disposal system. Current human activities taking place within the
38 controlled area are essentially those associated with development of the WIPP repository.
39 Historic human activities include existing boreholes.

- 1 2. Near-future human activities include resource extraction activities that may be expected
2 to occur outside the controlled area based on existing plans and leases. Thus, the near
3 future includes the expected lives of existing mines and oil and gas fields, and the
4 expected lives of new mines and oil and gas fields that the DOE expects will be
5 developed based on existing plans and leases. These activities are of potential
6 significance insofar as they could affect the geological, hydrological, or geochemical
7 characteristics of the disposal system or groundwater flow pathways outside the disposal
8 system. The only human activities that are expected to occur within the controlled area in
9 the near future are those associated with development of the WIPP repository. The DOE
10 expects that any activity initiated in the near future, based on existing plans and leases,
11 will be initiated prior to repository closure. Activities initiated prior to repository closure
12 are assumed to continue until their completion.
- 13 3. Future human activities include activities that might be initiated within or outside the
14 controlled area after repository closure. This includes drilling and mining for resources
15 within the disposal system at a time when institutional controls cannot be assumed to
16 completely eliminate the possibility of such activities. Future human activities could
17 influence the transport of contaminants within and outside the disposal system by directly
18 removing waste from the disposal system or altering the geological, hydrological, or
19 geochemical characteristics of the disposal system.

20 SCR-2.4.2.1 Scope of Future Human Activities in Performance Assessment

21 Performance assessments must consider the effects of future human activities on the performance
22 of the disposal system. The EPA has provided criteria relating to future human activities in 40
23 CFR § 194.32(a), which limits the scope of consideration of future human actions in PAs to
24 mining and drilling.

25 SCR-2.4.2.1.1 Criteria Concerning Future Mining

26 The EPA provides the following additional criteria concerning the type of future mining that
27 should be considered by the DOE in 40 CFR § 194.32(b):

28 Assessments of mining effects may be limited to changes in the hydraulic conductivity of the
29 hydrogeologic units of the disposal system from excavation mining for natural resources. Mining
30 shall be assumed to occur with a one in 100 probability in each century of the regulatory time
31 frame. Performance assessments shall assume that mineral deposits of those resources, similar in
32 quality and type to those resources currently extracted from the Delaware Basin, will be
33 completely removed from the controlled area during the century in which such mining is randomly
34 calculated to occur. Complete removal of such mineral resources shall be assumed to occur only
35 once during the regulatory time frame.

36 Thus, consideration of future mining may be limited to mining within the controlled area at the
37 locations of resources that are similar in quality and type to those currently extracted from the
38 Delaware Basin. Potash is the only resource that has been identified within the controlled area in
39 quality similar to that currently mined from underground deposits elsewhere in the Delaware
40 Basin. The hydrogeological impacts of future potash mining within the controlled area are
41 accounted for in calculations of the disturbed performance of the disposal system. Consistent

1 with 40 CFR § 194.32(b), all economically recoverable resources in the vicinity of the disposal
2 system (outside the controlled area) are assumed to be extracted in the near future.

3 SCR-2.4.2.1.2 Criteria Concerning Future Drilling

4 With respect to consideration of future drilling, in the preamble to 40 CFR Part 194, the EPA

5 ...reasoned that while the resources drilled for today may not be the same as those drilled for in
6 the future, the present rates at which these boreholes are drilled can nonetheless provide an
7 estimate of the future rate at which boreholes will be drilled.

8 Criteria concerning the consideration of future deep and shallow drilling in PAs are provided in
9 40 CFR § 194.33. The EPA also provides a criterion in 40 CFR § 194.33(d) concerning the use
10 of future boreholes subsequent to drilling.

11 With respect to future drilling events, performance assessments need not analyze the effects of
12 techniques used for resource recovery subsequent to the drilling of the borehole.

13 Thus, PAs need not consider the effects of techniques used for resource extraction and recovery
14 that would occur subsequent to the drilling of a borehole in the future. These activities are
15 screened SO-R.

16 The EPA provides an additional criterion that limits the severity of human intrusion scenarios
17 that must be considered in PAs. In 40 CFR § 194.33(b)(1) the EPA states that:

18 Inadvertent and intermittent intrusion by drilling for resources (other than those resources
19 provided by the waste in the disposal system or engineered barriers designed to isolate such waste)
20 is the most severe human intrusion scenario.

21 SCR-2.4.2.1.3 Screening of Future Human Event and Processes

22 Future Human EPs accounted for in PA calculations for the WIPP are those associated with
23 mining and deep drilling within the controlled area at a time when institutional controls cannot
24 be assumed to eliminate completely the possibility of such activities. All other future Human
25 EPs, if not eliminated from PA calculations based on regulation, have been eliminated based on
26 low consequence or low probability. For example, the effects of future shallow drilling within
27 the controlled area were eliminated from CCA PA calculations on the basis of low consequence
28 to the performance of the disposal system.

29 ***SCR-2.4.3 Description of Waste- and Repository-Induced Features, Events, and Processes***

30 The waste- and repository-induced FEPs are those that relate specifically to the waste material,
31 waste containers, shaft seals, MgO backfill, panel closures, repository structures, and
32 investigation boreholes. All FEPs related to radionuclide chemistry and radionuclide migration
33 are included in this category. The FEPs related to radionuclide transport resulting from future
34 borehole intersections of the WIPP excavation are defined as waste- and repository-induced
35 FEPs.

**SCR-3.0 FEATURES, EVENTS, AND PROCESSES BASELINE FOR
RECERTIFICATION**

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The reassessment of FEPs (Wagner et al. 2003) results in a new FEPs baseline for CRA-2004. As discussed in Section SCR.1, 106 of the original 237 WIPP FEPs have not changed. Additionally, 120 FEPs required updates to their FEP descriptions and/or screening arguments. Seven of the original baseline FEPs screening decisions have changed from their original screening decision. Four of the original baseline FEPs have been deleted or combined with other closely related FEPs. Finally, two new FEPs have been added to the baseline. These two FEPs were previously accounted for in a broader FEP. Table SCR-2 outlines the results of the assessment, and subsequent sections of this document present the actual screening decisions and supporting arguments. Those FEPs not separated by gridlines in the first column of Table SCR-2 have been addressed by group, due to close similarity with other FEPs within that group. This grouping process was formerly used in the CCA, and also by the EPA in their Technical Support Document (TSD) for §194.32 (EPA 1998c).

Table SCR-2. FEPs Reassessment Results

EPA FEP I.D.	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
N1	<i>Stratigraphy</i>	No	No change	UP
N2	<i>Brine Reservoirs</i>	No	No change	DP
N3	<i>Changes in Regional Stress</i>	No	Additional information added to FEP text, no change to italicized text.	SO-C
N4	<i>Regional Tectonics</i>	No	Additional information added to FEP text, no change to italicized text.	SO-C
N5	<i>Regional Uplift and Subsidence</i>	No	Additional information added to FEP text, no change to italicized text.	SO-C
N6	<i>Salt Deformation</i>	No	No change	SO-P
N7	<i>Diapirism</i>	No	No change	SO-P
N8	<i>Formation of Fractures</i>	No	Original FEP text revised and replaced, reference to other FEP removed from italicized text	SO-P UP (Repository)

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Table SCR-2. FEPs Reassessment Results — Continued

EPA FEP I.D.	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
N9	<i>Changes in Fracture Properties</i>	No	Original FEP text revised and replaced, reference to other FEP removed from italicized text	SO-C UP (Near Repository)
N10	<i>Formation of New Faults</i>	No	Additional information added to FEP text, no change to italicized text.	SO-P
N11	<i>Fault Movement</i>	No	Additional information added to FEP text, no change to italicized text.	SO-P
N12	<i>Seismic Activity</i>	No	No change	UP
N13	<i>Volcanic Activity</i>	No	Italicized text changed, FEP text unchanged	SO-P
N14	<i>Magmatic Activity</i>	No	No changes	SO-C
N15	<i>Metamorphic Activity</i>	No	No changes	SO-P
N16	<i>Shallow Dissolution</i>	No	N16 and N17 (<i>Lateral Dissolution</i>) combined, N17 deleted from baseline. FEP text modified and additional information added.	UP
N17	<i>Lateral Dissolution</i>	No	Combined with N16 (<i>Shallow Dissolution</i>) - Deleted from baseline – see N16	NA
N19	<i>Solution Chimneys</i>	No	Combined with N20 and deleted from baseline	NA
N18	<i>Deep Dissolution</i>	No	Both italicized and FEP text revised.	SO-P
N20	<i>Breccia Pipes</i>	No	N20 and N19 (<i>Solution Chimneys</i>) combined, Both italicized and FEP text revised.	SO-P
N21	<i>Collapse Breccias</i>	No	Both italicized and FEP text revised.	SO-P

Table SCR-2. FEPs Reassessment Results — Continued

EPA FEP I.D.	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
N22	<i>Fracture Infills</i>	No	No changes	SO-C - Beneficial
N23	<i>Saturated Groundwater Flow</i>	No	No change	UP
N24	<i>Unsaturated Groundwater Flow</i>	No	No change	UP SO-C in Culebra
N25	<i>Fracture Flow</i>	No	No change	UP
N27	<i>Effects of Preferential Pathways</i>	No	No change	UP UP in Salado and Culebra
N26	<i>Density effects on Groundwater Flow</i>	No	Reference to other FEPs removed from FEP and italicized text	SO-C
N28	<i>Thermal effects on Groundwater Flow</i>	No	Reference to other FEPs removed from FEP and italicized text	SO-C
N29	<i>Saline Intrusion [Hydrogeological Effects]</i>	No	Reference to other FEPs removed from the italicized text. FEP text unchanged.	SO-P
N30	<i>Freshwater Intrusion [Hydrogeological effects]</i>	No	Reference to other FEPs removed from the italicized text. FEP text unchanged.	SO-P
N31	<i>Hydrological Response to Earthquakes</i>	No	Reference to other FEPs removed from the italicized text. FEP text unchanged.	SO-C
N32	<i>Natural Gas Intrusion</i>	No	Reference to other FEPs removed from the italicized text. FEP text unchanged.	SO-P
N33	<i>Groundwater Geochemistry</i>	No	No change	UP
N34	<i>Saline Intrusion (Geochemical Effects)</i>	No	FEP N34 and N38 described together. Screening Argument revised and replaced, italicized text revised to remove reference to other FEPs	SO-C

Table SCR-2. FEPs Reassessment Results — Continued

EPA FEP I.D.	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
N38	<i>Effects of Dissolution</i>	No	FEP N34 and N38 are described together. Screening Argument revised and replaced, italicized text revised to remove reference to other FEPs	SO-C
N35	<i>Freshwater Intrusion (Geochemical Effects)</i>	No	FEP N35, N36 and N37 are described together. Screening Argument revised and replaced, italicized text revised to remove reference to other FEPs	SO-C
N36	<i>Changes in Groundwater Eh</i>	No	FEP N35, N36 and N37 are described together. Screening Argument revised and replaced, italicized text revised to remove reference to other FEPs	SO-C
N37	<i>Changes in Groundwater pH</i>	No	FEP N35, N36 and N37 are described together. Screening Argument revised and replaced, italicized text revised to remove reference to other FEPs	SO-C
N39	<i>Physiography</i>	No	No change	UP
N40	<i>Impact of a Large Meteorite</i>	No	No change	SO-P
N41	<i>Mechanical Weathering</i>	No	No change	SO-C
N42	<i>Chemical Weathering</i>	No	No change	SO-C
N43	<i>Aeolian Erosion</i>	No	No change	SO-C
N44	<i>Fluvial Erosion</i>	No	No change	SO-C
N45	<i>Mass Wasting [Erosion]</i>	No	No change	SO-C
N46	<i>Aeolian Deposition</i>	No	No change	SO-C
N47	<i>Fluvial Deposition</i>	No	No change	SO-C
N48	<i>Lacustrine Deposition</i>	No	No change	SO-C
N49	<i>Mass Wasting [Deposition]</i>	No	No change	SO-C

Table SCR-2. FEPs Reassessment Results — Continued

EPA FEP I.D.	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
N50	<i>Soil Development</i>	No	Clarification text added to the FEP text	SO-C
N51	<i>Stream and River Flow</i>	No	No change	SO-C
N52	<i>Surface Water Bodies</i>	No	No change	SO-C
N53	<i>Groundwater Discharge</i>	No	No change	UP
N54	<i>Groundwater Recharge</i>	No	No change	UP
N55	<i>Infiltration</i>	No	No change	UP
N56	<i>Changes in Groundwater Recharge and Discharge</i>	No	No change	UP
N57	<i>Lake Formation</i>	No	Reference to other FEPs removed from FEP and italicized text	SO-C
N58	<i>River Flooding</i>	No	Reference to other FEPs removed from FEP and italicized text	SO-C
N59	<i>Precipitation (e.g. Rainfall)</i>	No	No change	UP
N60	<i>Temperature</i>	No	No change	UP
N61	<i>Climate Change</i>	No	No change	UP
N62	<i>Glaciation</i>	No	No change	SO-P
N63	<i>Permafrost</i>	No	No change	SO-P
N64	<i>Seas and Oceans</i>	No	No change	SO-C
N65	<i>Estuaries</i>	No	No change	SO-C
N66	<i>Coastal Erosion</i>	No	No change	SO-C
N67	<i>Marine Sediment Transport and Deposition</i>	No	No change	SO-C
N68	<i>Sea Level Changes</i>	No	No change	SO-C
N69	<i>Plants</i>	No	Reference to other FEPs removed from FEP and italicized text	SO-C
N70	<i>Animals</i>	No	Reference to other FEPs removed from FEP and italicized text	SO-C
N71	<i>Microbes</i>	No	Additional information added to FEP text, reference to other FEPs removed from italicized text.	SO-C (UP - for colloidal effects and gas generation)

Table SCR-2. FEPs Reassessment Results — Continued

EPA FEP I.D.	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
N72	<i>Natural Ecological Development</i>	No	No change	SO-C
W1	<i>Disposal Geometry</i>	No	No change	UP
W2	<i>Waste Inventory</i>	No	No change	UP
W3	<i>Heterogeneity of Waste Forms</i>	No	No change	DP
W4	<i>Container Form</i>	No	Both italicized and FEP text revised	SO-C
W5	<i>Container Material Inventory</i>	No	No change	UP
W6	<i>Seal Geometry</i>	No	No change	UP
W7	<i>Seal Physical Properties</i>	No	No change	UP
W8	<i>Seal Chemical Composition</i>	No	Both italicized and FEP text revised	SO-C Beneficial SO-C
W9	<i>Backfill Physical Properties</i>	No	Both italicized and FEP text revised	SO-C
W10	<i>Backfill Chemical Composition</i>	No	No change	UP
W11	<i>Post-Closure Monitoring</i>	No	Additional information added to FEP text.	SO-C
W12	<i>Radionuclide Decay and In-Growth</i>	No	No change	UP
W13	<i>Heat from Radioactive Decay</i>	No	No change to Italicized text, new concluding paragraph added to FEP text.	SO-C
W14	<i>Nuclear Criticality: Heat</i>	No	No change to Italicized text, additional information added to FEP text.	SO-P
W15	<i>Radiological Effects on Waste</i>	No	No change to Italicized text, FEP text revised.	SO-C
W16	<i>Radiological Effects on Containers</i>	No	No change to Italicized text, FEP text revised.	SO-C
W17	<i>Radiological Effects on Seals</i>	No	No change	SO-C
W18	<i>Disturbed Rock Zone (DRZ)</i>	No	No change	UP

Table SCR-2. FEPs Reassessment Results — Continued

EPA FEP I.D.	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
W19	<i>Excavation-Induced Changes in Stress</i>	No	No change	UP
W20	<i>Salt Creep</i>	No	No change	UP
W21	<i>Changes in the Stress Field</i>	No	No change	UP
W22	<i>Roof Falls</i>	No	No change	UP
W23	<i>Subsidence</i>	No	Minor changes to FEPs text, no changes to italicized text.	SO-C
W24	<i>Large Scale Rock Fracturing</i>	No	Minor changes to FEPs text, no changes to italicized text.	SO-P
W25	<i>Disruption Due to Gas Effects</i>	No	No change	UP
W26	<i>Pressurization</i>	No	No change	UP
W27	<i>Gas Explosions</i>	No	No change	UP
W28	<i>Nuclear Explosions</i>	No	Reference to other FEPs removed from italicized text, FEP text revised.	SO-P
W29	<i>Thermal Effects on Material Properties</i>	No	Additional information added to FEP text, grouped with similar FEPs; italicized text unchanged	SO-C
W30	<i>Thermally-Induced Stress Changes</i>	No	Additional information added to FEP text, grouped with similar FEPs; italicized text unchanged	SO-C
W31	<i>Differing Thermal Expansion of Repository Components</i>	No	Additional information added to FEP text, grouped with similar FEPs; italicized text unchanged	SO-C
W72	<i>Exothermic Reactions</i>	No	Additional information added to FEP text, grouped with similar FEPs; italicized text unchanged	SO-C

Table SCR-2. FEPs Reassessment Results — Continued

EPA FEP I.D.	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
W73	<i>Concrete Hydration</i>	No	Additional information added to FEP text, grouped with similar FEPs; italicized text unchanged	SO-C
W32	<i>Consolidation of Waste</i>	No	No change	UP
W36	<i>Consolidation of Seals</i>	No	No change	UP
W37	<i>Mechanical Degradation of Seals</i>	No	No change	UP
W39	<i>Underground Boreholes</i>	No	No change	UP
W33	<i>Movement of Containers</i>	No	Reference to other FEPs removed from italicized text, FEP text revised	SO-C
W34	<i>Container Integrity</i>	No	Reference to other FEPs removed from italicized text, FEP text revised	SO-C Beneficial
W35	<i>Mechanical Effects of Backfill</i>	No	Both italicized and FEP text revised.	SO-C
W38	<i>Investigation Boreholes</i>	Yes	Encompassed in FEPS H31 and W33, FEP H38 deleted from baseline.	NA
W40	<i>Brine Inflow</i>	No	No change	UP
W41	<i>Wicking</i>	No	No change	UP
W42	<i>Fluid Flow Due to Gas Production</i>	No	No change	UP
W43	<i>Convection</i>	No	Reference to other FEPs removed from italicized text, FEP text revised	SO-C
W44	<i>Degradation of Organic Material</i>	No	No change	UP
W45	<i>Effects of Temperature on Microbial Gas Generation</i>	No	No change	UP
W48	<i>Effects of Biofilms on Microbial Gas Generation</i>	No	No change	UP
W46	<i>Effects of Pressure on Microbial Gas Generation</i>	No	Reference to other FEPs removed from italicized text, FEP text revised	SO-C

Table SCR-2. FEPs Reassessment Results — Continued

EPA FEP I.D.	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
W47	<i>Effects of Radiation on Microbial Gas Generation</i>	No	Reference to other FEPs removed from italicized text, FEP text revised	SO-C
W49	<i>Gases from Metal Corrosion</i>	No	No change	UP
W51	<i>Chemical Effects of Corrosion</i>	No	No change	UP
W50	<i>Galvanic Coupling (Within the Repository)</i>	Yes	Decision changed from SO-P to SO-C. Both italicized and FEP text revised.	SO-C
W52	<i>Radiolysis of Brine</i>	No	Both italicized and FEP text revised.	SO-C
W53	<i>Radiolysis of Cellulose</i>	No	FEP text revised	SO-C
W54	<i>Helium Gas Production</i>	No	Both italicized and FEP text revised.	SO-C
W55	<i>Radioactive Gases</i>	No	Reference to other FEPs removed from italicized text, no change to FEP text	SO-C
W56	<i>Speciation</i>	No	No change	UP UP in disposal rooms and Culebra. SO-C elsewhere, and beneficial SO-C in cementitious seals
W57	<i>Kinetics of Speciation</i>	No	Both italicized and FEP text revised.	SO-C
W58	<i>Dissolution of Waste</i>	No	No change	UP
W59	<i>Precipitation of Secondary Minerals</i>	No	Both italicized and FEP text revised.	SO-C-Beneficial
W60	<i>Kinetics of Precipitation and Dissolution</i>	No	Both italicized and FEP text revised.	SO-C
W61	<i>Actinide Sorption</i>	No	No change	UP
W62	<i>Kinetics of Sorption</i>	No	No change	UP
W63	<i>Changes in Sorptive Surfaces</i>	No	No change	UP
W64	<i>Effects of Metal Corrosion</i>	No	No change	UP
W65	<i>Reduction-Oxidation Fronts</i>	No	Reference to other FEPs removed from FEP and italicized text	SO-P

Table SCR-2. FEPs Reassessment Results — Continued

EPA FEP I.D.	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
W66	<i>Reduction-Oxidation Kinetics</i>	No	No change	UP
W67	<i>Localized Reducing Zones</i>	No	Changes to FEPs text, no changes to italicized text.	SO-C
W68	<i>Organic Complexation</i>	Yes	Decision changed from SO-C to UP. Both italicized and FEP text revised.	UP
W69	<i>Organic Ligands</i>	Yes	Decision changed from SO-C to UP. Both italicized and FEP text revised.	UP
W71	<i>Kinetics of Organic Complexation</i>	No	Both italicized and FEP text revised.	SO-C
W70	<i>Humic and Flvic Acids</i>	No	No change	UP
W74	<i>Chemical Degradation of Seals</i>	No	No change	UP
W76	<i>Microbial Growth on Concrete</i>	No	No change	UP
W75	<i>Chemical Degradation of Backfill</i>	No	FEP text unchanged, reference to other FEPs removed from FEP and italicized text	SO-C
W77	<i>Solute Transport</i>	No	No change	UP
W78	<i>Colloid Transport</i>	No	No change	UP
W79	<i>Colloid Formation and Stability</i>	No	No change	UP
W80	<i>Colloid Filtration</i>	No	No change	UP
W81	<i>Colloid Sorption</i>	No	No change	UP
W82	<i>Suspensions of Particles</i>	No	No change	DP
W83	<i>Rinse</i>	No	No change	SO-C
W84	<i>Cuttings</i>	No	No change	DP
W85	<i>Cavings</i>	No	No change	DP
W86	<i>Spallings</i>	No	No change	DP
W87	<i>Microbial Transport</i>	No	No change	UP
W88	<i>Biofilms</i>	No	Both italicized and FEP text revised.	SO-C Beneficial

Table SCR-2. FEPs Reassessment Results — Continued

EPA FEP I.D.	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
W89	<i>Transport of Radioactive Gases</i>	No	No change to Italicized text, additional information added to FEP text.	SO-C
W90	<i>Advection</i>	No	No change	UP
W91	<i>Diffusion</i>	No	No change	UP
W92	<i>Matrix Diffusion</i>	No	No change	UP
W93	<i>Soret Effect</i>	No	No changes	SO-C
W94	<i>Electrochemical Effects</i>	No	Both italicized and FEP text revised.	SO-C
W95	<i>Galvanic Coupling (Outside the Repository)</i>	No	Reference to other FEPs removed from italicized text, no change to FEP text	SO-P
W96	<i>Electrophoresis</i>	No	Both italicized and FEP text revised.	SO-C
W97	<i>Chemical Gradients</i>	No	Reference to other FEPs removed from italicized text, additional information added to FEP text.	SO-C
W98	<i>Osmotic Processes</i>	No	Reference to other FEPs removed from italicized text, FEP text revised.	SO-C
W99	<i>Alpha Recoil</i>	No	Reference to other FEPs removed from italicized text, FEP text revised.	SO-C
W100	<i>Enhanced Diffusion</i>	No	Both italicized and FEP text revised.	SO-C
W101	<i>Plant Uptake</i>	No	No changes	SO-R
W102	<i>Animal Uptake</i>	No	No changes	SO-R
W103	<i>Accumulation in Soils</i>	No	No changes	SO-C
W104	<i>Ingestion</i>	No	No changes	SO-R
W105	<i>Inhalation</i>	No	No changes	SO-R
W106	<i>Irradiation</i>	No	No changes	SO-R
W107	<i>Dermal Sorption</i>	No	No changes	SO-R
W108	<i>Injection</i>	No	No changes	SO-R

Table SCR-2. FEPs Reassessment Results — Continued

EPA FEP I.D.	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
H1	<i>Oil and Gas Exploration</i>	No	Updated	SO-C (HCN) DP (Future)
H2	<i>Potash Exploration</i>	No	Updated	SO-C (HCN) DP (Future)
H4	<i>Oil and Gas Exploitation</i>	No	Updated	SO-C (HCN) DP (Future)
H8	<i>Other Resources</i>	No	Updated	SO-C (HCN) DP (Future)
H9	<i>Enhanced Oil and Gas Recovery</i>	No	Updated	SO-C (HCN) DP (Future)
H3	<i>Water Resources Exploration</i>	No	Both italicized and FEP text revised.	SO-C (HCN) SO-C (Future)
H5	<i>Groundwater Exploitation</i>	No	Both italicized and FEP text revised.	SO-C (HCN) SO-C (Future)
H6	<i>Archaeological Investigations</i>	No	Both italicized and FEP text revised.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H7	<i>Geothermal</i>	No	Both italicized and FEP text revised.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H10	<i>Liquid Waste Disposal</i>	No	Both italicized and FEP text revised.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H11	<i>Hydrocarbon Storage</i>	No	Both italicized and FEP text revised.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H12	<i>Deliberate Drilling Intrusion</i>	No	Both italicized and FEP text revised.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H13	<i>Conventional Underground Potash Mining</i> <i>Formerly Called “Potash Mining”</i>	No	Name changed from “Potash Mining” to “Conventional Underground Potash Mining.” Both italicized and FEP text revised.	UP (HCN) DP (Future)
H14	<i>Other Resources</i>	No	Both italicized and FEP text revised.	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H15	<i>Tunneling</i>	No	Both italicized and FEP text revised.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H16	<i>Construction of Underground Facilities (for Example Storage, Disposal, Accommodation)</i>	No	Both italicized and FEP text revised.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H17	<i>Archaeological Excavations</i>	No	Both italicized and FEP text revised.	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)

Table SCR-2. FEPs Reassessment Results — Continued

EPA FEP I.D.	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
H18	<i>Deliberate Mining Intrusion</i>	No	Both italicized and FEP text revised.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H19	<i>Explosions for Resource Recovery</i>	No	Both italicized and FEP text revised.	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H20	<i>Underground Nuclear Device Testing</i>	No	No changes	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H21	<i>Drilling Fluid Flow</i>	No	Reference to other FEPs removed from FEP and italicized text	SO-C (HCN) DP (Future)
H22	<i>Drilling Fluid Loss</i>	No	Reference to other FEPs removed from FEP and italicized text	SO-C (HCN) DP (Future)
H23	<i>Blowouts</i>	No	Reference to other FEPs removed from FEP and italicized text	SO-C (HCN) DP (Future)
H24	<i>Drilling-Induced Geochemical Changes</i>	No	Reference to other FEPs removed from FEP and italicized text	UP (HCN) DP (Future)
H25	<i>Oil and Gas Extraction</i>	No	No changes	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H26	<i>Groundwater Extraction</i>	No	No changes	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H27	<i>Liquid Waste Disposal</i>	Yes	Additional information added to the original FEP text. Screening changed in italicized text from SO-R to SO-C (future).	SO-C (HCN) SO-C (Future)
H28	<i>Enhanced Oil and Gas Production</i>	Yes	Additional information added to the original FEP text. Screening changed in italicized text from SO-R to SO-C (future).	SO-C (HCN) SO-C (Future)

Table SCR-2. FEPs Reassessment Results — Continued

EPA FEP I.D.	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
H29	<i>Hydrocarbon Storage</i>	Yes	Additional information added to the original FEP text. Screening changed in italicized text from SO-R to SO-C (future).	SO-C (HCN) SO-C (Future)
H30	<i>Fluid-injection Induced Geochemical Changes</i>	No	Reference to other FEPs removed from FEP and italicized text.	UP (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H31	<i>Natural Borehole Fluid Flow</i>	No	H31 and H33 combined. Both FEP text and italicized text revised to include H33.	SO-C (HCN) DP (Future)
H33	<i>Flow Through Undetected Boreholes</i>	Yes	Combined with H31 and deleted from FEPs baseline.	NA
H32	<i>Waste-Induced Borehole Flow</i>	No	Both FEP text and italicized text revised.	SO-R (HCN) DP (Future)
H34	<i>Borehole-Induced Solution and Subsidence</i>	No	Reference to other FEPs removed from FEP and italicized text, additional information added to FEP text.	SO-C (HCN) SO-C (Future)
H35	<i>Borehole-Induced Mineralization</i>	No	Reference to other FEPs removed from FEP and italicized text, additional information added to FEP text.	SO-C (HCN) SO-C (Future)
H36	<i>Borehole-Induced Geochemical Changes</i>	No	Reference to other FEPs removed from FEP and italicized text, additional information added to FEP text.	UP (HCN) DP (Future)
H37	<i>Changes in Groundwater Flow Due to Mining</i>	No	Reference to other FEPs removed from FEP and italicized text, additional information added to FEP text.	UP (HCN) DP (Future)

Table SCR-2. FEPs Reassessment Results — Continued

EPA FEP I.D.	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
H38	<i>Changes in Geochemistry Due to Mining</i>	No	Reference to other FEPs removed from FEP and italicized text, additional information added to FEP text.	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H39	<i>Changes in Groundwater Flow Due to Explosions</i>	No	No changes	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H40	<i>Land Use Changes</i>	No	Reference to other FEPs removed from italicized text, additional information added to FEP text.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H41	<i>Surface Disruptions</i>	Yes	Reference to other FEPs removed from italicized text, additional information added to FEP text.	UP (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H42	<i>Damming of Streams or Rivers</i>	No	Reference to other FEPs removed from FEP and italicized text	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H43	<i>Reservoirs</i>	No	Reference to other FEPs removed from FEP and italicized text	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H44	<i>Irrigation</i>	No	Reference to other FEPs removed from FEP and italicized text	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H45	<i>Lake Usage</i>	No	Reference to other FEPs removed from FEP and italicized text, additional information added to FEP text.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H46	<i>Altered Soil or Surface Water Chemistry by Human Activities</i>	No	Reference to other FEPs removed from FEP and italicized text.	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H47	<i>Greenhouse Gas Effects</i>	No	No changes	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H48	<i>Acid Rain</i>	No	No changes	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)

Table SCR-2. FEPs Reassessment Results — Continued

EPA FEP I.D.	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
H49	<i>Damage to the Ozone Layer</i>	No	No changes	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H50	<i>Coastal Water Use</i>	No	No changes	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H51	<i>Sea water Use</i>	No	No changes	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H52	<i>Estuarine Water Use</i>	No	No changes	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H53	<i>Arable Farming</i>	No	No changes	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H54	<i>Ranching</i>	No	No changes	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H55	<i>Fish Farming</i>	No	No changes	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H56	<i>Demographic Change and Urban Development</i>	No	Reference to other FEPs removed from FEP and italicized text.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H57	<i>Loss of Records</i>	No	Additional information added to FEP text, italicized text modified to remove reference to another FEP.	NA (HCN) DP (Future)
H58	<i>Solution Mining for Potash</i>	Yes	New FEP, <i>Solution Mining</i> was contained in various other FEPs – see H13	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H59	<i>Solution Mining for Other Resources</i>	Yes	New FEP, <i>Solution Mining</i> was contained in various other FEPs – see H13	SO-C (HCN) SO-C (Future)

1 **SCR-4.0 SCREENING OF NATURAL FEPS**

2 This section presents the screening arguments and decisions for natural FEPs. Natural FEPs may
3 be important to the performance of the disposal system. Screening of natural FEPs is done in the
4 absence of human influences on the FEPs. Table SCR-2 provides information regarding the
5 changes to these FEPs since the CCA. Of the 72 natural FEPs, 32 remain completely unchanged,
6 38 were updated to include additional information or were edited for clarity and completeness,
7 and two were deleted from the baseline by combining with other more appropriate FEPs. No
8 screening decisions (classifications) for natural FEPs were changed.

1 **SCR-4.1 Geological FEPs**

2 **SCR-4.1.1 Stratigraphy**

3 SCR-4.1.1.1 FEP Number: N1 and N2
4 FEP Title: **Stratigraphy** (N1)
5 **Brine Reservoir** (N2)

6 SCR-4.1.1.1.1 Screening Decision: UP

7 The stratigraphy of the geological formations in the region of the WIPP is accounted for in PA
8 calculations. The presence of brine reservoirs in the Castile Formation is accounted for in PA
9 calculations.

10 SCR-4.1.1.1.2 Summary of New Information

11 No new information has been identified for this FEP. Since this FEP is accounted for (UP) in
12 PA, the implementation may differ from that used in the CCA, although the screening decision
13 has not changed. Changes in implementation (if any) are described in Chapter 6.0.

14 SCR-4.1.1.1.3 Screening Argument

15 The **Stratigraphy** and geology of the region around the WIPP, including the distribution and
16 characteristics of pressurized **Brine Reservoirs** in the Castile Formation (hereafter referred to as
17 the Castile), are discussed in detail in Section 2.1.3. The stratigraphy of the geological
18 formations in the region of the WIPP is accounted for in PA calculations through the setup of the
19 model geometries (Section 6.4.2). The presence of brine reservoirs is accounted for in the
20 treatment of inadvertent drilling (Sections 6.4.12.6 and 6.4.8).

21 **SCR-4.1.2 Tectonics**

22 SCR-4.1.2.1 FEP Number: N3, N4, and N5
23 FEP Title: **Regional Tectonics** (N3)
24 **Change in Regional Stress** (N4)
25 **Regional Uplift and Subsidence** (N5)

26 SCR-4.1.2.1.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

27 *The effects of regional tectonics, regional uplift and subsidence, and changes in regional stress*
28 *have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance*
29 *of the disposal system.*

30 SCR-4.1.2.1.2 Summary of New Information

31 The DOE's screening designations for WIPP regional tectonics, changes in regional stress,
32 regional uplift and subsidence appears to be technically valid. DOE described the WIPP site as
33 located in an area with no evidence of significant tectonic activity, and with a low level of stress
34 in the region. The WIPP is located in an area of tectonic quiescence. Seismic monitoring

1 conducted for the WIPP since the CCA continues to record small events at distance from the
2 WIPP, and these events are mainly in areas associated with hydrocarbon production. Two
3 nearby events (magnitude 3.5, 10/97, and magnitude 2.8, 12/98) are related to rockfalls in the
4 Nash Draw mine and are not tectonic in origin (DOE 1999). These events did not cause any
5 damage at the WIPP. There are no known nearby active faults, and one of the main tectonic
6 features is a slight eastward dip to pre-Cenozoic formations within the basin. There is no
7 geologic evidence of continuing tilting. These studies show short-term benchmark movements
8 consistent with the basin tilt.

9 SCR-4.1.2.1.3 Screening Argument

10 **Regional Tectonics** encompasses two related issues of concern: the overall level of regional
11 stress and whether any significant **Changes in Regional Stress** might occur.

12 The tectonic setting and structural features of the area around the WIPP are described in Section
13 2.1.5. In summary, there is no geological evidence for Quaternary regional tectonics in the
14 Delaware Basin. The eastward tilting of the region has been dated as mid-Miocene to Pliocene
15 by King (1948, pp. 120 - 121) and is associated with the uplift of the Guadalupe Mountains to
16 the west. Fault zones along the eastern margin of the basin, where it flanks the Central Basin
17 Platform, were active during the Late Permian. Evidence for this includes the displacement of
18 the Rustler Formation (hereafter referred to as the Rustler) observed by Holt and Powers (1988,
19 pp. 4 - 14) and the thinning of the Dewey Lake Redbeds (hereafter referred to as the Dewey
20 Lake) reported by Schiel (1994). There is, however, no surface displacement along the trend of
21 these fault zones, indicating that there has been no significant Quaternary movement. Other
22 faults identified within the evaporite sequence of the Delaware Basin are inferred by Barrows'
23 figures in Borns et al. (1983, pp. 58 - 60) to be the result of salt deformation rather than regional
24 tectonic processes. According to Muehlberger et al. (1978, p. 338), the nearest faults on which
25 Quaternary movement has been identified lie to the west of the Guadalupe Mountains and are of
26 minor regional significance. The effects of regional tectonics and changes in regional stress have
27 therefore been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the
28 performance of the disposal system.

29 There are no reported stress measurements from the Delaware Basin, but a low level of regional
30 stress has been inferred from the geological setting of the area (see Section 2.1.5). The inferred
31 low level of regional stress and the lack of Quaternary tectonic activity indicate that regional
32 tectonics and any changes in regional stress will be minor and therefore of low consequence to
33 the performance of the disposal system. Even if rates of regional tectonic movement
34 experienced over the past 10 million years continue, the extent of **Regional Uplift and**
35 **Subsidence** over the next 10,000 years would only be about several feet (approximately 1 m).
36 This amount of uplift or subsidence would not lead to a breach of the Salado because the salt
37 would deform plastically to accommodate this slow rate of movement. Uniform regional uplift
38 or a small increase in regional dip consistent with this past rate could give rise to downcutting by
39 rivers and streams in the region. The extent of this downcutting would be little more than the
40 extent of uplift, and reducing the overburden by 1 or 2 m would have no significant effect on
41 groundwater flow or contaminant transport in units above or below the Salado. Thus, the effects
42 of **Regional Uplift and Subsidence** have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of
43 low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

1 SCR-4.1.2.1.4 Tectonic Setting and Site Structural Features

2 The DOE has screened out, on the basis of either probability or consequence or both, all tectonic,
 3 magmatic, and structural related processes. The screening discussions can be found in CCA
 4 Appendix SCR. The information needed for this screening is included here and covers regional
 5 tectonic processes such as subsidence and uplift and basin tilting, magmatic processes such as
 6 igneous intrusion and events such as volcanism, and structural processes such as faulting, and
 7 loading and unloading of the rocks because of long-term sedimentation or erosion. Discussions
 8 of structural events, such as earthquakes, are considered to the extent that they may create new
 9 faults or activate old faults. The seismicity of the area is considered in Section 2.6 for the
 10 purposes of determining seismic design parameters for the facility.

11 SCR-4.1.2.1.5 Tectonics

12 The processes and features included in this section are those more traditionally considered part of
 13 tectonics-processes that develop the broad-scale features of the earth. Salt dissolution is a
 14 different process that can develop some features resembling those of tectonics.

15 Most broad-scale structural elements of the area around the WIPP developed during the Late
 16 Paleozoic (Appendix CCA GCR, pp. 3-58 to 3-77). There is little historical or geological
 17 evidence of significant tectonic activity in the vicinity, and the level of stress in the region is low.
 18 The entire region tilted slightly during the Tertiary, and activity related to Basin and Range
 19 tectonics formed major structures southwest of the area. Seismic activity is specifically
 20 addressed in a separate section.

21 Broad subsidence began in the area as early as the Ordovician, developing a sag called the
 22 Tobosa Basin. By Late Pennsylvanian to Early Permian time, the Central Basin Platform
 23 developed (Figure 2-19), separating the Tobosa Basin into two parts: the Delaware Basin to the
 24 west and the Midland Basin to the east. The Permian Basin refers to the collective set of
 25 depositional basins in the area during the Permian Period. Southwest of the Delaware Basin, the
 26 Diablo Platform began developing either in the Late Pennsylvanian or Early Permian. The
 27 Marathon Uplift and Ouachita tectonic belt limited the southern extent of the Delaware Basin.

28 According to Brokaw et al. (1972, p. 30), pre-Ochoan sedimentary rocks in the Delaware Basin
 29 show evidence of gentle downwarping during deposition, while Ochoan and younger rocks do
 30 not. A relatively uniform eastward tilt, generally from about 14 to 19 m/km (75 to 100 ft/mi),
 31 has been superimposed on the sedimentary sequence. P.B. King (1948, pp. 108 and 121)
 32 generally attributes the uplift of the Guadalupe and Delaware mountains along the west side of
 33 the Delaware Basin to the later Cenozoic, though he also notes that some faults along the west
 34 margin of the Guadalupe Mountains have displaced Quaternary gravels.

35 P.B. King (1948, p. 144) also infers the uplift from the Pliocene-age deposits of the Llano
 36 Estacado. Subsequent studies of the Ogallala of the Llano Estacado show that it varies in age
 37 from Miocene (about 12 million years before present) to Pliocene (Hawley 1993). This is the
 38 most likely range for uplift of the Guadalupe Mountains and broad tilting to the east of the
 39 Delaware Basin sequence.

1 Analysis of the present regional stress field indicates that the Delaware Basin lies within the
2 Southern Great Plains stress province. This province is a transition zone between the extensional
3 stress regime to the west and the region of compressive stress to the east. An interpretation by
4 Zoback and Zoback (1991, p. 350) of the available data indicates that the level of stress in the
5 Southern Great Plains stress province is low. Changes to the tectonic setting, such as the
6 development of subduction zones and a consequent change in the driving forces, would take
7 much longer than 10,000 years to occur.

8 To the west of the Southern Great Plains province is the Basin and Range province, or
9 Cordilleran Extension province, where according to Zoback and Zoback (1991, pp. 348-351)
10 normal faulting is the characteristic style of deformation. The eastern boundary of the Basin and
11 Range province is marked by the Rio Grande Rift. Sanford et al. (1991, p. 230) note that, as a
12 geological structure, the Rift extends beyond the relatively narrow geomorphological feature
13 seen at the surface, with a magnetic anomaly at least 500 km (300 mi) wide. On this basis, the
14 Rio Grande Rift can be regarded as a system of axial grabens along a major north-south trending
15 structural uplift (a continuation of the Southern Rocky Mountains). The magnetic anomaly
16 extends beneath the Southern Great Plains stress province, and regional-scale uplift of about
17 1,000 m (3,300 ft) over the past 10 million years also extends into eastern New Mexico.

18 To the east of the Southern Great Plains province is the large Mid-Plate province that
19 encompasses central and eastern regions of the conterminous United States and the Atlantic
20 basin west of the Mid-Atlantic Ridge. The Mid-Plate province is characterized by low levels of
21 paleo- and historic seismicity. Where Quaternary faulting has occurred, it is generally strike-slip
22 and appears to be associated with the reactivation of older structural elements.

23 Zoback et al. (1991) report no stress measurements from the Delaware Basin. The stress field in
24 the Southern Great Plains stress province has been defined from borehole measurements in west
25 Texas and from volcanic lineaments in northern New Mexico. These measurements were
26 interpreted by Zoback and Zoback (1991, p. 353) to indicate that the least principal horizontal
27 stress is oriented north-northeast and south-southwest and that most of the province is
28 characterized by an extensional stress regime.

29 There is an abrupt change between the orientation of the least principal horizontal stress in the
30 Southern Great Plains and the west-northwest orientation of the least principal horizontal stress
31 characteristic of the Rio Grande Rift. In addition to the geological indications of a transition
32 zone as described above, Zoback and Zoback (1980, p. 6134) point out that there is also evidence
33 for a sharp boundary between these two provinces. This is reinforced by the change in crustal
34 thickness from about 40 km (24 mi) beneath the Colorado Plateau to about 50 km (30 mi) or
35 more beneath the Southern Great Plains east of the Rio Grande Rift. The base of the crust within
36 the Rio Grande Rift is poorly defined but is shallower than that of the Colorado Plateau
37 (Thompson and Zoback 1979, p. 152). There is also markedly lower heat flow in the Southern
38 Great Plains (typically $< 60 \text{ m Wm}^{-2}$) reported by Blackwell et al. (1991, p. 428) compared with
39 that in the Rio Grande Rift (typically $> 80 \text{ m Wm}^{-2}$) reported by Reiter et al. (1991, p. 463).

40 On the eastern boundary of the Southern Great Plains province, there is only a small rotation in
41 the direction of the least principal horizontal stress. There is, however, a change from an
42 extensional, normal faulting regime to a compressive, strike-slip faulting regime in the Mid-Plate

1 province. According to Zoback and Zoback (1980, p. 6134), the available data indicate that this
 2 change is not abrupt and that the Southern Great Plains province can be viewed as a marginal
 3 part of the Mid-Plate province.

4 **SCR-4.1.3 Structural FEPs**

5 SCR-4.1.3.1 Deformation

6 SCR-4.1.3.1.1 FEP Number: N6 and N7
 7 FEP Title: **Salt Deformation** (N6)
 8 **Diapirism** (N7)

9 SCR-4.1.3.1.1.1 *Screening Decision: SO-P*

10 *Natural salt deformation and diapirism at the WIPP site over the next 10,000 years on a scale*
 11 *severe enough to significantly affect performance of the disposal system has been eliminated*
 12 *from PA calculations on the basis of low probability of occurrence.*

13 SCR-4.1.3.1.1.2 *Summary of New Information*

14 The DOE presented extensive evidence that some of the evaporites in the northern Delaware
 15 Basin have been deformed and proposed that the likely mechanism for deformation is gravity
 16 foundering of the more dense anhydrites in less dense halite (e.g., Anderson and Powers 1978;
 17 Jones 1981; Borns et al. 1983; Borns 1987). Diapirism occurs when the deformation is
 18 penetrative, i.e., halite beds disrupt overlying anhydrites. As Anderson and Powers (1978)
 19 suggested, this may have happened northeast of the WIPP at the location of drillhole ERDA-6.
 20 This is the only location where diapirism has been suggested for the evaporites of the northern
 21 Delaware Basin. The geologic situation suggests that deformation occurred before the Miocene-
 22 Pliocene Ogallala Formation was deposited (Jones 1981). Mechanical modeling is consistent
 23 with salt deformation occurring over about 700,000 years to form the deformed features known
 24 in the northern part of the WIPP site (Borns et al. 1983). The DOE drew the conclusion that
 25 evaporites at the WIPP site deform too slowly to affect performance of the disposal system.

26 Because brine reservoirs appear to be associated with deformation, Powers et al. (1996) prepared
 27 detailed structure elevation maps of various units from the base of the Castile Formation upward
 28 through the evaporites in the northern Delaware Basin. Drillholes are far more numerous for this
 29 study than at the time of the study by Anderson and Powers (1978). Subdivisions of the Castile
 30 appear to be continuous in the vicinity of ERDA 6 and at ERDA 6. There is little justification for
 31 interpreting diapiric piercement at that site. The location and distribution of evaporite
 32 deformation in the area of the WIPP site is similar to that proposed by earlier studies (e.g.,
 33 Anderson and Powers 1978; Borns et al. 1983; Borns and Shaffer 1985).

34 Surface domal features at the northwestern end of Nash Draw were of undetermined origin prior
 35 to WIPP investigations (e.g., Vine 1963), but extensive geophysical studies were conducted of
 36 these features as part of early WIPP studies (see Powers 1996). Two of the domal features were
 37 drilled, demonstrating that they had a solution-collapse origin (breccia pipes) and were not
 38 related in any way to salt diapirism (Snyder and Gard 1982).

1 A more recent study of structure for the Culebra Dolomite Member of the Rustler Formation
 2 (Powers 2002) shows that the larger deformation associated with deeper units is reflected by the
 3 Culebra, although the structural relief is muted. In addition, evaporite deformation in the
 4 northern part of the WIPP site, associated with the area earlier termed the “disturbed zone”
 5 (Powers et al. 1978), is hardly observable on a map of Culebra structure (Powers 2002). There is
 6 no evidence of more recent deformation at the WIPP site based on such maps.

7 These findings are consistent with the DOE position in the CCA that diapirism can be eliminated
 8 from PA calculations on the basis of low probability of occurrence. Although this discussion
 9 includes more recent information, the FEPs screening decision remains unchanged.

10 SCR-4.1.3.1.1.3 *Screening Argument*

11 *SCR-4.1.3.1.1.3.1 Deformation*

12 Deformed salt in the lower Salado and upper strata of the Castile has been encountered in a
 13 number of boreholes around the WIPP site; the extent of existing salt deformation is summarized
 14 in Section 2.1.6.1, and further detail is provided in CCA Appendix DEF.

15 A number of mechanisms may result in **Salt Deformation**: in massive salt deposits, buoyancy
 16 effects or **Diapirism** may cause salt to rise through denser, overlying units; and in bedded salt
 17 with anhydrite or other interbeds, gravity foundering of the interbeds into the halite may take
 18 place. Results from rock mechanics modeling studies (see CCA Appendix DEF) indicate that
 19 the time scale for the deformation process is such that significant natural deformation is unlikely
 20 to occur at the WIPP site over any time frame significant to waste isolation. Thus, natural **Salt**
 21 **Deformation** and **Diapirism** severe enough to alter existing patterns of groundwater flow or the
 22 behavior of the disposal system over the regulatory period has been eliminated from PA
 23 calculations on the basis of low probability of occurrence over the next 10,000 years.

24 SCR-4.1.3.2 Fracture Development

25 SCR-4.1.3.2.1 FEP Number: N8
 26 FEP Title: **Formation of Fractures**

27 SCR-4.1.3.2.1.1 *Screening Decision: SO-P, UP (Repository)*

28 *The formation of fractures has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of a low*
 29 *probability of occurrence over 10,000 years. The formation of fractures near the repository is*
 30 *accounted for in PA via treatment of the DRZ.*

31 SCR-4.1.3.2.1.2 *Summary of New Information*

32 The screening argument for formation of fractures has been revised to reflect recent studies. The
 33 screening statement has been updated to reflect the formation of fractures near the repository
 34 (DRZ).

1 SCR-4.1.3.2.1.3 *Screening Argument*

2 The **Formation of Fractures** requires larger changes in stress than are required for changes to
 3 the properties of existing fractures to overcome the shear and tensile strength of the rock. It has
 4 been concluded from the regional tectonic setting of the Delaware Basin that no significant
 5 changes in regional stress are expected over the regulatory period. The EPA agrees that fracture
 6 formation in the Rustler is likely a result of halite dissolution and subsequent overlying unit
 7 fracturing loading/unloading, as well as the syn- and post-depositional processes.
 8 Intraformational post-depositional dissolution of the Rustler Formation has been ruled out as a
 9 major contributor to Rustler salt distribution and thus to new fracture formation based on work
 10 by Holt and Powers (ibid., DOE 1996a: Appendix DEF, Section DEF3.2) and Powers and Holt
 11 (1999, 2000), who believe that depositional facies and syndepositional dissolution account for
 12 most of the patterns on halite distribution in the Rustler. The argument against developing new
 13 fractures in the Rustler during the regulatory period appears reasonable. The formation of new
 14 fracture sets in the Culebra has therefore been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of a
 15 low probability of occurrence over 10,000 years.

16 Repository-induced fracturing of the DRZ and Salado interbeds is accounted for in PA
 17 calculations.

18 A mechanism such as salt diapirism could develop fracturing in the Salado, but there is little
 19 evidence of diapirism in the Delaware Basin. Salt deformation has occurred in the vicinity of the
 20 WIPP, and fractures have developed in deeper Castile anhydrites as a consequence. Deformation
 21 rates are slow, and it is highly unlikely that this process will induce significant new fractures in
 22 the Salado during the regulatory time period. Surface domal features at the northwestern end of
 23 Nash Draw were of undetermined origin prior to WIPP investigations (e.g., Vine 1963), but
 24 extensive geophysical studies were conducted of these features as part of early WIPP studies (see
 25 Powers 1996). Two of the domal features were drilled, demonstrating that they had a solution-
 26 collapse origin (breccia pipes) and were not related in any way to salt diapirism (Snyder and
 27 Gard 1982).

28 The argument against developing new fractures within the Salado Formation during the
 29 regulatory period via regional stress therefore appears reasonable. Editorial changes for clarity
 30 are suggested, as well as separating the two FEPs into discrete arguments. Although the
 31 discussion of fracture development has been revised to include more recent information, the
 32 screening decision remains unchanged.

33 SCR-4.1.3.2.2 FEP Number: N9
 34 FEP Title: ***Changes in Fracture Properties***

35 SCR-4.1.3.2.2.1 *Screening Decision: SO-C, UP (near repository)*

36 *Naturally-induced changes in fracture properties that may affect groundwater flow or*
 37 *radionuclide transport in the region of the WIPP have been eliminated from PA calculations on*
 38 *the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system. **Changes in Fracture***
 39 ***Properties** near the repository are accounted for in PA calculations through treatment of the*
 40 *DRZ.*

1 SCR-4.1.3.2.2.2 *Summary of New Information*

2 The screening argument has been updated with additional information that addresses the
3 treatment of fractures in the near field. The screening decision has not changed.

4 SCR-4.1.3.2.2.3 *Screening Argument*

5 Groundwater flow in the region of the WIPP and transport of any released radionuclides may
6 take place along fractures. The rate of flow and the extent of transport will be influenced by
7 fracture characteristics. **Changes in Fracture Properties** could arise through natural changes in
8 the local stress field; for example, through tectonic processes, erosion or sedimentation changing
9 the amount of overburden, dissolution of soluble minerals along beds in the Rustler or upper
10 Salado, or dissolution or precipitation of minerals in fractures.

11 Tectonic processes and features (N3 **Changes in Regional Stress**; N4 **Tectonics**; N5 **Regional**
12 **Uplift and Subsidence**; N6 **Salt Deformation**; N7 **Diapirism**) have been screened out of PA.
13 These processes are not expected to change the character of fractures significantly during the
14 regulatory period.

15 Surface erosion or deposition (e.g., FEPs N41-N49) are not expected to change significantly the
16 overburden on the Culebra during the regulatory period. The relationship between Culebra
17 transmissivity (T) and depth is significant (Holt, 2002; Holt and Powers, 2002), but the potential
18 change to Culebra T based on deposition or erosion from these processes over the regulatory
19 period is insignificant.

20 Shallow dissolution (FEP N16), where soluble beds from the upper Salado or Rustler are
21 removed by groundwater, has been extensively considered. There are no direct effects on the
22 Salado at depths of the repository. Extensive study of the upper Salado and Rustler halite units
23 (Holt and Powers 1988; CCA Appendix FAC; Powers and Holt 1999, 2000; Powers 2002)
24 indicates little potential for dissolution at the WIPP site during the regulatory period. Existing
25 fracture properties are expressed through the relationship between Culebra T values and geologic
26 factors at and near the WIPP site (Holt 2002; Holt and Powers 2002). These will be incorporated
27 in PA (see N16, **Shallow Dissolution**).

28 Mineral precipitation within fractures (N22) is expected to be beneficial to performance, and it
29 has been screened out on the basis of low consequence. Natural dissolution of fracture fillings
30 within the Culebra is incorporated within FEP N16 (**Shallow Dissolution**). There is no new
31 information on the distribution of fracture fillings within the Culebra. The effects of fracture
32 fillings are also expected to be represented in the distribution of Culebra T values around the
33 WIPP site and are thus incorporated into PA.

34 Repository induced fracturing of the DRZ and Salado interbeds is accounted for in PA
35 calculations (UP), and is discussed further in FEPs W18 and W19.

1 SCR-4.1.3.2.3 FEP Number(s): N10 and N11
2 FEP Title(s): **Formation of New Faults** (N10)
3 **Fault Movement** (N11)

4 SCR-4.1.3.2.3.1 *Screening Decision: SO-P*

5 *The naturally induced fault movement and formation of new faults of sufficient magnitude to*
6 *significantly affect the performance of the disposal system have been eliminated from PA*
7 *calculations on the basis of low probability of occurrence over 10,000 years.*

8 SCR-4.1.3.2.3.2 *Summary of New Information*

9 No changes have been made to the FEP screening decision. However, the screening argument
10 text was revised to include information on seismic monitoring since the CCA and the nearby
11 rockfalls of non-tectonic origin in potash mines.

12 SCR-4.1.3.2.3.3 *Screening Argument*

13 Faults are present in the Delaware Basin in both the units underlying the Salado and in the
14 Permian evaporite sequence (see Section 2.1.5.3). According to Powers et al. (1978, included in
15 CCA Appendix GCR), there is evidence that movement along faults within the pre-Permian units
16 affected the thickness of Early Permian strata, but these faults did not exert a structural control
17 on the deposition of the Castile, the Salado, or the Rustler. Fault zones along the margins of the
18 Delaware Basin were active during the Late Permian Period. Along the eastern margin, where
19 the Delaware Basin flanks the Central Basin Platform, Holt and Powers (1988, included in CCA
20 Appendix FAC) note that there is displacement of the Rustler, and Schiel (1994) notes that there
21 is thinning of the Dewey Lake. There is, however, no surface displacement along the trend of
22 these fault zones, indicating that there has been no significant Quaternary movement.
23 Muehlberger et al. (1978, p. 338) note that the nearest faults on which Quaternary movement has
24 been identified lie to the west of the Guadalupe Mountains.

25 The WIPP is located in an area of tectonic quiescence. Seismic monitoring conducted for the
26 WIPP since the CCA continues to record small events at distance from the WIPP, and these
27 events are mainly in areas associated with hydrocarbon production. Two nearby events
28 (magnitude 3.5, 10/97, and magnitude 2.8, 12/98) are related to rockfalls in the Nash Draw mine
29 and are not tectonic in origin (DOE 1999). These events did not cause any damage at the WIPP.
30 The absence of Quaternary fault scarps and the general tectonic setting and understanding of its
31 evolution indicate that large-scale, tectonically-induced **Fault Movement** within the Delaware
32 Basin can be eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability over 10,000 years.
33 The stable tectonic setting also allows the **Formation of New Faults** within the basin over the
34 next 10,000 years to be eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability of
35 occurrence.

36 Evaporite dissolution at or near the WIPP site has the potential for developing fractures in the
37 overlying beds. Three zones (top of Salado, M1/H1 of the Los Medaños Member, and M2/H2 of
38 the Los Medaños Member) with halite underlie the Culebra Dolomite Member at the site
39 (Powers 2002). The upper Salado is present across the site, and there is no indication that
40 dissolution of this area will occur in the regulatory period or cause faulting at the site. The Los

1 Medaños units show both mudflat facies and halite-bearing facies within or adjacent to the WIPP
 2 site (Powers 2002). Although the distribution of halite in the Rustler is mainly due to
 3 depositional facies and syndepositional dissolution (Holt and Powers 1988; Powers and Holt
 4 1999, 2000), the possibility of past or future halite dissolution along the margins cannot be ruled
 5 out (Holt and Powers 1988; Beauheim and Holt 1999). If halite in the lower Rustler has been
 6 dissolved along the depositional margin, it has not occurred recently or has been of no
 7 consequence, as there is no indication on the surface or in Rustler structure of new (or old) faults
 8 in this area (e.g., Powers et al. 1978; Powers 2002).

9 The absence of Quaternary fault scarps and the general tectonic setting and understanding of its
 10 evolution indicate that large-scale, tectonically-induced fault movement within the Delaware
 11 Basin can be eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability over 10,000 years.
 12 The stable tectonic setting also allows the **Formation of New Faults** within the basin over the
 13 next 10,000 years to be eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability of
 14 occurrence.

15 SCR-4.1.3.2.4 FEP Number: N12
 16 FEP Title: **Seismic Activity**

17 SCR-4.1.3.2.4.1 *Screening Decision: UP*

18 *The postclosure effects of seismic activity on the repository and the DRZ are accounted for in PA*
 19 *calculations.*

20 SCR-4.1.3.2.4.2 *Summary of New Information*

21 No new information has been identified for this FEP. Any changes in the implementation of
 22 seismic activity within PA are discussed in Section 6.0.

23 SCR-4.1.3.2.4.3 *Screening Argument*

24 The following subsections present the screening argument for seismic activity (groundshaking).

25 SCR-4.1.3.2.4.4 *Causes of Seismic Activity*

26 **Seismic Activity** describes transient ground motion that may be generated by several energy
 27 sources. There are two possible causes of **Seismic Activity** that could potentially affect the WIPP
 28 site: natural- and human-induced. Natural seismic activity is caused by fault movement
 29 (earthquakes) when the buildup of strain in rock is released through sudden rupture or
 30 movement. Human-induced seismic activity may result from a variety of surface and subsurface
 31 activities, such as **Explosions** (H19 and H20), **Mining** (H13, H14, H58, and H59), **Fluid**
 32 **Injection** (H28), and **Fluid Withdrawal** (H25).

33 SCR-4.1.3.2.4.5 *Groundshaking*

34 Ground vibration and the consequent shaking of buildings and other structures are the most
 35 obvious effects of seismic activity. Once the repository and shafts have been sealed, however,

1 existing surface structures will be dismantled. Postclosure PAs are concerned with the effects of
2 seismic activity on the closed repository.

3 In regions of low and moderate seismic activity, such as the Delaware Basin, rocks behave
4 elastically in response to the passage of seismic waves, and there are no long-term changes in
5 rock properties. The effects of earthquakes beyond the DRZ have been eliminated from PA
6 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system. An
7 inelastic response, such as cracking, is only possible where there are free surfaces, as in the roof
8 and walls of the repository prior to closure by creep. *Seismic Activity* could, therefore, have an
9 effect on the properties of the DRZ.

10 An assessment of the extent of damage in underground excavations caused by groundshaking
11 largely depends on observations from mines and tunnels. Because such excavations tend to take
12 place in rock types more brittle than halite, these observations cannot be related directly to the
13 behavior of the WIPP. According to Wallner (1981, 244), the DRZ in brittle rock types is likely
14 to be more highly fractured and hence more prone to spalling and rockfalls than an equivalent
15 zone in salt. Relationships between groundshaking and subsequent damage observed in mines
16 will therefore be conservative with respect to the extent of damage induced at the WIPP by
17 seismic activity.

18 Dowding and Rozen (1978) classified damage in underground structures following seismic
19 activity and found that no damage (cracks, spalling, or rockfalls) occurred at accelerations below
20 0.2 gravities and that only minor damage occurred at accelerations up to 0.4 gravities. Lenhardt
21 (1988, p. 392) showed that a magnitude 3 earthquake would have to be within 1 km (0.6 mi) of a
22 mine to result in falls of loose rock. The risk of seismic activity in the region of the WIPP
23 reaching these thresholds is discussed below.

24 SCR-4.1.3.2.4.6 *Seismic Risk in the Region of the WIPP*

25 Prior to the introduction of a seismic monitoring network in 1960, most recorded earthquakes in
26 New Mexico were associated with the Rio Grande Rift, although small earthquakes were
27 detected in other parts of the region. In addition to continued activity in the Rio Grande Rift, the
28 instrumental record has shown a significant amount of seismic activity originating from the
29 Central Basin Platform and a number of small earthquakes in the Los Medaños area. Seismic
30 activity in the Rio Grande Rift is associated with extensional tectonics in that area. Seismic
31 activity in the Central Basin Platform may be associated with natural earthquakes, but there are
32 also indications that this activity occurs in association with oil-field activities such as fluid
33 injection. Small earthquakes in the Los Medaños region have not been precisely located, but
34 may be the result of mining activity in the region. Section 2.6.2 contains additional discussion of
35 seismic activity and risk in the WIPP region.

36 The instrumental record was used as the basis of a seismic risk study primarily intended for
37 design calculations of surface facilities rather than for postclosure PAs. The use of this study to
38 define probable ground accelerations in the WIPP region over the next 10,000 years is based on
39 the assumptions that hydrocarbon extraction and potash mining will continue in the region and
40 that the regional tectonic setting precludes major changes over the next 10,000 years.

1 Three source regions were used in calculating seismic risk: the Rio Grande Rift, the Central
2 Basin Platform, and part of the Delaware Basin province (including the Los Medaños). Using
3 conservative assumptions about the maximum magnitude event in each zone, the study indicated
4 a return period of about 10,000 years (annual probability of occurrence of 10^{-4}) for events
5 producing ground accelerations of 0.1 gravities. Ground accelerations of 0.2 gravities would
6 have an annual probability of occurrence of about 5×10^{16} .

7 The results of the seismic risk study and the observations of damage in mines due to
8 groundshaking give an estimated annual probability of occurrence of between 10^{-6} and 10^{-8} for
9 events that could increase the permeability of the DRZ. The DRZ is accounted for in PA
10 calculations as a zone of permanently high permeability (see Section 6.4.5.3); this treatment is
11 considered to account for the effects of any potential seismic activity.

12 **SCR-4.1.4 Crustal Process**

13 SCR-4.1.4.1 FEP Number: N13
14 FEP Title: **Volcanic Activity**

15 SCR-4.1.4.1.1 Screening Decision: SO-P

16 *Volcanic Activity has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability of*
17 *occurrence over 10,000 years.*

18 SCR-4.1.4.1.2 Summary of New Information

19 No new information has been identified for this FEP. Editorial changes were made to the
20 screening decision to remove reference to other FEPs. No changes have been made to the
21 description or screening argument.

22 SCR-4.1.4.1.3 Screening Argument

23 The Paleozoic and younger stratigraphic sequences within the Delaware Basin are devoid of
24 locally derived volcanic rocks. Volcanic ashes (dated at 13 million years and 0.6 million years)
25 do occur in the Gatuña Formation (hereafter referred to as the Gatuña), but these are not locally
26 derived. Within eastern New Mexico and northern, central, and western Texas, the closest
27 Tertiary volcanic rocks with notable areal extent or tectonic significance to the WIPP are
28 approximately 160 km (100 mi) to the south in the Davis Mountains volcanic area. The closest
29 Quaternary volcanic rocks are 250 km (150 mi) to the northwest in the Sacramento Mountains.
30 No volcanic rocks are exposed at the surface within the Delaware Basin.

31 *Volcanic Activity* is associated with particular tectonic settings: constructive and destructive
32 plate margins, regions of intraplate rifting, and isolated hot-spots in intraplate regions. The
33 tectonic setting of the WIPP site and the Delaware Basin is remote from plate margins, and the
34 absence of past volcanic activity indicates the absence of a major hot spot in the region.
35 Intraplate rifting has taken place along the Rio Grande some 200 km (120 mi) west of the WIPP
36 site during the Tertiary and Quaternary Periods. Igneous activity along this rift valley is
37 comprised of sheet lavas intruded on by a host of small-to-large plugs, sills, and other intrusive
38 bodies. However, the geological setting of the WIPP site within the large and stable Delaware

1 Basin allows volcanic activity in the region of the WIPP repository to be eliminated from
2 performance calculations on the basis of low probability of occurrence over the next 10,000
3 years.

4 SCR-4.1.4.2 FEP Number: N14
5 FEP Title: ***Magmatic Activity***

6 SCR-4.1.4.2.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

7 *The effects of **Magmatic Activity** have been eliminated from the PA calculations on the basis of*
8 *low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

9 SCR-4.1.4.2.2 Summary of New Information

10 No new information has been identified for this FEP. Editorial changes were made to the
11 screening decision to remove reference to other FEPs. No changes have been made to the
12 description or screening argument.

13 SCR-4.1.4.2.3 Screening Argument

14 **Magmatic Activity** is defined as the subsurface intrusion of igneous rocks into country rock.
15 Deep intrusive igneous rocks crystallize at depths of several kilometers (several miles) and have
16 no surface or near-surface expression until considerable erosion has taken place. Alternatively,
17 intrusive rocks may form from magma that has risen to near the surface or in the vents that give
18 rise to volcanoes and lava flows. Magma near the surface may be intruded along subvertical and
19 subhorizontal discontinuities (forming dikes and sills, respectively), and magma in volcanic
20 vents may solidify as plugs. The formation of such features close to a repository or the existence
21 of a recently intruded rock mass could impose thermal stresses inducing new fractures or altering
22 the hydraulic characteristics of existing fractures.

23 The principal area of magmatic activity in New Mexico is the Rio Grande Rift, where extensive
24 intrusions occurred during the Tertiary and Quaternary Periods. The Rio Grande Rift, however,
25 is in a different tectonic province than the Delaware Basin, and its magmatic activity is related to
26 the extensional stress regime and high heat flow in that region.

27 Within the Delaware Basin, there is a single identified outcrop of a lamprophyre dike about 70
28 km (40 mi) southwest of the WIPP (see Section 2.1.5.4 and CCA Appendix GCR for more
29 detail). Closer to the WIPP site, similar rocks have been exposed within potash mines some 15
30 km (10 mi) to the northwest, and igneous rocks have been reported from petroleum exploration
31 boreholes. Material from the subsurface exposures has been dated at around 35 million years.
32 Some recrystallization of the host rocks took place alongside the intrusion, and there is evidence
33 that minor fracture development and fluid migration also occurred along the margins of the
34 intrusion. However, the fractures have been sealed, and there is no evidence that the dike acted
35 as a conduit for continued fluid flow.

36 Aeromagnetic surveys of the Delaware Basin have shown anomalies that lie on a linear
37 southwest-northeast trend that coincides with the surface and subsurface exposures of magmatic
38 rocks. There is a strong indication therefore of a dike or a closely related set of dikes extending

1 for at least 120 km (70 mi) across the region (see Section 2.1.5.4). The aeromagnetic survey
 2 conducted to delineate the dike showed a magnetic anomaly that is several kilometers (several
 3 miles) wide at depth and narrows to a thin trace near the surface. This pattern is interpreted as
 4 the result of an extensive dike swarm at depths of less than approximately 4.0 km (2.5 mi) near
 5 the Precambrian basement, from which a limited number of dikes have extended towards the
 6 surface.

7 **Magmatic Activity** has taken place in the vicinity of the WIPP site in the past, but the igneous
 8 rocks have cooled over a long period. Any enhanced fracturing or conduits for fluid flow have
 9 been sealed by salt creep and mineralization. Continuing magmatic activity in the Rio Grande
 10 Rift is too remote from the WIPP location to be of consequence to the performance of the
 11 disposal system. Thus, the effects of magmatic activity have been eliminated from PA
 12 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

13 SCR-4.1.4.2.4 FEP Number: N15
 14 FEP Title: **Metamorphic Activity**

15 SCR-4.1.4.2.4.1 *Screening Decision: SO-P*

16 **Metamorphic Activity** has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability
 17 of occurrence over the next 10,000 years.

18 SCR-4.1.4.2.4.2 *Summary of New Information*

19 No new information has been identified for this FEP. Editorial changes were made to the
 20 screening decision to remove reference to other FEPs. No changes have been made to the
 21 description or screening argument.

22 SCR-4.1.4.2.4.3 *Screening Argument*

23 **Metamorphic Activity**, that is, solid-state recrystallization changes to rock properties and
 24 geologic structures through the effects of heat and/or pressure, requires depths of burial much
 25 greater than the depth of the repository. Regional tectonics that would result in the burial of the
 26 repository to the depths at which the repository would be affected by **Metamorphic Activity** have
 27 been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability of occurrence; therefore,
 28 metamorphic activity has also been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
 29 probability of occurrence over the next 10,000 years.

30 **SCR-4.1.5 Geochemical Processes**

31 SCR-4.1.5.1 FEP Number: N16
 32 FEP Title: **Shallow Dissolution (including lateral dissolution)**

33 SCR-4.1.5.1.1 Screening Decision: UP

34 **Shallow Dissolution** is accounted for in PA calculations.

1 SCR-4.1.5.1.2 Summary of New Information

2 In the vicinity of the WIPP site, the processes described in CCA Appendix SCR as *Shallow*
3 *Dissolution* (N16) and *Lateral Dissolution* (N17) extensively overlap. As a result, N16 and N17
4 have been combined and N17 has been deleted from the FEPs baseline. FEP N16 has been
5 modified to account for the deletion of N17. For CRA-2004, all of these interrelated processes,
6 and their attendant features, are considered as part of shallow dissolution, which is accounted for
7 in PA calculations.

8 SCR-4.1.5.1.3 Screening Argument

9 This section discusses a variety of styles of dissolution that have been active in the region of the
10 WIPP or in the Delaware Basin. A distinction has been drawn between *Shallow Dissolution*,
11 involving circulation of groundwater and mineral dissolution, in the Rustler and at the top of the
12 Salado in the region of the WIPP; and deep dissolution taking place in the Castile and the base of
13 the Salado. Dissolution will initially enhance porosities, but continued dissolution may lead to
14 compaction of the affected units with a consequent reduction in porosity. Compaction may
15 result in fracturing of overlying brittle units and increased permeability. Extensive dissolution
16 may create cavities (karst) and result in the total collapse of overlying units. This topic is
17 discussed further in Section 2.1.6.2.

18 SCR-4.1.5.1.4 Shallow Dissolution

19 In the region around WIPP, *Shallow Dissolution* by groundwater flow has removed soluble
20 minerals from the upper Salado as well as the Rustler to form Nash Draw; extensive solution
21 within the closed draw has created karst features including caves and dolines in the sulfate beds
22 of the Rustler (see Lee, 1925; Bachman, 1980, 1985, 1987a). An alluvial doline drilled at WIPP
23 33, about 850 m (2800 ft) west of the WIPP site boundary, is the nearest karst feature known in
24 the vicinity of the site. Upper Salado halite dissolution in Nash Draw resulted in propagating
25 fracturing upward through the overlying Rustler (Holt and Powers 1988). The margin of
26 dissolution of halite from the upper Salado has commonly been placed west of the WIPP site,
27 near, but east of, Livingston Ridge, the eastern boundary of Nash Draw. Halite occurs in the
28 Rustler east of Livingston Ridge, with the margin generally progressively eastward in higher
29 stratigraphic units (e.g., Snyder 1985; Powers and Holt 1995). The distribution of halite in the
30 Rustler has commonly been attributed to *Shallow Dissolution* (e.g., Powers et al. 1978; Lambert,
31 1983; Bachman 1985; Lowenstein 1987). During early studies for the WIPP, the variability of
32 transmissivity of the Culebra in the vicinity of the WIPP was commonly attributed to the effects
33 of dissolution of Rustler halite and changes in fracturing as a consequence.

34 After a detailed sedimentologic and stratigraphic investigation of WIPP cores, shafts, and
35 geophysical logs from the region around WIPP, the distribution of halite in the Rustler was
36 attributed to depositional and syndepositional processes rather than post-depositional dissolution
37 (Holt and Powers 1988; Powers and Holt 2000). Rustler exposures in shafts for the WIPP
38 revealed extensive sedimentary structures in clastic units (Holt and Powers 1984, 1986, 1990),
39 and the suite of features in these beds led these investigators (Holt and Powers 1988; Powers and
40 Holt 1990, 2000) to reinterpret the clastic units. They conclude that the clastic facies represent
41 mainly mudflat facies tracts adjacent to a salt pan. Although some halite likely was deposited in

1 mudflat areas proximal to the salt pan, it was largely removed by syndepositional dissolution, as
2 indicated by soil structures, soft sediment deformation, bedding, and small-scale vertical
3 relationships (Holt and Powers 1988; Powers and Holt 1990, 1999, 2000). The depositional
4 margins of halite in the Rustler are the likely points for past or future dissolution (e.g., Holt and
5 Powers 1988; Beauheim and Holt 1990). Cores from drillholes at the H-19 drillpad near the
6 Tamarisk Member halite margin show evidence of some dissolution of halite in the Tamarisk
7 (Mercer et al. 1998), consistent with these predictions. The distribution of Culebra T values is
8 not considered related to dissolution of Rustler halite, and other geological factors (e.g., depth,
9 upper Salado dissolution) correlate well with Culebra transmissivity (e.g., Powers and Holt 1995;
10 Holt and Powers 2002).

11 Since the CCA was completed, the WIPP has conducted additional work on *Shallow*
12 *Dissolution*, principally of the upper Salado, and its possible relationship to the distribution of T
13 values for the Culebra as determined through testing of WIPP hydrology wells.

14 AP-088 (Beauheim 2002) noted that potentiometric surface values for the Culebra in many
15 monitoring wells were outside the uncertainty ranges used to calibrate models of steady-state
16 heads for the unit. AP-088 directed the analysis of the relationship between geological factors
17 and values of T at Culebra wells. The relationship between geological factors, including
18 dissolution of the upper Salado as well as limited dissolution in the Rustler, and Culebra T is
19 being used to evaluate differences between assuming steady-state Culebra heads and changing
20 heads.

21 Task 1 for AP-088 (Powers 2002) evaluated geological factors, including shallow dissolution in
22 the vicinity of the WIPP site that related to Culebra T. A much more extensive drillhole
23 geological database was developed than was previously available, utilizing sources of data from
24 WIPP, potash exploration, and oil and gas exploration and development. The principal findings
25 related to shallow dissolution are: 1) a relatively narrow zone (~ 200-400 m wide) could be
26 defined as the margin of dissolution of the upper Salado in much of the area around WIPP: 2)
27 the upper Salado dissolution margin commonly underlies surface escarpments such as Livingston
28 Ridge; and 3) there are possible extensions or reentrants of incipient upper Salado dissolution
29 extending eastward from the general dissolution margin. The WIPP site proper is not affected by
30 this process.

31 Culebra T correlates well with depth or overburden, which affects fracture apertures (Powers and
32 Holt 1995, Holt and Powers 2002; Holt 2002). Dissolution of the upper Salado appears to
33 increase T by one or more orders of magnitude (Holt 2002). Because there is no indication of
34 upper Salado dissolution at the WIPP site, Holt (2002) did not include this factor for the WIPP
35 site in estimates of base T values for the WIPP site and surroundings.

36 There is no new work since the CCA on the distribution of fracture fillings in the Culebra or on
37 dissolution of the fillings. The effects of this process are represented in the distribution of
38 Culebra T values around the WIPP site.

39 New work regarding shallow dissolution does not change the inclusion of the effects in the T
40 field for the Culebra within PA calculations. The new work provides a firmer basis for
41 understanding the effects of shallow dissolution as represented in PA.

1 The effects of ***Shallow Dissolution*** (including the impacts of lateral dissolution) have been
2 included in PA calculations.

3 SCR-4.1.5.2 FEP Number: N17 (removed from baseline)
4 FEP Title: ***Lateral Dissolution***

5 SCR-4.1.5.2.1 Summary of New Information

6 FEP N17 ***Lateral Dissolution*** is so similar to FEP N16 ***Shallow Dissolution*** as features and
7 processes that they are better treated as a single FEP N16, ***Shallow Dissolution***. Therefore, N17
8 has been deleted from the FEPs baseline and the text for N16 has been modified to address the
9 combination of N16 and N17 into one FEP N16. ***Shallow Dissolution*** is accounted for in PA
10 calculations and encompasses the nature and characteristics of lateral dissolution.

11 SCR-4.1.5.3 FEP Number: N18, N20 and N21
12 FEP Title: ***Deep Dissolution*** (N18)
13 ***Breccia Pipes*** (N20)
14 ***Collapse Breccias*** (N21)

15 SCR-4.1.5.3.1 Screening Decision: SO-P

16 ***Deep Dissolution*** and the formation of associated features (for example, ***Solution Chimneys***,
17 ***Breccia Pipes***, ***Collapse Breccias***) at the WIPP site have been eliminated from PA calculations
18 on the basis of low probability of occurrence over the next 10,000 years.

19 SCR-4.1.5.3.2 Summary of New Information

20 The DOE limited ***Deep Dissolution*** to processes involving dissolution of the Castile or basal
21 Salado Formations and associated features such as ***Breccia Pipes*** (also known as ***Solution***
22 ***Chimneys***) with this process. The DOE found that deep dissolution is a process that may be
23 operating in the Delaware Basin, but the process is limited by the hydraulic and geochemical
24 characteristics of the expected source of water in the Delaware Mountain Group underlying the
25 evaporite formations. Investigations of the WIPP site have not found evidence of specific
26 features (e.g., ***Breccia Pipes***, ***Solution Collapse***, or ***Solution Chimneys***) associated with deep
27 dissolution. The EPA also concluded that the mechanism may be operating in the Delaware
28 Basin, and that there is little evidence of deep dissolution at the WIPP site. The EPA concluded
29 that the rate or magnitude of this process is not high enough that it is likely to threaten integrity
30 of the WIPP over the next 10,000 years. These conclusions appear reasonable. The original
31 description and screening arguments as presented in the CCA remain valid. The FEP discussion
32 has been modified to clarify the arguments and the original screening decision as presented in the
33 CCA has been revised to remove reference to other FEPs.

34 SCR-4.1.5.3.3 Screening Argument

35 This section discusses a variety of styles of dissolution that have been active in the region of the
36 WIPP or in the Delaware Basin. A distinction has been drawn between ***Shallow Dissolution***,
37 involving circulation of groundwater and mineral dissolution in the Rustler and at the top of the
38 Salado in the region of the WIPP, and ***Deep Dissolution*** taking place in the Castile and the base

1 of the Salado. Dissolution will initially enhance porosities, but continued dissolution may lead to
2 compaction of the affected units with a consequent reduction in porosity. Compaction may
3 result in fracturing of overlying brittle units and increased permeability. Extensive dissolution
4 may create cavities (karst) and result in the total collapse of overlying units. This topic is
5 discussed further in Section 2.1.6.2.

6 SCR-4.1.5.3.4 Deep Dissolution

7 **Deep Dissolution** refers to the dissolution of salt or other evaporite minerals in a formation at
8 depth (see Section 2.1.6.2). Deep dissolution is distinguished from shallow and lateral
9 dissolution not only by depth, but also by the origin of the water. Dissolution by groundwater
10 from deep water-bearing zones can lead to the formation of cavities. Collapse of overlying beds
11 leads to the formation of **Collapse Breccias** if the overlying rocks are brittle or to deformation if
12 the overlying rocks are ductile. If dissolution is extensive, **Breccia Pipes** or **Solution Chimneys**
13 may form above the cavity. These pipes may reach the surface or pass upwards into fractures
14 and then into microcracks that do not extend to the surface. **Breccia Pipes** may also form
15 through the downward percolation of meteoric waters, as discussed earlier. **Deep Dissolution** is
16 of concern because it could accelerate contaminant transport through the creation of vertical flow
17 paths that bypass low-permeability units in the Rustler. If dissolution occurred within or beneath
18 the waste panels themselves, there could be increased circulation of groundwater through the
19 waste, as well as a breach of the Salado host rock.

20 Features identified as being the result of **Deep Dissolution** are present along the northern and
21 eastern margins of the Delaware Basin. In addition to features that have a surface expression or
22 that appear within potash mine workings, **Deep Dissolution** has been cited by Anderson et al.
23 (1972, p. 81) as the cause of lateral variability within evaporite sequences in the lower Salado.

24 Exposures of the McNutt Potash Member of the Salado within a mine near Nash Draw have
25 shown a breccia pipe containing cemented brecciated fragments of formations higher in the
26 stratigraphic sequence. At the surface, this feature is marked by a dome, and similar domes have
27 been interpreted as dissolution features. The depth of dissolution has not been confirmed, but the
28 collapse structures led Anderson (1978, p. 52) and Snyder et al. (1982, p. 65) to postulate
29 dissolution of the Capitan Limestone at depth; collapse of the Salado, Rustler, and younger
30 formations; and subsequent dissolution and hydration by downward percolating waters. San
31 Simon Sink (see Section 2.1.6.2), some 35 km (20 mi) east-southeast of the WIPP site, has also
32 been interpreted as a **Solution Chimneys**. Subsidence has occurred there in historical times
33 according to Nicholson and Clebsch (1961, p. 14), suggesting that dissolution at depth is still
34 taking place. Whether this is the result of downwards-percolating surface water or of deep
35 groundwater has not been confirmed. The association of these dissolution features with the inner
36 margin of the Capitan Reef suggest that they owe their origins, if not their continued
37 development, to groundwaters derived from the Capitan Limestone.

38 SCR-4.1.5.3.5 Dissolution within the Castile and Lower Salado Formations

39 The Castile contains sequences of varved anhydrite and carbonate (that is, laminae deposited on
40 a cyclical basis) that can be correlated between several boreholes. On the basis of these deposits,
41 a basin-wide uniformity in the depositional environment of the Castile evaporites was assumed.

1 The absence of varves from all or part of a sequence and the presence of brecciated anhydrite
 2 beds have been interpreted by Anderson et al. (1972) as evidence of dissolution. Holt and
 3 Powers (CCA Appendix FAC) have questioned the assumption of a uniform depositional
 4 environment and contend that the anhydrite beds are lateral equivalents of halite sequences
 5 without significant postdepositional dissolution. Wedges of brecciated anhydrite along the
 6 margin of the Castile have been interpreted by Robinson and Powers (1987, p. 78) as gravity-
 7 driven clastic deposits, rather than the result of **Deep Dissolution**.

8 Localized depressions at the top of the Castile and inclined geophysical marker units at the base
 9 of the Salado have been interpreted by Davies (1983, p. 45) as the result of **Deep Dissolution** and
 10 subsequent collapse or deformation of overlying rocks. The postulated cause of this dissolution
 11 was circulation of undersaturated groundwaters from the Bell Canyon Formation (hereafter
 12 referred to as the Bell Canyon). Additional boreholes (notably WIPP-13, WIPP-32, and DOE-2)
 13 and geophysical logging led Borns and Shaffer (1985) to conclude that the features interpreted
 14 by Davies as being dissolution features are the result of irregularities at the top of the Bell
 15 Canyon. These irregularities led to localized depositional thickening of the Castile and lower
 16 Salado sediments.

17 SCR-4.1.5.3.6 Collapse Breccias at Basin Margins

18 **Collapse Breccias** are present at several places around the margins of the Delaware Basin. Their
 19 formation is attributed to relatively fresh groundwater from the Capitan Limestone that forms the
 20 margin of the basin. **Collapse Breccias** corresponding to features on geophysical records that
 21 have been ascribed to **Deep Dissolution** have not been found in boreholes away from the
 22 margins. These features have been reinterpreted as the result of early dissolution prior to the
 23 deposition of the Salado.

24 SCR-4.1.5.3.7 Summary of Deep Dissolution

25 **Deep Dissolution** features have been identified within the Delaware Basin, but only in marginal
 26 areas underlain by Capitan Reef. There is a low probability that deep dissolution will occur
 27 sufficiently close to the waste panels over the regulatory period to affect groundwater flow in the
 28 immediate region of the WIPP. **Deep Dissolution** at the WIPP site has therefore been eliminated
 29 from *PA* calculations on the basis of low probability of occurrence over the next 10,000 years.

30 SCR-4.1.5.4 FEP Number: N19 (removed from baseline)
 31 FEP Title: **Solution Chimneys**

32 SCR-4.1.5.4.1 Screening Decision: NA

33 SCR-4.1.5.4.2 Summary of New Information

34 **Solution Chimneys** (N19) and **Breccia Pipes** (N20) are equivalent as used in the CCA and
 35 supporting documents for the WIPP. Neither the DOE nor the EPA discussions supporting the
 36 original certification make a clear distinction between the two. These FEPs have been combined
 37 and are addressed in FEP N20 **Breccia Pipes**. The screening arguments have not changed as a
 38 result of consolidation.

1 SCR-4.1.5.5 FEP Number: N22
2 FEP Title: **Fracture Infill**

3 SCR-4.1.5.5.1 Screening Decision: SO-C - Beneficial

4 *The effects of **Fracture Infills** have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of*
5 *beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

6 SCR-4.1.5.5.2 Summary of New Information

7 No new information has been identified that related to the screening of this FEP. No changes
8 have been made.

9 SCR-4.1.5.5.3 Screening Argument

10 *SCR-4.1.5.5.3.1 Mineralization*

11 Precipitation of minerals as **Fracture Infills** can reduce hydraulic conductivities. The
12 distribution of infilled fractures in the Culebra closely parallels the spatial variability of lateral
13 transmissivity in the Culebra. The secondary gypsum veins in the Rustler have not been dated.
14 Strontium isotope studies (Siegel et al. 1991, pp. 5-53 to 5-57) indicate that the infilling minerals
15 are locally derived from the host rock rather than extrinsically derived, and it is inferred that they
16 reflect an early phase of mineralization and are not associated with recent meteoric waters.

17 Stable isotope geochemistry in the Rustler has also provided information on mineral stabilities in
18 these strata. Both Chapman (1986, p. 31) and Lambert and Harvey (1987, p. 207) imply that the
19 mineralogical characteristics of units above the Salado have been stable or subject to only minor
20 changes under the various recharge conditions that have existed during the past 0.6 million
21 years—the period since the formation of the Mescalero caliche and the establishment of a pattern
22 of climate change and associated changes in recharge that led to present-day hydrogeological
23 conditions. No changes in climate are expected other than those experienced during this period,
24 and for this reason, no changes are expected in the mineralogical characteristics other than those
25 expressed by the existing variability of fracture infills and diagenetic textures. Formation of
26 **Fracture Infills** will reduce transmissivities and will therefore be of beneficial consequence to
27 the performance of the disposal system.

1 **SCR-4.2 Subsurface Hydrological Features, Events, and Processes**

2 **SCR-4.2.1 Groundwater Characteristics**

3 SCR-4.2.1.1 FEP Number: N23, N24, N25 and N27
4 FEP Title: **Saturated Groundwater Flow (N23)**
5 **Unsaturated Groundwater Flow (N24)**
6 **Fracture Flow (N25)**
7 **Effects of Preferential Pathways (N27)**

8 SCR-4.2.1.1.1 Screening Decision: UP

9 *Saturated Groundwater Flow, Unsaturated Groundwater Flow, Fracture Flow, and the Effects*
10 *of Preferential Pathways are accounted for in PA calculations.*

11 SCR-4.2.1.1.2 Summary of New Information

12 No new information related to the screening of these FEPs has been identified. These FEPs
13 continue to be accounted for in PA.

14 SCR-4.2.1.1.3 Screening Argument

15 *Saturated Groundwater Flow, Unsaturated Groundwater Flow, and Fracture Flow* are
16 accounted for in PA calculations. Groundwater flow is discussed in Sections 2.2.1, 6.4.5, and
17 6.4.6.

18 The hydrogeologic properties of the Culebra are also spatially variable. This variability,
19 including the *Effects of Preferential Pathways*, is accounted for in PA calculations in the
20 estimates of transmissivity and aquifer thickness.

21 SCR-4.2.1.2 FEP Number: N26
22 FEP Title: **Density Effect on Groundwater Flow**

23 SCR-4.2.1.2.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

24 *Density Effects on Groundwater Flow have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis*
25 *of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

26 SCR-4.2.1.2.2 Summary of New Information

27 The effects of natural density variations on groundwater flow have been screened out on the
28 basis of low consequence. Editorial changes have been made to the FEP description, argument,
29 and screening decision.

30 SCR-4.2.1.2.3 Screening Argument

31 The most transmissive unit in the Rustler, and hence the most significant potential pathway for
32 transport of radionuclides to the accessible environment, is the Culebra. The properties of
33 Culebra groundwaters are not homogeneous, and spatial variations in groundwater density

1 (Section 2.2.1.4.1.2) could influence the rate and direction of groundwater flow. A comparison
 2 of the gravity-driven flow component and the pressure-driven component in the Culebra,
 3 however, shows that only in the region to the south of the WIPP are head gradients low enough
 4 for density gradients to be significant (Davies 1989, p. 53). Accounting for this variability would
 5 rotate groundwater flow vectors towards the east (down-dip) and hence fluid in the high
 6 transmissivity zone would move away from the zone. Excluding brine density variations within
 7 the Culebra from PA calculations is therefore a conservative assumption, and ***Density Effects on***
 8 ***Groundwater Flow*** have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence
 9 to the performance of the disposal system.

10 ***SCR-4.2.2 Changes in Groundwater Flow***

11 SCR-4.2.2.1 FEP Number: N28
 12 FEP Title: ***Thermal Effects on Groundwater Flow***

13 SCR-4.2.2.1.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

14 *Natural Thermal Effects on Groundwater Flow have been eliminated from PA calculations on*
 15 *the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

16 No new information has been identified related to this FEP. Only editorial changes have been
 17 made.

18 SCR-4.2.2.1.2 Screening Argument

19 The geothermal gradient in the region of the WIPP has been measured at about 30°C (54°F) per
 20 kilometer (50°C [90°F] per mile). Given the generally low permeability in the region, and the
 21 limited thickness of units in which groundwater flow occurs (for example the Culebra), natural
 22 convection will be too weak to have a significant effect on groundwater flow. No natural FEPs
 23 have been identified that could significantly alter the temperature distribution of the disposal
 24 system or give rise to ***Thermal Effects on Groundwater Flow***. Such effects have therefore been
 25 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
 26 disposal system.

27 SCR-4.2.2.2 FEP Number: N29
 28 FEP Title: ***Saline Intrusion (hydrogeological effects)***

29 SCR-4.2.2.2.1 Screening Decision: SO-P

30 *Changes in groundwater flow arising from Saline Intrusion has been eliminated from PA*
 31 *calculations on the basis of a low probability of occurrence over 10,000 years.*

32 SCR-4.2.2.2.2 Summary of New Information

33 No new information has been identified related to this FEP. Only editorial changes have been
 34 made.

1 SCR-4.2.2.2.3 Screening Argument

2 No natural events or processes have been identified that could result in **Saline Intrusion** into
3 units above the Salado or cause a significant increase in fluid density. Natural **Saline Intrusion**
4 has therefore been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability of occurrence
5 over the next 10,000 years. **Saline Intrusion** arising from human events such as drilling into a
6 pressurized brine pocket is discussed in FEPs H21 through H24.

7 SCR-4.2.2.3 FEP Number: N30
8 FEP Title: **Freshwater Intrusion (hydrogeological effects)**

9 SCR-4.2.2.3.1 Screening Decision: SO-P

10 *Changes in groundwater flow arising **Freshwater Intrusion** have been eliminated from PA*
11 *calculations on the basis of a low probability of occurrence over 10,000 years.*

12 SCR-4.2.2.3.2 Summary

13 No new information has been identified related to this FEP. Only editorial changes have been
14 made.

15 SCR-4.2.2.3.2.1 *Screening Argument*

16 A number of FEPs, including **Climate Change**, can result in changes in infiltration and recharge
17 (see discussions for FEPs N53 through N55). These changes will affect the height of the water
18 table and hence could affect groundwater flow in the Rustler through changes in head gradients.
19 The generally low transmissivity of the Dewey Lake and the Rustler, however, will prevent any
20 significant changes in groundwater density from occurring within the Culebra over the
21 timescales for which increased precipitation and recharge are anticipated. No other natural
22 events or processes have been identified that could result in **Freshwater Intrusion** into units
23 above the Salado or cause a significant decrease in fluid density. **Freshwater Intrusion** has
24 therefore been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability of occurrence
25 over the next 10,000 years.

26 SCR-4.2.2.4 FEP Number: N31
27 FEP Title: **Hydrological Response to Earthquakes**

28 SCR-4.2.2.4.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

29 *A **Hydrological Response to Earthquakes** has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis*
30 *of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

31 SCR-4.2.2.4.2 Summary of New Information

32 No new information has been identified related to this FEP. Only editorial changes have been
33 made.

1 SCR-4.2.2.4.3 Screening Argument

2 SCR-4.2.2.4.3.1 *Hydrological Effects of Seismic Activity*

3 There are a variety of **Hydrological Response to Earthquakes**. Some of these responses, such as
4 changes in surface-water flow directions, result directly from fault movement. Others, such as
5 changes in subsurface water chemistry and temperature, probably result from changes in flow
6 pathways along the fault or fault zone. According to Bredehoeft et al. (1987, p. 139), further
7 away from the region of fault movement, two types of changes to groundwater levels may take
8 place as a result of changes in fluid pressure:

- 9 • The passage of seismic waves through a rock mass causes a volume change, inducing a
10 transient response in the fluid pressure, which may be observed as a short-lived
11 fluctuation of the water level in wells, or
- 12 • Changes in volume strain can cause long-term changes in water level. A buildup of strain
13 occurs prior to rupture and is released during an earthquake. The consequent change in
14 fluid pressure may be manifested by the drying up or reactivation of springs some
15 distance from the region of the epicenter.

16 Fluid pressure changes induced by the transmission of seismic waves can produce changes of up
17 to several meters (several yards) in groundwater levels in wells, even at distances of thousands of
18 kilometers from the epicenter. These changes are temporary, however, and levels typically
19 return to pre-earthquake levels in a few hours or days. Changes in fluid pressure arising from
20 changes in volume strain persist for much longer periods, but they are only potentially
21 consequential in tectonic regimes where there is a significant buildup of strain. The regional
22 tectonics of the Delaware Basin indicate that such a buildup has a low probability of occurring
23 over the next 10,000 years (see FEPs N3 and N4).

24 The expected level of seismic activity in the region of the WIPP will be of low consequence to
25 the performance of the disposal system in terms of groundwater flow or contaminant transport.
26 Changes in groundwater levels resulting from more distant earthquakes will be too short in
27 duration to be significant. Thus, the **Hydrological Response to Earthquakes** have been
28 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
29 disposal system.

30 SCR-4.2.2.5 FEP Number: N32
31 FEP Title: **Natural Gas Intrusion**

32 SCR-4.2.2.5.1 Screening decision: SO-P

33 *Changes in groundwater flow arising from natural gas intrusion have been eliminated from PA*
34 *calculations on the basis of a low probability of occurrence over 10,000 years.*

35 SCR-4.2.2.5.2 Summary of New Information

36 No new information has been identified related to this FEP. Only editorial changes have been
37 made.

1 SCR-4.2.2.5.2.1 *Screening Argument*

2 Hydrocarbon resources are present in formations beneath the WIPP (Section 2.3.1.2), and natural
 3 gas is extracted from the Morrow Formation. These reserves are, however, some 4,200 m
 4 (14,000 ft) below the surface, and no natural events or processes have been identified that could
 5 result in **Natural Gas Intrusion** into the Salado or the units above. **Natural Gas Intrusion** has
 6 therefore been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability of occurrence
 7 over the next 10,000 years.

8 **SCR-4.3 Subsurface Geochemical Features, Events, and Processes**

9 **SCR-4.3.1 Groundwater Geochemistry**

10 SCR-4.3.1.1 FEP Number: N33
 11 FEP Title: **Groundwater Geochemistry**

12 SCR-4.3.1.1.1 Screening Decision: UP

13 **Groundwater Geochemistry** in the hydrological units of the disposal system is accounted for in
 14 PA calculations.

15 SCR-4.3.1.1.2 Summary of New Information

16 No new information related to the screening of these FEPs has been identified. These FEPs
 17 continue to be accounted for in PA.

18 SCR-4.3.1.1.3 Screening Argument

19 The most important aspect of **Groundwater Geochemistry** in the region of the WIPP in terms of
 20 chemical retardation and colloid stability is salinity. **Groundwater Geochemistry** is discussed in
 21 detail in Sections 2.2 and 2.4 and summarized here. The Delaware Mountain Group, Castile, and
 22 Salado contain basinal brines. Waters in the Castile and Salado are at or near halite saturation.
 23 Above the Salado, groundwaters are also relatively saline, and groundwater quality is poor in all
 24 of the permeable units. Waters from the Culebra vary spatially in salinity and chemistry. They
 25 range from saline sodium chloride-rich waters to brackish calcium sulfate-rich waters. In
 26 addition, a range of magnesium to calcium ratios has been observed, and some waters reflect the
 27 influence of potash mining activities, having elevated potassium to sodium ratios. Waters from
 28 the Santa Rosa are generally of better quality than any of those from the Rustler. Salado and
 29 Castile brine geochemistry is accounted for in PA calculations of the actinide source term
 30 (Section 6.4.3.4). Culebra brine geochemistry is accounted for in the retardation factors used in
 31 PA calculations of actinide transport (see Section 6.4.6.2).

1 SCR-4.3.1.2 FEP Number(s): N34 and N38
2 FEP Title(s): **Saline Intrusion** (geochemical effects) (N34)
3 **Effects of Dissolution** (N38)

4 SCR-4.3.1.2.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

5 *The effects of **Saline Intrusion** and dissolution on groundwater chemistry have been eliminated*
6 *from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

7 SCR-4.3.1.2.2 Summary of New Information

8 The conclusion that “No natural events or processes have been identified that could result in
9 saline intrusion into units above the Salado” (DOE 1996a, Appendix SCR) remains valid. The
10 possibility that dissolution might result in an increase in the salinity of low-to-moderate-ionic-
11 strength groundwaters in the Culebra also appears unlikely.

12 Nevertheless, **Saline Intrusion** and dissolution, in the unlikely event that they occur, would not
13 affect the predicted transport of radionuclides in the Culebra because results obtained from
14 laboratory studies (Brush 1996) with saline solutions were largely used to predict radionuclide
15 transport for the CCA PA and the Performance Assessment Verification Test (PAVT). These
16 results will also be used for the CRA-2004 PA.

17 SCR-4.3.1.2.3 Screening Argument

18 **Saline Intrusion** and **Effects of Dissolution** are considered together in this discussion because
19 dissolution of minerals such as halite (NaCl), anhydrite (CaSO₄), or gypsum (CaSO₄·2H₂O)
20 (N38) could – in the most extreme case – increase the salinity of groundwaters in the Culebra
21 Member of the Rustler Formation to levels characteristic of those expected after **Saline**
22 **Intrusion** (N34).

23 No natural events or processes have been identified that could result in saline intrusion into units
24 above the Salado. Injection of Castile-Formation or Salado brines into the Culebra as a result of
25 human intrusion, an anthropogenically induced event, was included in the PA calculations for the
26 CCA and the EPA’s PAVT, and is included in the CRA-2004 PA. Laboratory studies carried out
27 to evaluate radionuclide transport in the Culebra following human intrusion produced data that
28 can also be used to evaluate the consequences of natural saline intrusion.

29 The possibility that dissolution of halite, anhydrite, or gypsum might result in an increase in the
30 salinity of low-to-moderate-ionic-strength groundwaters in the Culebra also appears unlikely,
31 despite the presence of halite in the Los Medaños under most of the WIPP Site (Siegel and
32 Lambert 1991, Figure 1-13), including the expected Culebra off-site transport pathway (the
33 direction of flow from the point(s) at which brines from the repository would enter the Culebra in
34 the event of human intrusion to the south or south-southeast and eventually to the boundary of
35 the WIPP site). (The Los Medaños Member of the Rustler, formerly referred to as the unnamed
36 lower member of the Rustler, underlies the Culebra.) A dissolution-induced increase in the
37 salinity of Culebra groundwaters is unlikely because: (1) the dissolution of halite is known to be
38 rapid; (2) (moderate-ionic-strength) groundwaters along the off-site transport pathway (and at
39 many other locations in the Culebra) have had sufficient time to dissolve significant quantities of

1 halite, if this mineral is present in the subjacent Los Medaños and if Culebra fluids have been in
 2 contact with it; and (3) the lack of high-ionic-strength groundwaters along the offsite transport
 3 pathway (and elsewhere in the Culebra) implies that halite is present in the Los Medaños but
 4 Culebra fluids have not contacted it, or that halite is not present in the Los Medaños. Because
 5 halite dissolves so rapidly if contacted by undersaturated solutions, this conclusion does not
 6 depend on the nature and timing of Culebra recharge (i.e., whether the Rustler has been a closed
 7 hydrologic system for several thousand to a few tens of thousands of years, or is subject to
 8 significant modern recharge).

9 Nevertheless, saline intrusion would not affect the predicted transport of thorium (Th), uranium
 10 (U), plutonium (Pu), and americium (Am) in the Culebra. This is because: (1) the laboratory
 11 studies that quantified the retardation of Th, U, Pu, and Am for the CCA PA were carried out
 12 with both moderate-ionic-strength solutions representative of Culebra groundwaters along the
 13 expected offsite transport pathway, and with high-ionic-strength solutions representative of
 14 brines from the Castile and the Salado (Brush 1996; Brush and Storz 1996); and (2) the results
 15 obtained with the saline (Castile and Salado) solutions were – for the most part – used to predict
 16 the transport of Pu(III) and Am(III); Th(IV), U(IV), Np(IV) and Pu(IV); and U(VI). The results
 17 obtained with the saline solutions were used for these actinide oxidation states because the extent
 18 to which saline and Culebra brines will mix along the offsite transport pathway in the Culebra
 19 was unclear at the time of the CCA PA; therefore, Brush (1996) and Brush and Storz (1996)
 20 recommended that PA use the results that predict less retardation. In the case of Pu(III) and
 21 Am(III); Th(IV), U(IV), Np(IV) and Pu(IV); and U(VI), the K_{ds} obtained with the saline
 22 solutions were somewhat lower than those obtained with the Culebra fluids. The K_{ds}
 23 recommended by Brush and Storz (1996) were used for the CRA-2004 PA. These K_{ds} are also
 24 based mainly on results obtained with saline solutions.

25 Finally, it is important to reiterate that the use of results from laboratory studies with saline
 26 solutions to predict radionuclide transport in the Culebra for the CCA PA, the PAVT, and the
 27 CRA PA implements the effects of saline intrusion caused by human intrusion, not natural
 28 **Saline Intrusion**. The conclusions that natural **Saline Intrusion** is unlikely, that significant
 29 dissolution is unlikely, and that these events or processes would have no significant consequence
 30 – in the unlikely event that they occur – continue to be valid.

31 SCR-4.3.1.3 FEP Number: N35, N36 and N37
 32 FEP Title: **Freshwater Intrusion** (Geochemical Effects) (N35)
 33 **Change in Groundwater Eh** (N36)
 34 **Changes in Groundwater pH** (N37)

35 SCR-4.3.1.3.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

36 *The effects of **Freshwater Intrusion** on groundwater chemistry have been eliminated from PA*
 37 *calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*
 38 *Changes in **Groundwater Eh** and **pH** have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of*
 39 *low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

1 SCR-4.3.1.3.2 Summary of New Information

2 The most likely mechanism for (natural) *Freshwater Intrusion* into the Culebra, *Changes in*
3 *Groundwater Eh*, *Changes in Groundwater pH* is (natural) recharge of the Culebra. There is
4 still considerable uncertainty regarding the extent and timing of recharge of the Culebra. If
5 recharge occurs mainly during periods of high precipitation (pluvials) associated with periods of
6 continental glaciation, the consequences of such recharge are probably already reflected in the
7 ranges of geochemical conditions currently observed in the Culebra as a whole, as well as along
8 the likely offsite transport pathway. Therefore, the occurrence of another pluvial during the
9 10,000-year WIPP regulatory period would have no significant, additional consequence for the
10 long-term performance of the repository. If, on the other hand, significant recharge occurs
11 throughout both phases of the glacial-interglacial cycles, the conclusion that the effects of pluvial
12 and modern recharge are inconsequential (are already reflected by existing variations in
13 geochemical conditions) is also still valid.

14 The decision to screenout FEPs N35, N36, and N37 on the basis of low consequence for the
15 long-term performance of the WIPP remains valid. However, the following discussion provides
16 additional justification for this decision. FEPs N35, N36, and N37 are considered together in this
17 discussion because the same process is the most likely cause, and perhaps the only plausible
18 cause, for all three of these events or changes in these important geochemical properties of
19 groundwaters in the Culebra Member of the Rustler Formation. To summarize, the original
20 screening argument for these FEPs has been modified to provide a more robust basis for the low
21 consequence decision, and *Effects of Dissolution* (N38) have been removed from this set of
22 FEPs and is now addressed jointly with *Saline Intrusion* (N34).

23 SCR-4.3.1.3.3 Screening Argument

24 Natural changes in the groundwater chemistry of the Culebra and other units that resulted from
25 *Saline Intrusion* or *Freshwater Intrusion* could potentially affect chemical retardation and the
26 stability of colloids. Changes in *Groundwater Eh* and *Groundwater pH* could also affect the
27 migration of radionuclides (see FEPs W65 to W70). No natural EPs have been identified that
28 could result in *Saline Intrusion* into units above the Salado, and the magnitude of any natural
29 temporal variation due to the effects of dissolution on groundwater chemistry, or due to changes
30 in recharge, is likely to be no greater than the present spatial variation. These FEPs related to the
31 effects of future natural changes in groundwater chemistry have been eliminated from PA
32 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

33 The most likely mechanism for (natural) *freshwater intrusion* into the Culebra (FEP N35),
34 *Changes in Groundwater Eh* (N36), and *Changes in Groundwater pH* (N37) is (natural)
35 recharge of the Culebra. (Other FEPs consider possible anthropogenically induced recharge).
36 These three FEPs are closely related because an increase in the rate of recharge could reduce the
37 ionic strength(s) of Culebra groundwaters, possibly enough to saturate the Culebra with
38 (essentially) fresh water, at least temporarily. Such a change in ionic strength could, if enough
39 atmospheric oxygen remained in solution, also increase the Eh of Culebra groundwaters enough
40 to oxidize plutonium from the relatively immobile +III and +IV oxidation states (Pu(III) and
41 Pu(IV)) – the oxidation states expected under current conditions (Brush 1996; Brush and Storz
42 1996) – to the relatively mobile +V and +VI oxidation states (Pu(V) and Pu(VI)). Similarly,

1 recharge of the Culebra with freshwater could also change the pH of Culebra groundwaters from
2 the currently observed range of about 6 to 7 to mildly acidic values, thus (possibly) decreasing the
3 retardation of dissolved Pu and Am. (These changes in ionic strength, Eh, and pH could also
4 affect mobilities of Th, U, and neptunium (Np), but the long-term performance of the WIPP is
5 much less sensitive to the mobilities of these radioelements than to those of Pu and Am.)

6 There is still considerable uncertainty regarding the extent and timing of recharge of the Culebra.
7 Lambert (1986), Lambert and Carter (1987), Lambert and Harvey (1987), and Lambert (1991)
8 used a variety of stable and radiogenic, isotopic-dating techniques to conclude that the Rustler
9 (and the Dewey Lake Formation) have been closed hydrologic systems for several thousand to a
10 few tens of thousands of years. In other words, the last significant recharge of the Rustler
11 occurred during the late Pleistocene in response to higher levels of precipitation and infiltration
12 associated with the most recent continental glaciation of North America, and the current flow
13 field in the Culebra is the result of the slow discharge of groundwater from this unit. Other
14 investigators have agreed that it is possible that Pleistocene recharge has contributed to present-
15 day flow patterns in the Culebra, but that current patterns are also consistent with significant
16 current recharge (Haug et al. 1987; Davies 1989). Still others (Chapman 1986, 1988) have
17 rejected Lambert's interpretations in favor of exclusively modern recharge, at least in some
18 areas. For example, the low-salinity of Hydrochemical Zone B south of the WIPP site could
19 represent dilution of Culebra groundwater with significant quantities of recently introduced
20 meteoric water (see Siegel et al. 1991, pp. 2-57 – 2-62 and Figure 2-17 for definitions and
21 locations of the four hydrochemical facies in the Culebra in and around the WIPP site).

22 The current program to explain the cause(s) of the rising water levels observed in Culebra
23 monitoring wells may elucidate the nature and timing of recharge. However, the justification of
24 this screening decision does not depend on how this issue is resolved. If recharge occurs mainly
25 during periods of high precipitation (pluvials) associated with periods of continental glaciation,
26 the consequences of such recharge are probably already reflected in the ranges of geochemical
27 conditions currently observed in the Culebra as a whole, as well as along the likely offsite
28 transport pathway (the direction of flow from the point(s) at which brines from the repository
29 would enter the Culebra in the event of human intrusion to the south or south-southeast and
30 eventually to the boundary of the WIPP site). Hence, the effects of recharge, (possible)
31 freshwater intrusion, and (possible) concomitant changes in groundwater Eh and pH can be
32 screened out on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the far-field barrier. The
33 reasons for the conclusion that the effects of pluvial recharge are inconsequential (are already
34 included among existing variations in geochemical conditions) are: (1) as many as 50
35 continental glaciations and associated pluvials have occurred since the late Pliocene Epoch
36 2.5 million years ago (2.5 Ma BP); (2) the glaciations and pluvials that have occurred since about
37 0.5 to 1 Ma BP have been significantly more severe than those that occurred prior to 1 Ma BP
38 (see, for example, Servant 2001); (3) the studies that quantified the retardation of Th, U, Pu, and
39 Am for the WIPP CCA PA calculations and the EPA's PAVT were carried out under conditions
40 that encompass those observed along the likely Culebra offsite transport pathway (Brush 1996;
41 Brush and Storz 1996); and (4) these studies demonstrated that conditions in the Culebra are
42 favorable for retardation of actinides despite the effects of as many as 50 periods of recharge.

43 It is also worth noting that the choice of the most recent glacial maximum as an upper limit for
44 possible climatic changes during the 10,000 year WIPP regulatory period (Swift 1991 CCA

1 Appendix CLI) established conservative upper limits for precipitation and recharge of the
2 Culebra at the WIPP site. The review by Swift (1991), later incorporated in CCA Appendix CLI,
3 provides evidence that precipitation in New Mexico did not attain its maximum level (about 60-
4 100 percent of current precipitation) until a few thousand years before the last glacial maximum.
5 Swift pointed out that:

6 Prior to the last glacial maximum 22 to 18 ka BP, evidence from mid- Wisconsin faunal
7 assemblages in caves in southern New Mexico, including the presence of extralimital species such
8 as the desert tortoise that are now restricted to warmer climates, suggests warm summers and mild,
9 relatively dry winters (Harris 1987, 1988). Lacustrine evidence confirms the interpretation that
10 conditions prior to and during the glacial advance that were generally drier than those at the glacial
11 maximum. Permanent water did not appear in what was later to be a major lake in the Estancia
12 Valley in central New Mexico until sometime before 24 ka BP (Bachhuber 1989). Late-
13 Pleistocene lake levels in the San Agustin Plains in western New Mexico remained low until
14 approximately 26.4 ka BP, and the $\delta^{18}\text{O}$ record from ostracode shells suggests that mean annual
15 temperatures at that location did not decrease significantly until approximately 22 ka BP (Phillips
16 et al. 1992).

17 Therefore, it is likely that precipitation and recharge did not attain levels characteristic of the
18 most recent glacial maximum until about 70,000 to 75,000 years after the last glaciations had
19 begun. High-resolution, deep-sea $\delta^{18}\text{O}$ data (and other data) reviewed by Servant (2001, Figures
20 1 and 2) support the conclusion that, although the volume of ice incorporated in continental ice
21 sheets can expand rapidly at the start of a glaciation rapidly, attainment of maximum volume
22 does not occur until a few thousand or a few tens of thousands of years prior to the termination
23 of the approximately 100,000-year glaciations that have occurred during the last 0.5-1 Ma BP.
24 Therefore, it is unlikely that precipitation and recharge will reach their maximum levels during
25 the 10,000-year regulatory period.

26 If, on the other hand, significant recharge occurs throughout both phases of the glacial-
27 interglacial cycles, the conclusion that the effects of pluvial and modern recharge are
28 inconsequential (are already reflected by existing variations in geochemical conditions) is also
29 still valid.

30 SCR-4.3.1.4 FEP Number: N38
31 FEP Title: ***Effects of Dissolution***

32 SCR-4.3.1.4.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

33 See discussion in ***Saline Intrusion*** (N34).

1 **SCR-4.4 Geomorphological Features, Events, and Processes**

2 **SCR-4.4.1 Physiography**

3 SCR-4.4.1.1 FEP Number: N39
4 FEP Title: **Physiography**

5 SCR-4.4.1.1.1 Screening Decision: UP

6 *Relevant aspects of the **physiography**, geomorphology, and topography of the region around the*
7 *WIPP are accounted for in PA calculations.*

8 SCR-4.4.1.1.2 Summary of New Information

9 No new information has been identified related to this FEP. No changes have been made.

10 SCR-4.4.1.1.3 Screening Argument

11 ***Physiography** and geomorphology are discussed in detail in Section 2.1.4, and are accounted for*
12 *in the setup of the PA calculations (Section 6.4.2).*

13 SCR-4.4.1.2 FEP Number: N40
14 FEP Title: **Impact of a Large Meteorite**

15 SCR-4.4.1.2.1 Screening Decision: SO-P

16 *Disruption arising from the **Impact of a Large Meteorite** has been eliminated from PA*
17 *calculations on the basis of low probability of occurrence over 10,000 years.*

18 SCR-4.4.1.3 Summary of New Information

19 No new information has been identified related to this FEP. No changes have been made.

20 SCR-4.4.1.4 Screening Argument

21 Meteors frequently enter the earth's atmosphere, but most of these are small and burn up before
22 reaching the ground. Of those that reach the ground, most produce only small impact craters that
23 would have no effect on the postclosure integrity of a repository 650 m (2,150 ft) below the
24 ground surface. While the depth of a crater may be only one-eighth of its diameter, the depth of
25 the disrupted and brecciated material is typically one-third of the overall crater diameter (Grieve
26 1987, p. 248). Direct disruption of waste at the WIPP would only occur with a crater larger than
27 1.8 km (1.1 mi) in diameter. Even if waste were not directly disrupted, the ***impact of a large***
28 ***meteorite*** could create a zone of fractured rocks beneath and around the crater. The extent of
29 such a zone would depend on the rock type. For sedimentary rocks, the zone may extend to a
30 depth of half the crater diameter or more (Dence et al. 1977, p. 263). The impact of a meteorite
31 causing a crater larger than 1 km (0.6 mi) in diameter could thus fracture the Salado above the
32 repository.

1 Geological evidence for meteorite impacts on earth is rare because many meteorites fall into the
 2 oceans and erosion and sedimentation serve to obscure craters that form on land. Dietz (1961)
 3 estimated that meteorites that cause craters larger than 1 km (0.6 mi) in diameter strike the earth
 4 at the rate of about one every 10,000 years (equivalent to about 2×10^{-13} impacts per square
 5 kilometer per year). Using observations from the Canadian Shield, Hartmann (1965, p. 161)
 6 estimated a frequency of between 0.8×10^{-13} and 17×10^{-13} per square kilometer per year for
 7 impacts causing craters larger than 1 km (0.6 mi). Frequencies estimated for larger impacts in
 8 studies reported by Grieve (1987, p. 263) can be extrapolated to give a rate of about 1.3×10^{-12}
 9 per square kilometer per year for craters larger than 1 km (0.6 mi). It is commonly assumed that
 10 meteorite impacts are randomly distributed across the earth's surface, although Halliday (1964,
 11 pp. 267-277) calculated that the rate of impact in polar regions would be some 50 to 60 percent
 12 of that in equatorial regions. The frequencies reported by Grieve (1987) would correspond to an
 13 overall rate of about 1 per 1,000 years on the basis of a random distribution.

14 Assuming the higher estimated impact rate of 17×10^{-13} impacts per square kilometer per year
 15 for impacts leading to fracturing of sufficient extent to affect a deep repository and assuming a
 16 repository footprint of 1.4 km \times 1.6 km (0.9 mi \times 1.0 mi) for the WIPP yields a frequency of
 17 about 4×10^{-12} impacts per year for a direct hit above the repository. This impact frequency is
 18 several orders of magnitude below the screening limit of 10^{-4} per 10,000 years provided in 40
 19 CFR \S 194.32(d).

20 Meteorite hits directly above the repository footprint are not the only impacts of concern,
 21 however, because large craters may disrupt the waste panels even if the center of the crater is
 22 outside the repository area. It is possible to calculate the frequency of meteorite impacts that
 23 could disrupt a deep repository such as the WIPP by using the conservative model of a cylinder
 24 of rock fractured to a depth equal to one-half the crater diameter, as shown in CCA Appendix
 25 SCR, Figure SCR-1. The area within which a meteorite could impact the repository is calculated
 26 by

$$27 \quad S_D = \left(L + 2 \times \frac{D}{2} \right) \times \left(W + 2 \times \frac{D}{2} \right), \quad (1)$$

28 Where

- 29 L = length of the repository footprint (kilometers),
- 30 W = width of the repository footprint (kilometers),
- 31 D = diameter of the impact crater (kilometers), and
- 32 S_D = area of the region where the crater would disrupt the repository (square
 33 kilometers).

34 There are insufficient data on meteorites that have struck the earth to derive a distribution
 35 function for the size of craters directly. Using meteorite impacts on the moon as an analogy,
 36 however, Grieve (1987, p. 257) derived the following distribution function:

$$37 \quad F_D \propto D^{-18} \quad (2)$$

1 where

2 F_D = frequency of impacts resulting in craters larger than D (impacts per square
3 kilometer per year).

4 If $f(D)$ denotes the frequency of impacts giving craters of diameter D, then the frequency of
5 impacts giving craters larger than D is

$$6 \quad F_D = \int_D^{\infty} f(D) dD \quad (3)$$

7 and

$$8 \quad f(D) = F_1 \times 1.8 \times D^{-2.8}, \quad (4)$$

9 where

10 F_1 = frequency of impacts resulting in craters larger than 1 km (impacts per square
11 kilometer per year), and

12 $f(D)$ = frequency of impacts resulting in craters of diameter D (impacts per square
13 kilometer per year).

14 The overall frequency of meteorite impacts that could disrupt or fracture the repository is thus
15 given by

$$16 \quad N = \int_{2h}^{\infty} f(D) \times S_D dD, \quad (5)$$

17 Where

18 h = depth to repository (kilometers),

19 N = frequency of impacts leading to disruption of the repository (impacts per year),
20 and

$$21 \quad N = 1.8F_1 \left[1.8 LW(2h)^{-1.8} + 0.8(L + W)(2h)^{-0.8} - 0.2(2h)^{0.2} \right] \quad (6)$$

22 If it is assumed that the repository is located at a depth of 650 m (2,150 ft) and has a footprint
23 area of 1.4 km × 1.6 km (0.9 mi × 1.0 mi) and that meteorites creating craters larger than 1 km in
24 diameter hit the earth at a frequency (F_1) of 17×10^{-13} impacts per square kilometer per year,
25 then Equation (6) gives a frequency of approximately 1.3×10^{-11} impacts per year for impacts
26 disrupting the repository. If impacts are randomly distributed over time, this corresponds to a
27 probability of 1.3×10^{-7} over 10,000 years.

28 Similar calculations have been performed that indicate rates of impact of between 10^{-12} and 10^{-13}
29 per year for meteorites large enough to disrupt a deep repository (see, for example, Hartmann
30 1979, Kärnbränslesakerhet 1978, Claiborne and Gera 1974, Cranwell et al. 1990, and Thorne

1 1992). Meteorite impact can thus be eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
2 probability of occurrence over 10,000 years.

3 Assuming a random or nearly random distribution of meteorite impacts, cratering at any location
4 is inevitable given sufficient time. Although repository depth and host-rock lithology may
5 reduce the consequences of a **Meteorite Impact**, there are no repository locations or engineered
6 systems that can reduce the probability of impact over 10,000 years.

7 SCR-4.4.1.5 FEP Number: N41 and N42
8 FEP Title(s): **Mechanical Weathering** (N41)
9 **Chemical Weathering** (N42)

10 SCR-4.4.1.5.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

11 *The effects of **Chemical and Mechanical Weathering** have been eliminated from PA*
12 *calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

13 SCR-4.4.1.5.2 Summary of New Information

14 No new information has been identified related to these FEPs. No changes have been made.

15 SCR-4.4.1.5.3 Screening Argument

16 **Mechanical Weathering** and **Chemical Weathering** are assumed to be occurring at or near the
17 surface around the WIPP site, through processes such as exfoliation and leaching. The extent of
18 these processes is limited and they will contribute little to the overall rate of erosion in the area
19 or to the availability of material for other erosional processes. The effects of **Chemical and**
20 **Mechanical Weathering** have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
21 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

22 SCR-4.4.1.6 FEP Number: N43, N44 & N45
23 FEP Title: **Aeolian Erosion** (N43)
24 **Fluvial Erosion** (N44)
25 **Mass Wasting** (N45)

26 SCR-4.4.1.6.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

27 *The effects of **Fluvial and Aeolian Erosion and Mass Wasting** in the region of the WIPP have*
28 *been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the*
29 *disposal system.*

30 SCR-4.4.1.6.2 Summary of New Information

31 No new information has been identified related to the screening of these FEPs. No changes have
32 been made.

1 SCR-4.4.1.6.3 Screening Argument

2 The geomorphological regime on the Mescalero Plain (Los Medaños) in the region of the WIPP
3 is dominated by aeolian processes. Dunes are present in the area, and although some are
4 stabilized by vegetation, ***Aeolian Erosion*** will occur as they migrate across the area. Old dunes
5 will be replaced by new dunes, and no significant changes in the overall thickness of aeolian
6 material are likely to occur.

7 Currently, precipitation in the region of the WIPP is too low (about 33 cm [13 in.] per year) to
8 cause perennial streams, and the relief in the area is too low for extensive sheet flood erosion
9 during storms. An increase in precipitation to around 61 cm (24 in.) per year in cooler climatic
10 conditions could result in perennial streams, but the nature of the relief and the presence of
11 dissolution hollows and sinks will ensure that these streams remain small. Significant ***Fluvial***
12 ***Erosion*** is not expected during the next 10,000 years.

13 ***Mass Wasting*** (the downslope movement of material caused by the direct effect of gravity) is
14 important only in terms of sediment erosion in regions of steep slopes. In the vicinity of the
15 WIPP, Mass ***Wasting*** will be insignificant under the climatic conditions expected over the next
16 10,000 years.

17 Erosion from wind, water, and mass wasting will continue in the WIPP region throughout the
18 next 10,000 years at rates similar to those occurring at present. These rates are too low to affect
19 the performance of the disposal system significantly. Thus, the effects of ***Fluvial*** and ***Aeolian***
20 ***Erosion*** and Mass ***Wasting*** have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
21 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

22 SCR-4.4.1.7 FEP Number: N50
23 FEP Title: **Soil Development**

24 SCR-4.4.1.7.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

25 ***Soil Development*** has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to
26 the performance of the disposal system.

27 SCR-4.4.1.7.2 Summary of New Information

28 No new information has been identified related to the screening of this FEP. Editorial changes
29 have been made.

30 SCR-4.4.1.7.3 Screening Argument

31 The Mescalero caliche is a well-developed calcareous remnant of an extensive soil profile across
32 the WIPP site and adjacent areas. Although this unit may be up to 3 m (10 ft) thick, it is not
33 continuous and does not prevent infiltration to the underlying formations. At Nash Draw, this
34 caliche, dated in Lappin et al. (1989, pp. 2-4) at 410,000 to 510,000 years old, is present in
35 collapse blocks, indicating some growth of Nash Draw in the late Pleistocene. Localized gypsite
36 spring deposits about 25,000 years old occur along the eastern flank of Nash Draw, but the
37 springs are not currently active. The Berino soil, interpreted as 333,000 years old (Rosholt and

1 McKinney 1980, Table 5), is a thin soil horizon above the Mescalero caliche. The persistence of
2 these soils on the Livingston Ridge and the lack of deformation indicates the relative stability of
3 the WIPP region over the past half-million years.

4 Continued growth of caliche may occur in the future but will be of low consequence in terms of
5 its effect on infiltration. Other soils in the area are not extensive enough to affect the amount of
6 infiltration that reaches underlying aquifers. *Soil Development* has been eliminated from PA
7 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

8 **SCR-4.5 Surface Hydrological Features, Events, and Processes**

9 ***SCR-4.5.1 Depositional Processes***

10 SCR-4.5.1.1 FEP Number: N46, N47, N48 and N49
11 FEP Title: *Aeolian Deposition* (N46)
12 *Fluvial Deposition* (47)
13 *Lacustrine Deposition* (N48)
14 *Mass Waste (Deposition)* (N49)

15 SCR-4.5.1.1.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

16 *The effects of Aeolian, Fluvial, and Lacustrine deposition and sedimentation in the region of the*
17 *WIPP have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the*
18 *performance of the disposal system.*

19 SCR-4.5.1.1.2 Summary of New Information

20 No new information has been identified related to the screening of these FEPs. No changes have
21 been made.

22 SCR-4.5.1.1.3 Screening Argument

23 The geomorphological regime on the Mescalero Plain (Los Medaños) in the region of the WIPP
24 is dominated by aeolian processes, but although some dunes are stabilized by vegetation, no
25 significant changes in the overall thickness of aeolian material are expected to occur.
26 Vegetational changes during periods of wetter climate may further stabilize the dune fields, but
27 *Aeolian Deposition* is not expected to significantly increase the overall thickness of the
28 superficial deposits.

29 The limited extent of water courses in the region of the WIPP, under both present-day conditions
30 and under the expected climatic conditions, will restrict the amount of *Fluvial Deposition* and
31 *Lacustrine Deposition* in the region.

32 *Mass Wasting (Deposition)* may be significant if it results in dams or modifies streams. In the
33 region around the WIPP, the Pecos River forms a significant water course some 19 km (12 mi)
34 away, but the broadness of its valley precludes either significant mass wasting or the formation
35 of large impoundments.

1 Sedimentation from wind, water, and Mass **Wasting** is expected to continue in the WIPP region
2 throughout the next 10,000 years at the low rates similar to those occurring at present. These
3 rates are too low to significantly affect the performance of the disposal system. Thus, the effects
4 of **Aeolian, Fluvial, and Lacustrine Deposition** and sedimentation resulting from Mass **Wasting**
5 have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence.

6 **SCR-4.5.2 Streams and Lakes**

7 SCR-4.5.2.1 FEPs Number: N51
8 FEPs Title: **Stream and River Flow**

9 SCR-4.5.2.1.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

10 ***Stream and River Flow** has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low*
11 *consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

12 SCR-4.5.2.1.2 Summary of New Information

13 No new information has been identified related to the screening of this FEP. No changes have
14 been made.

15 SCR-4.5.2.1.3 Screening Argument

16 No perennial streams are present at the WIPP site, and there is no evidence in the literature
17 indicating that such features existed at this location since the Pleistocene (see, for example,
18 Powers et al. 1978; and Bachman 1974, 1981, and 1987b). The Pecos River is approximately
19 19 km (12 mi) from the WIPP site and more than 90 m (300 ft) lower in elevation. **Stream and**
20 **River Flow** have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the
21 performance of the disposal system.

22 SCR-4.5.2.2 FEP Number: N52
23 FEP Title: **Surface Water Bodies**

24 SCR-4.5.2.2.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

25 *The effects of **Surface Water Bodies** have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of*
26 *low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

27 SCR-4.5.2.2.2 Summary of New Information

28 No new information has been identified related to the screening of this FEP. No changes have
29 been made.

30 SCR-4.5.2.2.3 Screening Argument

31 No standing **Surface Water Bodies** are present at the WIPP site, and there is no evidence in the
32 literature indicating that such features existed at this location during or after the Pleistocene (see,
33 for example, Powers et al. 1978; and Bachman 1974, 1981, and 1987b). In Nash Draw, lakes

1 and spoil ponds associated with potash mines are located at elevations 30 m (100 ft) below the
 2 elevation of the land surface at the location of the waste panels. There is no evidence in the
 3 literature to suggest that Nash Draw was formed by stream erosion or was at any time the
 4 location of a deep body of standing water, although shallow playa lakes have existed there at
 5 various times. Based on these factors, the formation of large lakes is unlikely and the formation
 6 of smaller lakes and ponds is of little consequence to the performance of the disposal system.
 7 The effects of **Surface Water Bodies** have therefore been eliminated from PA calculations on the
 8 basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

9 **SCR-4.5.3 Groundwater Recharge and Discharge**

10 SCR-4.5.3.1 FEP Number: N53, N54, and N55
 11 FEP Title: **Groundwater Discharge (N53)**
 12 **Groundwater Recharge (N54)**
 13 **Infiltration (N55)**

14 SCR-4.5.3.1.1 Screening Decision: UP

15 **Groundwater Recharge, Infiltration, and Groundwater Discharge are accounted for in PA**
 16 **calculations.**

17 SCR-4.5.3.1.2 Summary of New Information

18 No new information has been identified for these FEPs. Since these FEPs are accounted for
 19 (UP) in PA, the implementation may differ from that used in the CCA, however the screening
 20 decision has not changed. Changes in implementation (if any) are described in Chapter 6.0.

21 SCR-4.5.3.1.3 Screening Argument

22 The groundwater basin described in Section 2.2.1.4 is governed by flow from areas where the
 23 water table is high to areas where the water table is low. The height of the water table is
 24 governed by the amount of **Groundwater Recharge** reaching the water table, which in turn is a
 25 function of the vertical hydraulic conductivity and the partitioning of precipitation between
 26 evapotranspiration, runoff, and **Infiltration**. Flow within the Rustler is also governed by the
 27 amount of **Groundwater Discharge** that takes place from the basin. In the region around the
 28 WIPP, the principal discharge areas are along Nash Draw and the Pecos River. Groundwater
 29 flow modeling accounts for infiltration, recharge, and discharge (Sections 2.2.1.4 and 6.4.10.2).

30 SCR-4.5.3.2 FEP Number: N56
 31 FEP Title: **Changes in Groundwater Recharge and Discharge**

32 SCR-4.5.3.2.1 Screening Decision: UP

33 **Changes in Groundwater Recharge and Discharge arising as a result of climate change are**
 34 **accounted for in PA calculations.**

1 SCR-4.5.3.2.2 Summary of New Information

2 No information has become available that would change the screening decision for this FEP.
 3 Changes in the implementation (if any) of this FEP within PA are addressed in Chapter 6.0. This
 4 FEP has been separated from N57 and N58 for editorial purposes.

5 SCR-4.5.3.2.3 Screening Argument

6 Changes in recharge may affect groundwater flow and radionuclide transport in units such as the
 7 Culebra and Magenta dolomites. Changes in the surface environment driven by natural climate
 8 change are expected to occur over the next 10,000 years (see FEPs N59 to N63). Groundwater
 9 basin modeling (Section 2.2.1.4) indicates that a change in recharge will affect the height of the
 10 water table in the area of the WIPP, and that this will in turn affect the direction and rate of
 11 groundwater flow.

12 The present-day water table in the vicinity of the WIPP is within the Dewey Lake at about 980 m
 13 (3,215 ft) above mean sea level (Section 2.2.1.4.2.1). An increase in recharge relative to present-
 14 day conditions would raise the water table, potentially as far as the local ground surface.
 15 Similarly, a decrease in recharge could result in a lowering of the water table. The low
 16 transmissivity of the Dewey Lake and the Rustler ensures that any such lowering of the water
 17 table will be at a slow rate, and lateral discharge from the groundwater basin is expected to
 18 persist for several thousand years after any decrease in recharge. Under the anticipated changes
 19 in climate over the next 10,000 years, the water table will not fall below the base of the Dewey
 20 Lake, and dewatering of the Culebra is not expected to occur during this period (Section 2.2.1.4).

21 ***Changes in Groundwater Recharge and Discharge*** are accounted for in PA calculations
 22 through definition of the boundary conditions for flow and transport in the Culebra (Section
 23 6.4.9).

24 SCR-4.5.3.3 FEP Number: N57 & N58
 25 FEP Title: ***Lake Formation*** (N57)
 26 ***River Flooding*** (N58)

27 SCR-4.5.3.3.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

28 *The effects of **River Flooding and Lake Formation** have been eliminated from PA calculations*
 29 *on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

30 SCR-4.5.3.3.2 Summary of New Information

31 The original text in CCA Appendix SCR has been modified only to remove reference to other
 32 FEPs. No substantive changes have been made to the FEP descriptions, screening arguments, or
 33 screening decision.

1 SCR-4.5.3.3.3 Screening Argument

2 Intermittent flooding of stream channels and the formation of shallow lakes will occur in the
3 WIPP region over the next 10,000 years. These may have a short-lived and local effect on the
4 height of the water table, but are unlikely to affect groundwater flow in the Culebra.

5 Future occurrences of playa lakes or other longer-term floods will be remote from the WIPP and
6 will have little consequence on system performance in terms of groundwater flow at the site.
7 There is no reason to believe that any impoundments or lakes could form over the WIPP site
8 itself. Thus, **River Flooding** and **Lake Formation** have been eliminated from PA calculations on
9 the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

10 **SCR-4.6 Climate Events and Processes**

11 **SCR-4.6.1 Climate and Climate Changes**

12 SCR-4.6.1.1 FEP Number: N59 and N60
13 FEP Title: **Precipitation** (N59)
14 **Temperature** (N60)

15 SCR-4.6.1.1.1 Screening Decision: UP

16 *Precipitation and temperature are accounted for in PA calculations.*

17 SCR-4.6.1.1.2 Summary of New Information

18 No new information has been identified for these FEPs. Since these FEPs are accounted for
19 (UP) in PA, the implementation may differ from that used in the CCA, however the screening
20 decision has not changed. Changes in implementation (if any) are described in Chapter 6.0.

21 SCR-4.6.1.1.3 Screening Argument

22 The climate and meteorology of the region around the WIPP are described in, Section 2.5.2.
23 Precipitation in the region is low (about 33 cm (13 in.) per year) and temperatures are moderate
24 with a mean annual temperature of about 63°F (17°C). **Precipitation** and **Temperature** are
25 important controls on the amount of recharge that reaches the groundwater system and are
26 accounted for in PA calculations by use of a sampled parameter for scaling flow velocity in the
27 Culebra (Section 6.4.9 and Appendix PA, Attachment PAR).

28 SCR-4.6.1.2 FEP Number: N61
29 FEP Title: **Climate Change**

30 SCR-4.6.1.2.1 Screening Decision: UP

31 *Climate Change is accounted for in PA calculations.*

1 SCR-4.6.1.2.2 Summary of New Information

2 No new information has been identified for this FEP. Since this FEP is accounted for (UP) in
 3 PA, the implementation may differ from that used in the CCA, although the screening decision
 4 has not changed. Changes in implementation (if any) are described in Chapter 6.0.

5 SCR-4.6.1.2.3 Screening Argument

6 **Climate Changes** are instigated by changes in the earth's orbit, which affect the amount of
 7 insolation, and by feedback mechanisms within the atmosphere and hydrosphere. Models of
 8 these mechanisms, combined with interpretations of the geological record, suggest that the
 9 climate will become cooler and wetter in the WIPP region during the next 10,000 years as a
 10 result of natural causes. Other changes, such as fluctuations in radiation intensity from the sun
 11 and variability within the many feedback mechanisms, will modify this climatic response to
 12 orbital changes. The available evidence suggests that these changes will be less extreme than
 13 those arising from orbital fluctuations.

14 The effect of a change to cooler and wetter conditions is considered to be an increase in the
 15 amount of recharge, which in turn will affect the height of the water table (see FEPs N53 through
 16 N56). The height of the water table across the groundwater basin is an important control on the
 17 rate and direction of groundwater flow within the Culebra (see Section 2.2.1.4), and hence
 18 potentially on transport of radionuclides released to the Culebra through the shafts or intrusion
 19 boreholes. **Climate Change** is accounted for in PA calculations through a sampled parameter
 20 used to scale groundwater flow velocity in the Culebra (Section 6.4.9 and Appendix PA,
 21 Attachment PAR).

22 SCR-4.6.1.3 FEP Number: N62 and N63
 23 FEP Title: **Glaciation** (N62)
 24 **Permafrost** (N63)

25 SCR-4.6.1.3.1 Screening Decision: SO-P

26 *Glaciation and the effects of Permafrost have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis*
 27 *of low probability of occurrence over 10,000 years.*

28 SCR-4.6.1.3.2 Summary of New Information

29 No new information has been identified related to the screening of these FEPs. No changes have
 30 been made.

31 SCR-4.6.1.3.3 Screening Argument

32 No evidence exists to suggest that the northern part of the Delaware Basin has been covered by
 33 continental glaciers at any time since the beginning of the Paleozoic Era. During the maximum
 34 extent of continental glaciation in the Pleistocene Epoch, glaciers extended into northeastern
 35 Kansas at their closest approach to southeastern New Mexico. There is no evidence that alpine
 36 glaciers formed in the region of the WIPP during the Pleistocene glacial periods.

1 According to the theory that relates the periodicity of climate change to perturbations in the
2 earth's orbit, a return to a full glacial cycle within the next 10,000 years is highly unlikely
3 (Imbrie and Imbrie 1980, 951).

4 Thus, **Glaciation** has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability of
5 occurrence over the next 10,000 years. Similarly, a number of processes associated with the
6 proximity of an ice sheet or valley glacier, such as **Permafrost** and accelerated slope erosion
7 (solifluction) have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability of
8 occurrence over the next 10,000 years.

9 **SCR-4.7 Marine Features, Events, and Process**

10 **SCR-4.7.1 Seas, Sedimentation, and Level Changes**

11 SCR-4.7.1.1 FEP Number(s): N64 and N65
12 FEP Title(s): **Seas and Oceans** (N64)
13 **Estuaries** (N65)

14 SCR-4.7.1.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

15 *The effects of **Estuaries**, seas, and oceans have has been eliminated from PA calculations on the*
16 *basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

17 SCR-4.7.1.1.2 Summary of New Information

18 No new information has been identified related to this FEP. No changes have been made.

19 SCR-4.7.1.1.3 Screening Argument

20 The WIPP site is more than 800 km (480 mi) from the Pacific Ocean and from the Gulf of
21 Mexico. **Estuaries** and **Seas and Oceans** have therefore been eliminated from PA calculations on
22 the basis of low consequence to the disposal system.

23 SCR-4.7.1.2 FEPs Number(s): N66 and N67
24 FEPs Title(s): **Coastal Erosion** (N66)
25 **Marine Sediment Transport and Deposition** (N67)

26 SCR-4.7.1.2.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

27 *The effects of **Coastal Erosion**, and **Marine Sediment Transport and Deposition** have been*
28 *eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the*
29 *disposal system.*

30 SCR-4.7.1.2.2 Summary of New Information

31 No new information has been identified related to these FEPs. No changes have been made.

1 SCR-4.7.1.2.3 Screening Argument

2 The WIPP site is more than 800 km (480 mi) from the Pacific Ocean and Gulf of Mexico. The
3 effects of *Coastal Erosion*, and *Marine Sediment Transport and Deposition* have therefore been
4 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
5 disposal system.

6 SCR-4.7.1.3 FEP Number: N68
7 FEP Title: *Sea Level Changes*

8 SCR-4.7.1.3.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

9 *The effects of both short-term and long-term Sea Level Changes have been eliminated from PA*
10 *calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

11 SCR-4.7.1.3.2 Summary of New Information

12 No new information has been identified relating to the screening of this FEP. No changes have
13 been made.

14 SCR-4.7.1.3.3 Screening Argument

15 The WIPP site is some 1,036 m (3,400 ft) above sea level. Global *Sea Level Changes* may
16 result in sea levels as much as 140 m (460 ft) below that of the present day during glacial
17 periods, according to Chappell and Shackleton (1986, p. 138). This can have marked effects on
18 coastal aquifers. During the next 10,000 years, the global sea level can be expected to drop
19 towards this glacial minimum, but this will not affect the groundwater system in the vicinity of
20 the WIPP. Short-term changes in sea level, brought about by events such as meteorite impact,
21 tsunamis, seiches, and hurricanes may raise water levels by several tens of meters. Such events
22 have a maximum duration of a few days and will have no effect on the surface or groundwater
23 systems at the WIPP site. Anthropogenic-induced global warming has been conjectured by
24 Warrick and Oerlemans (1990, p. 278) to result in longer-term sea level rise. The magnitude of
25 this rise, however, is not expected to be more than a few meters, and such a variation will have
26 no effect on the groundwater system in the WIPP region. Thus, the effects of both short-term
27 and long-term *Sea Level Changes* have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of
28 low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

1 **SCR-4.8 Ecological Features, Events, and Process**

2 **SCR-4.8.1 Flora and Fauna**

3 SCR-4.8.1.1 FEP Number(s): N69 and N70

4 FEP Title(s): **Plants** (N69)

5 **Animals** (N70)

6 SCR-4.8.1.1.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

7 *The effects of the natural **Plants and Animals**, (flora and fauna) in the region of the WIPP have*
8 *been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the*
9 *disposal system.*

10 SCR-4.8.1.1.2 Summary of New Information

11 No new information has been identified related to the screening of these FEPs. Only editorial
12 changes have been made.

13 SCR-4.8.1.1.3 Screening Argument

14 The terrestrial and aquatic ecology of the region around the WIPP is described in Section 2.4.1.
15 The **Plants** in the region are predominantly shrubs and grasses. The most conspicuous **Animals**
16 in the area are jackrabbits and cottontail rabbits. The effects of this flora and fauna in the region
17 have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance
18 of the disposal system.

19 SCR-4.8.1.2 FEP Number: N71

20 FEP Title: **Microbes**

21 SCR-4.8.1.2.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

22 UP for colloidal effects and gas generation

23 *The effects of **Microbes** on the region of the WIPP has been eliminated from PA calculations on*
24 *the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

25 SCR-4.8.1.2.2 Summary of New Information

26 **Microbes** can be important in soil development. As dissolved actinide elements are introduced to
27 the Culebra, it is possible that those dissolved actinides can sorb onto **Microbes**. However, due
28 to the size effect, **Microbes** will be rapidly filtered out of the advective flow domain; hence, the
29 effect of **Microbes** on radionuclide transport in the Culebra will be insignificant. The original
30 screening decision remains valid. Additional information has been included to support the
31 screening argument.

1 SCR-4.8.1.2.3 Screening Argument

2 **Microbes** are presumed to be present with the thin soil horizons. Gillow et al. (2000)
3 characterized the microbial distribution in Culebra groundwater at the WIPP site. Culebra
4 groundwater contained $1.51 \pm 1.08 \times 10^5$ cells/ml. The dimension of the cells are 0.75 μm in
5 length and 0.58 μm in width, right at the upper limit of colloidal particle size. Gillow et al.
6 (2000) also found that at pH 5.0, Culebra denitrifier CDn ($0.90 \pm 0.02 \times 10^8$ cells/ml) removed
7 32 percent of the uranium added to sorption experiments, which is equivalent to 180 ± 10 mg
8 U/g of dry cells. Another isolate from WIPP (*Halomonas* sp.) ($3.55 \pm 0.11 \times 10^8$ cells/ml) sorbed
9 79 percent of the added uranium. Due to their large sizes, microbial cells as colloidal particles
10 will be rapidly filtered out in the Culebra formation. Therefore, the original FEP screening
11 decision that **Microbes** in groundwater have an insignificant impact on radionuclide transport in
12 the Culebra formation remains valid. A similar conclusion has also been arrived for Sweden
13 repository environments (Pedersen 1999).

14 SCR-4.8.1.3 FEP Number: N72
15 FEP Title: **Natural Ecological Development**

16 SCR-4.8.1.3.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

17 *The effects of **Natural Ecological Development** likely to occur in the region of the WIPP have*
18 *been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the*
19 *disposal system.*

20 SCR-4.8.1.3.2 Summary of New Information

21 No new information has been identified related to the screening of this FEP. No changes have
22 been made.

23 SCR-4.8.1.3.3 Screening Argument

24 The region around the WIPP is sparsely vegetated as a result of the climate and poor soil quality.
25 Wetter periods are expected during the regulatory period, but botanical records indicate that,
26 even under these conditions, dense vegetation will not be present in the region (Swift 1992; see
27 CCA Appendix CLI, p. 17). The effects of the indigenous fauna are of low consequence to the
28 performance of the disposal system and no natural events or processes have been identified that
29 would lead to a change in this fauna that would be of consequence to system performance.
30 **Natural Ecological Development** in the region of the WIPP has therefore been eliminated from
31 PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

32 **SCR-5.0 SCREENING OF HUMAN-INITIATED EPS**

33 The following section presents screening arguments and decisions for human-initiated EPs.
34 Table SCR-2 provides summary information regarding changes to human-initiated EPs since the
35 CCA. Of the 57 human-initiated EPs, 13 remain unchanged, 39 were updated with new
36 information or were edited for clarity and completeness, 4 screening decisions were changed, 1

1 EP was deleted from the baseline by combining with other more appropriate EPs, and 2 EPs
2 were added.

3 **SCR-5.1 Human Induced Geological Events and Process**

4 ***SCR-5.1.1 Drilling***

5 SCR-5.1.1.1 FEP Number: H1, H2, H4, H8, and H9
6 FEP Title: ***Oil and Gas Exploration (H1)***
7 ***Potash Exploration (H2)***
8 ***Oil and Gas Exploitation (H4)***
9 ***Other Resources (drilling for) (H8)***
10 ***Enhanced Oil and Gas Recovery (drilling for) (H9)***

11 SCR-5.1.1.1.1 Screening Decision: SO-C (HCN)
12 DP (Future)

13 *The effects of historical, current, and near-future drilling associated with Oil and Gas*
14 ***Exploration, Potash Exploration, Oil and Gas Exploitation, Drilling for Other Resources, and***
15 ***Enhanced Oil and Gas Recovery has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low***
16 ***consequence to the performance of the disposal system (see screening discussion for H21, H22,***
17 ***and H23). Oil and gas exploration, potash exploration, oil and gas exploitation, drilling for***
18 ***other resources, and enhanced oil and gas recovery in the future is accounted for in disturbed***
19 ***performance scenarios through incorporation of the rate of future drilling as specified in 40***
20 ***CFR § 194.33.***

21 SCR-5.1.1.1.2 Summary of New Information

22 Regulations require that drilling for resources in the future be considered in PA calculations. As
23 such, deep drilling associated with ***Oil and Gas Exploration, Potash Exploration, Oil and Gas***
24 ***Exploration*** drilling for ***Other Resources***, and ***Enhanced Oil and Gas Recovery*** in the future is
25 accounted for in the PA in DP scenarios via the drilling rate as calculated by the method
26 prescribed by the EPA. For HCN time frames, deep drilling for ***Oil and Gas Exploration,***
27 ***Potash Exploration, Oil and Gas Exploitation,*** and drilling for ***Other Resources*** has been
28 screened out based on consequence. Additionally, ***Drilling for the Purposes of Enhanced Oil***
29 ***and Gas Recovery*** has been screened out based on consequence because the process of drilling
30 does not vary depending on the intended use of the borehole, be it for resource recovery,
31 reservoir stimulation, or for other purposes such as geologic characterization and exploration.
32 The screening decision of SO-C for HCN for these FEPs is largely based on the screening of
33 FEPs H21 ***Drilling Fluid Flow***, H22 ***Drilling Fluid Loss***, and H23 ***Blowouts***. Because these
34 activities are currently taking place, and will not occur within the land withdrawal boundary
35 during the current time period nor in the near future (due to active institutional controls), the only
36 possible impact to the repository could be from ***Drilling Fluid Flow, Fluid Loss, or Blowout*** in
37 boreholes outside the WIPP land withdrawal boundary. The specific effects are discussed in
38 detail within the screening discussions for FEPs H21, H22, and H23.

1 SCR-5.1.1.1.3 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs

2 Resource exploration and exploitation are the most common reasons for drilling in the Delaware
3 Basin and are the most likely reasons for drilling in the near future. The WIPP location has been
4 evaluated for the occurrence of natural resources in economic quantities. Powers et al. (1978)
5 (CCA Appendix GCR, Chapter 8) investigated the potential for exploitation of potash,
6 hydrocarbons, caliche, gypsum, salt, uranium, sulfur, and lithium. Also, in 1995, the New
7 Mexico Bureau of Mines and Mineral Resources (NMBMMR) performed a reevaluation of the
8 mineral resources at and within 1.6 km (1 mi) around the WIPP site. While some resources do
9 exist at the WIPP site, for the HCN timeframes, such drilling is assumed to only occur outside
10 the WIPP site boundary. This assumption is based on current federal ownership and
11 management of the WIPP during operations, and assumed effectiveness of institutional controls
12 for the 100-year period immediately following site closure.

13 Drilling associated with *Oil and Gas Exploration* and *Oil and Gas Exploitation* currently takes
14 place in the vicinity of the WIPP. For example, gas is extracted from reservoirs in the Morrow
15 Formation, some 4,200 m (14,000 ft) below the surface, and oil is extracted from shallower units
16 within the Delaware Mountain Group, some 2,150 to 2,450 m (7,000 to 8,000 ft) below the
17 surface.

18 Potash resources in the vicinity of the WIPP are discussed in Section 2.3.1.1. Throughout the
19 Carlsbad Potash District, commercial quantities of potash are restricted to the McNutt, which
20 forms part of the Salado above the repository horizon. *Potash Exploration* and evaluation
21 boreholes have been drilled within and outside the controlled area. Such drilling will continue
22 outside the WIPP land withdrawal boundary, but no longer occurs within the boundary due to
23 transfer of rights and controls to the DOE. Moreover, drilling for the evaluation of potash
24 resources within the boundary will not occur throughout the time period of active institutional
25 controls.

26 *Drilling for Other Resources* has taken place within the Delaware Basin. For example, sulfur
27 extraction using the Frasch process began in 1969 and continued for three decades at the
28 Culberson County Rustler Springs mine near Orla, Texas. In addition, brine wells have been in
29 operation in and about the Delaware Basin for at least as long. Solution mining processes for
30 sulfur, salt (brine), potash, or any other mineral are not addressed in this FEP; only the drilling of
31 the borehole is addressed here. Resource extraction through solution mining and any potential
32 effects are evaluated in H58, solution mining. Nonetheless, the drilling activity associated with
33 the production of other resources is not notably different than drilling for petroleum exploration
34 and exploitation.

35 Drilling for the purposes of reservoir stimulation and subsequent *Enhanced Oil and Gas*
36 *Recovery* does take place within the Delaware Basin, although systematic, planned
37 waterflooding has not taken place near the WIPP. Instead, injection near WIPP consists of
38 single-point injectors, rather than broad, grid-type waterflood projects (Hall et al. 2003). In the
39 vicinity of the WIPP, fluid injection usually takes place using boreholes initially drilled as
40 producing wells. Therefore, regardless of the initial intent of a deep borehole, whether in search
41 of petroleum reserves or as an injection point, the drilling event and associated processes are
42 virtually the same. These drilling related processes are addressed more fully in H21 *Drilling*

1 **Fluid Flow**, H22 **Drilling Fluid Loss**, and H23 **Blowouts**. Discussion on the effects subsequent
 2 to drilling a borehole for the purpose of enhancing oil and gas recovery is discussed in FEP H28,
 3 **Enhanced Oil and Gas Production**.

4 In summary, drilling associated with **Oil and Gas Exploration**, **Potash Exploration**, **Oil and**
 5 **Gas Exploitation**, **Enhanced Oil and Gas Recovery**, and drilling associated with **Other**
 6 **Resources** has taken place and is expected to continue in the Delaware Basin. The potential
 7 effects of existing and possible near-future boreholes on fluid flow and radionuclide transport
 8 within the disposal system are discussed in FEPs H25 through H36, where low consequence
 9 screening arguments are provided.

10 SCR-5.1.1.1.4 Future Human EPs

11 Criteria in 40 CFR § 194.33 require the DOE to examine the historical rate of drilling for
 12 resources in the Delaware Basin. Thus, consistent with 40 CFR § 194.33(b)(3)(i), the DOE has
 13 used the historical record of deep drilling associated with **Oil and Gas Exploration**, **Potash**
 14 **Exploration**, **Oil and Gas Exploitation**, **Enhanced Oil and Gas Recovery**, and **Drilling**
 15 **Associated With Other** resources (sulfur exploration) in the Delaware Basin in calculations to
 16 determine the rate of future deep drilling in the Delaware Basin (see Appendix DEL, Appendix
 17 DATA; and Chapter 6.3.2).

18 SCR-5.1.1.2 FEP Number(s): H3 and H5
 19 FEP Title(s): **Water Resources Exploration (H3)**
 20 **Groundwater Exploitation (H5)**

21 SCR-5.1.1.2.1 Screening Decision: SO-C (HCN)
 22 SO-C (Future)

23 *The effects of HCN drilling associated with **Water Resources Exploration** and **Groundwater***
 24 ***Exploitation** have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the*
 25 *performance of the disposal system. Historical shallow drilling associated with **Water***
 26 ***Resources Exploration** and **Groundwater Exploitation** is accounted for in calculations to*
 27 *determine the rate of future shallow drilling.*

28 SCR-5.1.1.2.2 Summary of New Information

29 In the screening of FEPs conducted for the CCA, FEP H3 and H5 were screened out based on
 30 low consequence (SO-C) for the long-term performance of the WIPP. The CCA screening
 31 decision and argument applied to both the HCN and future time periods and remain valid for the
 32 CRA; however, additional justification for this conclusion has been provided.

33 SCR-5.1.1.2.3 Screening Argument

34 Drilling associated with **Water Resources Exploration** and **Groundwater Exploitation** has taken
 35 place and is expected to continue in the Delaware Basin. For the most part, water resources in the
 36 vicinity of the WIPP are scarce. Elsewhere in the Delaware Basin, potable water occurs in
 37 places while some communities rely solely on groundwater sources for drinking water. Even
 38 though **Water Resources Exploration** and **Groundwater Exploitation** occur in the Basin, all

1 such exploration/exploitation is confined to shallow drilling that extends no deeper than the
 2 Rustler Formation and thus will not impact repository performance because of the limited
 3 drilling anticipated in the future and the sizeable thickness of low permeability Salado salt
 4 between the waste panels and the shallow groundwaters. Given the limited groundwater
 5 resources and minimal consequence of shallow drilling on performance, the effects of HCN and
 6 future drilling associated with *Water Resources Exploration* and *Groundwater Exploitation*
 7 have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance
 8 of the disposal system. Thus, the screening argument remains the same as given previously in
 9 the CCA.

10 Although shallow drilling for *Water Resources Exploration* and *Groundwater Exploitation*
 11 have been eliminated from PA calculations, the Delaware Basin Drilling Surveillance Program
 12 (DBDSP) continues to collect drilling data related to water resources, as well as other shallow
 13 drilling activities. As shown in the DBDSP 2002 Annual Report (DOE 2002), the total number
 14 of shallow water wells in the Delaware Basin is currently 2,296 compared to 2,331 shallow water
 15 wells reported in the CCA, a decrease of 35 wells (attributed primarily to the reclassification of
 16 water wells to other types of shallow boreholes). Based on these data, the shallow drilling rate
 17 for *Water Resources Exploration* and *Groundwater Exploitation* is essentially the same as
 18 reported in the CCA. The distribution of groundwater wells in the Delaware Basin was included
 19 in CCA Appendix USDW, Section USDW.3.

20 SCR-5.1.1.2.4 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs

21 Water is currently extracted from formations above the Salado, as discussed in CCA Section
 22 2.3.1.3. The distribution of groundwater wells in the Delaware Basin is included in CCA
 23 Appendix USDW, Section USDW.3. *Water Resources Exploration* and *Groundwater*
 24 *Exploitation* are expected to continue in the Delaware Basin.

25 In summary, drilling associated with *Water Resources Exploration, Groundwater Exploitation,*
 26 *Potash Exploration, Oil and Gas Exploration, Oil and Gas Exploitation, Enhanced Oil and*
 27 *Gas Recovery,* and drilling to explore *Other Resources* has taken place and is expected to
 28 continue in the Delaware Basin. The potential effects of existing and possible near-future
 29 boreholes on fluid flow and radionuclide transport within the disposal system are discussed in
 30 Section SCR.5.2, where low consequence screening arguments are provided.

31 SCR-5.1.1.2.5 Future Human EPs

32 Criteria in 40 CFR § 194.33 require that, to calculate the rates of future shallow and deep drilling
 33 in the Delaware Basin, the DOE should examine the historical rate of drilling for resources in the
 34 Delaware Basin.

35 Shallow drilling associated with water, potash, sulfur, oil, and gas extraction has taken place in
 36 the Delaware Basin over the past 100 years. However, of these resources, only water and potash
 37 are present at shallow depths (less than 655 m (2,150 ft) below the surface) within the controlled
 38 area. Thus, consistent with 40 CFR § 194.33(b)(4), the DOE accounts for this drilling through
 39 the use of the historical record of shallow drilling associated with *Water Resources Exploration,*

1 **Potash Exploration**, and **Groundwater Exploitation**, in calculations to determine the rate of
2 future shallow drilling in the Delaware Basin.

3 SCR-5.1.1.3 FEP Number: H6, H7, H10, H11, and H12
4 FEP Title: **Archeology (H6)**
5 **Geothermal Energy Production (H7)**
6 **Liquid Waste Disposal (H10)**
7 **Hydrocarbon Storage (H11)**
8 **Deliberate Drilling Intrusion (H12)**

9 SCR-5.1.1.3.1 Screening Decision: SO-R (HCN)
10 SO-R (Future)

11 *Drilling associated with **Archeology**, **Geothermal Energy Production**, **Liquid Waste Disposal**,*
12 ***Hydrocarbon Storage**, and **Deliberate Drilling Intrusion** have been eliminated from PA*
13 *calculations on regulatory grounds.*

14 SCR-5.1.1.3.2 Summary of New Information

15 Based on current Delaware Basin data (Appendix DATA, Attachment A), the regulatory
16 exclusion based on the “future states assumption” continues to be valid; i.e., no drilling for
17 geothermal, archeological, liquid waste disposal, or hydrocarbon storage has occurred. Only
18 editorial changes have been made.

19 SCR-5.1.1.3.3 Screening Argument

20 SCR-5.1.1.3.3.1 *Historic, Current, and Near-Future EPs*

21 No drilling associated with **Archeology** or **Geothermal Energy Production**, has taken place in
22 the Delaware Basin. Consistent with the future states assumptions in 40 CFR § 194.25(a), such
23 drilling activities have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

24 While numerous archeological sites exist at and near the WIPP site, drilling for archeological
25 purposes has not occurred. Archeological investigations have only involved shallow surface
26 disruptions, and do not require deeper investigation by any method, drilling or otherwise.
27 Geothermal energy is not considered to be a potentially exploitable resource because
28 economically attractive geothermal conditions do not exist in the northern Delaware Basin.

29 Oil and gas production byproducts are disposed of underground in the WIPP region, but such
30 liquid waste disposal does not involve drilling of additional boreholes (see H27); therefore
31 drilling of boreholes for the explicit purpose of disposal has not occurred.

32 **Hydrocarbon Storage** takes place in the Delaware Basin, but it involves gas injection through
33 existing boreholes into depleted reservoirs (see, for example, Burton et al. 1993, 66-67).
34 Therefore, drilling of boreholes for the explicit purpose of **Hydrocarbon Storage** has not
35 occurred.

1 Consistent with 40 CFR § 194.33(b)(1), all near-future Human EPs relating to **Deliberate**
 2 **Drilling Intrusion** into the WIPP excavation have been eliminated from PA calculations on
 3 regulatory grounds.

4 SCR-5.1.1.3.4 Future Human EPs

5 Consistent with 40 CFR § 194.33 and the future states assumptions in 40 CFR § 194.25(a),
 6 drilling for purposes other than resource recovery (such as WIPP site investigation), and drilling
 7 activities that have not taken place in the Delaware Basin over the past 100 years, need not be
 8 considered in determining future drilling rates. Thus, drilling associated with archeological
 9 investigations, **Geothermal Energy Production, Liquid Waste Disposal, Hydrocarbon Storage,**
 10 **and Deliberate Drilling Intrusion** have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory
 11 grounds.

12 **SCR-5.1.2 Excavation Activities**

13 SCR-5.1.2.1 FEP Number: H13

14 FEP Title: **Conventional Underground Potash Mining**

15 SCR-5.1.2.1.1 Screening Decision: UP (HCN)
 16 DP (Future)

17 *As prescribed by 40 CFR § 194.32 (b), the effects of HCN and future **Conventional***
 18 ***Underground Potash Mining** are accounted for in PA calculations (see also FEP H37).*

19 SCR-5.1.2.1.2 Summary of New Information

20 The name of this FEP has been changed to more specifically identify the mining process.
 21 Previously, H13 was generically titled **Potash Mining**, which broadly included all mining
 22 mechanisms and techniques such as conventional, strip or surface, and solution mining. **Solution**
 23 **Mining** for potash is addressed in FEP H58, and **Solution Mining for brine, other Minerals**, or
 24 for the **Creation of Storage Cavities**, is addressed in FEP H59.

25 SCR-5.1.2.1.3 Screening Argument

26 Potash is the only known economically viable resource in the vicinity of the WIPP that is
 27 recovered by underground mining (see Section 2.3.1). Potash is mined by conventional
 28 techniques extensively in the region east of Carlsbad and up to 2.4 km (1.5 mi) from the
 29 boundaries of the controlled area of the WIPP. According to existing plans and leases (see
 30 Section 2.3.1.1), potash mining is expected to continue in the vicinity of the WIPP in the near
 31 future. The DOE assumes that all economically recoverable potash in the vicinity of the disposal
 32 system will be extracted in the near future, although there are no economical reserves above the
 33 WIPP waste panels (Griswold and Griswold 1999).

34 In summary, **Conventional Underground Potash Mining** is currently taking place and is
 35 expected to continue in the vicinity of the WIPP in the near future. The potential effects of
 36 HCN, and future **Conventional Underground Potash Mining** are accounted for in PA
 37 calculations as prescribed by 40 CFR § 194.32 (b), and as further described in the Supplementary

1 Information to 40 CFR 194, Subpart C, “Compliance Certification and Recertification” and in
2 the Compliance Application Guidance (CAG), Subpart C, § 194.32, Scope of Performance
3 Assessments.

4 SCR-5.1.2.2 FEP Number: H14
5 FEP Title: **Other Resources (mining for)**

6 SCR-5.1.2.2.1 Screening Decision: SO-C (HCN)
7 SO-R (Future)

8 *HCN Mining for Other Resources has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low*
9 *consequence to the performance of the disposal system. Future Mining for Other Resources has*
10 *been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.*

11 SCR-5.1.2.2.2 Summary of New Information

12 Since the CCA, no changes in the resources sought via mining have occurred. Therefore, the
13 screening decision for mining for other resources have not changed. Minimal changes to the
14 screening argument have been made for clarity and completeness.

15 SCR-5.1.2.2.3 Screening Argument

16 Potash is the only known economically viable resource in the vicinity of the WIPP that is
17 recovered by underground mining. Potash is mined extensively in the region east of Carlsbad
18 and up to 5 km (3.1 mi) from the boundaries of the controlled area. According to existing plans
19 and leases, *potash mining* is expected to continue in the vicinity of the WIPP in the near future.
20 The DOE assumes that all economically recoverable potash in the vicinity of the disposal system
21 will be extracted in the near future. Excavation for resources other than potash and
22 archaeological excavations have taken place or are currently taking place in the Delaware Basin.
23 These activities have not altered the geology of the controlled area significantly, and have been
24 eliminated from PA calculations for the HCN timeframe on the basis of low consequence to the
25 performance of the disposal system.

26 Potash is the only resource that has been identified within the controlled area in quality similar to
27 that currently mined elsewhere in the Delaware Basin. Future *Mining for Other Resources* has
28 been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

29 SCR-5.1.2.3 FEP Number: H15 and H16
30 FEP Title: **Tunneling (H15)**
31 **Construction of Underground Facilities (H16)**

32 SCR-5.1.2.3.1 Screening Decision: SO-R (HCN)
33 SO-R (Future)

34 *Consistent with 40 CFR § 194.33(b)(1), near-future human-initiated events and processes*
35 *relating to **Tunneling** into the WIPP excavation and **construction of underground facilities***
36 *have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds. Furthermore, consistent with*
37 *40 CFR § 194.33(b)(1), future human-initiated EPs relating to **Tunneling** into the WIPP*

1 *excavation and **Construction of Underground Facilities** have been eliminated from PA*
2 *calculations on regulatory grounds.*

3 SCR-5.1.2.3.2 Summary

4 This FEP has been screened out according to the regulatory criteria in 40 CFR 194.25 (a)
5 (characteristics of the future remain what they are at the time the compliance application).
6 Potash mining, which includes **Tunneling**, has taken place in the Northern Delaware Basin and
7 potash mining is accounted for in PA calculations. The FEP description, screening argument,
8 and screening decision remain unchanged.

9 SCR-5.1.2.3.3 Screening Argument

10 No **Tunneling** or **Construction of Underground Facilities** (for example, storage, disposal,
11 accommodation [that is, dwellings]) has taken place in the Delaware Basin. Mining for potash
12 occurs (a form of **Tunneling**), but is addressed specifically in FEP H-13. Gas storage does take
13 place in the Delaware Basin, but it involves injection through boreholes into depleted reservoirs,
14 and not excavation (see, for example, Burton et al. 1993, pp. 66-67).

15 On April 26, 2001, the DOE formally requested approval the installation of the OMNISita
16 astrophysics experiment in the core storage alcove of the WIPP underground. The purpose of the
17 project is to develop a prototype neutrino detector to test proof of concept principles and measure
18 background cosmic radiation levels within the WIPP underground. EPA approved the request on
19 August 29, 2001. This project does not require additional **Tunneling** or excavation beyond the
20 current repository footprint, and therefore does not impact the screening argument for this FEP.

21 Because **Tunneling** and **Construction of Underground Facilities** (other than WIPP) have not
22 taken place in the Delaware Basin, and consistent with the future states assumptions in 40 CFR §
23 194.25(a), such excavation activities have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory
24 grounds.

25 SCR-5.1.2.4 FEP Number: H17
26 FEP Title: **Archeological Excavations**

27 SCR-5.1.2.4.1 Screening Decision: SO-C (HCN)
28 SO-R (Future)

29 *HCN **Archeological Excavations** have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of*
30 *low consequence to the performance of the disposal system. Future **Archeological Excavations***
31 *into the disposal system have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.*

32 SCR-5.1.2.4.2 Summary of New Information

33 The original description for this FEP and screening argument remain valid; only editorial
34 changes have been made.

1 SCR-5.1.2.4.3 Screening Argument

2 **Archeological Excavations** have occurred at or near the WIPP, but involved only minor surface
3 disturbances. These **Archeological Excavations** may continue into the foreseeable future as
4 other archeological sites are discovered. These activities have not altered the geology of the
5 controlled area significantly, and have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
6 consequence to the performance of the disposal system for the HCN timeframe.

7 Also, consistent with 40 CFR § 194.32(a), which limits the scope of consideration of future
8 human actions to mining and drilling, future **Archeological Excavations** have been eliminated
9 from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

10 SCR-5.1.2.5 FEP Number: H18
11 FEP Title: **Deliberate Mining Intrusion**

12 SCR-5.1.2.5.1 Screening Decision: SO-R (HCN)
13 SO-R (Future)

14 *Consistent with 40 CFR § 194.33(b)(1), near-future human-initiated EPs relating to **Deliberate***
15 ***Mining Intrusion** into the WIPP excavation have been eliminated from PA calculations on*
16 *regulatory grounds. Furthermore, consistent with 40 CFR § 194.33(b)(1), future human-*
17 *initiated EPs relating to **Deliberate Mining Intrusion** into the WIPP excavation have been*
18 *eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.*

19 SCR-5.1.2.5.2 Summary of New Information

20 No changes have been to this FEP.

21 SCR-5.1.2.5.3 Screening Argument

22 Consistent with 40 CFR § 194.33(b)(1), all future Human related EPs relating to **Deliberate**
23 **Mining Intrusion** into the WIPP excavation have been eliminated from PA calculations on
24 regulatory grounds.

25 **SCR-5.1.3 Subsurface Explosions**

26 SCR-5.1.3.1 FEPs Number: H19
27 FEP Title: **Explosions for Resource Recovery**

28 SCR-5.1.3.1.1 Screening Decision: SO-C (HCN)
29 SO-R (Future)

30 *Historical underground **Explosions for Resource Recovery** have been eliminated from PA*
31 *calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system. Future*
32 *underground explosions for resource recovery have been eliminated from PA calculations on*
33 *regulatory grounds.*

1 SCR-5.1.3.1.2 Summary of New Information

2 The original screening argument and decision for this FEP remain valid. Additional text has
3 been added to describe the past use of explosives in potash mining in the Delaware Basin. This
4 additional information is provided for completeness, and does not affect the screening argument
5 or decision.

6 SCR-5.1.3.1.3 Screening Argument

7 This section discusses subsurface explosions associated with resource recovery that may result in
8 pathways for fluid flow between hydraulically conductive horizons. The potential effects of
9 explosions on the hydrological characteristics of the disposal system are discussed in H39.

10 SCR-5.1.3.1.4 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs

11 Neither small-scale nor regional-scale explosive techniques to enhance formation hydraulic
12 conductivity form a part of current mainstream oil- and gas-production technology. Instead,
13 controlled perforating and hydrofracturing are used to improve the performance of oil and gas
14 boreholes in the Delaware Basin. However, small-scale explosions have been used in the past to
15 fracture oil- and natural-gas-bearing units to enhance resource recovery. The size of explosion
16 used to fracture an oil- or gas-bearing unit is limited by the need to contain the damage within
17 the unit being exploited. In the area surrounding the WIPP, the stratigraphic units with oil and
18 gas resources are too deep for explosions to affect the performance of the disposal system. Thus,
19 the effects of ***Explosions for Resource Recovery*** have been eliminated from PA calculations on
20 the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

21 Potash mining is currently taking place and is expected to continue in the vicinity of the WIPP in
22 the near future. Potash is mined extensively in the region east of Carlsbad and up to 2.4 km (1.3
23 mi) from the boundaries of the controlled area. In earlier years conventional drill, blast, load, and
24 rail-haulage methods were used. Today, continuous miners similar to those used in coal-mining
25 have been adapted to fit the potash-salt formations. Hence, drilling and blasting technology is not
26 used in the present day potash mines. Thus, the effects of ***Explosions for Resource Recovery***
27 have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance
28 of the disposal system.

29 Consistent with 40 CFR § 194.33(d), PAs need not analyze the effects of techniques used for
30 resource recovery subsequent to the drilling of a future borehole. Therefore, future underground
31 ***explosions for resource recovery*** have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory
32 grounds.

1 SCR-5.1.3.2 FEPs Number: H20
2 FEP Title: ***Underground Nuclear Device Testing***

3 SCR-5.1.3.2.1 Screening Decision: SO-C (HCN)
4 SO-R (Future)

5 *Historical **Underground Nuclear Device Testing** has been eliminated from PA calculations on*
6 *the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system. Future **Underground***
7 ***Nuclear Device Testing** has been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.*

8 SCR-5.1.3.2.2 Summary of New Information

9 No new information has been identified related to this FEP. No changes have been made.

10 SCR-5.1.3.2.3 Screening Argument

11 SCR-5.1.3.2.3.1 *Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs*

12 The Delaware Basin has been used for an isolated nuclear test. This test, Project Gnome
13 (Rawson et al. 1965), took place in 1961 at a location approximately 13 km (8 mi) southwest of
14 the WIPP waste disposal region. Project Gnome was decommissioned in 1979.

15 The primary objective of Project Gnome was to study the effects of an underground nuclear
16 explosion in salt. The Gnome experiment involved the detonation of a 3.1 kiloton nuclear device
17 at a depth of 360 m (1,190 ft) in the bedded salt of the Salado. The explosion created an
18 approximately spherical cavity of about 27,000 m³ (950,000 ft³) and caused surface
19 displacements in a radius of 360 m (1,180 ft). No earth tremors perceptible to humans were
20 reported at distances over 40 km (25 mi) from the explosion. A zone of increased permeability
21 was observed to extend at least 46 m (150 ft) laterally from and 105 m (344 ft) above the point of
22 the explosion. The test had no significant effects on the geological characteristics of the WIPP
23 disposal system. Thus, historical ***Underground Nuclear Device Testing*** has been eliminated
24 from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.
25 There are no existing plans for ***Underground Nuclear Device Testing*** in the vicinity of the
26 WIPP in the near future.

27 SCR-5.1.3.2.3.2 *Future Human EPs*

28 The criterion in 40 CFR § 194.32(a), relating to the scope of PAs, limits the consideration of
29 future human actions to mining and drilling. Therefore, future ***Underground Nuclear Device***
30 ***Testing*** has been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

1 **SCR-5.2 Subsurface Hydrological and Geochemical Events and Processes**

2 **SCR-5.2.1 Borehole Fluid Flow**

3 SCR-5.2.1.1 FEP Number: H21
4 FEP Title: **Drilling Fluid Flow**

5 SCR-5.2.1.1.1 Screening Decision: SO-C (HCN)
6 DP (Future)

7 ***Drilling Fluid Flow** associated with historical, current, near-future, and future boreholes that*
8 *do not intersect the waste disposal region has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis*
9 *of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system. The possibility of a future deep*
10 *borehole penetrating a waste panel, such that drilling-induced flow results in transport of*
11 *radionuclides to the land surface or to overlying hydraulically conductive units, is accounted for*
12 *in PA calculations. The possibility of a deep borehole penetrating both the waste disposal*
13 *region and a Castile brine reservoir is accounted for in PA calculations.*

14 SCR-5.2.1.1.2 Summary of New Information

15 No new information is available for this FEP. However, the screening argument has been
16 revised for clarity and editorial purposes.

17 SCR-5.2.1.1.3 Screening Argument

18 Borehole circulation fluid could be lost to thief zones encountered during drilling, or fluid could
19 flow from pressurized zones through the borehole to the land surface (blowout) or to a thief
20 zone. Such drilling-related EPs could influence groundwater flow and, potentially, radionuclide
21 transport in the affected units. Future drilling within the controlled area could result in direct
22 releases of radionuclides to the land surface or transport of radionuclides between hydraulically
23 conductive units.

24 Movement of brine from a pressurized zone, through a borehole into potential thief zones such as
25 the Salado interbeds or the Culebra, could result in geochemical changes and altered radionuclide
26 migration rates in these units.

27 SCR-5.2.1.1.3.1 *Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs*

28 **Drilling Fluid Flow** is a short-term event that can result in the flow of pressurized fluid from
29 one geologic stratum to another. However, long-term flow through abandoned boreholes would
30 have a greater hydrological impact in the Culebra than a short-term event like drilling-induced
31 flow outside the controlled area. Wallace (1996a) analyzed the potential effects of flow through
32 abandoned boreholes in the future within the controlled area, and concluded that
33 interconnections between the Culebra and deep units could be eliminated from PA calculations
34 on the basis of low consequence. Thus, the HCN of **Drilling Fluid Flow** associated with
35 boreholes outside the controlled area has been screened out on the basis of low consequence to
36 the performance of the disposal system.

1 As discussed in FEPs H25 through H36, drilling associated with **Water Resources Exploration,**
2 **Groundwater Exploitation, Potash Exploration, Oil and Gas Exploration, Oil and Gas**
3 **Exploitation, Enhanced Oil and Gas Recovery, and Drilling to Explore Other Resources** has
4 taken place or is currently taking place outside the controlled area in the Delaware Basin. These
5 drilling activities are expected to continue in the vicinity of the WIPP in the near future.

6 SCR-5.2.1.1.3.2 *Future Human EPs*

7 For the future, drill holes may intersect the waste disposal region and their effects could be more
8 profound. Thus, the possibility of a future borehole penetrating a waste panel, so that **Drilling**
9 **Fluid Flow** and, potentially, **Blowout**, results in transport of radionuclides to the land surface or
10 to overlying hydraulically conductive units, is accounted for in PA calculations.

11 The units intersected by the borehole may provide sources for fluid flow (brine, oil, or gas) to the
12 waste panel during drilling. In the vicinity of the WIPP, the Castile that underlies the Salado
13 contains isolated volumes of brine at fluid pressures greater than hydrostatic. A future borehole
14 that penetrates a Castile brine reservoir could provide a connection for brine flow from the
15 reservoir to the waste panel, thus increasing fluid pressure and brine volume in the waste panel.
16 The possibility of a deep borehole penetrating both a waste panel and a brine reservoir is
17 accounted for in PA calculations.

18 A future borehole that is drilled through a disposal room wall, but does not intersect waste, could
19 penetrate a brine reservoir underlying the waste disposal region. Such an event would
20 depressurize the brine reservoir to some extent, and thus would affect the consequences of any
21 subsequent intersections of the reservoir. The possibility for a borehole to depressurize a brine
22 reservoir underlying the waste disposal region is accounted for in PA calculations.

23 Penetration of an underpressurized unit underlying the Salado could result in flow and
24 radionuclide transport from the waste panel to the underlying unit during drilling, although
25 drillers would minimize such fluid loss to a thief zone through the injection of materials to
26 reduce permeability or through the use of casing and cementing. Also, the permeabilities of
27 formations underlying the Salado are less than the permeability of the Culebra (Wallace 1996a).
28 Thus, the consequences associated with radionuclide transport to an underpressurized unit below
29 the waste panels during drilling will be less significant, in terms of disposal system performance,
30 than the consequences associated with radionuclide transport to the land surface or to the Culebra
31 during drilling. Through this comparison, drilling events that result in penetration of
32 underpressurized units below the waste-disposal region have been eliminated from PA
33 calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

34 In evaluating the potential consequences of **Drilling Fluid Loss** to a waste panel, two types of
35 drilling events need to be considered – those that intercept pressurized fluid in underlying
36 formations such as the Castile (defined in CCA Section 6.3.2.2 as E1 events), and those that do
37 not (E2 events). A possible hydrological effect would be to make a greater volume of brine
38 available for gas generation processes and thereby increase gas volumes at particular times in the
39 future. As discussed in CCA Section 6.4.12.6, of boreholes that intersect a waste panel in the
40 future, 8 percent are assumed to be E1 events and 92 percent are E2 events. For either type of
41 drilling event, on the basis of current drilling practices, the driller is assumed to pass through the

1 SCR-5.2.1.2.3.1 *Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs*

2 **Drilling Fluid Flow** will not affect hydraulic conditions in the disposal system significantly
 3 unless there is substantial **Drilling Fluid Loss** to a thief zone, such as the Culebra. Typically,
 4 zones into which significant borehole circulation fluid is lost are isolated through injection of
 5 materials to reduce permeability or through casing and cementing programs. Assuming such
 6 operations are successful, **Drilling Fluid Loss** in the near future outside the controlled area will
 7 not affect the hydrology of the disposal system significantly and be of no consequence.

8 SCR-5.2.1.2.3.2 *Future Human EPs*

9 The consequences of drilling within the controlled area in the future will primarily depend on the
 10 location of the borehole. Potentially, future deep drilling could penetrate the waste disposal
 11 region. Hydraulic and geochemical conditions in the waste panel could be affected as a result of
 12 **Drilling Fluid Loss** to the panel.

13 Penetration of an under pressurized unit underlying the Salado could result in flow and
 14 radionuclide transport from the waste panel to the underlying unit during drilling, although
 15 drillers would minimize such fluid loss to a thief zone through the injection of materials to
 16 reduce permeability or through the use of casing and cementing. Also, the permeabilities of
 17 formations underlying the Salado are less than the permeability of the Culebra (Wallace 1996a).
 18 Thus, the consequences associated with radionuclide transport to an underpressurized unit below
 19 the waste panels during drilling will be less significant, in terms of disposal system performance,
 20 than the consequences associated with radionuclide transport to the land surface or to the Culebra
 21 during drilling. Through this comparison, drilling events that result in penetration of under
 22 pressurized units below the waste-disposal region have been eliminated from PA calculations on
 23 the basis of beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

24 For boreholes that do not intersect pressurized brine reservoirs (but do penetrate the waste-
 25 disposal region) the treatment of the disposal room implicitly accounts for the potential for
 26 greater gas generation resulting from drilling fluid loss. Thus, the hydrological effects of
 27 **Drilling Fluid Loss** for E2 drilling events are accounted for in PA calculations within the
 28 conceptual model of the disposal room for drilling intrusions.

29 SCR-5.2.1.3 FEP Number: H23
 30 FEP Title: **Blowouts**

31 SCR-5.2.1.3.1 Screening Decision: SO-C (HCN)
 32 DP (Future)

33 ***Blowouts** associated with HCN, and future boreholes that do not intersect the waste disposal*
 34 *region, have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the*
 35 *performance of the disposal system. The possibility of a future deep borehole penetrating a*
 36 *waste panel, such that drilling-induced flow results in transport of radionuclides to the land*
 37 *surface or to overlying hydraulically conductive units, is accounted for in PA calculations. The*
 38 *possibility of a deep borehole penetrating both the waste disposal region and a Castile brine*
 39 *reservoir is accounted for in PA calculations.*

1 SCR-5.2.1.3.2 Summary of New Information

2 No new information is available for this FEP. However, the screening argument has been
3 revised for clarity and editorial purposes.

4 SCR-5.2.1.3.3 Screening Argument

5 **Blowouts** are short-term events that can result in the flow of pressurized fluid from one geologic
6 stratum to another. For the near future, a **Blowout** may occur in the vicinity of the WIPP but is
7 not likely to affect the disposal system because of the distance from the well to the waste panels,
8 assuming that passive and active institutional controls are in place which restrict borehole
9 installation to outside the WIPP boundary. **Blowouts** associated with HCN, and future boreholes
10 that do not intersect the waste disposal region have been eliminated from PA calculations on the
11 basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system. For the future, the drill
12 holes may intersect the waste disposal region and these effects could be more profound. Thus,
13 **Blowouts** are included in the assessment of future activities.

14 The consequences of **Blowout** in the future are accounted for in PA calculations.

15 Fluid could flow from pressurized zones through the borehole to the land surface (**Blowout**) or to
16 a thief zone. Such drilling-related EPs could influence groundwater flow and, potentially,
17 radionuclide transport in the affected units. Movement of brine from a pressurized zone, through
18 a borehole, into potential thief zones such as the Salado interbeds or the Culebra, could result in
19 geochemical changes and altered radionuclide migration rates in these units.

20 SCR-5.2.1.3.3.1 *Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs*

21 Drilling associated with **Water Resources Exploration, Groundwater Exploitation, Potash**
22 **Exploration, Oil and Gas Exploration, Oil and Gas Exploitation, Enhanced Oil and Gas**
23 **Recovery, and Drilling to Explore Other Resources** has taken place or is currently taking place
24 outside the controlled area in the Delaware Basin. These drilling activities are expected to
25 continue in the vicinity of the WIPP in the near future.

26 Naturally occurring brine and gas pockets have been encountered during drilling in the Delaware
27 Basin. Brine pockets have been intersected in the Castile (as discussed in Section 2.2.1.3) and in
28 the Salado above the WIPP horizon (Section 2.2.1.2.2). Gas **Blowouts** have occurred during
29 drilling in the Salado. Usually, such events result in brief interruptions in drilling while the
30 intersected fluid pocket is allowed to depressurize through flow to the surface (for a period
31 lasting from a few hours to a few days). Drilling then restarts with an increased drilling mud
32 weight. Under these conditions, **Blowouts** in the near future will cause isolated hydraulic
33 disturbances, but will not affect the hydrology of the disposal system significantly.

34 Potentially, the most significant disturbance to the disposal system could occur if an uncontrolled
35 **Blowout** during drilling resulted in substantial flow through the borehole from a pressurized zone
36 to a thief zone. For example, if a borehole penetrates a brine reservoir in the Castile, brine could
37 flow through the borehole to the Culebra, and, as a result, could affect hydraulic conditions in the
38 Culebra. The potential effects of such an event can be compared to the effects of long-term fluid
39 flow from deep overpressurized units to the Culebra through abandoned boreholes. Wallace

1 (1996a) analyzed the potential effects of flow through abandoned boreholes in the future within
2 the controlled area and concluded that interconnections between the Culebra and deep units
3 could be eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence. Long-term flow
4 through abandoned boreholes would have a greater hydrological impact in the Culebra than
5 short-term drilling-induced flow outside the controlled area. Thus, the effects of fluid flow
6 during drilling in the near future have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
7 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

8 In summary, **Blowouts** associated with historical, current, and near-future boreholes have been
9 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
10 disposal system.

11 SCR-5.2.1.3.3.2 *Future Human EPs - Boreholes that Intersect the Waste Disposal Region*

12 The consequences of drilling within the controlled area in the future will primarily depend on the
13 location of the borehole. Potentially, future deep drilling could penetrate the waste disposal
14 region. If the borehole intersects the waste in the disposal rooms, radionuclides could be
15 transported as a result of **Drilling Fluid Flow**: releases to the accessible environment may occur
16 as material entrained in the circulating drilling fluid is brought to the surface. Also, during
17 drilling, contaminated brine may flow up the borehole and reach the surface, depending on fluid
18 pressure within the waste disposal panels; **Blowout** conditions could prevail if the waste panel
19 were sufficiently pressurized at the time of intrusion.

20 SCR-5.2.1.3.3.3 *Hydraulic Effects of Drilling-Induced Flow*

21 The possibility of a future borehole penetrating a waste panel, so that **Drilling Fluid Flow** and,
22 potentially, **Blowout**, results in transport of radionuclides to the land surface or to overlying
23 hydraulically conductive units, is accounted for in PA calculations.

24 The units intersected by the borehole may provide sources for fluid flow (brine, oil, or gas) to the
25 waste panel during drilling. In the vicinity of the WIPP, the Castile that underlies the Salado
26 contains isolated volumes of brine at fluid pressures greater than hydrostatic. A future borehole
27 that penetrates a Castile brine reservoir could provide a connection for brine flow from the
28 reservoir to the waste panel, thus increasing fluid pressure and brine volume in the waste panel.
29 The possibility of a deep borehole penetrating both a waste panel and a brine reservoir is
30 accounted for in PA calculations.

31 Future boreholes could affect the hydraulic conditions in the disposal system. Intersection of
32 pockets of pressurized gas and brine would likely result in short-term, isolated hydraulic
33 disturbances, and will not affect the hydrology of the disposal system significantly. Potentially,
34 the most significant hydraulic disturbance to the disposal system could occur if an uncontrolled
35 **Blowout** during drilling resulted in substantial flow through the borehole from a pressurized zone
36 to a thief zone. For example, if a borehole penetrates a brine reservoir in the Castile, brine could
37 flow through the borehole to the Culebra, and, as a result, could affect hydraulic conditions in the
38 Culebra. The potential effects of such an event can be compared to the effects of long-term fluid
39 flow from deep overpressurized units to the Culebra through abandoned boreholes. Wallace
40 (1996a) analyzed the potential effects of such interconnections in the future within the controlled

1 area concluded that flow through abandoned boreholes between the Culebra and deep units could
2 be eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence.

3 SCR-5.2.1.4 FEP Number: H24
4 FEP Title: ***Drilling Induced Geochemical Changes***

5 SCR-5.2.1.4.1 Screening Decision: UP (HCN)
6 DP (Future)

7 ***Drilling Induced Geochemical Changes*** that occur within the controlled area as a result of
8 HCN, and future drilling-induced flow are accounted for in PA calculations.

9 SCR-5.2.1.4.2 Summary of New Information

10 No new information is available for this FEP. However, the screening argument has been
11 revised for clarity and editorial purposes.

12 SCR-5.2.1.4.3 Screening Argument

13 Borehole circulation fluid could be lost to thief zones encountered during drilling, or fluid could
14 flow from pressurized zones through the borehole to the land surface (***Blowout***) or to a thief
15 zone. Such drilling-related EPs could influence groundwater flow and, potentially, radionuclide
16 transport in the affected units. Future drilling within the controlled area could result in direct
17 releases of radionuclides to the land surface or transport of radionuclides between hydraulically
18 conductive units.

19 Movement of brine from a pressurized zone, through a borehole, into potential thief zones such
20 as the Salado interbeds or the Culebra, could result in geochemical changes and altered
21 radionuclide migration rates in these units.

22 SCR-5.2.1.4.3.1 *Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs*

23 Drilling associated with resource exploration, exploitation, and recovery has taken place or is
24 currently taking place outside the controlled area in the Delaware Basin. These drilling activities
25 are expected to continue in the vicinity of the WIPP in the near future. Chemical changes
26 induced by such drilling are discussed below.

27 SCR-5.2.1.4.3.2 *Geochemical effects of drilling-induced flow*

28 Radionuclide migration rates are governed by the coupled effects of hydrological and
29 geochemical processes (see discussions in FEPs W77 through W100). Human EPs outside the
30 controlled area could affect the geochemistry of units within the controlled area if they occur
31 sufficiently close to the edge of the controlled area. Movement of brine from a pressurized
32 reservoir in the Castile through a borehole into potential thief zones, such as the Salado interbeds
33 or the Culebra, could cause ***Drilling-Induced Geochemical Changes*** resulting in altered
34 radionuclide migration rates in these units through their effects on colloid transport and sorption
35 (colloid transport may enhance radionuclide migration, while radionuclide migration may be
36 retarded by sorption).

1 The treatment of colloids in PA calculations is described in Sections 6.4.3.6 and 6.4.6.2.2. The
2 repository and its contents provide the main source of colloids in the disposal system. By
3 comparison, Castile brines have relatively low total colloid concentrations. Therefore, changes
4 in colloid transport in units within the controlled area as a result of HCN drilling-induced flow
5 have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance
6 of the disposal system.

7 Sorption within the Culebra is accounted for in PA calculations as discussed in Section 6.4.6.2.
8 The sorption model comprises an equilibrium, sorption isotherm approximation, employing
9 distribution coefficients (K_ds) applicable to dolomite in the Culebra (Appendix PA, Attachment
10 MASS, Section MASS.15.2; and PAVT). The CDFs of distribution coefficients used are derived
11 from a suite of experimental studies that include measurements of K_ds for actinides in a range of
12 chemical systems including Culebra and Castile brines, Culebra brines, and Salado brines.
13 Therefore, any changes in sorption geochemistry in the Culebra within the controlled area as a
14 result of HCN drilling-induced flow are accounted for in PA calculations.

15 Sorption within the Dewey Lake is accounted for in PA calculations, as discussed in Section
16 6.4.6.6. It is assumed that the sorptive capacity of the Dewey Lake is sufficiently large to
17 prevent any radionuclides that enter the Dewey Lake from being released over 10,000 years
18 (Wallace et al. 1995). Sorption within other geological units of the disposal system has been
19 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the performance of the
20 disposal system. The effects of changes in sorption in the Dewey Lake and other units within the
21 controlled area as a result of HCN drilling-induced flow have been eliminated from PA
22 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

23 SCR-5.2.1.4.3.3 *Future Human EPs - Boreholes that Intersect the Waste Disposal Region*

24 The consequences of drilling within the controlled area in the future will primarily depend on the
25 location of the borehole. Potentially, future deep drilling could penetrate the waste disposal
26 region. If the borehole intersects the waste in the disposal rooms, radionuclides could be
27 transported as a result of **Drilling Fluid Flow** and geochemical conditions in the waste panel
28 could be affected as a result of **Drilling-Induced Geochemical Changes**.

29 SCR-5.2.1.4.3.4 *Geochemical Effects of Drilling-Induced Flow*

30 **Drilling Fluid Loss** to a waste panel could modify the chemistry of disposal room brines in a
31 manner that would affect the solubility of radionuclides and the source term available for
32 subsequent transport from the disposal room. The majority of drilling fluids used are likely to be
33 locally derived, and their bulk chemistry will be similar to fluids currently present in the disposal
34 system. In addition, the presence of the MgO chemical conditioner in the disposal rooms will
35 buffer the chemistry across a range of fluid compositions, as discussed in detail in Appendix PA,
36 Attachment SOTERM. Furthermore, for E1 drilling events, the volume of Castile brine that
37 flows into the disposal room will be greater than that of any drilling fluids; Castile brine
38 chemistry is accounted for in PA calculations. Thus, the effects on radionuclide solubility of
39 **Drilling Fluid Loss** to the disposal room have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis
40 of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

1 Movement of brine from a pressurized reservoir in the Castile through a borehole into thief
2 zones, such as the Salado interbeds or the Culebra, could result in geochemical changes in the
3 receiving units, and thus alter radionuclide migration rates in these units through their effects on
4 colloid transport and sorption.

5 The repository and its contents provide the main source of colloids in the disposal system. Thus,
6 colloid transport in the Culebra within the controlled area as a result of drilling-induced flow
7 associated with boreholes that intersect the waste disposal region are accounted for in PA
8 calculations, as described in Sections 6.4.3.6 and 6.4.6.2.1. The Culebra is the most transmissive
9 unit in the disposal system and it is the most likely unit through which significant radionuclide
10 transport could occur. Therefore, colloid transport in units other than the Culebra, as a result of
11 **Drilling Fluid Loss** associated with boreholes that intersect the waste disposal region, has been
12 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
13 disposal system.

14 As discussed in FEPs H21, H22, and H23, sorption within the Culebra is accounted for in PA
15 calculations. The sorption model used incorporates the effects of changes in sorption in the
16 Culebra as a result of drilling-induced flow associated with boreholes that intersect the waste
17 disposal region.

18 Consistent with the screening discussion in FEPs H21, H22, and H23, the effects of changes in
19 sorption in the Dewey Lake inside the controlled area as a result of drilling-induced flow
20 associated with boreholes that intersect the waste disposal region have been eliminated from PA
21 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.
22 Sorption within other geological units of the disposal system has been eliminated from PA
23 calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

24 SCR-5.2.1.4.3.5 *Future Human EPs - Boreholes That Do Not Intersect the Waste Disposal*
25 *Region*

26 Future boreholes that do not intersect the waste disposal region could nevertheless encounter
27 contaminated material by intersecting a region into which radionuclides have migrated from the
28 disposal panels, or could affect hydrogeological conditions within the disposal system.
29 Consistent with the containment requirements in 40 CFR § 191.13(a), PAs need not evaluate the
30 effects of the intersection of contaminated material outside the controlled area.

31 Movement of brine from a pressurized reservoir in the Castile, through a borehole, into thief
32 zones such as the Salado interbeds or the Culebra, could result in **Drilling-Induced Geochemical**
33 **Changes** and altered radionuclide migration rates in these units.

34 SCR-5.2.1.4.3.6 *Geochemical Effects of Drilling-Induced Flow*

35 Movement of brine from a pressurized reservoir in the Castile through a borehole into thief
36 zones, such as the Salado interbeds or the Culebra, could cause geochemical changes resulting in
37 altered radionuclide migration rates in these units through their effects on colloid transport and
38 sorption.

1 The contents of the waste disposal panels provide the main source of colloids in the disposal
 2 system. Thus, consistent with the discussion in FEPs H21, H22, and H23, colloid transport as a
 3 result of drilling-induced flow associated with future boreholes that do not intersect the waste
 4 disposal region has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the
 5 performance of the disposal system.

6 As discussed in FEPs H21, H22, and H23, sorption within the Culebra is accounted for in PA
 7 calculations. The sorption model accounts for the effects of changes in sorption in the Culebra
 8 as a result of drilling-induced flow associated with boreholes that do not intersect the waste
 9 disposal region.

10 Consistent with the screening discussion in FEPs H21, H22, and H23, the effects of changes in
 11 sorption in the Dewey Lake within the controlled area as a result of drilling-induced flow
 12 associated with boreholes that do not intersect the waste disposal region have been eliminated
 13 from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.
 14 Sorption within other geological units of the disposal system has been eliminated from PA
 15 calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

16 In summary, the effects of ***Drilling-Induced Geochemical Changes*** that occur within the
 17 controlled area as a result of historical, current, near-future, and future drilling-induced flow are
 18 accounted for in PA calculations. Those that occur outside the controlled area have been
 19 eliminated from PA calculations.

20 SCR-5.2.1.5 FEP Number(s): H25 and H26
 21 FEP Title(s): ***Oil and Gas Extraction***
 22 ***Groundwater Extraction***

23 SCR-5.2.1.5.1 Screening Decision: SO-C (HCN)
 24 SO-R (Future)

25 *HCN Groundwater, Oil, and Gas Extraction outside the controlled area has been eliminated*
 26 *from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*
 27 ***Groundwater, Oil, and Gas Extraction through future boreholes has been eliminated from PA***
 28 *calculations on regulatory grounds.*

29 SCR-5.2.1.5.2 Summary of New Information

30 No new information has been identified related to the screening of these FEPs. Delaware Basin
 31 monitoring information (see Appendix DATA, Attachment A) does not indicate any changes in
 32 oil, gas, or water extraction that would require modification to these screening arguments or
 33 decisions. No changes have been made.

34 SCR-5.2.1.5.2.1 *Screening Argument*

35 The extraction of fluid could alter fluid-flow patterns in the target horizons, or in overlying units
 36 as a result of a failed borehole casing. Also, the removal of confined fluid from oil- or gas-
 37 bearing units can cause compaction in some geologic settings, potentially resulting in subvertical
 38 fracturing and surface subsidence.

1 SCR-5.2.1.5.2.2 *Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs*

2 As discussed in FEPs H25 through H36, water, oil, and gas production are the only activities
3 involving fluid extraction through boreholes that have taken place or are currently taking place in
4 the vicinity of the WIPP. These activities are expected to continue in the vicinity of the WIPP in
5 the near future.

6 **Groundwater Extraction** outside the controlled area from formations above the Salado could
7 affect groundwater flow. The Dewey Lake contains a productive zone of saturation south of the
8 WIPP site. Several wells operated by the J.C. Mills Ranch south of the WIPP produce water
9 from the Dewey Lake to supply livestock (see Section 2.2.1.4.2.1). Also, water has been
10 extracted from the Culebra at the Engle Well approximately 9.66 km (6 mi) south of the
11 controlled area to provide water for livestock. No water wells in other areas in the vicinity of the
12 WIPP are expected to be drilled in the near future because of the high concentrations of total
13 dissolved solids in the groundwater.

14 If contaminated water intersects a well while it is producing, then contaminants could be pumped
15 to the surface. Consistent with the containment requirements in 40 CFR § 191.13(a), PAs need
16 not evaluate radiation doses that might result from such an event. However, compliance
17 assessments must include any such events in dose calculations for evaluating compliance with
18 the individual protection requirements in 40 CFR § 191.15. As discussed in Chapter 8.0, under
19 undisturbed conditions, there are no calculated radionuclide releases to units containing
20 producing wells.

21 Pumping from wells at the J.C. Mills Ranch may have resulted in reductions in hydraulic head in
22 the Dewey Lake within southern regions of the controlled area, leading to increased hydraulic
23 head gradients. However, these changes in the groundwater flow conditions in the Dewey Lake
24 will have no significant effects on the performance of the disposal system, primarily because of
25 the sorptive capacity of the Dewey Lake (see Section 6.4.6.6). Retardation of any radionuclides
26 that enter the Dewey Lake will be such that no radionuclides will migrate through the Dewey
27 Lake to the accessible environment within the 10,000-year regulatory period.

28 The effects of **Groundwater Extraction** from the Culebra from a well 9.66 km (6 mi) south of
29 the controlled area have been evaluated by Wallace (1996b), using an analytical solution for
30 Darcian fluid flow in a continuous porous medium. Wallace (1996b) showed that such a well
31 pumping at about 0.5 g (1.9 L) per minute for 10,000 years will induce a hydraulic head gradient
32 across the controlled area of about 4×10^{-5} . The hydraulic head gradient across the controlled
33 area currently ranges from between 0.001 to 0.007. Therefore, pumping from the Engle Well
34 will have only minor effects on the hydraulic head gradient within the controlled area even if
35 pumping were to continue for 10,000 years. Thus, the effects of HCN **Groundwater Extraction**
36 outside the controlled area have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
37 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

38 **Oil and Gas Extraction** outside the controlled area could affect the hydrology of the disposal
39 system. However, the horizons that act as oil and gas reservoirs are sufficiently below the
40 repository for changes in fluid-flow patterns to be of low consequence, unless there is fluid
41 leakage through a failed borehole casing. Also, **Oil and Gas Extraction** horizons in the

1 Delaware Basin are well-lithified rigid strata, so oil and gas extraction is not likely to result in
 2 compaction and subsidence (Brausch et al. 1982, pp. 52, 61). Furthermore, the plasticity of the
 3 salt formations in the Delaware Basin will limit the extent of any fracturing caused by
 4 compaction of underlying units. Thus, neither the extraction of gas from reservoirs in the
 5 Morrow Formation (some 4,200 m (14,000 ft) below the surface), nor extraction of oil from the
 6 shallower units within the Delaware Mountain Group (about 1,250 to 2,450 m (about 4,000 to
 7 8,000 ft) below the surface) will lead to compaction and subsidence. In summary, historical,
 8 current, and near-future **Oil and Gas Extraction** outside the controlled area has been eliminated
 9 from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

10 SCR-5.2.1.5.2.3 *Future Human EPs*

11 Consistent with 40 CFR § 194.33(d), PAs need not analyze the effects of techniques used for
 12 resource recovery subsequent to the drilling of a future borehole. Therefore, **Groundwater**
 13 **Extraction** and **Oil and Gas Extraction** through future boreholes have been eliminated from PA
 14 calculations on regulatory grounds.

15 SCR-5.2.1.6 FEP Number(s): H27, H28 and H29
 16 FEP Title(s): **Liquid Waste Disposal (H27)**
 17 **Enhanced Oil and Gas Production (H28)**
 18 **Hydrocarbon Storage (H29)**

19 SCR-5.2.1.6.1 Screening Decision: SO-C (HCN)
 20 SO-C (Future)

21 *The hydrological effects of HCN fluid injection (**Liquid Waste Disposal, Enhanced Oil and Gas***
 22 ***Production, and Hydrocarbon Storage**) through boreholes outside the controlled area have*
 23 *been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the*
 24 *disposal system. Geochemical changes that occur inside the controlled area as a result of fluid*
 25 *flow associated with HCN fluid injection are accounted for in PA calculations. **Liquid Waste***
 26 ***Disposal, Enhanced Oil and Gas Production, and Hydrocarbon Storage** in the future have been*
 27 *eliminated from PA calculations based on low consequence.*

28 SCR-5.2.1.6.2 Summary of New Information

29 Fluid injection modeling conducted since the CCA has demonstrated that injection of fluids will
 30 not have a significant effect upon the WIPP's ability to contain radioactive materials (Stoelzel
 31 and Swift 1997). The results of this modeling justify changing the screening decision for these
 32 FEPs from SO-R to SO-C for the future timeframe. Neither hydraulic fracturing nor
 33 waterflooding conducted in wells outside the controlled area have the potential to affect the
 34 disposal system in any significant way. The screening argument for this FEP has been updated
 35 to include references and conclusions from Stoelzel and Swift. The hydrological effects of HCN,
 36 and future **Hydrocarbon Storage (H29)** have been screened out on the basis of low consequence.
 37 Only one hydrocarbon (gas) storage facility is operating in the Delaware Basin, and it is too far
 38 away to have any effect on groundwater at the WIPP under any circumstances. No changes have
 39 been made to the FEP description, although the screening decision for the future time period has

1 been changed from SO-R to SO-C; the screening argument has been modified slightly to include
2 citation of a recent survey.

3 SCR-5.2.1.6.3 Screening Argument

4 The injection of fluids could alter fluid-flow patterns in the target horizons or, if there is
5 accidental leakage through a borehole casing in any other intersected hydraulically conductive
6 zone. Injection of fluids through a leaking borehole could also result in geochemical changes
7 and altered radionuclide migration rates in the thief units.

8 SCR-5.2.1.6.3.1 *Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs*

9 The only historical and current activities involving fluid injection through boreholes in the
10 Delaware Basin are **Enhanced Oil and Gas Production** (waterflooding or carbon dioxide (CO₂)
11 injection), **Hydrocarbon Storage** (gas reinjection), and **Liquid Waste Disposal** (by-products
12 from oil and gas production). These fluid injection activities are expected to continue in the
13 vicinity of the WIPP in the near future.

14 Hydraulic fracturing of oil- or gas-bearing units is currently used to improve the performance of
15 hydrocarbon reservoirs in the Delaware Basin. Fracturing is induced during a short period of
16 high-pressure fluid injection, resulting in increased hydraulic conductivity near the borehole.
17 Normally, this controlled fracturing is confined to the pay zone and is unlikely to affect
18 overlying strata.

19 Secondary production techniques, such as waterflooding, that are used to maintain reservoir
20 pressure and displace oil are currently employed in hydrocarbon reservoirs in the Delaware
21 Basin (Brausch et al. 1982, pp. 29-30). Tertiary recovery techniques, such as **Carbon Dioxide**
22 miscible flooding, have been implemented with limited success in the Delaware Basin, but CO₂
23 miscible flooding is not an attractive recovery method for reservoirs near WIPP (Melzer 2003).
24 Even if **Carbon Dioxide** flooding were to occur the effects (if any) would be very similar to
25 those associated with waterflooding.

26 Reinjection of gas for storage currently takes place at one location in the Delaware Basin in a
27 depleted gas field in the Morrow Formation at the Washington Ranch near Carlsbad Caverns
28 (Burton et al. 1993, pp. 66-67; CCA Appendix DATA, Attachment A). This field is too far from
29 the WIPP site to have any effect on WIPP groundwaters under any circumstances. Disposal of
30 liquid by-products from oil and gas production involves injection of fluid into depleted
31 reservoirs. Such fluid injection techniques result in repressurization of the depleted target
32 reservoir and mitigates any effects of fluid withdrawal.

33 The most significant effects of fluid injection would arise from substantial and uncontrolled fluid
34 leakage through a failed borehole casing. The highly saline environment of some units can
35 promote rapid corrosion of well casings and may result in fluid loss from boreholes.

36 SCR-5.2.1.6.3.2 *Hydraulic Effects of Leakage through Injection Boreholes*

37 The Vacuum Field (located in the Capitan Reef, some 30 km [20 mi] northeast of the WIPP site)
38 and the Rhodes-Yates Field (located in the back reef of the Capitan, some 70 km (45 mi)

1 southeast of the WIPP site) have been waterflooded for 40 years with confirmed leaking wells,
2 which have resulted in brine entering the Salado and other formations above the Salado (see, for
3 example, Silva 1994, pp. 67-68). Currently, saltwater disposal takes place in the vicinity of the
4 WIPP into formations below the Castile. However, leakages from saltwater disposal wells or
5 waterflood wells in the near future in the vicinity of the WIPP are unlikely to occur because of
6 the following:

- 7 • There are significant differences between the geology and lithology in the vicinity of the
8 disposal system and that of the Vacuum and Rhodes-Yates Fields. The WIPP is located
9 in the Delaware Basin in a fore-reef environment, where a thick zone of anhydrite and
10 halite (the Castile) exists. In the vicinity of the WIPP, oil is produced from the Brushy
11 Canyon Formation at depths greater than 2100 m (7,000 ft). By contrast, the Castile is
12 not present at either the Vacuum or the Rhodes-Yates Field, which lie outside the
13 Delaware Basin. Oil production at the Vacuum Field is from the San Andres and
14 Grayburg Formations at depths of approximately 1400 m (4,500 ft), and oil production at
15 the Rhodes-Yates Field is from the Yates and Seven Rivers Formations at depths of
16 approximately 900 m (3,000 ft). Waterflooding at the Rhodes-Yates Field involves
17 injection into a zone only 60 m (200 ft) below the Salado. There are more potential thief
18 zones below the Salado near the WIPP than at the Rhodes-Yates or Vacuum Fields; the
19 Salado in the vicinity of the WIPP is therefore less likely to receive any fluid that leaks
20 from an injection borehole. Additionally, the oil pools in the vicinity of the WIPP are
21 characterized by channel sands with thin net pay zones, low permeabilities, high
22 irreducible water saturations, and high residual oil saturations. Therefore, waterflooding
23 of oil fields in the vicinity of the WIPP on the scale of that undertaken in the Vacuum or
24 the Rhodes-Yates Field is unlikely.
- 25 • New Mexico state regulations require the emplacement of a salt isolation casing string for
26 all wells drilled in the potash enclave, which includes the WIPP area, to reduce the
27 possibility of petroleum wells leaking into the Salado. Also, injection pressures are not
28 allowed to exceed the pressure at which the rocks fracture. The injection pressure
29 gradient must be kept below 4.5×10^3 pascals per meter above hydrostatic if fracture
30 pressures are unknown. Such controls on fluid injection pressures limit the potential
31 magnitude of any leakages from injection boreholes.
- 32 • Recent improvements in well completion practices and reservoir operations management
33 have reduced the occurrences of leakages from injection wells. For example, injection
34 pressures during waterflooding are typically kept below about 23×10^3 pascals per meter
35 to avoid fracture initiation. Also, wells are currently completed using cemented and
36 perforated casing, rather than the open-hole completions used in the early Rhodes-Yates
37 wells. A recent report (Hall et al. 2003) concludes that injection well operations near
38 WIPP have a very low failure rate, and that failures, although rare, are remedied quickly.

39 Any injection well leakages that do occur in the vicinity of the WIPP in the near future are more
40 likely to be associated with liquid waste disposal than waterflooding. Disposal typically involves
41 fluid injection through old and potentially corroded well casings and does not include monitoring
42 to the same extent as waterflooding. Such fluid injection could affect the performance of the

1 disposal system if sufficient fluid leaked into the Salado interbeds to affect the rate of brine flow
2 into the waste disposal panels.

3 Stoelzel and O'Brien (1996) evaluated the potential effects on the disposal system of leakage
4 from a hypothetical salt water disposal borehole near the WIPP. Stoelzel and O'Brien (1996)
5 used the two-dimensional BRAGFLO model (vertical north-south cross-section) to simulate
6 saltwater disposal to the north and to the south of the disposal system. The disposal system
7 model included the waste disposal region, the marker beds and anhydrite intervals near the
8 excavation horizon, and the rock strata associated with local oil and gas developments. A worst
9 case simulation was run using high values of borehole and anhydrite permeability and a low
10 value of halite permeability to encourage flow to the disposal panels via the anhydrite. Also, the
11 boreholes were assumed to be plugged immediately above the Salado (consistent with the
12 plugging configurations described in Section 6.4.7.2). Saltwater disposal into the Upper Bell
13 Canyon was simulated, with annular leakage through the Salado. A total of approximately $7 \times$
14 10^5 m^3 ($2.47 \times 10^7 \text{ ft}^3$) of brine was injected through the boreholes during a 50-year simulated
15 disposal period. In this time, approximately 50 m^3 (1765.5 ft^3) of brine entered the anhydrite
16 interval at the horizon of the waste disposal region. For the next 200 years the boreholes were
17 assumed to be abandoned (with open-hole permeabilities of $1 \times 10^{-9} \text{ m}^2$ ($4 \times 10^{-8} \text{ in.}$)). Cement
18 plugs (of permeability $1 \times 10^{-17} \text{ m}^2$ ($4 \times 10^{-16} \text{ in.}$)) were assumed to be placed at the injection
19 interval and at the top of the Salado. Subsequently, the boreholes were prescribed the
20 permeability of silty sand (see Section 6.4.7.2), and the simulation was continued until the end of
21 the 10,000-year regulatory period. During this period, approximately 400 m^3 ($14,124 \text{ ft}^3$) of
22 brine entered the waste disposal region from the anhydrite interval. This value of cumulative
23 brine inflow is within the bounds of the values generated by PA calculations for the undisturbed
24 performance scenario. During the disposal well simulation, leakage from the injection boreholes
25 would have had no significant effect on the inflow rate at the waste panels.

26 Stoelzel and Swift (1997) expanded on Stoelzel and O'Brien's (1996) work by considering
27 injection for a longer period of time (up to 150 years) and into deeper horizons at higher
28 pressures. They developed two computational models (a modified cross-sectional model and an
29 axisymmetric radial model) that are alternatives to the cross-sectional model used by Stoelzel
30 and O'Brien (1996). Rather than repeat the conservative and bounding approach used by
31 Stoelzel and O'Brien (1996), Stoelzel and Swift (1997) focused on reasonable and realistic
32 conditions for most aspects of the modeling, including setting parameters that were sampled in
33 the CCA at their median values. Model results indicate that, for the cases considered, the largest
34 volume of brine entering MB139 (the primary pathway to the WIPP) from the borehole is
35 approximately $1,500 \text{ m}^3$ ($52,974 \text{ ft}^3$), which is a small enough volume that it would not affect
36 Stoelzel and O'Brien's (1996) conclusion even if it somehow all reached the WIPP. Other cases
37 showed from 0 to 600 m^3 ($21,190 \text{ ft}^3$) of brine entering MB139 from the injection well. In all
38 cases, high-permeability fractures created in the Castile and Salado anhydrite layers by the
39 modeled injection pressures were restricted to less than 400 m (1,312 ft) from the wellbore, and
40 did not extend more than 250 m in MB138 and MB139.

41 No flow entered MB139, nor was fracturing of the unit calculated to occur away from the
42 borehole, in cases in which leaks in the cement sheath had permeabilities of $1 \times 10^{-12.5} \text{ m}^2$
43 (corresponding to the median value used to characterize fully degraded boreholes in the CCA) or
44 lower. The cases modeled in which flow entered MB139 from the borehole and fracturing

1 occurred away from the borehole required injection pressures conservatively higher than any
2 currently in use near the WIPP and either 150 years of leakage through a fully degraded cement
3 sheath or 10 years of simultaneous tubing and casing leaks from a waterflood operation. These
4 conditions are not likely to occur in the future. If leaks like these do occur from brine injection
5 near the WIPP, however, results of the Stoelzel and Swift (1997) modeling study indicate that
6 they will not affect the performance of the repository.

7 Thus, the hydraulic effects of leakage through HCN boreholes outside the controlled area have
8 been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
9 disposal system.

10 SCR-5.2.1.6.3.3 *Effects of Density Changes Resulting from Leakage Through Injection*
11 *Boreholes*

12 Leakage through a failed borehole casing during a fluid injection operation in the vicinity of the
13 WIPP could alter fluid density in the affected unit, which could result in changes in fluid flow
14 rates and directions within the disposal system. Disposal of oil and gas production by-products
15 through boreholes could increase fluid densities in transmissive units affected by leakage in the
16 casing. Operations such as waterflooding use fluids derived from the target reservoir, or fluids
17 with a similar composition, to avoid scaling and other reactions. Therefore, the effects of
18 leakage from waterflood boreholes would be similar to leakage from disposal wells.

19 Denser fluids have a tendency to sink relative to less dense fluids, and, if the hydrogeological
20 unit concerned has a dip, there will be a tendency for the dense fluid to travel in the downdip
21 direction. If this direction is the same as the direction of the groundwater pressure gradient, there
22 would be an increase in flow velocity, and conversely, if the downdip direction is opposed to the
23 direction of the groundwater pressure gradient, there would be a decrease in flow velocity. In
24 general terms, taking account of density-related flow will cause a rotation of the flow vector
25 towards the downdip direction that is dependent on the density contrast and the dip.

26 Wilmot and Galson (1996) showed that brine density changes in the Culebra resulting from
27 leakage through an injection borehole outside the controlled area will not affect fluid flow in the
28 Culebra significantly. Potash mining activities assumed on the basis of regulatory criteria to
29 occur in the near future outside the controlled area will have a more significant effect on
30 modeled Culebra hydrology. The distribution of existing leases suggests that near-future mining
31 will take place to the north, west, and south of the controlled area (see Section 2.3.1.1). The
32 effects of such potash mining are accounted for in calculations of undisturbed performance of the
33 disposal system (through an increase in the transmissivity of the Culebra above the mined region,
34 as discussed in FEPs H37, H38, and H39). Groundwater modeling that accounts for potash
35 mining shows a change in the fluid pressure distribution, and a consequent shift of flow
36 directions towards the west in the Culebra within the controlled area (Wallace 1996c). A
37 localized increase in fluid density in the Culebra resulting from leakage from an injection
38 borehole would rotate the flow vector towards the downdip direction (towards the east).

39 Wilmot and Galson (1996) compared the relative magnitudes of the freshwater head gradient and
40 the gravitational gradient and showed that the density effect is of low consequence to the

1 performance of the disposal system. According to Darcy’s Law, flow in an isotropic porous
 2 medium is governed by the gradient of fluid pressure and a gravitational term

$$3 \quad \bar{v} = -\frac{k}{\mu} [\nabla p - \rho \bar{g}], \quad (7)$$

4 where

- 5 v = Darcy velocity vector (m s⁻¹)
- 6 k = intrinsic permeability (m²)
- 7 μ = fluid viscosity (pa s)
- 8 ∇p = gradient of fluid pressure (pa m⁻¹)
- 9 ρ = fluid density (kg m⁻³)
- 10 g = gravitational acceleration vector (m s⁻²)

11 The relationship between the gravity-driven flow component and the pressure-driven component
 12 can be shown by expressing the velocity vector in terms of a freshwater head gradient and a
 13 density-related elevation gradient

$$14 \quad \bar{v} = -K \left[\nabla H_f + \frac{\Delta \rho}{\rho_f} \nabla E \right], \quad (8)$$

15 where

- 16 K = hydraulic conductivity (m s⁻¹)
- 17 ∇H_f = gradient of freshwater head
- 18 $\Delta \rho$ = difference between actual fluid
 19 density and reference fluid density (kg m⁻³)
- 20 ρ_f = density of freshwater (kg m⁻³)
- 21 ∇E = gradient of elevation

22 Davies (1989, p. 28) defined a driving force ratio (DFR) to assess the potential significance of
 23 the density gradient

$$24 \quad \text{DFR} = \frac{\Delta \rho |\nabla E|}{\rho_f |\nabla H_f|} \quad (9)$$

25 and concluded that a DFR of 0.5 can be considered an approximate threshold at which density-
 26 related gravity effects may become significant (Davies 1989, p. 28).

27 The dip of the Culebra in the vicinity of the WIPP is about 0.44° or 8 m/km (26 ft/mi) to the east
 28 (Davies 1989, p. 42). According to Davies (1989, pp. 47 - 48), freshwater head gradients in the
 29 Culebra between the waste panels and the southwestern and western boundaries of the accessible
 30 environment range from 4 m/km (13 ft/mi) to 7 m/km (23 ft/mi). Only small changes in gradient
 31 arise from the calculated effects of near-future mining. Culebra brines have densities ranging

1 from 998 to 1,158 kg/m³ (998 to 1,158 ppm) (Cauffman et al. 1990, Table E1.b). Assuming the
2 density of fluid leaking from a waterflood borehole or a disposal well to be 1,215 kg/m³ (1,215
3 ppm) (a conservative high value similar to the density of Castile brine [Popielak et al. 1983,
4 Table C-2]), leads to a DFR of between 0.07 and 0.43. These values of the DFR show that
5 density-related effects caused by leakage of brine into the Culebra during fluid injection
6 operations are not significant.

7 In summary, the effects of HCN fluid injection (*Liquid Waste Disposal, Enhanced Oil and Gas*
8 *Production, and Hydrocarbon Storage*) through boreholes outside the controlled area have been
9 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
10 disposal system.

11 SCR-5.2.1.6.3.4 *Geochemical Effects of Leakage through Injection Boreholes*

12 Injection of fluids through a leaking borehole could affect the geochemical conditions in thief
13 zones, such as the Salado interbeds or the Culebra. Such *Fluid Injection-Induced Geochemical*
14 *Changes* could alter radionuclide migration rates within the disposal system in the affected units
15 if they occur sufficiently close to the edge of the controlled area through their effects on colloid
16 transport and sorption.

17 The majority of fluids injected (for example, during brine disposal) have been extracted locally
18 during production activities. Because they have been derived locally, their compositions are
19 similar to fluids currently present in the disposal system, and they will have low total colloid
20 concentrations compared to those in the waste disposal panels (see FEPs discussion for H21
21 through H24). The repository will remain the main source of colloids in the disposal system.
22 Therefore, colloid transport as a result of HCN fluid injection has been eliminated from PA
23 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

24 As discussed in FEPs H21 through H24, sorption within the Culebra is accounted for in PA
25 calculations. The sorption model used accounts for the effects of any changes in sorption in the
26 Culebra as a result of leakage through HCN injection boreholes.

27 Consistent with the screening discussion in FEPs H21 through H24, the effects of changes in
28 sorption in the Dewey Lake within the controlled area as a result of leakage through HCN
29 injection boreholes have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence
30 to the performance of the disposal system. Sorption within other geological units of the disposal
31 system has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the
32 performance of the disposal system.

33 Nonlocally derived fluids could be used during hydraulic fracturing operations. However, such
34 fluid injection operations would be carefully controlled to minimize leakage to thief zones.
35 Therefore, any potential geochemical effects of such leakages have been eliminated from PA
36 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

37 SCR-5.2.1.6.3.5 *Future Human EPs*

38 Consistent with 40 CFR § 194.33(d), PAs need not analyze the effects of techniques used for
39 resource recovery subsequent to the drilling of a future borehole within the site boundary.

1 **Liquid Waste dDisposal** (by-products from oil and gas production), **Enhanced Oil and Gas**
 2 **Production**, and **Hydrocarbon Storage** are techniques associated with resource recovery and are
 3 expected to continue into the future outside the site boundary. Analyses have shown that these
 4 activities have little consequence on repository performance (Stoelzel and Swift 1997).
 5 Therefore, activities such as **Liquid Waste Disposal**, **Enhanced Oil and Gas Production**, and
 6 **Hydrocarbon Storage** have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
 7 consequence.

8 SCR-5.2.1.7 FEP Number: H30
 9 FEP Title: **Fluid Injection-Induced Geochemical Changes**

10 SCR-5.2.1.7.1 Screening Decision: UP (HCN)
 11 SO-R (Future)

12 *Geochemical changes that occur inside the controlled area as a result of fluid flow associated*
 13 *with HCN fluid injection are accounted for in PA calculations. **Liquid Waste dDisposal**,*
 14 ***Enhanced Oil and Gas Production**, and **Hydrocarbon Storage** involving future boreholes have*
 15 *been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.*

16 SCR-5.2.1.7.2 Summary of New Information

17 No new information regarding this FEP has been identified. The screening argument has been
 18 enhanced; the screening decisions have not changed.

19 SCR-5.2.1.7.3 Screening Argument

20 The injection of fluids could alter fluid-flow patterns in the target horizons or, if there is
 21 accidental leakage through a borehole casing, in any other intersected hydraulically conductive
 22 zone. Injection of fluids through a leaking borehole could also result in geochemical changes
 23 and altered radionuclide migration rates in the thief units.

24 SCR-5.2.1.7.3.1 *Geochemical Effects of Leakage through Injection Boreholes*

25 Injection of fluids through a leaking borehole could affect the geochemical conditions in thief
 26 zones, such as the Salado interbeds or the Culebra. Such **Fluid Injection-Induced Geochemical**
 27 **Changes** could alter radionuclide migration rates within the disposal system in the affected units
 28 if they occur sufficiently close to the edge of the controlled area through their effects on colloid
 29 transport and sorption.

30 The majority of fluids injected (for example, during brine disposal) have been extracted locally
 31 during production activities. Because they have been derived locally, their compositions are
 32 similar to fluids currently present in the disposal system, and they will have low total colloid
 33 concentrations compared to those in the waste disposal panels (see FEPs H21 through H24). The
 34 repository will remain the main source of colloids in the disposal system. Therefore, colloid
 35 transport as a result of HCN fluid injection has been eliminated from PA calculations on the
 36 basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

1 As discussed in FEPs H21 through H24, sorption within the Culebra is accounted for in PA
2 calculations. The sorption model used accounts for the effects of any changes in sorption in the
3 Culebra as a result of leakage through HCN injection boreholes.

4 Consistent with the screening discussion in FEPs H21 through H24, the effects of changes in
5 sorption in the Dewey Lake within the controlled area as a result of leakage through HCN
6 injection boreholes have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence
7 to the performance of the disposal system. Sorption within other geological units of the disposal
8 system has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the
9 performance of the disposal system.

10 Non-locally derived fluids could be used during hydraulic fracturing operations. However, such
11 fluid injection operations would be carefully controlled to minimize leakage to thief zones.
12 Therefore, any potential geochemical effects of such leakages have been eliminated from PA
13 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

14 SCR-5.2.1.7.3.2 *Future Human EPs*

15 Consistent with 40 CFR § 194.33(d), PAs need not analyze the effects of techniques used for
16 resource recovery subsequent to the drilling of a future borehole. **Liquid Waste dDisposal** (by-
17 products from oil and gas production), **Enhanced Oil and Gas Production**, and **Hydrocarbon**
18 **Storage** are techniques associated with resource recovery. Therefore, the use of future boreholes
19 for such activities and fluid injection-induced geochemical changes have been eliminated from
20 PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

21 SCR-5.2.1.8 FEP Number: H31 and H33
22 FEP Title: **Natural Borehole Fluid Flow (H31)**
23 **Flow Through Undetected Boreholes (H33)**

24 SCR-5.2.1.8.1 Screening Decision: SO-C (HCN)
25 SO-C (Future, holes not penetrating waste panels)
26 DP (Future, holes through waste panels)

27 *The effects of natural fluid flow through existing or near-future abandoned boreholes, known or*
28 *unknown, have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the*
29 *performance of the disposal system. Natural borehole flow through a future borehole that*
30 *intersects a waste panel is accounted for in PA calculations. The effects of natural borehole flow*
31 *through a future borehole that does not intersect the waste-disposal region have been eliminated*
32 *from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

33 SCR-5.2.1.8.2 Summary of New Information

34 **Natural Borehole Fluid Flow** and **Flow Through Undetected Boreholes** have been combined
35 because knowledge of a borehole's existence has no impact on its effects. **Flow Through**
36 **Undetected Boreholes** has been deleted from the baseline and the description of **Natural**
37 **Borehole Fluid Flow** was changed to include unknown boreholes. The screening argument has
38 been modified to simplify and improve clarity.

1 SCR-5.2.1.8.3 Screening Argument

2 Abandoned boreholes could provide pathways for fluid flow and, potentially, contaminant
 3 transport between any intersected zones. For example, such boreholes could provide pathways
 4 for vertical flow between transmissive units in the Rustler, or between the Culebra and units
 5 below the Salado, which could affect fluid densities, flow rates, and flow directions.

6 Movement of fluids through abandoned boreholes could result in borehole-induced geochemical
 7 changes in the receiving units such as the Salado interbeds or Culebra, and thus alter
 8 radionuclide migration rates in these units.

9 Potentially, boreholes could provide pathways for surface-derived water or groundwater to
 10 percolate through low-permeability strata and into formations containing soluble minerals.
 11 Large-scale dissolution through this mechanism could lead to subsidence and to changes in
 12 groundwater flow patterns. Also, fluid flow between hydraulically conductive horizons through
 13 a borehole may result in changes in permeability in the affected units through mineral
 14 precipitation.

15 SCR-5.2.1.8.3.1 *Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs*

16 SCR-5.2.1.8.3.2 *Abandoned water, potash, oil, and gas exploration and production boreholes*
 17 *exist within and outside the controlled area. Most of these boreholes have*
 18 *been plugged in some way, but some have simply been abandoned. Over*
 19 *time, even the boreholes that have been plugged may provide hydraulic*
 20 *connections among the units they penetrate as the plugs degrade. The DOE*
 21 *assumes that records of past and present drilling activities in New Mexico*
 22 *are largely accurate and that evidence of most boreholes would be included*
 23 *in these records. However, the potential effects of boreholes do not change*
 24 *depending on whether we know of their existence or not, hence **Flow***
 25 ***Through Undetected Boreholes and Flow Through Undetected Boreholes***
 26 *can be evaluated together.*

27 SCR-5.2.1.8.3.3 *Hydraulic Effects of Flow through Abandoned Boreholes*

28 Fluid flow and radionuclide transport within the Culebra could be affected if deep boreholes
 29 result in hydraulic connections between the Culebra and deep overpressurized or
 30 underpressurized units, or if boreholes provide interconnections for flow between shallow units.

31 SCR-5.2.1.8.3.4 *Connections Between the Culebra and Deeper Units*

32 Fluid flow and radionuclide transport within the Culebra could be affected if deep boreholes
 33 result in hydraulic connections between the Culebra and deep overpressurized or
 34 underpressurized units. Over the past 80 years, a large number of deep boreholes have been
 35 drilled within and around the controlled area (see Section 6.4.12.2). The effects on the
 36 performance of the disposal system of long-term hydraulic connections between the Culebra and
 37 deep units depends on the locations of the boreholes. In some cases, changes in the Culebra flow
 38 field caused by interconnections with deep units could decrease lateral radionuclide travel times
 39 to the accessible environment.

1 As part of an analysis to determine the impact of such interconnections, Wallace (1996a)
2 gathered information on the pressures, permeabilities, and thicknesses of potential oil- or gas-
3 bearing sedimentary units; such units exist to a depth of about 5,500 m (18,044 ft) in the vicinity
4 of the WIPP. Of these units, the Atoka, some 4,000 m (13,123 ft) below the land surface, has the
5 highest documented pressure of about 64×10^6 pascals (9,600 psi), with permeability of about 2
6 $\times 10^{-14}$ m² (2.1×10^{-13} ft²) and thickness of about 210 m (689 ft). The Strawn, 3,900 m (12,795
7 ft) below the land surface, has the lowest pressures (35×10^6 pascals (5,000 psi), which is lower
8 than hydrostatic) and highest permeability (10^{-13} m² (1.1×10^{-12} ft²)) of the deep units, with a
9 thickness of about 90 m (295 ft).

10 PA calculations indicate that the shortest radionuclide travel times to the accessible environment
11 through the Culebra occur when flow in the Culebra in the disposal system is from north to
12 south. Wallace (1996a) ran the steady-state SECOFL2D model with the PA data that generated
13 the shortest radionuclide travel times (with and without mining in the controlled area) but
14 perturbed the flow field by placing a borehole connecting the Atoka to the Culebra just north of
15 the waste disposal panels and a borehole connecting the Culebra to the Strawn just south of the
16 controlled area. The borehole locations were selected to coincide with the end points of the
17 fastest flow paths modeled, which represents an unlikely worst-case condition. Although the
18 Atoka is primarily a gas-bearing unit, Wallace (1996a) assumed that the unit is brine saturated.
19 This assumption is conservative because it prevents two-phase flow from occurring in the
20 Culebra, which would decrease the water permeability and thereby increase transport times. He
21 further conservatively assumed that the pressure in the Atoka would not have been depleted by
22 production before the well was plugged and abandoned. He also conservatively assumed that all
23 flow from the Atoka would enter the Culebra and not intermediate or shallower units, and that
24 flow from the Culebra could somehow enter the Strawn despite intermediate zones having higher
25 pressures than the Culebra. The fluid flux through each borehole was determined using Darcy's
26 Law, assuming a borehole hydraulic conductivity of 10^{-4} m/s (for a permeability of about 10^{-11}
27 m² (1.1×10^{-10} ft²)) representing silty sand, a borehole radius of 0.25 m (.82 ft), and a fluid
28 pressure in the Culebra of 0.88×10^6 pascals (132 psi) at a depth of about 200 m (650 ft). With
29 these parameters, the Atoka was calculated to transmit water to the Culebra at about 1.4×10^{-5}
30 m³/s (0.22 gpm), and the Strawn was calculated to receive water from the Culebra at about $1.5 \times$
31 10^{-6} m³/s (0.024 gpm).

32 Travel times through the Culebra to the accessible environment were calculated using the
33 SECOFL2D velocity fields for particles released to the Culebra above the waste panels,
34 assuming no retardation by sorption or diffusion into the rock matrix. Mean Darcy velocities
35 were then determined from the distance each radionuclide traveled, the time taken to reach the
36 accessible environment, and the effective Culebra porosity. The results show that, at worst,
37 interconnections between the Culebra and deep units under the unrealistically conservative
38 assumptions listed above could cause less than a twofold increase in the largest mean Darcy
39 velocity expected in the Culebra in the absence of such interconnections.

40 These effects can be compared to the potential effects of climate change on gradients and flow
41 velocities through the Culebra. As discussed in Section 6.4.9 (and Corbet and Knupp 1996), the
42 maximum effect of a future wetter climate would be to raise the water table to the ground
43 surface. This would raise heads and gradients in all units above the Salado. For the Culebra, the

1 maximum change in gradient was estimated to be about a factor of 2.1. The effect of climate
2 change is incorporated in compliance calculations through the Climate Index, which is used as a
3 multiplier for Culebra groundwater velocities. The Climate Index has a bimodal distribution,
4 with the range from 1.00 to 1.25 having a 75 percent probability, and the range from 1.50 to 2.25
5 having a 25 percent probability. Because implementation of the Climate Index leads to
6 radionuclide releases through the Culebra that are orders of magnitude lower than the regulatory
7 limits, the effects of flow between the Culebra and deeper units through abandoned boreholes
8 can be screened out on the basis of low consequence.

9 SCR-5.2.1.8.3.5 *Connections Between the Culebra and Shallower Units*

10 Abandoned boreholes could also provide interconnections for long-term fluid flow between
11 shallow units (overlying the Salado). Abandoned boreholes could provide pathways for
12 downward flow of water from the Dewey Lake and/or Magenta to the Culebra because the
13 Culebra hydraulic head is lower than the hydraulic heads of these units. Magenta freshwater
14 heads are as much as 45 m (148 ft) higher than Culebra freshwater heads. Because the Culebra
15 is generally at least one order of magnitude more transmissive than the Magenta at any location,
16 a connection between the Magenta and Culebra would cause proportionally more drawdown in
17 the Magenta head than rise in the Culebra head. For example, for a one order of magnitude
18 difference in transmissivity and a 45-m (148-ft) difference in head, the Magenta head would
19 decrease by approximately 40 m (131 ft) while the Culebra head increased by 5 m (16 ft). This
20 head increase in the Culebra would also be a localized effect, decreasing with radial distance
21 from the leaking borehole. The primary flow direction in the Culebra across the WIPP site is
22 from north to south, with the Culebra head decreasing by approximately 20 m (66 ft) across this
23 distance. A 5-m (16-ft) increase in Culebra head at the northern WIPP boundary would,
24 therefore, increase gradients by at most 25 percent.

25 The Dewey Lake freshwater head at the WQSP-6 pad is 55 m (180 ft) higher than the Culebra
26 freshwater head. Leakage from the Dewey Lake could have a greater effect on Culebra head
27 than leakage from the Magenta if the difference in transmissivity between the Dewey Lake and
28 Culebra observed at the WQSP-6 pad, where the Dewey Lake is two orders of magnitude more
29 transmissive than the Culebra (Beauheim and Ruskauff 1998), persists over a wide region.
30 However, the saturated, highly transmissive zone in the Dewey Lake has only been observed
31 south of the WIPP disposal panels. A connection between the Dewey Lake and the Culebra
32 south of the panels would tend to decrease the north-south gradient in the Culebra across the site,
33 not increase it.

34 In any case, leakage of water from overlying units into the Culebra could not increase Culebra
35 heads and gradients as much as might result from climate change, discussed above. Because
36 implementation of the Climate Index leads to radionuclide releases through the Culebra that are
37 orders of magnitude lower than the regulatory limits, the effects of flow between the Culebra and
38 shallower units through abandoned boreholes can be screened out on the basis of low
39 consequence.

1 SCR-5.2.1.8.3.6 *Changes in Fluid Density Resulting from Flow Through Abandoned*
2 *Boreholes*

3 Leakage from historical, current, and near-future abandoned boreholes that penetrate pressurized
4 brine pockets in the Castile could give rise to fluid density changes in affected units. Wilmot and
5 Galson (1996) showed that brine density changes in the Culebra resulting from leakage through
6 an abandoned borehole would not have a significant effect on the Culebra flow field. A
7 localized increase in fluid density in the Culebra resulting from leakage from an abandoned
8 borehole would rotate the flow vector towards the downdip direction (towards the east). A
9 comparison of the relative magnitudes of the freshwater head gradient and the gravitational
10 gradient, based on an analysis similar to that presented in Sections SCR.5.2.1 (FEPs H27, H28,
11 and H29), shows that the density effect is of low consequence to the performance of the disposal
12 system.

13 SCR-5.2.1.8.3.7 *Future Human EPs*

14 The EPA provides criteria concerning analysis of the consequences of future drilling events in 40
15 CFR § 194.33(c). Consistent with these criteria, the DOE assumes that after drilling is complete,
16 the borehole is plugged according to current practice in the Delaware Basin (see Section 6.4.7.2).
17 Degradation of casing and/or plugs may result in connections for fluid flow and, potentially,
18 contaminant transport between connected hydraulically conductive zones. The long-term
19 consequences of boreholes drilled and abandoned in the future will primarily depend on the
20 location of the borehole and the borehole casing and plugging methods used.

21 SCR-5.2.1.8.3.8 *Hydraulic Effects of Flow Through Abandoned Boreholes*

22 A future borehole that penetrates a Castile brine reservoir could provide a connection for brine
23 flow from the reservoir to the waste panel, thus increasing fluid pressure and brine volume in the
24 waste panel. Long-term **Natural Borehole Flow** through such a borehole is accounted for in PA
25 calculations (see Section 6.4.8).

26 Deep abandoned boreholes that intersect the Salado interbeds near the waste disposal panels
27 could provide pathways for long-term radionuclide transport from the waste panels to the land
28 surface or to overlying units. The potential significance of such events were assessed by WIPP
29 PA Department (1991, B-26 to B-27), which examined single-phase flow and transport between
30 the waste panels and a borehole intersecting MB139 outside the DRZ. The analysis assumed an
31 in situ pressure of 11 megapascals in MB139, a borehole pressure of 6.5 megapascals (975 psi)
32 (hydrostatic) at MB139, and a constant pressure of 18 megapascals (2,700 psi) as a source term
33 in the waste panels representing gas generation. Also, MB139 was assigned a permeability of
34 approximately $3 \times 10^{-20} \text{ m}^2$ ($3.2 \times 10^{-19} \text{ ft}^2$) and a porosity of 0.01 percent. The disturbed zone
35 was assumed to exist in MB139 directly beneath the repository only and was assigned a
36 permeability of $1.0 \times 10^{-17} \text{ m}^2$ ($1.1 \times 10^{-16} \text{ ft}^2$) and a porosity of 0.055 percent. Results showed
37 that the rate of flow through a borehole located just 0.25 m (0.8 ft) outside the DRZ would be
38 more than two orders of magnitude less than the rate of flow through a borehole located within
39 the DRZ because of the contrast in permeability. Thus, any releases of radionuclides to the
40 accessible environment through deep boreholes that do not intersect waste panels would be
41 insignificant compared to the releases that would result from transport through boreholes that

1 intersect waste panels. Thus, radionuclide transport through deep boreholes that do not intersect
 2 waste panels has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the
 3 performance of the disposal system.

4 SCR-5.2.1.8.3.9 *Fluid Flow and Radionuclide Transport in the Culebra*

5 Fluid flow and radionuclide transport within the Culebra could be affected if future boreholes
 6 result in hydraulic connections between the Culebra and either deeper or shallower units. Over
 7 the 10,000-year regulatory period, a large number of deep boreholes could be drilled within and
 8 around the controlled area (see Section 6.4.12.2). The effects on the performance of the disposal
 9 system of long-term hydraulic connections between the Culebra and deeper or shallower units
 10 would be the same as those discussed above for historic, current, and near-future conditions.
 11 Thus, the effects of flow between the Culebra and deeper or shallower units through abandoned
 12 future boreholes can be screened out on the basis of low consequence.

13 SCR-5.2.1.8.3.10 *Changes in Fluid Density Resulting from Flow Through Abandoned*
 14 *Boreholes*

15 A future borehole that intersects a pressurized brine reservoir in the Castile could also provide a
 16 source for brine flow to the Culebra in the event of borehole casing leakage, with a consequent
 17 localized increase in fluid density in the Culebra. The effect of such a change in fluid density
 18 would be to increase any density-driven component of groundwater flow. If the downdip
 19 direction, along which the density-driven component would be directed, is different from the
 20 direction of the groundwater pressure gradient, there would be a slight rotation of the flow vector
 21 towards the downdip direction. The groundwater modeling presented by Davies (1989, p. 50)
 22 indicates that a borehole that intersects a pressurized brine pocket and causes a localized increase
 23 in fluid density in the Culebra above the waste panels would result in a rotation of the flow
 24 vector slightly towards the east. However, the magnitude of this effect would be small in
 25 comparison to the magnitude of the pressure gradient (see screening argument for FEPS H27,
 26 H28, and H29 where this effect is screened out on the basis of low consequence.

27 SCR-5.2.1.9 FEP Number: H32
 28 FEP Title: **Waste-Induced Borehole Flow**

29 SCR-5.2.1.9.1 Screening Decision: SO-R (HCN)
 30 DP (Future)

31 *Waste-induced flow through boreholes drilled in the near future has been eliminated from PA*
 32 *calculations on regulatory grounds. **Waste-Induced Borehole Flow and Natural Borehole***
 33 ***Flow** through a future borehole that intersects a waste panel are accounted for in PA*
 34 *calculations.*

1 SCR-5.2.1.9.2 Summary of New Information

2 SCR-5.2.1.9.3 No new information has been identified for this FEP. This discussion for this
3 FEP has been modified for editorial purposes.

4 SCR-5.2.1.9.4 Screening Argument

5 Abandoned boreholes could provide pathways for fluid flow and, potentially, contaminant
6 transport between any intersected zones. For example, such boreholes could provide pathways
7 for vertical flow between transmissive units in the Rustler, or between the Culebra and units
8 below the Salado, which could affect fluid densities, flow rates, and flow directions.

9 Continued resource exploration and production in the near future will result in the occurrence of
10 many more abandoned boreholes in the vicinity of the controlled area. Institutional controls will
11 prevent drilling (other than that associated with the WIPP development) from taking place within
12 the controlled area in the near future. Therefore, no boreholes will intersect the waste disposal
13 region in the near future, and **Waste-Induced Borehole Flow** in the near future has been
14 eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

15 SCR-5.2.1.9.4.1 *Future Human EPs*

16 The EPA provides criteria concerning analysis of the consequences of future drilling events in 40
17 CFR § 194.33(c). Consistent with these criteria, the DOE assumes that after drilling is complete
18 the borehole is plugged according to current practice in the Delaware Basin (see Section 6.4.7.2).
19 Degradation of casing and/or plugs may result in connections for fluid flow and, potentially,
20 contaminant transport between connected hydraulically conductive zones. The long-term
21 consequences of boreholes drilled and abandoned in the future will primarily depend on the
22 location of the borehole and the borehole casing and plugging methods used.

23 SCR-5.2.1.9.4.2 *Hydraulic Effects of Flow Through Abandoned Boreholes*

24 An abandoned future borehole that intersects a waste panel could provide a connection for
25 contaminant transport away from the repository horizon. If the borehole has degraded casing
26 and/or plugs, and the fluid pressure within the waste panel is sufficient, radionuclides could be
27 transported to the land surface. Additionally, if brine flows through the borehole to overlying
28 units, such as the Culebra, it may carry dissolved and colloidal actinides that can be transported
29 laterally to the accessible environment by natural groundwater flow in the overlying units.
30 Long-term **Waste-Induced Borehole Flow** is accounted for in PA calculations (see Section
31 6.4.7.2).

1 SCR-5.2.1.10 FEP Number: H34
2 FEP Title: **Borehole-Induced Solution and Subsidence**

3 SCR-5.2.1.10.1 Screening Decision: SO-C (HCN)
4 SO-C (Future)

5 *The effects of **Borehole-Induced Solution and Subsidence** associated with existing, near-future,*
6 *and future abandoned boreholes have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low*
7 *consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

8 SCR-5.2.1.10.2 Summary of New Information

9 The original description and screening arguments for **Borehole-Induced Solution and**
10 **Subsidence** around existing and future boreholes remain unchanged and valid. The change in
11 hydraulic conductivity within the Culebra from **Borehole-Induced Solution and Subsidence**
12 along the flow path will have no significant affect on the long-term performance of the disposal
13 system. The effects have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence
14 to the performance of the disposal system. The FEP description and screening arguments have
15 been revised to include new information related to borehole-induced subsidence by recognizing
16 new and developing sinks in the region.

17 SCR-5.2.1.10.3 Screening Argument

18 Potentially, boreholes could provide pathways for surface-derived water or groundwater to
19 percolate through low-permeability strata and into formations containing soluble minerals.
20 Large-scale dissolution through this mechanism could lead to subsidence and to changes in
21 groundwater flow patterns. Also, fluid flow between hydraulically conductive horizons through
22 a borehole may result in changes in permeability in the affected units through mineral
23 precipitation.

24 SCR-5.2.1.10.3.1 *Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs*

25 *SCR-5.2.1.10.3.1.1 Borehole-Induced Solution and Subsidence*

26 During the period covered by HCN FEPs, drilling within the land withdrawn for the WIPP will
27 be controlled, and boreholes will be plugged according to existing regulations. Under these
28 circumstances and during this time period, **Borehole-Induced Solution and Subsidence** at WIPP
29 is eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of no consequence to the disposal system.

30 Outside the area withdrawn for the WIPP, drilling has been regulated, but conditions of historical
31 and existing boreholes are highly variable. **Borehole-Induced Solution and Subsidence** may
32 occur in these areas, although it is expected to be limited and should not affect the disposal
33 system, as discussed in the following paragraphs.

34 Three features are required for significant **Borehole-Induced Solution and Subsidence** to occur:
35 a borehole, an energy gradient to drive unsaturated (with respect to halite) water through the
36 evaporite-bearing formations, and a conduit to allow migration of brine away from the site of
37 dissolution. Without these features, minor amounts of halite might be dissolved in the immediate

1 vicinity of a borehole, but percolating water would become saturated with respect to halite and
2 stagnant in the bottom of the drillhole, preventing further dissolution.

3 At, and in the vicinity of, the WIPP site, drillholes penetrating into, but not through, the
4 evaporite-bearing formations have little potential for dissolution. Brines coming from the Salado
5 and Castile, for example, have high total dissolved solids (TDS) and are likely to precipitate
6 halite, not dissolve more halite during passage through the borehole. Water infiltrating from the
7 surface or near-surface units may not be saturated with halite. For drillholes with a total depth in
8 halite-bearing formations, there is little potential for dissolution because the halite-bearing units
9 have very low permeability and provide little outlet for the brine created as the infiltrating water
10 fills the drillhole. ERDA 9 is the deepest drillhole in the immediate vicinity of the waste panels
11 at WIPP; the bottom of the drillhole is in the uppermost Castile Formation, with no known outlet
12 for brine at the bottom.

13 Drillholes penetrating through the evaporite-bearing formations provide possible pathways for
14 circulation of water. Underlying units in the vicinity of the WIPP site with sufficient
15 potentiometric levels or pressures to reach or move upward through the halite units generally
16 have one of two characteristics: (1) high-salinity brines, which limit or eliminate the potential
17 for dissolution of evaporites, or (2) are gas-producers. Wallace et al. (1982) analyzed natural
18 processes of dissolution of the evaporites by water from the underlying Bell Canyon Formation.
19 They concluded that brine removal in the Bell Canyon is slow, limiting the movement of
20 dissolution fronts or the creation of natural collapse features. Existing drillholes that are within
21 the boundaries of the withdrawn land and also penetrate through the evaporites are not located in
22 the immediate vicinity of the waste panels or WIPP workings.

23 There are three examples in the region that appear to demonstrate the process for ***Borehole-***
24 ***Induced Solution and Subsidence***, but the geohydrologic setting and drillhole completions differ
25 from those at or near the WIPP.

26 An example of ***Borehole-Induced Solution and Subsidence*** occurred in 1980 about 160 km
27 (100 mi) southeast of the WIPP site (outside the Delaware Basin) at the Wink Sink
28 (Baumgardner et al. 1982; Johnson 1989); percolation of shallow groundwater through
29 abandoned boreholes, dissolution of the Salado, and subsidence of overlying units led to a
30 surface collapse feature 110 m (360 ft) in width and 34 m (110 ft) deep. At Wink Sink, the
31 Salado is underlain by the Tansill, Yates, and Capitan Formations, which contain vugs and
32 solution cavities through which brine could migrate. Also, the hydraulic head of the Santa Rosa
33 (the uppermost aquifer) is greater than those of the deep aquifers (Tansill, Yates, and Capitan
34 Formations), suggesting downward flow if a connection were established. A second sink (Wink
35 Sink 2) formed in May 2002, near the earlier sink (Johnson et al., in press). Its origin is similar to
36 the earlier sink. By February 2003, Wink Sink 2 had enlarged by surface collapse to a length of
37 about 305 m (1000 ft) and a width of about 198 m (650 ft).

38 A similar, though smaller, surface collapse occurred in 1998 northwest of Jal, New Mexico
39 (Powers 2000). The most likely cause of collapse appears to be dissolution of Rustler, and
40 possibly Salado, halite as relatively low salinity water from the Capitan Reef circulated through
41 breaks in the casing of a deep water supply well. Much of the annulus behind the casing through
42 the evaporite section was uncemented, and work in the well at one time indicated bent and

1 ruptured casing. The surface collapse occurred quickly, and the sink was initially about 23 m
2 (75 ft) across and a little more than 30 m (100 ft) deep. By 2001, the surface diameter was about
3 37 m (120 ft), and the sink was filled with collapse debris to about 18 m (60 ft) below the ground
4 level (Powers, in press).

5 The sinkholes near Wink, Texas, and Jal, New Mexico, occurred above the Capitan Reef (which
6 is by definition outside the Delaware Basin), and the low salinity water and relatively high
7 potentiometric levels of the Capitan Reef appear to be integral parts of the process that formed
8 these sinkholes. They are reviewed as examples of the process of evaporite dissolution and
9 subsidence related to circulation in drillholes. Nevertheless, the factors of significant low salinity
10 water and high potentiometric levels in units below the evaporites do not appear to apply at the
11 WIPP site.

12 Beauheim (1986) considered the direction of natural fluid flow through boreholes in the vicinity
13 of the WIPP. Beauheim (1986, p. 72) examined hydraulic heads measured using drill stem tests
14 in the Bell Canyon and the Culebra at well DOE-2 and concluded that the direction of flow in a
15 cased borehole open only to the Bell Canyon and the Culebra would be upward. Bell Canyon
16 waters in the vicinity of the WIPP site are saline brines (e.g., Lambert 1978; Beauheim et al.
17 1983; Mercer et al. 1987), limiting the potential for dissolution of the overlying evaporites.
18 However, dissolution of halite in the Castile and the Salado would increase the relative density of
19 the fluid in an open borehole, causing a reduction in the rate of upward flow. Potentially, the
20 direction of borehole fluid flow could reverse, but such a flow could be sustained only if
21 sufficient driving pressure, porosity, and permeability exist for fluid to flow laterally within the
22 Bell Canyon. A further potential sink for Salado-derived brine is the Capitan Limestone.
23 However, the subsurface extent of the Capitan Reef is approximately 16 km (10 mi) from the
24 WIPP at its closest point, and this unit will not provide a sink for brine derived from boreholes in
25 the vicinity of the controlled area. A similar screening argument is made for natural deep
26 dissolution in the vicinity of the WIPP (see N16, N17, and N18).

27 The effects of *Borehole-Induced Solution and Subsidence* through a waste panel are considered
28 below. The principal effects of *Borehole-Induced Solution and Subsidence* in the remaining
29 parts of the disposal system should be to change the hydraulic properties of the Culebra and other
30 rocks in the system. The features are local (limited lateral dimensions) and commonly nearly
31 circular. If subsidence occurs along the expected travel path and the transmissivity of the Culebra
32 is increased, as in the calculations conducted by Wallace (1996c), the travel times should
33 increase. If the transmissivity along the expected flow path decreased locally due to such a
34 feature, the flow path should be lengthened by travel around the feature. Thus, the effects of
35 *Borehole-Induced Solution and Subsidence* around existing abandoned boreholes, and
36 boreholes drilled and abandoned in the near-future, have been eliminated from PA calculations
37 on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

38 SCR-5.2.1.10.3.2 *Future Human EPs*

39 The EPA provides criteria concerning analysis of the consequences of future drilling events in 40
40 CFR § 194.33(c). Consistent with these criteria, the DOE assumes that after drilling is complete
41 the borehole is plugged according to current practice in the Delaware Basin (see Section 6.4.7.2).
42 Degradation of casing and/or plugs may result in connections for fluid flow and, potentially,

1 contaminant transport between connected hydraulically conductive zones. The long-term
2 consequences of boreholes drilled and abandoned in the future will primarily depend on the
3 location of the borehole and the borehole casing and plugging methods used.

4 *SCR-5.2.1.10.3.2.1 Borehole-Induced Solution and Subsidence*

5 Future boreholes that do not intersect the WIPP excavation do not differ in long-term behavior or
6 consequences from existing boreholes, and can be eliminated from PA on the basis of low
7 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

8 The condition of more apparent concern is a future borehole that intersects the WIPP excavation.
9 Seals and casings are assumed to degrade, connecting the excavation to various units. For a
10 drillhole intersecting the excavation, but not connecting to a brine reservoir or to formations
11 below the evaporites, downward flow is limited by the open volume of the disposal room(s),
12 which is dependent with time, gas generation, or brine inflow to the disposal system from the
13 Salado.

14 Maximum dissolution, and maximum increase in borehole diameter, will occur at the top of the
15 Salado; dissolution will decrease with depth as the percolating water becomes salt saturated.
16 Eventually, degraded casing and concrete plug products, clays, and other materials will fill the
17 borehole. Long-term flow through a borehole that intersects a waste panel is accounted for in
18 disturbed performance calculations by assuming that the borehole is eventually filled by such
19 materials, which have the properties of a silty sand (see Section 6.4.7.2). However, these
20 calculations assume that the borehole diameter does not increase with time. Under the conditions
21 assumed in the SCR for the CCA for an E2 drilling event at 1,000 years, about 1,000 m³ (35,316
22 ft³) would be dissolved from the lower Rustler and upper Salado Formations. If the dissolved
23 area is approximately cylindrical or conical around the borehole, and the collapse/subsidence
24 propagates upward as occurred in breccia pipes (e.g., Snyder and Gard 1982), the diameter of the
25 collapsed or subsided area through the Culebra and other units would be a few tens of meters
26 across. Changes in hydraulic parameters for this small zone should slow travel times for any
27 hypothesized radionuclide release, as discussed for HCN occurrences. This does not change the
28 argument for low consequence due to *Borehole-Induced Solution and Subsidence* for these
29 circumstances.

30 If a drillhole through a waste panel and into deeper evaporites intercepts a Castile brine reservoir,
31 the brine has little or no capability of dissolving additional halite. The Castile brine flow is
32 considered elsewhere as part of disturbed performance. There is, however, no *Borehole-Induced*
33 *Solution and Subsidence* under this circumstance, and therefore there is no effect on
34 performance due to this EP.

35 If a borehole intercepts a waste panel and also interconnects with formations below the evaporite
36 section, fluid flow up or down is determined by several conditions and may change over a period
37 of time (e.g., as dissolution increases the fluid density in the borehole. Fluid flow downward is
38 not a concern for performance, as fluid velocities in units such as the Bell Canyon are slow and
39 should not be of concern for performance (e.g., II-G-12, 3.12.3.3.). For dissolution at the top of
40 the evaporite section (as with boreholes considered under HCN), the process can develop a
41 localized area around the borehole in which the hydraulic parameters for the Culebra and other

1 units are altered. As with boreholes considered for HCN, the local change in hydraulic
2 parameters, if it occurs along the expected flow path, would be expected to cause little change in
3 travel time and should increase the travel time.

4 In summary, the effects of ***Borehole-Induced Solution and Subsidence*** around future abandoned
5 boreholes have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the
6 performance of the disposal system.

7 SCR-5.2.1.11 FEP Number: H35
8 FEP Title: ***Borehole Induced Mineralization***

9 SCR-5.2.1.11.1 Screening Decision: SO-C (HCN)
10 SO-C (Future)

11 *The effects of **Borehole -Induced Mineralization**, associated with existing, near-future, and*
12 *future abandoned boreholes, have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low*
13 *consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

14 SCR-5.2.1.11.2 Summary of New Information

15 Abandoned boreholes could provide pathways for fluid flow and, potentially, contaminant
16 transport between any intersected zones. Movement of compositionally different groundwater
17 into the Culebra may lead to mineral precipitation, potentially changing porosity and
18 permeability within the unit, and affecting contaminant transport. The potential effects of
19 borehole-induced brine movement into the Culebra dolomite and mineral precipitation/
20 dissolution are discussed in FEPs H31 through H36. The original FEP description was slightly
21 modified to include an evaluation of the effects of mineral precipitation on matrix diffusion.

22 SCR-5.2.1.11.3 Screening Argument

23 Abandoned boreholes could provide pathways for fluid flow and, potentially, contaminant
24 transport between any intersected zones. For example, such boreholes could provide pathways
25 for vertical flow between transmissive units in the Rustler, or between the Culebra and units
26 below the Salado, which could affect fluid densities, flow rates, and flow directions.

27 Movement of fluids through abandoned boreholes could result in ***Borehole-Induced***
28 ***Geochemical Changes*** in the receiving units, such as the Salado interbeds or Culebra, and thus
29 alter radionuclide migration rates in these units.

30 Potentially, boreholes could provide pathways for surface-derived water or groundwater to
31 percolate through low-permeability strata and into formations containing soluble minerals.
32 Large-scale dissolution through this mechanism could lead to subsidence and to changes in
33 groundwater flow patterns. Also, fluid flow between hydraulically conductive horizons through
34 a borehole may result in changes in permeability in the affected units through mineral
35 precipitation.

1 SCR-5.2.1.11.3.1 *Borehole-Induced Mineralization*

2 Fluid flow between hydraulically conductive horizons through a borehole may result in changes
3 in permeability in the affected units through mineral precipitation. For example:

- 4 • Limited calcite precipitation may occur as the waters mix in the Culebra immediately
5 surrounding the borehole, and calcite dissolution may occur as the brines migrate away
6 from the borehole due to variations in water chemistry along the flow path.
- 7 • Gypsum may be dissolved as the waters mix in the Culebra immediately surrounding the
8 borehole but may precipitate as the waters migrate through the Culebra.

9 The effects of these mass transfer processes on groundwater flow depend on the original
10 permeability structure of the Culebra rocks and the location of the mass transfer. The volumes of
11 minerals that may precipitate and/or dissolve in the Culebra as a result of the injection of Castile
12 or Salado brine through a borehole will not affect the existing spatial variability in the
13 permeability field significantly.

14 Predicted radionuclide transport rates in the Culebra assume that the dolomite matrix is
15 diffusively accessed by the contaminants. The possible inhibition of matrix diffusion by
16 secondary mineral precipitation on fracture walls, due to mixing between brines and Culebra
17 porewater, was addressed by Wang (1998). Wang showed that the volume of secondary
18 minerals precipitated due to this mechanism was too small to significantly affect matrix porosity
19 and accessibility.

20 Consequently, the effects of ***Borehole -Induced Mineralization*** on permeability and
21 groundwater flow within the Culebra, as a result of brines introduced via any existing abandoned
22 boreholes, and boreholes drilled and abandoned in the near-future, have been eliminated from
23 PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

24 SCR-5.2.1.11.4 Future Human EPs

25 The EPA provides criteria concerning analysis of the consequences of future drilling events in 40
26 CFR § 194.33(c). Consistent with these criteria, the DOE assumes that after drilling is complete
27 the borehole is plugged according to current practice in the Delaware Basin (see Section 6.4.7.2).
28 Degradation of casing and/or plugs may result in connections for fluid flow and, potentially,
29 contaminant transport between connected hydraulically conductive zones. The long-term
30 consequences of boreholes drilled and abandoned in the future will primarily depend on the
31 location of the borehole and the borehole casing and plugging methods used.

32 SCR-5.2.1.11.4.1 *Borehole-Induced Mineralization*

33 Fluid flow between hydraulically conductive horizons through a future borehole may result in
34 changes in permeability in the affected units through mineral precipitation. However, the effects
35 of mineral precipitation as a result of flow through a future borehole in the controlled area will
36 be similar to the effects of mineral precipitation as a result of flow through an existing or near-
37 future borehole (see FEP H32 and H33). Thus, ***Borehole-Induced Mineralization*** associated

1 with flow through a future borehole has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of
2 low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

3 SCR-5.2.1.12 FEP Number: H36
4 FEP Title: ***Borehole-Induced Geochemical Changes***

5 SCR-5.2.1.12.1 Screening Decision: UP (HCN)
6 DP (Future)
7 SO-C for units other than the Culebra

8 *Geochemical changes that occur inside the controlled area as a result of long-term flow*
9 *associated with HCN, and future abandoned boreholes are accounted for in PA calculations.*

10 SCR-5.2.1.12.2 Summary of New Information

11 No new information has been identified. This FEP has been modified for editorial purposes.

12 SCR-5.2.1.12.3 Screening Argument

13 Abandoned boreholes could provide pathways for fluid flow and, potentially, contaminant
14 transport between any intersected zones. For example, such boreholes could provide pathways
15 for vertical flow between transmissive units in the Rustler, or between the Culebra and units
16 below the Salado, which could affect fluid densities, flow rates, and flow directions.

17 Movement of fluids through abandoned boreholes could result in ***Borehole-Induced***
18 ***Geochemical Changes*** in the receiving units such as the Salado interbeds or Culebra, and thus
19 alter radionuclide migration rates in these units.

20 SCR-5.2.1.12.3.1 *Geochemical Effects of Borehole Flow*

21 Movement of fluids through abandoned boreholes could result in ***Borehole-Induced***
22 ***Geochemical Changes*** in the receiving units such as the Salado interbeds or Culebra. Such
23 geochemical changes could alter radionuclide migration rates within the disposal system in the
24 affected units if they occur sufficiently close to the edge of the controlled area, or if they occur as
25 a result of flow through existing boreholes within the controlled area through their effects on
26 colloid transport and sorption.

27 The contents of the waste disposal panels provide the main source of colloids in the disposal
28 system. Thus, consistent with the discussion for ***Borehole-Induced Geochemical Changes***
29 (H24), colloid transport as a result of flow through existing and near-future abandoned boreholes
30 has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of
31 the disposal system.

32 As discussed in H24, sorption within the Culebra is accounted for in PA calculations. The
33 sorption model used accounts for the effects of changes in sorption in the Culebra as a result of
34 flow through existing and near-future abandoned boreholes.

1 Consistent with the screening discussion in H24, the effects of changes in sorption in the Dewey
 2 Lake inside the controlled area as a result of flow through existing and near-future abandoned
 3 boreholes have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the
 4 performance of the disposal system. Sorption within other geological units of the disposal
 5 system has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the
 6 performance of the disposal system.

7 SCR-5.2.1.12.4 Future Human EPs

8 The EPA provides criteria concerning analysis of the consequences of future drilling events in 40
 9 CFR § 194.33(c). Consistent with these criteria, the DOE assumes that after drilling is complete
 10 the borehole is plugged according to current practice in the Delaware Basin (see Section 6.4.7.2).
 11 Degradation of casing and/or plugs may result in connections for fluid flow and, potentially,
 12 contaminant transport between connected hydraulically conductive zones. The long-term
 13 consequences of boreholes drilled and abandoned in the future will primarily depend on the
 14 location of the borehole and the borehole casing and plugging methods used.

15 SCR-5.2.1.12.4.1 *Geochemical Effects of Flow Through Abandoned Boreholes*

16 Movement of fluids through abandoned boreholes could result in **Borehole-Induced**
 17 **Geochemical Changes** in the receiving units, such as the Salado interbeds or Culebra. Such
 18 geochemical changes could alter radionuclide migration rates within the disposal system in the
 19 affected units through their effects on colloid transport and sorption.

20 The waste disposal panels provide the main source of colloids in the disposal system. Colloid
 21 transport within the Culebra as a result of long-term flow associated with future abandoned
 22 boreholes that intersect the waste disposal region are accounted for in PA calculations, as
 23 described in Sections 6.4.3.6 and 6.4.6.2.1. Consistent with the discussion in H24, colloid
 24 transport as a result of flow through future abandoned boreholes that do not intersect the waste
 25 disposal region has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the
 26 performance of the disposal system. The Culebra is the most transmissive unit in the disposal
 27 system and it is the most likely unit through which significant radionuclide transport could occur.
 28 Therefore, colloid transport in units other than the Culebra, as a result of flow through future
 29 abandoned boreholes, has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence
 30 to the performance of the disposal system.

31 As discussed in H24, sorption within the Culebra is accounted for in PA calculations. The
 32 sorption model accounts for the effects of changes in sorption in the Culebra as a result of flow
 33 through future abandoned boreholes.

34 Consistent with the screening discussion in H24, the effects of changes in sorption in the Dewey
 35 Lake within the controlled area as a result of flow through future abandoned boreholes have been
 36 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
 37 disposal system. Sorption within other geological units of the disposal system has been
 38 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the performance of the
 39 disposal system.

1 subsidence and fracturing associated with mining in the McNutt in the vicinity of the WIPP may
2 allow increased recharge to the Rustler units and affect the lateral hydraulic conductivity of
3 overlying units, such as the Culebra, which could influence the direction and magnitude of fluid
4 flow within the disposal system. Such ***Changes in Groundwater Flow Due to Mining*** are
5 accounted for in calculations of undisturbed performance of the disposal system. The effects of
6 any increased recharge that may be occurring are in effect included by using heads measured in
7 2000 (which should reflect that recharge) to calibrate Culebra transmissivity fields and calculate
8 transport through those fields (Beauheim 2002). Changes (increases) in Culebra transmissivity
9 are incorporated directly in the modeling of flow and transport in the Culebra (see Section
10 6.4.6.2.3).

11 Potash mining, and the associated processing outside the controlled area, have changed fluid
12 densities within the Culebra, as demonstrated by the areas of higher densities around boreholes
13 WIPP-27 and WIPP-29 (Davies 1989, p. 43). Transient groundwater flow calculations (Davies
14 1989, pp. 77 - 81) show that brine density variations to the west of the WIPP site caused by
15 historical and current potash processing operations will not persist because the rate of
16 groundwater flow in this area is fast enough to flush the high density groundwaters to the Pecos
17 River. These calculations also show that accounting for the existing brine density variations in
18 the region east of the WIPP site, where hydraulic conductivities are low, would have little effect
19 on the direction or rate of groundwater flow. Therefore, changes in fluid densities from
20 historical and current Human EPs have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
21 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

22 The distribution of existing leases and potash grades suggests that near-future mining will take
23 place to the north, west, and south of the controlled area (see CCA Appendix DEL). A localized
24 increase in fluid density in the Culebra, in the mined region or elsewhere outside the controlled
25 area, would rotate the flow vector towards the downdip direction (towards the east). A
26 comparison of the relative magnitudes of the pressure gradient and the density gradient (based on
27 an analysis identical to that presented for fluid leakage to the Culebra through boreholes) shows
28 that the density effect is of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

29 SCR-5.2.2.1.4 Future Human EPs

30 Consistent with 40 CFR § 194.32(b), consideration of future mining may be limited to potash
31 mining within the disposal system. Within the controlled area, the McNutt provides the only
32 potash of appropriate quality. The extent of possible future potash mining within the controlled
33 area is discussed in Section 2.3.1.1. Criteria concerning the consequence modeling of future
34 mining are provided in 40 CFR § 194.32(b): the effects of future mining may be limited to
35 changes in the hydraulic conductivity of the hydrogeologic units of the disposal system. Thus,
36 consistent with 40 CFR § 194.32(b), ***Changes in Groundwater Flow Due to Mining*** within the
37 controlled area are accounted for in calculations of the disturbed performance of the disposal
38 system (see Section 6.4.6.2.3).

1 SCR-5.2.2.2 FEP Number: H38
2 FEP Title: *Changes in Geochemistry Due to Mining*

3 SCR-5.2.2.2.1 Screening Decision: SO-C (HCN)
4 SO-R (Future)

5 *Changes in geochemistry due to HCN potash mining have been eliminated from PA calculations*
6 *on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system. Changes in*
7 *geochemistry due to future mining have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory*
8 *grounds.*

9 SCR-5.2.2.2.2 Summary of New Information

10 The only natural resource being mined underground currently near WIPP is potash in the
11 McNutt, and it is the only mineral considered for future mining. Potash mining is also the only
12 excavation activity currently taking place in the vicinity of the WIPP that could affect
13 hydrogeological or geochemical conditions in the disposal system. It appears unlikely that
14 underground mining will impact the site geochemistry during the time of passive institutional
15 controls, and a conclusion of no near-term consequence is screened from future events as per 40
16 CFR § 194.25. Changes have been made to the screening argument. However, the screening
17 decision remains the same.

18 SCR-5.2.2.2.3 Screening Argument

19 SCR-5.2.2.2.3.1 *Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs*

20 Potash mining is the only excavation activity currently taking place in the vicinity of the WIPP
21 that could affect hydrogeological or geochemical conditions in the disposal system. Potash is
22 mined in the region east of Carlsbad and up to 5 km (1.5 mi) from the boundaries of the
23 controlled area. Mining of the McNutt in the Salado is expected to continue in the vicinity of the
24 WIPP (see Section 2.3.1.1): the DOE assumes that all economically recoverable potash in the
25 vicinity of the WIPP (outside the controlled area) will be extracted in the near future.

26 SCR-5.2.2.2.3.2 *Geochemical Effects of Mining*

27 Fluid flow associated with excavation activities may result in geochemical disturbances of the
28 disposal system. Some waters from the Culebra reflect the influence of current potash mining,
29 having elevated potassium to sodium ratios. However, potash mining has had no significant
30 effect on the geochemical characteristics of the disposal system. Solution mining, which
31 involves the injection of freshwater to dissolve the ore body, can be used for extracting sylvite.
32 The impact on the WIPP of neighboring potash mines was examined in greater detail by
33 D'Appolonia (1982). D'Appolonia noted that attempts to solution mine sylvite in the Delaware
34 Basin failed due to low ore grade, thinness of the ore beds, and problems with heating and
35 pumping injection water. See discussion for potash mining FEP H13. Thus, ***Changes in***
36 ***Groundwater Flow Due to Mining*** (HCN) have been eliminated from PA calculations on the
37 basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

1 SCR-5.2.2.2.3.3 *Future Human EPs*

2 Consistent with 40 CFR § 194.32(b), consideration of future mining may be limited to potash
 3 mining within the disposal system. Within the controlled area, the McNutt provides the only
 4 potash of appropriate quality. The extent of possible future potash mining within the controlled
 5 area is discussed in Section 2.3.1.1. Criteria concerning the consequence modeling of future
 6 mining are provided in 40 CFR § 194.32(b): the effects of future mining may be limited to
 7 changes in the hydraulic conductivity of the hydrogeologic units of the disposal system. Thus,
 8 consistent with 40 CFR § 194.32(b), changes in groundwater flow due to mining within the
 9 controlled area are accounted for in calculations of the disturbed performance of the disposal
 10 system (see Section 6.4.6.2.3). Other potential effects, such as ***Changes in Groundwater Flow***
 11 ***Due to Mining***, have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

12 SCR-5.2.2.3 FEP Number H58
 13 FEP Title: ***Solution Mining for Potash***

14 SCR-5.2.2.3.1 Screening Decision: SO-R (HCN)
 15 SO-R (future)

16 *HCN, and future **Solution Mining for Potash** has been eliminated from PA calculations on*
 17 *regulatory grounds. HCN, and future solution mining for other resources have been eliminated*
 18 *from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

19 SCR-5.2.2.3.2 Summary of New Information

20 In the CCA, ***Solution Mining for Potash*** was not identified as a separate FEP, although all
 21 components of the solution mining process were accounted for in FEPs screening, albeit in a
 22 piecemeal fashion. For example, the drilling of the borehole necessary for solution injection or
 23 effluent recovery is addressed in FEP H8, ***Drilling For Other Resources***, mainly because the
 24 physical and mechanical effects of the drilling activity do not vary based on the type of resource
 25 being sought, nor on the final intended use of the borehole; e.g., disposal well, injection well,
 26 solution mining, or oil and gas extraction. The removal of an ore as a result of solution mining is
 27 ultimately the same as if conventional mining processes had removed the ore. Potash mining
 28 using conventional methods is addressed in FEP H13, ***Conventional Underground Potash***
 29 ***Mining***. The ultimate effect of such ore body removal is believed to be the eventual subsidence
 30 of the overlying units and the associated impact upon hydraulic conductivity. This has been
 31 demonstrated to have a negligible effect on performance of the WIPP, and is in fact accounted
 32 for in PA by EPA's requisite treatment of potash mining above the waste area.

33 Although the original FEP baseline considered different types of mineral and petroleum resource
 34 exploration/exploitation, it did not initially consider the possibility of brine mining (solution
 35 mining), even though this has occurred in the Delaware Basin. EPA noted this oversight in their
 36 March 1997 letter requesting additional information regarding the CCA (EPA 1997). In
 37 response to this request, the DOE submitted two memos (Hicks 1997a, 1997b) that addressed
 38 both ***Solution Mining for Potash*** and solution mining for brine. In EPA's TSD for §194.32,
 39 "Scope of Performance Assessments," EPA noted that these memos adequately supported the
 40 screening decisions presented in the CCA.

1 For CRA-2004, solution mining has been explicitly represented within the FEPs baseline through
2 the additions of FEP H58, *Solution Mining for Potash* and FEP H59, *Solution Mining for*
3 *Other Resources*. The reassessment of these EPs confirms that no significant developments
4 have occurred since the CCA, and the arguments used by Hicks remain valid. The creation of
5 these FEPs will aid in clarifying and separating the activities related to solution mining from
6 conventional mining for potash as addressed in FEP H13.

7 SCR-5.2.2.3.3 Screening Argument

8 Currently, no *Solution Mining for Potash* occurs in the Carlsbad Potash District (CPD). The
9 prospect of using solution-mining techniques for extracting potash has been identified in the
10 region, but has not been implemented. A pilot plant for secondary solution mining of sylvite in
11 the Clayton Basin, just north of the Delaware Basin was permitted, and concept planning took
12 place during the mid-1990s and was noted by the EPA in their Response to Comments to the
13 CCA (EPA 1998b). Five years later, this pilot project has yet to begin. Therefore, it is
14 premature to consider this an operational solution mining activity. More importantly, the
15 proposed site is outside the Delaware Basin.

16 The potash reserves evaluated by Griswold and Griswold (1999) and NMBMMR (1995) at
17 WIPP are of economic importance in only two ore zones; the 4th and the 10th and contain two
18 minerals of economic importance, langbeinite and sylvite. The ore in the 10th ore zone is
19 primarily sylvite with some langbeinite and the ore in the 4th zone is langbeinite with some
20 sylvite. Langbeinite falls between gypsum and polyhalite in solubility and dissolves at a rate
21 1000 times slower than sylvite (Heyn 1997). Halite, the predominate gangue mineral present, is
22 much more soluble than the langbeinite. Due to the insolubility of langbeinite, sylvite is the only
23 ore that could be mined using a solution mining process. Mining for sylvite by solutioning would
24 cause the langbeinite to be lost because conventional mining could not be done in conjunction
25 with a solution mining process.

26 Communiqués with IMC Global (Heyn 1997, Prichard 2003), indicate that rock temperature is
27 critical to the success of a solution-mining endeavor. IMC Global's solution mines in Michigan
28 and Saskatchewan are at depths around 914 m (3,000 ft) or greater, at which rock temperatures
29 are higher. The ore zones at WIPP are shallow, at depths of 457 to 549 m (1500 to 1800 ft), with
30 fairly cool rock temperatures. David Prichard of IMC Global states that solution mining is
31 energy intensive and the cool temperature of the rock would add to the energy costs. In addition,
32 variable concentrations of confounding minerals (such as kainite and leonite) will cause
33 problems with the brine chemistry.

34 Typically, solution mining is used for potash:

- 35 • when deposits are at depths in excess of 914 m (3000 ft) and rock temperatures are high
36 or are geologically too complex to mine profitably using conventional underground
37 mining techniques;
- 38 • to recover the potash pillars at the end of a mine's life; or

- 1 • when a mine is unintentionally flooded with waters from underlying or overlying rock
2 strata and conventional mining is no longer feasible.

3 Douglas W. Heyn (chief chemist of IMC Kalium) provided written testimony to EPA related to
4 the Agency’s rulemaking activities on the CCA. Heyn concluded that “the rational choice for
5 extracting WIPP potash ore reserves would be by conventional room and pillar mechanical
6 means” (Heyn 1997). It is the opinion of IMC Global that no company will ever attempt solution
7 mining of the ores in or near the WIPP (Heyn 1997, Prichard 2003).

8 The impact on the WIPP of neighboring potash mines was examined in detail by D’Appolonia
9 (1982) and evaluated the possible effects of *Solution Mining for Potash* or other evaporite
10 minerals. According to D’Appolonia (1982), and in agreement with Heyn (1997) of IMC Global
11 Inc, solution mining of langbeinite is not technically feasible because the ore is less soluble than
12 the surrounding evaporite minerals. Solution mining of sylvite was unsuccessfully attempted in
13 the past by the Potash Company of America and Continental Potash, both ore bodies currently
14 owned by Mississippi Chemical. Failure of solution mining was attributed to low ore grade,
15 thinness of the ore beds, and problems with heating and pumping injection water. Unavailability
16 of water in the area would also impede implementation of this technique. For these reasons,
17 solution mining is not currently used in the Carlsbad Potash District.

18 Serious technical and economic obstacles exist that render *Solution Mining for Potash* very
19 unlikely in the vicinity of the WIPP. Expectedly, no operational example of this technology
20 exists in the CPD; that is, *Solution Mining for Potash* is not considered a current practice in the
21 area. For this reason, consideration of solution mining on the disposal system in the future may
22 be excluded on regulatory grounds. For example, the EPA stated in their Response to
23 Comments, Section 8, Issue GG (EPA 1998b):

24 ...However, the Agency emphasizes that, in accordance with the WIPP compliance criteria,
25 solution mining does not need to be included in the PA. As previously discussed, potash solution
26 mining is not an ongoing activity in the Delaware Basin. Section 194.32(b) of the rule limits
27 assessment of mining effects to excavation mining. Thus the solution mining scenarios proposed
28 are excluded on regulatory grounds after repository closure. Prior to or soon after disposal,
29 solution mining is an activity that could be considered under Section 194.32(c). However, DOE
30 found that potash solution mining is not an ongoing activity in the Delaware Basin; and one pilot
31 project examining solution mining in the Basin is not substantive evidence that such mining is
32 expected to occur in the near future. (Even if mining were assumed to occur in the near future, the
33 proposed scenarios would not be possible because, even though solution mining might occur, there
34 would be no intruding borehole to provide a pathway into the repository: active institutional
35 controls would preclude such drilling during the first 100 years after disposal.) Furthermore,
36 Section 194.33(d) states that PA need not analyze the effects of techniques used for resource
37 recovery (e.g. solution mining) after a borehole is drilled in the future.

38 No new data or information has become available that compromise, reduce, or invalidate the
39 project’s position on whether *Solution Mining for Potash* should be included in the PA
40 calculations. Therefore, conventional mining activities will continue to be incorporated into the
41 WIPP PA as directed by the EPA Compliance Application Guidance (CAG) (EPA 1996c). It
42 remains to be seen if a viable potash solution mining project (or others like it) ever progress
43 beyond the planning phase. Construction of a facility for solution mining is an expensive
44 undertaking, and its use as a final recovery method implies that marginal (residual) ore quantities

1 In single-borehole operations, a borehole is drilled into the upper part of the halite unit. After
 2 casing and cementing this portion of the borehole, the borehole is extended, uncased into the
 3 halite formation. An inner pipe is installed from the surface to the base of this uncased portion
 4 of the borehole. During operation, fresh water is pumped down the annulus of the borehole.
 5 This dissolves halite over the uncased portion of the borehole, and saturated brine is forced up
 6 the inner tube to the surface.

7 In doublet operations, a pair of boreholes are drilled, cased and cemented into the upper part of
 8 the halite unit. The base of the production well is set some feet below the base of the injection
 9 well. In the absence of natural fractures or other connections between the boreholes,
 10 hydrofracturing is used to induce fractures around the injection well. During operation, fresh
 11 water is pumped down the injection well. This initially dissolves halite from the walls of the
 12 fractures and the resulting brine is then pumped from the production well. After a period of
 13 operation a cavity develops between the boreholes as the halite between fractures is removed.
 14 Because of its lower density, fresh water injected into this cavity will rise to the top and dissolve
 15 halite from the roof of the cavity. As the brine density increases it sinks within the cavern and
 16 saturated brine is extracted from the production well.

17 SCR-5.2.2.4.4.1 *Current Brine Wells within the Vicinity of WIPP*

18 Brine wells are classified as Class II injection wells. In the Delaware Basin, the process includes
 19 injecting fresh water into a salt formation to create a saturated brine solution which is then
 20 extracted and utilized as a drilling agent. These wells are tracked by the Delaware Basin Drilling
 21 Surveillance Program on a continuing basis. Supplemental information provided to the EPA in
 22 1997 showed 11 brine wells in the Delaware Basin. Since that time, additional information has
 23 shown that there are 15 brine wells within the Delaware basin, of which four are plugged and
 24 abandoned. This results in 11 currently active brine wells. Table SCR-3 provides information
 25 on these wells.

Table SCR-3. Delaware Basin Brine Well Status

County	Location	API No.	Well Name and No.	Operator	Status
Eddy	22S-26E-36	3001521842	City of Carlsbad #WS-1	Key Energy Services	Brine Well
Eddy	22S-27E-03	3001520331	Tracy #3	Ray Westall	Plugged Brine Well
Eddy	22S-27E-17	3001522574	Eugenie #WS-1	I & W Inc	Brine Well
Eddy	22S-27E-17	3001523031	Eugenie #WS-2	I & W Inc	Plugged Brine Well
Loving	Blk 29-03	4230110142	Lineberry Brine Station #1	Chance Properties	Brine Well
Loving	Blk 01-82	4230130680	Chapman Ford #BR1	Herricks & Son Co.	Plugged Brine Well
Loving	Blk 33-80	4230180318	Mentone Brine Station #1D	Basic Energy Services	Brine Well
Loving	Blk 29-28	4230180319	East Mentone Brine Station #1	Permian Brine Sales, Inc.	Plugged Brine Well

Table SCR-3. Delaware Basin Brine Well Status — Continued

County	Location	API No.	Well Name and No.	Operator	Status
Loving	Blk 01-83	4230180320	North Mentone #1	Chance Properties	Brine Well
Reeves	Blk 56-30	4238900408	Orla Brine Station #1D	Mesquite SWD Inc.	Brine Well
Reeves	Blk 04-08	4238920100	North Pecos Brine Station #WD-1	Chance Properties	Brine Well
Reeves	Blk 07-21	4238980476	Coyanosa Brine Station #1	Chance Properties	Brine Well
Ward	Blk 17-20	4247531742	Pyote Brine Station #WD-1	Chance Properties	Brine Well
Ward	Blk 01-13	4247534514	Quito West Unit #207	Seaboard Oil Co.	Brine Well
Ward	Blk 34-174	4247582265	Barstow Brine Station #1	Chance Properties	Brine Well

1 While these wells are within the Delaware Basin, none are within the vicinity of the WIPP. The
 2 nearest brine well to the WIPP is the Eugenie #WS-1, located within the city limits of Carlsbad,
 3 New Mexico. This well is approximately 48 km (30 mi) from the WIPP site.

4 SCR-5.2.2.4.5 Solution Mining for Other Minerals

5 Currently, there are no ongoing solution mining activities within the vicinity of WIPP. The
 6 Rustler Springs sulfur mine located in Culberson County, Texas, began operations in 1969 and
 7 continued until it was officially closed in 1999. This mine used the Frasch process to extract
 8 molten sulfur (Cunningham 1999).

9 SCR-5.2.2.4.6 Solution Mining for Gas Storage

10 No gas storage cavities have been solution mined within the New Mexico portion of the
 11 Delaware Basin. Five gas storage facilities exist within the general vicinity of the WIPP;
 12 however only one is within the Delaware basin. This one New Mexico Delaware Basin facility
 13 uses a depleted gas reservoir for storage and containment; it was not solution mined (Appendix
 14 DATA).

15 SCR-5.2.2.4.7 Solution Mining for Disposal

16 Solution mining can be used to create a disposal cavity in bedded salt. Such disposal cavities can
 17 be used for the disposal of naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) or other wastes. No
 18 such cavities have been mined or operated within the vicinity of the WIPP.

19 SCR-5.2.2.4.8 Effects of Solution Mining

20 SCR-5.2.2.4.8.1 Subsidence

21 Regardless of whether the single-borehole or two-borehole technique is used for solution mining,
 22 the result is a subsurface cavity which could collapse and lead to subsidence of overlying strata.
 23 Gray (1991) quoted earlier analyses that show cavity stability is relatively high if the cavity has

1 at least 15 m (50 ft) of overburden per million cubic feet of cavity volume (26.9 m per
2 50,000 m³). There are two studies - discussed below - of the size of solution mining cavities in
3 the Carlsbad region. These studies concern the Carlsbad Eugenie Brine Wells and the Carlsbad
4 Brine Well and show that neither of these cavities are currently close to this critical ratio, but that
5 subsidence in the future, given continued brine extraction, is a possibility.

6 Hickerson (1991) considered the potential for subsidence resulting from operation of the
7 Carlsbad Eugenie Brine wells, where fresh water is injected into a salt section at a depth of 178
8 m (583 ft) and brine is recovered through a borehole at a depth of 179 m (587 ft). The boreholes
9 are 100 m (327 ft) apart. Hickerson noted that the fresh water, being less dense than brine, tends
10 to move upwards, causing the dissolution cavern to grow preferentially upwards. Thus, the
11 dissolution cavern at the Carlsbad Eugenie Brine wells is approximately triangular in cross-
12 section, being bounded by the top of the salt section and larger near the injection well.
13 Hickerson estimated that brine production from 1979 until 1991 had created a cavern of about
14 $9.6 \times 10^4 \text{ m}^3$ ($3.4 \times 10^6 \text{ ft}^3$). The size of this cavern was estimated as 107 m (350 ft) by 47 m
15 (153 ft) at the upper surface of the cavern with a depth of 39 m (127 ft).

16 Gray (1991) investigated the potential for collapse and subsidence at the Carlsbad Brine Well.
17 Based on estimated production rates between 1976 and 1991, approximately $9.6 \times 10^4 \text{ m}^3$ ($3.4 \times$
18 10^6 ft^3) of salt has been dissolved at this site. The well depth is 216 m (710 ft) and thus there are
19 about 64 m (210 ft) of overburden per million cubic feet of capacity (112 m of overburden per
20 50,000 m³ of capacity).

21 Gray (1991) also estimated the time required for the cavity at the Carlsbad Brine Well to reach
22 the critical ratio. At an average cavity growth rate of $6.4 \times 10^3 \text{ m}^3$ per year ($2.25 \times 10^5 \text{ ft}^3$ per
23 year), a further 50 years of operation would be required before cavity stability was reduced to
24 levels of concern. A similar calculation for the Carlsbad Eugenie Brine well, based on an
25 overburden of 140 m (460 ft) and an estimated average cavity growth rate of $7.9 \times 10^3 \text{ m}^3$ per
26 year ($2.8 \times 10^5 \text{ ft}^3$ per year), shows that a further 15 years of operation is required before the
27 cavity reaches the critical ratio.

28 SCR-5.2.2.4.8.2 *Hydrogeological Effects*

29 In regions where solution mining takes place, the hydrogeology could be affected in a number
30 ways:

- 31 • Subsidence above a large dissolution cavity could change the vertical and lateral
32 hydraulic conductivity of overlying units.
- 33 • Extraction of fresh water from aquifers for solution mining could cause local changes in
34 pressure gradients.
- 35 • Loss of injected fresh water or extracted brine to overlying units could cause local
36 changes in pressure gradients.

37 The potential for subsidence to take place above solution mining operations in the region of
38 Carlsbad is discussed above. Some subsidence could occur in the future if brine operations

1 continue at existing wells. Resulting fracturing may change permeabilities locally in overlying
2 formations. However, because of the restricted scale of the solution mining at a particular site,
3 and the distances between such wells, such fracturing will have no significant effect on
4 hydrogeology near the WIPP.

5 Solution mining operations in the Delaware Basin extract water from shallow aquifers so that,
6 even if large drawdowns are permitted, the effects on the hydrogeology will be limited to a
7 relatively small area around the operation. Since all the active operations are more than 32 km
8 (20 mi) from the WIPP, there will be no significant effects on the hydrogeology near the WIPP.

9 Discharge plans for solution mining operations typically include provision for annual mechanical
10 integrity tests at one and one-half the normal operating pressure for four hours (OCD 1994).
11 Thus, the potential for loss of integrity and consequent leakage of freshwater or brine to
12 overlying formations is low. If, despite these annual tests, large water losses did take place, from
13 either injection or production wells, the result would be low brine yields and remedial actions
14 would most likely be taken by the operators.

15 SCR-5.2.2.4.8.3 *Geochemical Effects*

16 Solution mining operations could affect the geochemistry of surface or subsurface water near the
17 operation if there were brine leakage from storage tanks or production wells. Discharge plans for
18 solution mining operations specify the measures to be taken to prevent leakage and to mitigate
19 the effects of any that do take place. These measures include berms around tanks and annual
20 mechanical integrity testing of wells (OCD 1994). The potential for changes in geochemistry is
21 therefore low, and any brine losses that did take place would be limited by remedial actions
22 taken by the operator. In the event of leakage from a production well, the effect on geochemistry
23 of overlying formation waters would be localized and, given the distance of such wells from the
24 WIPP site, such leakage would have no significant effect on geochemistry near the WIPP.

25 SCR-5.2.2.4.9 *Conclusion of Low Consequence*

26 Brine production through solution mining takes place in the Delaware Basin, and the DOE
27 assumes it will continue in the near future.

28 Despite oil and gas exploration and production taking place in the vicinity of the WIPP site, the
29 nearest operating solution mine is more than 32 km (20 mi) from the WIPP site. These locations
30 are too far from the WIPP site for any changes in hydrogeology or geochemistry, from
31 subsidence or fresh water or brine leakage, to affect the performance of the disposal system.
32 Thus, the effects of historical, current, near-future, and future ***Solution Mining for Other***
33 ***Resources*** in the Delaware Basin can be eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
34 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

1 **SCR-5.2.3** *Explosion-Induced Flow*

2 SCR-5.2.3.1 FEP Number: H39

3 FEPs Title: ***Changes in Groundwater Flow due to Explosions***

4 SCR-5.2.3.1.1 Screening Decision: SO-C (HCN)
5 SO-R (Future)

6 *Changes in groundwater flow due to historical explosions have been eliminated from PA*
7 *calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*
8 *Changes in groundwater flow due to future explosions have been eliminated from PA*
9 *calculations on regulatory grounds.*

10 SCR-5.2.3.1.2 Summary of New Information

11 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

12 SCR-5.2.3.1.3 Screening Argument

13 SCR-5.2.3.1.3.1 *Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs*

14 The small-scale explosions that have been used in the Delaware Basin to fracture oil- and
15 natural-gas-bearing units to enhance resource recovery have been too deep to have disturbed the
16 hydrology of the disposal system (see FEP H19).

17 Also, as discussed in *Underground Nuclear Device Testing* (H20), the Delaware Basin has been
18 used for an isolated nuclear test (Project Gnome), approximately 13 km (8 mi) southwest of the
19 WIPP waste disposal region. An induced zone of increased permeability was observed to extend
20 46 m (150 ft) laterally from the point of the explosion. The increase in permeability was
21 primarily associated with motions and separations along bedding planes, the major pre-existing
22 weaknesses in the rock. This region of increased permeability is too far from the WIPP site to
23 have had a significant effect on the hydrological characteristics of the disposal system. Thus,
24 ***Changes in Groundwater Flow Due to Explosions*** in the past have been eliminated from PA
25 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

26 SCR-5.2.3.1.3.2 *Future Human EPs*

27 The criterion in 40 CFR § 194.32(a) relating to the scope of PAs limits the consideration of
28 future human actions to mining and drilling. Also, consistent with 40 CFR § 194.33(d), PAs
29 need not analyze the effects of techniques used for resource recovery subsequent to the drilling
30 of a future borehole. Therefore, ***Changes in Groundwater Flow Due to Explosions*** in the future
31 have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

1 **SCR-5.3 Geomorphological Events and Processes**

2 **SCR-5.3.1 Land Use Changes**

3 SCR-5.3.1.1 FEP Number: H40
4 FEP Title: ***Land Use Changes***

5 SCR-5.3.1.1.1 Screening Decision: SO-R (HCN)
6 SO-R (Future)

7 ***Land Use Changes have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.***

8 SCR-5.3.1.1.2 Summary of New Information

9 The Delaware Basin monitoring program monitors land use activities in the WIPP vicinity. This
10 program has not identified new planned uses for land in the vicinity of the WIPP (DOE 2002).
11 This FEP discussion has been updated with additional information about industrial land uses in
12 the region.

13 SCR-5.3.1.1.3 Screening Argument

14 This section discusses surface activities that could affect the geomorphological characteristics of
15 the disposal system and result in changes in infiltration and recharge conditions. The potential
16 effects of water use and control on disposal system performance are discussed in FEPs H42
17 through H46.

18 SCR-5.3.1.1.4 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs

19 Surface activities that take place at present in the vicinity of the WIPP site include those
20 associated with potash mining, oil and gas reservoir development, water extraction, and grazing.
21 Additionally, a number of archeological investigations have taken place within the controlled
22 area that were aimed at protecting and preserving cultural resources. Elsewhere in the Delaware
23 Basin, sand, gravel, and caliche are produced through surface quarrying. The only surface
24 activity that has the potential to affect the disposal system is potash tailings, salt tailings (both
25 potash and WIPP) and effluent disposal. Potash tailings ponds may act as sources of focused
26 recharge to the Dewey Lake and Rustler units.

27 Three potash tailings piles/ponds are in operation that might be influencing groundwater flow at
28 the WIPP site. These are the Mississippi Potash Inc. (MPI) East tailings pile, approximately
29 10 km (6 mi) due north of the WIPP, the MPI West tailings pile in the northwest arm of Nash
30 Draw, and the IMC Kalium tailings pile, approximately 10 km (6 mi) due west of the WIPP in
31 Nash Draw. These tailings piles have been in operation for decades—disposal at the MPI East
32 site, the youngest of the piles, began in 1965. Brine disposal at these locations affects Rustler
33 groundwaters in Nash Draw, as shown by the hydrochemical facies D waters described by Siegel
34 et al. (1991, p. 2-61). Brine disposal also affects heads in Nash Draw, and these head effects
35 likely propagate to the WIPP site as well. These effects, however, predate water-level
36 monitoring for the WIPP and have been implicitly included when defining boundary heads for
37 Culebra flow models. The Culebra transmissivity fields developed for the CRA used water

1 levels measured in 2000 to define model boundary conditions. Thus, the effects of brine disposal
 2 at the tailings piles can be considered to be included in PA calculations. These effects are
 3 expected to continue in the near future.

4 The Delaware Basin monitoring program monitors land use activities in the WIPP vicinity. This
 5 program has not identified new planned uses for land in the vicinity of the WIPP (DOE 2002).
 6 Therefore, consistent with the criteria in 40 CFR § 194.32(c) and 40 CFR § 194.54(b), **Land Use**
 7 **Changes** in the near future in the vicinity of the WIPP have been eliminated from PA
 8 calculations on regulatory grounds.

9 SCR-5.3.1.1.5 Future Human EPs

10 The criterion in 40 CFR § 194.25(a), concerned with predictions of the future states of society,
 11 requires that compliance assessments and PAs “shall assume that characteristics of the future
 12 remain what they are at the time the compliance application is prepared, provided that such
 13 characteristics are not related to hydrogeologic, geologic or climatic conditions.” Therefore, no
 14 future **Land Use Changes** need be considered in the vicinity of the WIPP, and they have been
 15 eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

16 SCR-5.3.1.2 FEP Number: H41
 17 FEP Title: ***Surface Disruptions***

18 Future **Surface Disruptions** not affecting hydrogeologic or geologic conditions have been
 19 eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds. Future tailings ponds, if situated in
 20 Nash Draw, are expected to change Culebra (and Magenta) heads, similar to existing ones.
 21 Future tailings ponds outside of Nash Draw would not be expected to alter Culebra heads
 22 because leakage from the ponds would not be able to propagate through the low-permeability
 23 lower Dewey Lake clastics and Rustler anhydrites overlying the Culebra during the 100 years or
 24 less that such a pond might be in operation. Because PA calculations already include the
 25 present-day effects of tailings ponds in Nash Draw on heads, as well as the effects of future
 26 potash mining on the permeability of the Culebra (which has much greater potential to alter flow
 27 than changes in head), future potash tailings ponds may be screened out on the basis of low
 28 consequence.

29 SCR-5.3.1.2.1 Screening Decision: UP (HCN)
 30 SO-R (Future)

31 *The effects of HCN **Surface Disruptions** have been screened out on the basis of low consequence*
 32 *if they have no potential to affect the disposal system, or are implicitly included in PA*
 33 *calculations when they might affect the disposal system. The effects of future **Surface***
 34 ***Disruptions** have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.*

35 SCR-5.3.1.2.2 Summary of New Information

36 The screening argument for **Surface Disruptions** has changed. Per the original screening
 37 decision, surface activities in the vicinity of the WIPP site have disrupted the surface, but most
 38 surface activities have no potential to affect the disposal system and are, therefore, screened out
 39 on the basis of low consequence. However, the effects of the activity capable of altering the

1 disposal system (disposal of potash effluent) are included in our modeling of current conditions
2 (i.e., heads) at and around the site. Therefore, the screening decision has been changed from
3 SO-C to UP for HCN. Discussion regarding these anthropogenic effects is found in Section
4 2.2.1.4.2.2 of the CRA. There are no planned changes to land use in the vicinity of the WIPP in
5 the near future, and future events that might disrupt the surface at the WIPP site are screened out
6 on the basis of regulatory criteria.

7 SCR-5.3.1.2.3 Screening Argument

8 This section discusses surface activities that could affect the geomorphological characteristics of
9 the disposal system and result in changes in infiltration and recharge conditions. The potential
10 effects of water use and control on disposal system performance are discussed in FEPs H42
11 through H46.

12 SCR-5.3.1.2.4 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs

13 Surface activities that take place at present in the vicinity of the WIPP site include those
14 associated with potash mining, oil and gas reservoir development, water extraction, and grazing.
15 Additionally, a number of *Archeological Investigations* have taken place within the controlled
16 area that were aimed at protecting and preserving cultural resources. Elsewhere in the Delaware
17 Basin, sand, gravel, and caliche are produced through surface quarrying. The only surface
18 activity that has the potential to affect the disposal system is potash tailings, salt tailings (both
19 potash and WIPP) and effluent disposal. Potash tailings ponds may act as sources of focused
20 recharge to the Dewey Lake and Rustler units.

21 Three potash tailings piles/ponds are in operation that might be influencing groundwater flow at
22 the WIPP site. These are the Mississippi Potash Inc. (MPI) East tailings pile, approximately 10
23 km (6 mi) due north of the WIPP, the MPI West tailings pile in the northwest arm of Nash Draw,
24 and the IMC Kalium tailings pile, approximately 10 km (6 mi) due west of the WIPP in Nash
25 Draw. These tailings piles have been in operation for decades—disposal at the MPI East site, the
26 youngest of the piles, began in 1965. Brine disposal at these locations affects Rustler
27 groundwaters in Nash Draw, as shown by the hydrochemical facies D waters described by Siegel
28 et al. (1991, p. 2-61). Brine disposal also affects heads in Nash Draw, and these head effects
29 likely propagate to the WIPP site as well. These effects, however, predate water-level
30 monitoring for the WIPP and have been implicitly included when defining boundary heads for
31 Culebra flow models. The Culebra transmissivity fields developed for the CRA used water
32 levels measured in 2000 to define model boundary conditions. Thus, the effects of brine disposal
33 at the tailings piles can be considered to be included in PA calculations. These effects are
34 expected to continue in the near future.

35 The Delaware Basin monitoring program monitors land use activities in the WIPP vicinity. This
36 program has not identified new planned uses for land in the vicinity of the WIPP (DOE 2002).
37 Therefore, consistent with the criteria in 40 CFR § 194.32(c) and 40 CFR § 194.54(b), *Land Use*
38 *Changes* in the near future in the vicinity of the WIPP have been eliminated from PA
39 calculations on regulatory grounds.

1 SCR-5.3.1.2.5 Future Human EPs

2 The criterion in 40 CFR § 194.25(a), concerned with predictions of the future states of society,
 3 requires that compliance assessments and PAs “shall assume that characteristics of the future
 4 remain what they are at the time the compliance application is prepared, provided that such
 5 characteristics are not related to hydrogeologic, geologic or climatic conditions.” Therefore, no
 6 future **Land Use Changes** need be considered in the vicinity of the WIPP, and they have been
 7 eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

8 Future **Surface Disruptions** not affecting hydrogeologic or geologic conditions have been
 9 eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds. Future tailings ponds, if situated in
 10 Nash Draw, are expected to change Culebra (and Magenta) heads, similar to existing ones.
 11 Future tailings ponds outside of Nash Draw would not be expected to alter Culebra heads
 12 because leakage from the ponds would not be able to propagate through the low-permeability
 13 lower Dewey Lake clastics and Rustler anhydrites overlying the Culebra during the 100 years or
 14 less that such a pond might be in operation. Because PA calculations already include the
 15 present-day effects of tailings ponds in Nash Draw on heads, as well as the effects of future
 16 potash mining on the permeability of the Culebra (which has much greater potential to alter flow
 17 than changes in head), future potash tailings ponds may be screened out on the basis of low
 18 consequence.

19 **SCR-5.4 Surface Hydrological Events and Processes**

20 **SCR-5.4.1 Water Control and Use**

21 SCR-5.4.1.1 FEP Number(s): H42, H43, and H44
 22 FEP Title(s): **Damming of Streams and Rivers** (H42)
 23 **Reservoirs** (H43)
 24 **Irrigation** (H44)

25 SCR-5.4.1.1.1 Screening Decision: SO-C (HCN)
 26 SO-R (Future)

27 *The effects of HCN **Damming of Streams and Rivers, Reservoirs, and Irrigation** have been*
 28 *eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the*
 29 *disposal system. Future **Damming of Streams and Rivers, Reservoirs, and Irrigation** have been*
 30 *eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.*

31 SCR-5.4.1.1.2 Summary of New Information

32 No new information has been identified related to these FEPs. Changes have been made for
 33 editorial purposes.

34 SCR-5.4.1.1.3 Screening Argument

35 **Irrigation** and damming, as well as other forms of water control and use, could lead to localized
 36 changes in recharge, possibly leading to increased heads locally, thereby affecting flow
 37 directions and velocities in the Rustler and Dewey Lake.

1 SCR-5.4.1.1.4 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs

2 In the WIPP area, two topographically low features, the Pecos River and Nash Draw, are
 3 sufficiently large to warrant consideration for damming. Dams and **Reservoirs** already exist
 4 along the Pecos River. However, the Pecos River is far enough from the waste panels (19 km
 5 [12 mi]) that the effects of **Damming of Streams and Rivers**, and **Reservoirs** can be eliminated
 6 from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.
 7 Nash Draw is not currently dammed, and based on current hydrological and climatic conditions,
 8 there is no reason to believe it will be dammed in the near future.

9 **Irrigation** uses water from rivers, lakes, impoundments, and wells to supplement the rainfall in
 10 an area to grow crops. **Irrigation** in arid environments needs to be efficient and involves the
 11 spreading of a relatively thin layer of water for uptake by plants, so little water would be
 12 expected to infiltrate beyond the root zone. However, some water added to the surface may
 13 infiltrate and reach the water table, affecting groundwater flow patterns. **Irrigation** currently
 14 takes place on a small scale within the Delaware Basin but not in the vicinity of the WIPP, and
 15 the extent of **Irrigation** is not expected to change in the near future. Such **Irrigation** has no
 16 significant effect on the characteristics of the disposal system. Thus, the effects of **Irrigation**
 17 have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance
 18 of the disposal system.

19 SCR-5.4.1.1.5 Future Human EPs

20 The EPA has provided criteria relating to future human activities in 40 CFR § 194.32(a), that
 21 limit the scope of consideration of future human actions in PAs to mining and drilling.
 22 Therefore, the effects of future **Damming of Streams and Rivers**, **Reservoirs**, and **Irrigation**
 23 have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

24 SCR-5.4.1.2 FEP Number: H45
 25 FEP Title: Lake Usage

26 SCR-5.4.1.2.1 Screening Decision: SO-R (HCN)
 27 SO-R (Future)

28 *The effects of **Lake Usage** have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.*

29 SCR-5.4.1.2.2 Summary of New Information

30 No new information has been identified related to this FEP. Changes have been made for
 31 editorial purposes.

32 SCR-5.4.1.2.3 Screening Argument

33 **Irrigation** and damming, as well as other forms of water control and use, could lead to localized
 34 changes in recharge, possibly leading to increased heads locally, thereby affecting flow
 35 directions and velocities in the Rustler and Dewey Lake. Surface activities, such as those
 36 associated with potash mining, could also affect soil and surface water chemistry. Note that the
 37 potential effects of geomorphological changes through land use are discussed in H40 and H41.

1 SCR-5.4.1.2.4 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs

2 As discussed in Section 2.2.2, there are no major natural lakes or ponds within 8 km (5 mi) of the
 3 site. To the northwest, west, and southwest, Red Lake, Lindsey Lake, and Laguna Grande de la
 4 Sal are more than 8 km (5 mi) from the site, at elevations of 914 to 1,006 m (3,000 to 3,300 ft).
 5 Laguna Gatuña, Laguna Tonto, Laguna Plata, and Laguna Toston are playas more than 16 km
 6 (10 mi) north and are at elevations of 1,050 m (3,450 ft) or higher.

7 Waters from these lakes are of limited use. Therefore human activities associated with lakes
 8 have been screened out of PA calculations based on regulatory grounds supported by 194.32(c)
 9 and 194.54(b).

10 SCR-5.4.1.2.5 Future Human EPs

11 The EPA has provided criteria relating to future human activities in 40 CFR § 194.32(a), that
 12 limit the scope of consideration of future human actions in PAs to mining and drilling.
 13 Therefore, the effects of future **Lake Usage** have been eliminated from PA calculations on
 14 regulatory grounds.

15 SCR-5.4.1.3 FEP Number: H46

16 FEP Title: **Altered Soil or Surface Water Chemistry by Human Activities**

17 SCR-5.4.1.3.1 Screening Decision: SO-C (HCN)
 18 SO-R (Future)

19 *The effects of HCN **Altered Soil or Surface Water Chemistry by Human Activities** have been*
 20 *eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the*
 21 *disposal system. Future **Altered Soil or Surface Water Chemistry by Human Activities** have*
 22 *been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.*

23 SCR-5.4.1.3.2 Summary of New Information

24 No new information has been identified related to this FEP. Changes have been made for
 25 editorial purposes.

26 SCR-5.4.1.3.3 Screening Argument

27 **Irrigation** and damming, as well as other forms of water control and use, could lead to localized
 28 changes in recharge, possibly leading to increased heads locally, thereby affecting flow
 29 directions and velocities in the Rustler and Dewey Lake. Surface activities, such as those
 30 associated with potash mining, could also affect soil and surface water chemistry.

31 SCR-5.4.1.3.4 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs

32 Potash mining effluent and runoff from oil fields have altered soil and surface water chemistry in
 33 the vicinity of the WIPP. However, the performance of the disposal will not be sensitive to soil
 34 and surface water chemistry. Therefore, **Altered Soil or Surface Water Chemistry by Human**
 35 **Activities** has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the

1 performance of the disposal system. The effects of effluent from potash processing on
2 groundwater flow are discussed in H37.

3 SCR-5.4.1.3.5 Future Human EPs

4 The EPA has provided criteria relating to future human activities in 40 CFR § 194.32(a) that
5 limit the scope of consideration of future human actions in PAs to mining and drilling.
6 Therefore, the effects of future *Altered Soil or Surface Water Chemistry by Human Activities*
7 have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

8 **SCR-5.5 Climatic Events and Processes**

9 ***SCR-5.5.1 Anthropogenic Climate Change***

10 SCR-5.5.1.1 FEP Number(s): H47, H48, and H49
11 FEP Title: ***Greenhouse Gas Effects (H47)***
12 ***Acid Rain (H48)***
13 ***Damage to the Ozone (N49)***

14 SCR-5.5.1.1.1 Screening Decision: SO-R (HCN)
15 SO-R (Future)

16 *The effects of anthropogenic climate change (Acid Rain, Greenhouse Gas Effects, and Damage*
17 *to the Ozone layer) have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.*

18 SCR-5.5.1.1.2 Summary of New Information

19 No new information has been identified related to this FEP. Changes have been made for
20 editorial purposes.

21 SCR-5.5.1.1.3 Anthropogenic Climate Change

22 The effects of the current climate and natural climatic change are accounted for in PA
23 calculations, as discussed in Section 6.4.9. However, human activities may also affect the future
24 climate and thereby influence groundwater recharge in the WIPP region. The effects of
25 anthropogenic climate change may be on a local to regional scale (*Acid Rain (H48)*) or on a
26 regional to global scale (*Greenhouse Gas Effects (H47)* and *Damage to the Ozone layer (H49)*).
27 Of these anthropogenic effects, only the *Greenhouse Gas Effect* could influence groundwater
28 recharge in the WIPP region. However, consistent with the future states assumptions in 40 CFR
29 § 194.25, compliance assessments and PAs need not consider indirect anthropogenic effects on
30 disposal system performance. Therefore, the effects of anthropogenic climate change have been
31 eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

1 **SCR-5.6 Marine Events and Processes**

2 **SCR-5.6.1 Marine Activities**

3 SCR-5.6.1.1.1 FEP Number(s): H50, H51 & H52
4 FEP Title(s): *Coastal Water Use* (H50)
5 *Seawater Use* (H51)
6 *Estuarine Water* (H52)

7 SCR-5.6.1.1.1 Screening Decision: SO-R (HCN)
8 SO-R (Future)

9 *HCN, and future Coastal Water Use, Seawater Use, and Estuarine Water use have been*
10 *eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.*

11 SCR-5.6.1.1.2 Summary of New Information

12 No new information has been identified related to this FEP. Changes have been made for
13 editorial purposes.

14 SCR-5.6.1.1.3 Screening Argument

15 This section discusses the potential for Human EPs related to marine activities to affect
16 infiltration and recharge conditions in the vicinity of the WIPP.

17 SCR-5.6.1.1.4 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs

18 The WIPP site is more than 800 km (480 mi) from the nearest seas, and hydrological conditions
19 in the vicinity of the WIPP have not been affected by marine activities. Furthermore, consistent
20 with the criteria in 40 CFR § 194.32(c) and 40 CFR § 194.54(b), consideration of HCN human
21 activities is limited to those activities that have occurred or are expected to occur in the vicinity
22 of the disposal system. Therefore, Human EPs related to marine activities (such as *Coastal*
23 *Water Use, Seawater Use, and Estuarine Water* use) have been eliminated from PA calculations
24 on regulatory grounds.

25 SCR-5.6.1.1.5 Future Human EPs

26 The EPA has provided criteria relating to future human activities in 40 CFR § 194.32(a) that
27 limit the scope of consideration of future human actions in PAs to mining and drilling.
28 Therefore, the effects of future marine activities (such as *Coastal Water Use, Seawater Use, and*
29 *Estuarine Water* use) have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

30 **SCR-5.7 Ecological Events and Processes**

31 **SCR-5.7.1 Agricultural Activities**

32 SCR-5.7.1.1 FEP Number(s): H53, H54, and H55
33 FEP Title(s): *Arable Farming* (H53)

1 **SCR-5.7.2 Social and Technological Development**

2 SCR-5.7.2.1 FEP Number: H56

3 FEP Title: **Demographic Change and Urban Development**

4 SCR-5.7.2.1.1 Screening Decision: SO-R (HCN)
5 SO-R (Future)

6 *Demographic Change and Urban Development in the near future and in the future have been*
7 *eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.*

8 SCR-5.7.2.1.2 Summary of New Information

9 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

10 SCR-5.7.2.1.3 Screening Argument

11 Social and technological changes in the future could result in the development of new
12 communities and new activities in the vicinity of the WIPP that could have an impact on the
13 performance of the disposal system.

14 Demography in the WIPP vicinity is discussed in Section 2.3.2.1. The community nearest to the
15 WIPP site is the town of Loving, 29 km (18 mi) west-southwest of the site center. There are no
16 existing plans for urban developments in the vicinity of the WIPP in the near future.
17 Furthermore, the criterion in 40 CFR § 194.25(a), concerned with predictions of the future states
18 of society, requires that compliance assessments and PAs “shall assume that characteristics of the
19 future remain what they are at the time the compliance application is prepared.” Therefore,
20 **Demographic Change and Urban Development** in the vicinity of the WIPP and technological
21 developments have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

22 SCR-5.7.2.2 FEP Number: H57

23 FEP Title: **Loss of Records**

24 SCR-5.7.2.2.1 Screening Decision: NA (HCN)
25 DP (Future)

26 *Loss of Records in the future is accounted for in PA calculations.*

27 SCR-5.7.2.2.2 Summary of New Information

28 No new information has been identified for this FEP. Changes have been made for editorial
29 purposes.

30 SCR-5.7.2.2.3 Screening Argument

31 Human activities will be prevented from occurring within the controlled area in the near future.
32 However, PAs must consider the potential effects of human activities that might take place
33 within the controlled area at a time when institutional controls cannot be assumed to eliminate

1 completely the possibility of human intrusion. Consistent with 40 CFR § 194.41(b), the DOE
 2 assumes no credit for active institutional controls for more than 100 years after disposal. Also,
 3 consistent with 40 CFR § 194.43(c), the DOE originally assumed in the CCA that passive
 4 institutional controls do not eliminate the likelihood of future human intrusion entirely. The
 5 provisions at 40 CFR 194.43(c) allow credit for passive institutional controls by reducing the
 6 likelihood of human intrusions for several hundred years. In DOE (1996a), the DOE took credit
 7 for these controls that include records retention by reducing the probability of intrusion for the
 8 first 600 years after active controls cease. EPA disallowed this credit during the original
 9 certification (EPA 1998a). DOE no longer takes credit for passive institutional controls in PA,
 10 effectively assuming that all public records and archives relating to the repository are lost 100
 11 years after closure. Therefore, DOE continues to include the **Loss of Records** FEP within PA
 12 and does not include credit for passive institutional controls.

13 **SCR-6.0 WASTE AND REPOSITORY-INDUCED FEPS**

14 This section presents screening arguments and decisions for waste- and repository-induced FEPs.
 15 Of the original 108 waste- and repository-induced FEPs, 61 remain unchanged, 43 were updated
 16 with new information or were edited for clarity and completeness, three screening decisions were
 17 changed, and one FEP was deleted from the baseline by combining with other, more appropriate
 18 FEPs.

19 **SCR-6.1 Waste and Repository Characteristics**

20 **SCR-6.1.1 Repository Characteristics**

21 SCR-6.1.1.1 FEP Number: W1
 22 FEP Title: Disposal Geometry

23 SCR-6.1.1.1.1 Screening Decision: UP

24 *The WIPP repository Disposal Geometry is accounted for in PA calculations.*

25 SCR-6.1.1.1.2 Summary of New Information

26 Representation of the repository within the PA has changed since the CCA; however, the
 27 screening argument and decision remain unchanged. **Disposal Geometry** is accounted for in PA
 28 calculations.

29 SCR-6.1.1.2 Screening Argument

30 **Disposal Geometry** is described in Chapter 3, Section 3.2 and is accounted for in the setup of PA
 31 calculations (Section 6.4.2).

1 **SCR-6.1.2 Waste Characteristics**

2 SCR-6.1.2.1 FEP Number: W2 and W3
3 FEP Title: ***Waste Inventory***
4 ***Heterogeneity of Waste Forms***

5 SCR-6.1.2.1.1 Screening Decision: UP

6 *The Waste Inventory and Heterogeneity of Waste Forms are accounted for in PA calculations.*

7 SCR-6.1.2.1.2 Summary of New Information

8 No new information has been identified for these FEPs. Since these FEPs are accounted for
9 (UP) in PA, the implementation may differ from that used in the CCA, however the screening
10 decision has not changed. Changes in implementation (if any) are described in Chapter 6.0.

11 SCR-6.1.2.1.3 Screening Argument

12 Waste characteristics, comprising the ***Waste Inventory*** and the ***Heterogeneity of Waste Forms***,
13 are described in Chapter 4.0. The waste inventory is accounted for in PA calculations in deriving
14 the dissolved actinide source term and gas generation rates (Sections 6.4.3.5 and 6.4.3.3). The
15 distribution of contact-handled (CH) and remote-handled (RH) transuranic (TRU) waste within
16 the repository leads to room scale heterogeneity of the waste forms, which is accounted for in PA
17 calculations when considering the potential activity of waste material encountered during
18 inadvertent borehole intrusion (Section 6.4.7).

19 **SCR-6.1.3 Container Characteristics**

20 SCR-6.1.3.1 FEP Number: W4
21 FEP Title: ***Container Form***

22 SCR-6.1.3.1.1 Screening Decision: SO-C - Beneficial

23 *The Container Form has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence*
24 *to the performance of the disposal system.*

25 SCR-6.1.3.1.2 Summary of New Information

26 The inventories of container materials (i.e., steel and plastic liners) are included in WIPP long-
27 term PAs as input parameters of the gas generation model (Wang and Brush 1996). The
28 ***Container Form*** has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of its beneficial effect on
29 retarding radionuclide release. The PAs assume instantaneous container failure and waste
30 dissolution according to the source-term model. The screening argument has been modified to
31 incorporate additional information, although the screening decision has not changed.

1 SCR-6.1.3.1.3 Screening Argument

2 As in the CCA, the CRA calculations show that a significant fraction of steel and other Fe-base
3 materials will remain undegraded over 10,000 years (see Helton et al. 1998). For all undisturbed
4 cases, at least 30 percent of the steels will remain uncorroded at the end of 10,000 years. In
5 addition, it is assumed in both CCA and CRA-2004 calculations that there is no microbial
6 degradation of plastic container materials in 75 percent of PA realizations (Wang and Brush
7 1996). All these undegraded container materials will (1) prevent the contact between brine and
8 radionuclides; (2) decrease the rate and extent of radionuclide transport due to high tortuosity
9 along the flow pathways and, as a result, increase opportunities for metallic Fe and corrosion
10 products to beneficially reduce radionuclides to lower oxidation states. Therefore, the container
11 form can be eliminated on the basis of its beneficial effect on retarding radionuclide transport.
12 Both CCA and CRA assume instantaneous container failure and waste dissolution according to
13 the source-term model. In CCA Appendix WCL, a minimum quantity of metallic Fe was
14 specified to ensure sufficient reactants to reduce radionuclides to lower and less soluble
15 oxidation states. This requirement is met as long as there are no substantial changes in container
16 materials. The 2003 update to the TWBIR Revision 3 (Appendix DATA, Attachment F)
17 indicates that the density of steel in container materials currently reported by the sites has an
18 average value of 170 kg/m^3 . This is an increase over what was reported for the CCA (139 to 230
19 kg/m^3)(8.6 to 14.3 lb/ft^3). Therefore, the current inventory estimates indicate that there is a
20 sufficient quantity of metallic iron to ensure reduction of radionuclides to lower and less soluble
21 oxidation states. The 2003 update to the TWBIR Revision 3 (Appendix DATA, Attachment F)
22 indicates that the density of plastic liners currently reported by the sites has an average value of
23 16 kg/m^3 . This is a decrease from 26 to 21 kg/m^3 (1.6 to 1.3 lb/ft^3) reported in the CCA.

24 SCR-6.1.3.2 FEP Number: W5
25 FEP Title: ***Container Material Inventory***

26 SCR-6.1.3.2.1 Screening Decision: UP

27 *The **Container Material Inventory** is accounted for in PA calculations.*

28 SCR-6.1.3.2.2 Summary of New Information

29 No new information has been identified that relates to the screening of this FEP. Since this FEP
30 is accounted for (UP) in PA, the implementation may differ from that used in the CCA; however,
31 the screening decision has not changed. Changes in implementation (if any) are described in
32 Chapter 6.0.

33 SCR-6.1.3.2.3 Screening Argument

34 The **Container Material Inventory** is described in Chapter 4.0, and is accounted for in PA
35 calculations through the estimation of gas generation rates (Section 6.4.3.3).

1 **SCR-6.1.4 Seal Characteristics**

2 SCR-6.1.4.1 FEP Number: W6 and W7
3 FEP Title: **Seal Geometry (W6)**
4 **Seal Physical Properties (W7)**

5 SCR-6.1.4.1.1 Screening Decision: UP

6 *The **Seal Geometry** and **Seal Physical Properties** are accounted for in PA calculations.*

7 SCR-6.1.4.1.2 Summary of New Information

8 No new information has been identified that relates to the screening of these FEPs. Since these
9 FEP are accounted for (UP) in PA, the implementation may differ from that used in the CCA,
10 however the screening decision has not changed. Changes in implementation are described in
11 Section 6.4.4.

12 SCR-6.1.4.1.3 Screening Argument

13 Seal (shaft seals, panel closures, and drift closures) characteristics, including **Seal Geometry** and
14 **Seal Physical Properties**, are described in Section 3.3.2 and are accounted for in PA calculations
15 through the representation of the seal system in BRAGFLO and the permeabilities assigned to
16 the seal materials (Section 6.4.4).

17 SCR-6.1.4.2 FEPs Number: W8
18 FEP Title: **Seal Chemical Composition**

19 SCR-6.1.4.2.1 Screening Decision: SO-C Beneficial

20 *The **Seal Chemical Composition** has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of*
21 *beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

22 SCR-6.1.4.2.2 Summary of New Information

23 In the CCA, **Seal Chemical Composition** was screened out on the basis of predicted beneficial
24 consequences, which are not credited in PA calculations. Recent publications provide support
25 for the screening argument that chemical interactions between the cement seals and the brine will
26 be of beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal system, through sorption and
27 sequestration of radionuclides. Ignoring adsorption simplifies the PA calculations, and is
28 expected to produce somewhat more conservative results. However, because little or no upward
29 flow is predicted to occur through the seals, the overall effect on PA results may not be
30 significant.

31 The original FEP description has been modified slightly to include supporting evidence for the
32 argument that chemical interactions between the cement seals and the brine will be of beneficial
33 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

1 SCR-6.1.4.2.3 Screening Argument

2 Seal (shaft seals, panel closures, and drift closures) characteristics, including *Seal Geometry* and
 3 *Seal Physical Properties*, are described in CCA Chapter 3.0 and are accounted for in PA
 4 calculations through the representation of the seal system in BRAGFLO and the permeabilities
 5 assigned to the seal materials. The effect of shaft *Seal Chemical Composition* on actinide
 6 speciation and mobility has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial
 7 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

8 SCR-6.1.4.2.4 Repository Seals

9 Certain repository materials have the potential to interact with groundwater and significantly
 10 alter the chemical speciation of any radionuclides present. In particular, extensive use of
 11 cementitious materials in the seals may have the capacity to buffer groundwaters to extremely
 12 high pH (for example, Bennett et al. 1992, pp. 315 - 325). At high pH values, the speciation and
 13 adsorption behavior of many radionuclides is such that their dissolved concentrations are reduced
 14 in comparison with near-neutral waters. This effect reduces the migration of radionuclides in
 15 dissolved form.

16 Several recent publications describe strong actinide (or actinide analog) sorption by cement
 17 (Altenheinhaese et al. 1994; Wierczinski et al. 1998; Pointeau et al. 2001), or sequestration by
 18 incorporation into cement alteration phases (Gougar et al. 1996, Dickson and Glasser 2000).
 19 These provide support for the screening argument that chemical interactions between the cement
 20 seals and the brine will be of beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

21 The effects of cementitious seals on groundwater chemistry have been eliminated from PA
 22 calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

23 **SCR-6.1.5 Backfill Characteristics**

24 SCR-6.1.5.1 FEP Number: W9
 25 FEP Title: Backfill Physical Properties

26 SCR-6.1.5.1.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

27 *Backfill Physical Properties have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low*
 28 *consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

29 SCR-6.1.5.1.2 Summary of New Information

30 No new information related to this FEP has been identified. Changes have been made for
 31 editorial purposes.

32 SCR-6.1.5.1.3 Screening Argument

33 A chemical backfill is being added to the disposal room to buffer the chemical environment. The
 34 backfill characteristics were previously described in CCA Appendix BACK with additional
 35 information contained in Appendix BARRIERS. The mechanical and thermal effects of backfill

1 are discussed in W35 and W72 respectively, where they have been eliminated from PA
2 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system. Backfill
3 will result in an initial permeability for the disposal room lower than that of an empty cavity, so
4 neglecting the hydrological effects of backfill is a conservative assumption with regard to brine
5 inflow and radionuclide migration. Thus, **Backfill Physical Properties** have been eliminated
6 from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

7 SCR-6.1.5.2 FEP Number: W10
8 FEP Title: **Backfill Chemical Composition**

9 SCR-6.1.5.2.1 Screening Decision: UP

10 *The **Backfill Chemical Composition** is accounted for in PA calculations.*

11 SCR-6.1.5.2.2 Summary of New Information

12 No new information related to this FEP has been identified. Changes have been made for
13 editorial purposes.

14 SCR-6.1.5.2.3 Screening Argument

15 A chemical backfill is added to the disposal room to buffer the chemical environment. The
16 backfill characteristics are described in Section 6.4.3.4. The mechanical and thermal effects of
17 backfill are discussed in FEP W35 and FEP W72, respectively, where they have been eliminated
18 from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.
19 **Backfill Chemical Composition** is accounted for in PA calculations in deriving the dissolved and
20 colloidal actinide source terms (Section 6.4.3).

21 **SCR-6.1.6 Post-Closure Monitoring Characteristics**

22 SCR-6.1.6.1 FEPs Number: W11
23 FEP Title: **Post-Closure Monitoring**

24 SCR-6.1.6.1.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

25 *The potential effects of **Post-Closure Monitoring** have been eliminated from PA calculations on*
26 *the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

27 SCR-6.1.6.1.2 Summary of New Information

28 The FEP screening argument has been modified to include reference to 40 CFR 194.42(d).
29 Compliance with this requirement ensures that **Post-Closure Monitoring** is not detrimental to the
30 performance of the repository. No changes have been proposed to the **Post-Closure Monitoring**
31 program as presented in the CCA. The pre-closure monitoring program has not identified a
32 condition relating to the act of monitoring that would be detrimental to the performance of the
33 repository after closure (Annual Site Environmental Reports and Annual Compliance Monitoring
34 Parameter Assessments). No changes have been made to the FEP description, screening
35 argument, or screening decision.

1 SCR-6.1.6.1.3 Screening Argument

2 **Post-Closure Monitoring** is required by 40 CFR § 191.14(b) as an assurance requirement to
3 “detect substantial and detrimental deviations from expected performance.” The DOE has
4 designed the monitoring program (see CCA Appendix MON) so that the monitoring methods
5 employed are not detrimental to the performance of the disposal system (40 CFR 194.42(d)).
6 Non-intrusive monitoring techniques are used so that **Post-Closure Monitoring** would not
7 impact containment or require remedial activities. In summary, the effects of monitoring have
8 been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
9 disposal system.

10 **SCR-6.2 Radiological Features, Events, and Processes**

11 **SCR-6.2.1 Radioactive Decay and Heat**

12 SCR-6.2.1.1 FEP Number: W12
13 FEP Title: ***Radionuclide Decay and Ingrowth***

14 SCR-6.2.1.1.1 Screening Decision: UP

15 ***Radionuclide Decay and Ingrowth*** are accounted for in PA calculations.

16 SCR-6.2.1.1.2 Summary of New Information

17 No new information related to this FEP has been identified. No changes have been made.

18 SCR-6.2.1.1.3 Screening Argument

19 ***Radionuclide Decay and Ingrowth*** are accounted for in PA calculations (see Section 6.4.12.4).

20 SCR-6.2.1.2 FEP Number: W13
21 FEP Title: ***Heat From Radioactive Decay***

22 SCR-6.2.1.2.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

23 ***The effects of temperature increases as a result of radioactive decay have been eliminated from***
24 ***PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.***

25 SCR-6.2.1.2.2 Summary of New Information

26 WIPP transportation restrictions do not allow the thermal load of the WIPP to exceed 10
27 kW/acre (NRC 2002). Transportation requirements restrict the thermal load from RH-TRU
28 waste containers to no more than 300 watts per container (NRC 2002). However, the limit on
29 the surface dose equivalent rate of the RH-TRU containers (1,000 rem/hr) is more restrictive and
30 equates to a thermal load of only about 60 watts per container. Based on the thermal loads
31 permitted, the maximum temperature rise in the repository from radioactive decay heat should be
32 less than 2°C (3.6°F). The 2003 update to the TWBIR Revision 3 (Appendix DATA, Attachment
33 F) indicates that the radionuclide inventory is lower than previously estimated for the CCA.

1 Thus, all CRA radioactive decay heating screening arguments are bounded by the previous CCA
2 screening arguments.

3 SCR-6.2.1.3 Screening Argument

4 Radioactive decay of the waste emplaced in the repository will generate heat. The importance of
5 ***Heat from Radioactive Decay*** depends on the effects that the induced temperature changes
6 would have on mechanics (W29 - W31), fluid flow (W40 and W41), and geochemical processes
7 (W44 through W75). For example, extreme temperature increases could result in thermally
8 induced fracturing, regional uplift, or thermally driven flow of gas and brine in the vicinity of the
9 repository.

10 The design basis for the WIPP requires that the thermal loading does not exceed 10 kW per acre.
11 Transportation restrictions also require that the thermal power generated by waste in an RH-TRU
12 container shall not exceed 300 watts (NRC 2002).

13 The DOE has conducted numerous studies related to ***Heat from Radioactive Decay***. The
14 following presents a brief summary of these past analyses. First, a numerical study to calculate
15 induced temperature distributions and regional uplift is reported in DOE (1980 pp. 9-149 to 9-
16 150). This study involved estimation of the thermal power of CH-TRU waste containers. The
17 DOE (1980 pp. 9-149) analysis assumed the following:

- 18 • All CH-TRU waste drums and boxes contain the maximum permissible quantity of
19 plutonium. The fissionable radionuclide content for CH-TRU waste containers was
20 assumed to be no greater than 200 grams per 0.21 m^3 (7 ounces per 7.4 ft^3) drum and 350
21 grams per 1.8 m^3 (12.3 ounces per 63.6 ft^3) standard waste box (plutonium-239 fissile
22 gram equivalents).
- 23 • The plutonium in CH-TRU waste containers is weapons grade material producing heat at
24 0.0024 watts per gram. Thus, the thermal power of a drum is approximately 0.5 watts
25 and that of a box is approximately 0.8 watts.
- 26 • Approximately $3.7 \times 10^5 \text{ m}^3$ ($1.3 \times 10^7 \text{ ft}^3$) of CH-TRU waste are distributed within a
27 repository enclosing an area of $7.3 \times 10^5 \text{ m}^2$ ($7.9 \times 10^6 \text{ ft}^2$). This is a conservative
28 assumption in terms of quantity and density of waste within the repository, because the
29 maximum capacity of the WIPP is $1.756 \times 10^5 \text{ m}^3$ ($6.2 \times 10^6 \text{ ft}^3$) for all waste (as
30 specified by the Land Withdrawal Act [LWA]) to be placed in an enclosed area of
31 approximately $5.1 \times 10^5 \text{ m}^2$ (16 mi^2).
- 32 • Half of the CH-TRU waste volume is placed in drums and half in boxes so that the
33 repository will contain approximately 900,000 drums and 900,000 boxes. Thus, a
34 calculated thermal power of 0.7 watts per square meter (2.8 kW/acre) of heat is generated
35 by the CH-TRU waste.
- 36 • Insufficient RH-TRU waste would be emplaced in the repository to influence the total
37 thermal load.

1 Under these assumptions, Thorne and Rudeen (1981) estimated the long-term temperature
2 response of the disposal system to waste emplacement. Calculations assumed a uniform initial
3 power density of 2.8 kW/acre (0.7 W/m²) which decreases over time. Thorne and Rudeen (1981)
4 attributed this thermal load to RH-TRU waste, but the DOE (1980), more appropriately,
5 attributed this thermal load to CH-TRU waste based on the assumptions listed above. Thorne and
6 Rudeen (1981) estimated the maximum rise in temperature at the center of a repository to be
7 1.6°C (2.9°F) at 80 years after waste emplacement.

8 More recently, Sanchez and Trelue (1996) estimated the maximum thermal power of an RH-
9 TRU waste container. The Sanchez and Trelue (1996) analysis involved inverse shielding
10 calculations to evaluate the thermal power of an RH-TRU container corresponding to the
11 maximum permissible surface dose of 1000 rem per hour. The following calculational steps
12 were taken in the Sanchez and Trelue (1996) analysis:

- 13 • Calculate the absorbed dose rate for gamma radiation corresponding to the maximum
14 surface dose equivalent rate of 1000 rem per hour. Beta and alpha radiation are not
15 included in this calculation because such particles will not penetrate the waste matrix or
16 the container in significant quantities. Neutrons are not included in the analysis because
17 the maximum dose rate from neutrons is 270 millirem per hour, and the corresponding
18 neutron heating rate will be insignificant.
- 19 • Calculate the exposure rate for gamma radiation corresponding to the absorbed dose rate
20 for gamma radiation.
- 21 • Calculate the gamma flux density at the surface of a RH-TRU container corresponding to
22 the exposure rate for gamma radiation. Assuming the gamma energy is 1.0 megaelectron
23 volts, the maximum allowable gamma flux density at the surface of a RH-TRU container
24 is about 5.8×10^8 gamma rays per square centimeter per second.
- 25 • Determine the distributed gamma source strength, or gamma activity, in an RH-TRU
26 container from the surface gamma flux density. The source is assumed to be shielded
27 such that the gamma flux is attenuated by the container and by absorbing material in the
28 container. The level of shielding depends on the matrix density. Scattering of the
29 gamma flux, with loss of energy, is also accounted for in this calculation through
30 inclusion of a gamma buildup factor. The distributed gamma source strength is
31 determined assuming a uniform source in a right cylindrical container. The maximum
32 total gamma source (gamma curies) is then calculated for a RH-TRU container
33 containing 0.89 m³ (31.4 ft³) of waste. For the waste of greatest expected density (about
34 6,000 kg/m³ (360 lb/ft³), the gamma source is about 2×10^4 Ci/m³ (566 Ci/ft³).
- 35 • Calculate the total curie load of a RH-TRU container (including alpha and beta radiation)
36 from the gamma load. The ratio of the total curie load to the gamma curie load was
37 estimated through examination of the radionuclide inventory presented in CCA Appendix
38 BIR. The gamma curie load and the total curie load for each radionuclide listed in the
39 WIPP BIR were summed. Based on these summed loads the ratio of total curie load to
40 gamma curie load of RH-TRU waste was calculated to be 1.01.

- 1 • Calculate the thermal load of a RH-TRU container from the total curie load. The ratio of
2 thermal load to curie load was estimated through examination of the radionuclide
3 inventory presented in CCA Appendix BIR. The thermal load and the total curie load for
4 each radionuclide listed in the WIPP inventory were summed. Based on these summed
5 loads the ratio of thermal load to curie load of RH-TRU waste was calculated to be about
6 0.0037 watts per curie. For a gamma source of 2×10^4 Ci/m³ (566 Ci/ft³), the maximum
7 permissible thermal load of a RH-TRU container is about 70 W/m³ (2 W/ft³). Thus, the
8 maximum thermal load of a RH-TRU container is about 60 W, and the transportation
9 limit of 300 W will not be achieved.

10 Note that Sanchez and Trelue (1996) calculated the average thermal load for a RH-TRU
11 container to be less than 1 W. Also, the total RH-TRU heat load is less than 10 percent of the
12 total heat load in the WIPP. Thus, the total thermal load of the RH-TRU waste will not
13 significantly affect the average rise in temperature in the repository resulting from decay of
14 CH-TRU waste.

15 Temperature increases will be greater at locations where the thermal power of an RH-TRU
16 container is 60 W, if any such containers are emplaced. Sanchez and Trelue (1996) estimated
17 the temperature increase at the surface of a 60 W RH-TRU waste container. Their analysis
18 involved solution of a steady-state thermal conduction problem with a constant heat source term
19 of 70 W/m³ (2 W/ft³). These conditions represent conservative assumptions because the thermal
20 load will decrease with time as the radioactive waste decays. The temperature increase at the
21 surface of the container was calculated to be about 3°C (5.4°F).

22 In summary, analysis has shown that the average temperature increase in the WIPP repository,
23 due to radioactive decay of the emplaced CH- and RH-TRU waste, will be less than 2°C (3.6°F).
24 Temperature increases of about 3°C (5.4°F) may occur in the vicinity of RH-TRU containers
25 with the highest allowable thermal load of about 60 watts (based on the maximum allowable
26 surface dose equivalent for RH-TRU containers). Potential heat generation from nuclear
27 criticality is discussed in W14 and exothermic reactions and the effects of repository temperature
28 changes on mechanics are discussed in the set of FEPs grouped as W29, W30, W31, W72, and
29 W73. These FEPs have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence
30 to the performance of the disposal system.

31 The previous FEPs screening arguments for the CCA used a bounding radioactivity heat load of
32 0.5 watts/drum for the CH-TRU waste containers. With a total CH-TRU volume of 168,500 m³
33 (~5,950,000 ft³) this corresponds to approximately 810,000 55-gallon drum equivalents with a
34 corresponding heat load of > 400 kW used for the CCA FEPs screening arguments. From
35 Sanchez and Trelue (1996), it can be seen that a realistic assessment of the heat load, based on
36 radionuclide inventory data in the Transuranic Waste Baseline Inventory Report (TWBIR) is less
37 than 100 kW. Thus, the CCA FEPs incorporate a factor of safety of at least four.

38 Since the 2003 update to the TWBIR Revision 3 (Appendix DATA, Attachment F) indicates that
39 the radionuclide inventory is lower than that previously estimated for the CCA, all CRA-2004
40 radioactive decay heating screening arguments are bounded by the previous CCA screening
41 arguments. Verification of the fact that heat loads for the CRA-2004 are less than those for the

1 CCA is provided in Djordjevic (2003). Djordjevic (2003) is a recalculation of the work of
2 Sanchez and Trelle (1996) using radionuclide data from Appendix DATA, Attachment F.

3 SCR-6.2.1.4 FEPs Number: W14
4 FEPs Title: ***Nuclear Criticality: Heat***

5 SCR-6.2.1.4.1 Screening Decision: SO-P

6 **Nuclear Criticality** has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability of
7 occurrence over 10,000 years.

8 SCR-6.2.1.4.2 Summary of New Information

9 Heat generated via **Nuclear Criticality** was screened out based on the low probability that a
10 criticality event would occur. The updated information for the WIPP disposal inventory of fissile
11 material (Appendix DATA, Attachment F; Leigh 2003a) indicates that the expected WIPP-scale
12 quantity is 43 percent lower than previously estimated in CCA TWBIR Rev 3. Thus, all CRA-
13 2004 criticality screening arguments are conservatively bounded by the previous CCA screening
14 arguments (Rechard et al. 1996, 2000, and 2001).

15 SCR-6.2.1.4.3 Screening Argument

16 **Nuclear Criticality** refers to a sustained fission reaction that may occur if fissile radionuclides
17 reach both a sufficiently high concentration and total mass (where the latter parameter includes
18 the influence of enrichment of the fissile radionuclides). In the subsurface, the primary effect of
19 a nuclear reaction is the production of heat.

20 Nuclear criticality (near and far field) was eliminated from PA calculations for the WIPP for
21 waste contaminated with TRU radionuclides. The probability for criticality within the repository
22 is low (there are no mechanisms for concentrating fissile radionuclides dispersed amongst the
23 waste). Possible mechanisms for concentration in the waste disposal region include high
24 solubility, compaction, sorption, and precipitation. First, the maximum solubility of ²³⁹Pu in the
25 WIPP repository, the most abundant fissile radionuclide, is orders of magnitude lower than
26 necessary to create a critical solution. The same is true for ²³⁵U, the other primary fissile
27 radionuclide. Second, the waste is assumed to be compacted by repository processes to one
28 fourth its original volume. This compaction is still an order of magnitude too disperse (many
29 orders of magnitude too disperse if neutron absorbers that prevent criticality (for example, ²³⁸U)
30 are included). Third, any potential sorbents in the waste would be fairly uniformly distributed
31 throughout the waste disposal region; consequently, concentration of fissile radionuclides in
32 localized areas through sorption is improbable. Fourth, precipitation requires significant
33 localized changes in brine chemistry; small local variations are insufficient to separate
34 substantial amounts of ²³⁹Pu from other actinides in the waste disposal region (for example, 11
35 times more ²³⁸U is present than ²³⁹Pu).

36 Criticality away from the repository (following an inadvertent human intrusion) has a low
37 probability because (1) the amount of fissile material transported from the repository is small; (2)
38 host rock media have small porosities (insufficient for generation of sizable precipitation zone);
39 and (3) no credible mechanism exists for the concentrating fissile material during transport (the

1 natural tendency is for transported to be dispersed). As discussed in Section 6.4.6.2 and CCA
 2 Appendix PA, Attachment MASS Section MASS.15, the dolomite porosity consists of
 3 intergranular porosity, vugs, microscopic fractures, and macroscopic fractures. As discussed in
 4 Section 6.4.5.2, porosity in the marker beds consists of partially healed fractures that may dilate
 5 as pressure increases. Advective flow in both units occurs mostly through macroscopic
 6 fractures. Consequently, any potential deposition through precipitation or sorption is constrained
 7 by the depth to which precipitation and sorption occur away from fractures. This geometry is not
 8 favorable for fission reactions and eliminates the possibility of criticality. Thus, **Nuclear**
 9 **Criticality** has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability of
 10 occurrence.

11 Screening arguments made in Rechar et al. (1996) are represented in greater detail in Rechar et
 12 al. (2000, 2001). A major finding among the analysis results in the screening arguments is the
 13 determination that fissile material would need to be reconcentrated by three orders of magnitude
 14 in order to be considered in a criticality scenario. These previous arguments were based on
 15 radionuclide information from Revision 3 of the TWBIR (DOE 1996b). Of the 135
 16 radionuclides presented in that TWBIR database, only 17 are possible contributors to fissile
 17 material. Table SCR-4 identifies these nuclides along with their conversion factors for specific
 18 activity and ²³⁹Pu fissile gram equivalents (²³⁹Pu fissile gram equivalent (FGE) per ANSI/ANS-
 19 18.5).

20 Radioactivity inventories for the fissile radionuclides used in the CCA and CRA-2004 are
 21 presented in Table SCR-5. Also shown in Table SCR-5 are the corresponding FGE inventories.
 22 Key amongst the information presented in this table is updated information for the WIPP
 23 disposal inventory of fissile material (Appendix DATA, Attachment F; Leigh 2003a) indicates
 24 that the expected WIPP-scale quantity is 43 percent lower than previously estimated in TWBIR
 25 Rev. 3. Thus, all CRA-2004 criticality screening arguments are conservatively bounded by the
 26 previous CCA screening arguments (Rechar et al. 1996, 2000, and 2001).

27 **SCR-6.2.2 Radiological Effects on Material Properties**

28 SCR-6.2.2.1 FEP Number: W15, W16, and W17
 29 FEP Title: **Radiological Effects on Waste (W15)**
 30 **Radiological Effects on Containers (W16)**
 31 **Radiological Effects on Seals (W17)**

32 SCR-6.2.2.1.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

33 ***Radiological Effects on the Properties of the Waste, Container, and Seals have been eliminated***
 34 ***from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.***

35 SCR-6.2.2.1.2 Summary of New Information

36 The FEPs screening argument has been updated by referencing new radiological waste data. The
 37 screening decision for these FEPs has not been affected or changed by these new data.

Table SCR-4. Properties of Fissile Radionuclides in the Actinide Series

Nuclide ID	Atomic Number	Atomic Number	Half-Life ⁽¹⁾ (sec)	Mass Excess Value ⁽²⁾ (MeV)	Atomic Weight ⁽³⁾ (gm/mole)	Specific Activity ⁽⁴⁾ (Ci/gm)	Fissile Gram Equivalent Factor ⁽⁵⁾ (²³⁹ Pu)
²³³ U	92	233	5.0020E+12	36.914	233.040	9.6763E-03	1.00E+00
²³⁵ U	92	235	2.2210E+16	40.916	235.044	2.1611E-06	1.00E+00
²³⁷ Np	93	237	6.7530E+13	44.868	237.048	7.0476E-04	1.50E-02
²³⁸ Pu	94	238	2.7690E+09	46.160	238.050	1.7115E+01	1.13E-01
²³⁹ Pu	94	239	7.5940E+11	48.585	239.052	6.2146E-02	1.00E+00
²⁴⁰ Pu	94	240	2.0630E+11	50.122	240.054	2.2781E-01	2.25E-02
²⁴¹ Pu	94	241	4.5440E+08	52.952	241.057	1.0300E+02	2.25E+00
²⁴² Pu	94	242	1.2210E+13	54.714	242.059	3.8171E-03	7.50E-03
²⁴¹ Am	95	241	1.3640E+10	52.931	241.057	3.4312E+00	1.87E-02
^{242m} Am	95	242	4.7970E+09	55.513	242.060	9.7159E+00	3.46E+01
²⁴³ Am	95	243	2.3290E+11	57.171	243.061	1.9929E-01	1.29E-02
²⁴³ Cm	96	243	8.9940E+08	57.177	243.061	5.1607E+01	5.00E+00
²⁴⁴ Cm	96	244	5.7150E+08	58.449	244.063	8.0883E+01	9.00E-02
²⁴⁵ Cm	96	245	2.6820E+11	60.998	245.065	1.7165E-01	1.50E+01
²⁴⁷ Cm	96	247	4.9230E+14	65.528	247.070	9.2752E-05	5.00E-01
²⁴⁹ Cf	98	249	1.1060E+10	69.718	249.075	4.0953E+00	4.50E+01
²⁵¹ Cf	98	251	2.8340E+10	74.128	251.080	1.5855E+00	9.00E+01

¹ Half-life data originally taken from ORIGEN2 decay library (Croff 1980). Data values presented in Ref. Sanchez 1996 (WIPP WPO# 037404).

² Mass excess values originally taken from Nuclear Wallet Cards (Tuli 1985). Data values presented in Ref. Sanchez 1996 (WIPP WPO# 037404).

³ Atomic weight calculated from: ATWT (AMU) = AN (atomic mass number) – ME (mass difference in MeV, ME of C¹² = 0) / 931.4943 (MeV per AMU, Parrington et al. 1996, pg. 58).

⁴ Specific Activity calculated from: A' = (Na ln(2))/(ATWT half-life), Ref. Turner 1992, pg. 64 and A (Ci/gm) = A' (Bq/gm) / 3.7E+10 (Bq/Ci), Turner 1992, pg. 43, where Na = Avogadro's number = 6.02213676E+23 (atom/mole, Parrington, pg.59).

⁵ FGE (²³⁹Pu based) data values from NuPac 1989 (TRUPACT-II SAR/Table 10.1/pg. 1.3.7-51 (data originally from Ref. ANSI/ANS-8.15 1981).

1

Table SCR-5. Fissile Equivalents of Radionuclides in the Actinide Series

Nuclide ID	Radioactivity Inventory ⁽¹⁾ (Ci)				Nuclide Fissile Mass ⁽²⁾ (FGE- ²³⁹ Pu)			
	TWBIR 3 (1995)	TWBIR 3 (2033)	2003 UpDate (2002)	2003 UpDate (2033)	TWBIR 3 (1995)	TWBIR 3 (2033)	2003 UpDate (2002)	2003 UpDate (2033)
²³³ U	1.95E+03	1.95E+03	1.27E+03	1.27E+03	2.02E+05	2.02E+05	1.31E+05	1.32E+05
²³⁵ U	1.74E+01	1.75E+01	2.26E+00	2.28E+00	8.05E+06	8.10E+06	1.05E+06	1.06E+06
²³⁷ Np	5.90E+01	6.49E+01	5.46E+00	1.01E+01	1.26E+03	1.38E+03	1.16E+02	2.14E+02
²³⁸ Pu	2.61E+06	1.94E+06	1.61E+06	1.25E+06	1.72E+04	1.28E+04	1.07E+04	8.27E+03
²³⁹ Pu	7.96E+05	7.95E+05	6.66E+05	6.64E+05	1.28E+07	1.28E+07	1.07E+07	1.07E+07
²⁴⁰ Pu	2.15E+05	2.14E+05	1.09E+05	1.09E+05	2.12E+04	2.11E+04	1.07E+04	1.07E+04
²⁴¹ Pu	2.45E+06	3.94E+05	2.51E+06	5.38E+05	5.35E+04	8.61E+03	5.49E+04	1.18E+04

Table SCR-5. Fissile Equivalents of Radionuclides in the Actinide Series — Continued

Nuclide ID	Radioactivity Inventory ⁽¹⁾ (Ci)				Nuclide Fissile Mass ⁽²⁾ (FGE- ²³⁹ Pu)			
	TWBIR 3 (1995)	TWBIR 3 (2033)	2003 UpDate (2002)	2003 UpDate (2033)	TWBIR 3 (1995)	TWBIR 3 (2033)	2003 UpDate (2002)	2003 UpDate (2033)
²⁴² Pu	1.17E+03	1.17E+03	2.71E+01	2.71E+01	2.30E+03	2.30E+03	5.33E+01	5.32E+01
²⁴¹ Am	4.48E+05	4.88E+05	4.15E+05	4.58E+05	2.44E+03	2.66E+03	2.26E+03	2.50E+03
^{242m} Am	1.75E+00	1.47E+00	2.44E-01	2.11E-01	6.23E+00	5.23E+00	8.67E-01	7.50E-01
²⁴³ Am	3.26E+01	3.25E+01	2.18E+01	2.17E+01	2.11E+00	2.10E+00	1.41E+00	1.41E+00
²⁴³ Cm	5.23E+01	2.07E+01	8.87E-01	4.07E-01	5.07E+00	2.01E+00	8.59E-02	3.94E-02
²⁴⁴ Cm	3.18E+04	7.44E+03	1.18E+04	2.51E+03	3.54E+01	8.28E+00	1.32E+01	2.79E+00
²⁴⁵ Cm	1.15E-02	1.15E-02	1.90E-02	1.92E-02	1.00E+00	1.00E+00	1.66E+00	1.68E+00
²⁴⁷ Cm	3.21E-09	9.51E-09	9.44E+00	9.45E+00	1.73E-05	5.13E-05	5.09E+04	5.09E+04
²⁴⁹ Cf	6.87E-02	6.38E-02	7.72E-02	7.24E-02	7.55E-01	7.01E-01	8.48E-01	7.96E-01
²⁵¹ Cf	3.78E-03	3.67E-03	5.23E-04	5.10E-04	2.15E-01	2.08E-01	2.97E-02	2.90E-02
				Σ	2.11E+07	2.12E+07	1.20E+07	1.20E+07

¹ TWBIR Rev. 3 data values originally from DOE 1996b. Data values presented in Sanchez 1997, pp. 27-30. TWBIR 2003 Update 2002 (beginning of calendar year) data from Appendix DATA, Attachment F. TWBIR 2002 Update 2033 (end of calendar year) data from Leigh 2003a.

² ²³⁹Pu Fissile Gram Equivalents calculated from: FGE(²³⁹Pu) = Inventory (Ci) * FGE Factor (from Table 1) / A'(Ci/gm, from Table 1).

1 SCR-6.2.2.1.3 Screening Argument

2 Ionizing radiation can change the physical properties of many materials. Strong radiation fields
 3 could lead to damage of waste matrices, brittleness of the metal containers, and disruption of any
 4 crystalline structure in the seals. The low level of activity of the waste in the WIPP is unlikely to
 5 generate a strong radiation field. According to the new *inventory* data, the total radionuclide
 6 inventory decreased from 7.44×10^6 (DOE 1996b) to 6.66×10^6 curies (Appendix DATA,
 7 Attachment F), about a 10 percent decrease. Such a small decrease will not change the original
 8 screening argument. In addition, PA calculations assume instantaneous container failure and
 9 waste dissolution according to the source-term model (see Sections 6.4.3.4, 6.4.3.5, and 6.4.3.6.
 10 Therefore, ***Radiological Effects on the Properties of the Waste, Container, and Seals*** have been
 11 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
 12 disposal system.

13 SCR-6.3 Geological and Mechanical Features, Events, and Processes

14 SCR-6.3.1 Excavation-Induced Changes

15 SCR-6.3.1.1 FEP Number: W18 and W19
 16 FEP Title: ***Disturbed Rock Zone (W18)***
 17 ***Excavation-Induced Change in Stress (W19)***

1 SCR-6.3.1.1.1 Screening Decision: UP

2 *Excavation-induced host rock fracturing through formation of a disturbed rock zone (DRZ) and*
 3 *changes in stress are accounted for in PA calculations.*

4 SCR-6.3.1.1.2 Summary of New Information

5 No new information has been identified relating to these two FEPs. No changes have been made
 6 since the CRA.

7 SCR-6.3.1.1.3 Screening Argument

8 Construction of the repository has caused local *excavation-induced changes in stress* in the
 9 surrounding rock as discussed in Section 3.3.1.5. This has led to failure of intact rock around the
 10 opening, creating a DRZ of fractures. On completion of the WIPP excavation, the extent of the
 11 induced stress field perturbation will be sufficient to have caused dilation and fracturing in the
 12 anhydrite layers a and b, MB139, and, possibly, MB138. The creation of the DRZ around the
 13 excavation and the disturbance of the anhydrite layers and marker beds will alter the
 14 permeability and effective porosity of the rock around the repository, providing enhanced
 15 pathways for flow of gas and brine between the waste-filled rooms and the nearby interbeds.
 16 This excavation-induced, host-rock fracturing is accounted for in PA calculations (Section
 17 6.4.5.3).

18 The DRZ around repository shafts could provide pathways for flow from the repository to
 19 hydraulically conductive units above the repository horizon. The effectiveness of long-term
 20 shaft seals is dependent upon the seals providing sufficient backstress for salt creep to heal the
 21 DRZ around them, so that connected flow paths out of the repository horizon will cease to exist.
 22 These factors are considered in the current seal design.

23 SCR-6.3.1.2 FEP Number: W20 and W21
 24 FEP Title: *Salt Creep (W20)*
 25 *Change in the Stress Field (W21)*

26 SCR-6.3.1.2.1 Screening Decision: UP

27 *Salt Creep in the Salado and resultant Changes in the Stress Field are accounted for in PA*
 28 *calculations.*

29 SCR-6.3.1.2.2 Summary of New Information

30 No new information has been identified relating to these two FEPs. No changes have been made
 31 since CRA-2004.

32 SCR-6.3.1.2.3 Screening Argument

33 *Salt Creep* will lead to *Changes in the Stress Field*, compaction of the waste and containers, and
 34 consolidation of the long-term components of the sealing system. It will also tend to close
 35 fractures in the DRZ, leading to reductions in porosity and permeability, increases in pore fluid

1 pressure, and reductions in fluid flow rates in the repository. **Salt Creep** in the Salado is
 2 accounted for in PA calculations (Section 6.4.3.1). The long-term repository seal system relies
 3 on the consolidation of the crushed-salt seal material and healing of the DRZ around the seals to
 4 achieve a low permeability under stresses induced by salt creep. Seal performance is discussed
 5 further in FEPs W36 and W37.

6 SCR-6.3.1.3 FEP Number: W22
 7 FEP Title: **Roof Falls**

8 SCR-6.3.1.3.1 Screening Decision: UP

9 *The potential effects of roof falls on flow paths are accounted for in PA calculations.*

10 SCR-6.3.1.3.2 Summary of New Information

11 No new information has been identified relating to this FEP. No changes have been made since
 12 the CRA.

13 SCR-6.3.1.3.3 Screening Argument

14 Instability of the DRZ could lead to localized **Roof Falls** in the first few hundred years. If
 15 instability of the DRZ causes roof falls, development of the DRZ may be sufficient to disrupt the
 16 anhydrite layers above the repository, which may create a zone of rock containing anhydrite
 17 extending from the interbeds toward a waste-filled room. Fracture development is most likely to
 18 be induced as the rock stress and strain distributions evolve because of creep. In the long term,
 19 the effects of roof falls in the repository are likely to be minor because **Salt Creep** will reduce the
 20 void space and the potential for **Roof Falls** as well as leading to healing of any roof material that
 21 has fallen into the rooms. However, because of uncertainty in the process by which the disposal
 22 room DRZ heals, the flow model used in the PA assumes that a higher permeability zone
 23 remains for the long term. Thus, the potential effects of **Roof Falls** on flow paths are accounted
 24 for in PA calculations through appropriate ranges of the parameters describing the DRZ.

25 SCR-6.3.1.4 FEP Number(s): W23 and W24
 26 FEP Title(s): **Subsidence (W23)**
 27 **Large Scale Rock Fracturing (W24)**

28 SCR-6.3.1.4.1 Screening Decision(s): SO-C (W23)
 29 SO-P (W24)

30 *Fracturing within units overlying the Salado and surface displacement caused by **Subsidence***
 31 *associated with repository closure have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low*
 32 *consequence to the performance of the disposal system. The potential for excavation or*
 33 *repository-induced **Subsidence** to create **Large-Scale Rock Fracturing** and fluid flow paths*
 34 *between the repository and units overlying the Salado has been eliminated from PA calculations*
 35 *on the basis of the low probability of occurrence over 10,000 years.*

1 SCR-6.3.1.4.2 Summary of New Information

2 The DOE acknowledges that proximal **Roof Falls** (see W22, Appendix SCR, Section SCR.2.3.3)
3 will occur and minor subsidence of stratigraphic units overlying the Salado at WIPP could occur.
4 Subsidence of geologic formations overlying the WIPP due to **Salt Creep** is shown to be only
5 modestly perturbed and the consequence is captured by the uncertainty employed in the PA.
6 **Roof Falls** and large-scale **Subsidence** have therefore been screened out of the PA calculations
7 based upon low consequence. The potential effects of **Roof Falls** on flow paths are accounted
8 for in PA calculations through appropriate ranges of the parameters describing the DRZ.
9 Continuous survey data, reported annually, reaffirm that **Subsidence** is minimal and near the
10 accuracy of the survey itself (COMPs, annual reports). Changes for clarity and editorial
11 purposes have been made to the screening argument.

12 SCR-6.3.1.4.3 Screening Argument

13 Instability of the DRZ could lead to localized **Roof Falls** in the first few hundred years. If
14 instability of the DRZ causes **Roof Falls**, development of the DRZ may be sufficient to disrupt
15 the anhydrite layers above the repository, which may create a zone of rock containing anhydrite
16 extending from the interbeds toward a waste-filled room. Fracture development is most likely to
17 be induced as the rock stress and strain distributions evolve because of creep and the local
18 lithologies. In the long term, the effects of **Roof Falls** in the repository are likely to be minor
19 because **Salt Creep** will reduce the void space and the potential for roof falls as well as leading to
20 healing of any roof material that has fallen into the rooms. Because of uncertainty in the process
21 by which the disposal room DRZ heals, the flow model used in the PA assumed that a higher
22 permeability zone remained for the long term. The PAVT modified the DRZ permeability to a
23 sampled range. Thus, the potential effects of **Roof Falls** on flow paths are accounted for in PA
24 calculations through appropriate ranges of the parameters describing the DRZ.

25 The amount of **Subsidence** that can occur as a result of **Salt Creep** closure or roof collapse in the
26 WIPP excavation depends primarily on the volume of excavated rock, the initial and compressed
27 porosities of the various emplaced materials (waste, backfill, panel and drift closures, and seals),
28 the amount of inward creep of the repository walls, and the gas and fluid pressures within the
29 repository. The DOE (Westinghouse 1994) has analyzed potential excavation-induced
30 subsidence with the primary objective of determining the geomechanical advantage of
31 backfilling the WIPP excavation. The DOE (Westinghouse 1994, pp. 3-4 to 3-23) used mass
32 conservation calculations, the influence function method, the National Coal Board empirical
33 method, and the two-dimensional, finite-difference code, Fast Lagrangian Analysis of Continua
34 (FLAC) to estimate **Subsidence** for conditions ranging from no backfill to emplacement of a
35 highly compacted crushed salt backfill. The DOE (Westinghouse 1994, pp. 2-17 to 2-23) also
36 investigated **Subsidence** at potash mines located near the WIPP site to gain insight into the
37 expected **Subsidence** conditions at the WIPP and to calibrate the subsidence calculation
38 methods.

39 Subsidence over potash mines will be much greater than subsidence over the WIPP because of
40 the significant differences in stratigraphic position, depth, extraction ratio, and layout. The
41 WIPP site is located stratigraphically lower than the lowest potash mine, which is near the base
42 of the McNutt Potash Member (hereafter called the McNutt). At the WIPP site, the base of the

1 McNutt is about 150 m (490 ft) above the repository horizon. Also, the WIPP rock extraction
2 ratio in the waste disposal region will be about 22 percent, as compared to 65 percent for the
3 lowest extraction ratios within potash mines investigated by the DOE (Westinghouse 1994, p.
4 2-17).

5 The DOE (Westinghouse 1994, p. 2-22) reported the maximum total *Subsidence* at potash mines
6 to be about 1.5 m (5 ft). This level of *Subsidence* has been observed to have caused surface
7 fractures. However, the DOE (Westinghouse 1994, p. 2-23) found no evidence that *Subsidence*
8 over potash mines had caused fracturing sufficient to connect the mining horizon to water-
9 bearing units or the landsurface. The level of disturbance caused by *Subsidence* above the WIPP
10 repository will be less than that associated with potash mining and thus, by analogy, will not
11 create fluid flow paths between the repository and the overlying units.

12 The various *Subsidence* calculation methods used by the DOE (Westinghouse 1994, pp. 3-4 to
13 3-23) provided similar and consistent results, which support the premise that *Subsidence* over
14 the WIPP will be less than *Subsidence* over potash mines. Estimates of maximum *Subsidence* at
15 the land surface for the cases of no backfill and highly compacted backfill are 0.62 m (2 ft) and
16 0.52 m (1.7 ft), respectively. The mass conservation method gave the upper bound estimate of
17 *Subsidence* in each case. The surface topography in the WIPP area varies by more than 3 m (10
18 ft), so the expected amount of repository-induced *Subsidence* will not create a basin, and will not
19 affect surface hydrology significantly. The DOE (Westinghouse 1994, Table 3-13) also
20 estimated *Subsidence* at the depth of the Culebra using the FLAC model, for the case of an
21 empty repository (containing no waste or backfill). The FLAC analysis assumed the Salado to
22 be halite and the Culebra to have anhydrite material parameters.

23 Maximum *Subsidence* at the Culebra was estimated to be 0.56 m (1.8 ft). The vertical strain was
24 concentrated in the Salado above the repository. Vertical strain was less than 0.01 percent in
25 units overlying the Salado and was close to zero in the Culebra (Westinghouse 1994, Figure
26 3-40). The maximum horizontal displacement in the Culebra was estimated to be 0.02 m (0.08
27 ft), with a maximum tensile horizontal strain of 0.007 percent. The DOE (Westinghouse 1994,
28 4-1 to 4-2) concluded that the induced strains in the Culebra will be uniformly distributed
29 because no large-scale faults or discontinuities are present in the vicinity of the WIPP.
30 Furthermore, strains of this magnitude would not be expected to cause extensive fracturing.

31 At the WIPP site, the Culebra hydraulic conductivity varies spatially over approximately four
32 orders of magnitude, from 1×10^{-8} m (3.2×10^{-8} ft) per second (0.4 m (1.3 ft) per year) to $1 \times$
33 10^{-5} m (3.2×10^{-5} ft) per second (Appendix PA, Attachment TFIELD). Where transmissive
34 horizontal fractures exist, hydraulic conductivity in the Culebra is dominated by flow through the
35 fractures. An induced tensile vertical strain may result in an increase in fracture aperture and
36 corresponding increases in hydraulic conductivity. The magnitude of increase in hydraulic
37 conductivity can be estimated by approximating the hydrological behavior of the Culebra with a
38 simple conceptual model of fluid flow through a series of parallel fractures with uniform
39 properties. A conservative estimate of the change in hydraulic conductivity can be made by
40 assuming that all the vertical strain is translated to fracture opening (and none to rock
41 expansion). This method for evaluating changes in hydraulic conductivity is similar to that used
42 by the EPA in estimating the effects of subsidence caused by potash mining (Peake 1996; EPA
43 1996b).

1 The equivalent porous medium hydraulic conductivity, K (meters per second), of a system of
 2 parallel fractures can be calculated assuming the cubic law for fluid flow (Witherspoon et al.
 3 1980):

$$4 \quad K = \frac{w^3 \rho g N}{12 \mu D}, \quad (10)$$

5 where w is the fracture aperture, ρ is the fluid density (taken to be 1,000 kg/m³), g is the
 6 acceleration due to gravity (9.79 m (32 ft) per second squared), μ is the fluid viscosity (taken as
 7 0.001 pascal seconds), D is the effective Culebra thickness (7.7 m (26.3 ft)), and N is the number
 8 of fractures. For 10 fractures with a fracture aperture, w , of 6×10^{-5} m (2×10^{-4} ft), the Culebra
 9 hydraulic conductivity, K , is approximately 7 m per year (2×10^{-7} m (6.5×10^{-7} ft) per second).
 10 The values of the parameters used in this calculation are within the range of those expected for
 11 the Culebra at the WIPP site (Appendix PA, Attachment TFIELD).

12 The amount of opening of each fracture as a result of subsidence-induced tensile vertical strain,
 13 ε , (assuming rigid rock) is $D\varepsilon/N$ meters. Thus, for a vertical strain of 0.0001, the fracture
 14 aperture, w , becomes approximately 1.4×10^{-4} m. The Culebra hydraulic conductivity, K , then
 15 increases to approximately 85 m (279 ft) per year (2.7×10^{-6} m (8.9×10^{-6} ft) per second). Thus,
 16 on the basis of a conservative estimate of vertical strain, the hydraulic conductivity of the
 17 Culebra may increase by an order of magnitude. In the PA calculations, multiple realizations of
 18 the Culebra transmissivity field are generated as a means of accounting for spatial variability and
 19 uncertainty (Appendix TFIELD). A change in hydraulic conductivity of one order of magnitude
 20 through vertical strain is within the range of uncertainty incorporated in the Culebra
 21 transmissivity field through these multiple realizations. Thus, changes in the horizontal
 22 component of Culebra hydraulic conductivity resulting from repository-induced subsidence have
 23 been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence.

24 A similar calculation can be performed to estimate the change in vertical hydraulic conductivity
 25 in the Culebra as a result of a horizontal strain of 0.00007 m/m (Westinghouse 1994, p. 3-20).
 26 Assuming this strain to be distributed over about 1,000 fractures (neglecting rock expansion),
 27 with zero initial aperture, in a lateral extent of the Culebra of about 800 m (2,625 ft)
 28 (Westinghouse 1994, Figure 3-39), then the subsidence-induced fracture aperture is
 29 approximately 6×10^{-5} m (1.9×10^{-4} ft). Using the values for ρ , g , and μ , above, the vertical
 30 hydraulic conductivity of the Culebra can then be calculated, through an equation similar to
 31 above, to be 7 m (23 ft) per year (2×10^{-7} m (6.5×10^{-7} ft) per second). Thus, vertical hydraulic
 32 conductivity in the Culebra may be created as a result of repository-induced **Subsidence**,
 33 although this is expected to be insignificant.

34 In summary, as a result of observations of **Subsidence** associated with potash mines in the
 35 vicinity of the WIPP, the potential for **Subsidence** to create fluid flow paths between the
 36 repository and units overlying the Salado has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis
 37 of low probability. The effects of repository-induced **Subsidence** on hydraulic conductivity in
 38 the Culebra have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the
 39 performance of the disposal system.

1 **SCR-6.3.2 Effects of Fluid Pressure Changes**

2 SCR-6.3.2.1 FEP Number: W25 and W26
3 FEP Title: **Disruption Due to Gas Effects (W25)**
4 **Pressurization (W26)**

5 SCR-6.3.2.1.1 Screening Decision: UP

6 *The mechanical effects of gas generation through **Pressurization** and **Disruption Due to Gas***
7 *flow are accounted for in PA calculations.*

8 SCR-6.3.2.1.2 Summary of New Information

9 No new information has been identified relating to these FEPs. No changes have been made.

10 SCR-6.3.2.1.3 Screening Argument

11 The mechanical effects of gas generation, including the slowing of creep closure of the
12 repository due to gas **Pressurization**, and the fracturing of interbeds in the Salado through
13 **Disruption Due to Gas Effects** are accounted for in PA calculations (Sections 6.4.5.2 and
14 6.4.3.1).

15 **SCR-6.3.3 Effects of Explosions**

16 SCR-6.3.3.1 FEP Number: W27
17 FEP Title: **Gas Explosions**

18 SCR-6.3.3.1.1 Screening Decision: UP

19 *The potential effects of **Gas Explosions** are accounted for in PA calculations.*

20 SCR-6.3.3.1.2 Summary of New Information

21 No new information has been identified related to this FEP. Only editorial changes have been
22 made to this FEP.

23 Explosive gas mixtures could collect in the head space above the waste in a closed panel. The
24 most explosive gas mixture potentially generated will be a mixture of hydrogen, methane, and
25 oxygen which will convert to CO₂ and water on ignition. This means that there is little
26 likelihood of a **Gas Explosion** in the long term, because the rooms and panels are expected to
27 become anoxic and oxygen depleted. Compaction through salt creep will also greatly reduce any
28 void space in which the gas can accumulate. Analysis (see Appendix BARRIERS, Attachment
29 PCS) indicates that the most explosive mixture of hydrogen, methane, and oxygen will be
30 present in the void space approximately 20 years after panel-closure emplacement. This
31 possibility of an explosion prior to the occurrence of anoxic conditions is considered in the
32 design of the operational panel closure. The effect of such an explosion on the DRZ is expected
33 to be no more severe than a **Roof Fall** which is accounted for in the PA calculations (FEP W22).

1 SCR-6.3.3.2 FEP Number: W28
2 FEP Title: *Nuclear Explosions*

3 SCR-6.3.3.2.1 Screening Decision: SO-P

4 *Nuclear Explosions* have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability
5 of occurrence over 10,000 years.

6 SCR-6.3.3.2.2 Summary of New Information

7 Editorial changes have been made for clarity as well as separating the two FEPs within the
8 original SCR text into discrete arguments. Additional information is referenced to support the
9 conclusions.

10 SCR-6.3.3.2.3 Screening Argument

11 Nuclear explosions have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability of
12 occurrence over 10,000 years. For a *Nuclear Explosions* to occur, a critical mass of Pu would
13 have to undergo rapid compression to a high density. Even if a critical mass of Pu could form in
14 the system, there is no mechanism for rapid compression. Radioactivity inventories for the
15 fissile radionuclides used in DOE (1996a) and CRA-2004 are presented in Table SCR-6. The
16 updated information for the WIPP disposal inventory of fissile material (Appendix DATA,
17 Attachment F; Leigh 2003a) indicates that the expected WIPP-scale quantity is 43 percent lower
18 than previously estimated in TWBIR Rev. 3 (DOE 1996b). Thus, all CRA-2004 criticality
19 screening arguments are conservatively bounded by the previous CCA screening arguments
20 (Rechard et al. 1996, 2000, and 2001).

21 **SCR-6.3.4 Thermal Effects**

22 SCR-6.3.4.1 FEP Number: W29, W30, W31, W72, and W73
23 FEP Title: *Thermal Effects on Material Properties (W29)*
24 *Thermally-Induced Stress Changes (W30)*
25 *Differing Thermal Expansion of Repository Components (W31)*
26 *Exothermic Reactions (W72)*
27 *Concrete Hydration (W73)*

28 SCR-6.3.4.1.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

29 *The effects of Thermally Induced Stress, Differing Thermal Expansion of Components, and*
30 *Thermal Effects on Material Properties in the repository have been eliminated from PA*
31 *calculations on the basis of low consequence to performance of the disposal system.*

32 *The thermal effects of exothermic reactions, including Concrete Hydration, have been*
33 *eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the*
34 *disposal system.*

1 SCR-6.3.4.1.2 Summary of New Information

2 All potential sources of heat and elevated temperature have been evaluated and found not to
3 produce high enough temperature changes to affect the repository's performance. Sources of
4 heat within the repository include radioactive decay and exothermic chemical reactions such as
5 backfill hydration and metal corrosion. The rates of these exothermic reactions are limited by
6 the availability of brine in the repository. **Concrete Hydration** in the seals is a significant source
7 of heat, but it is relatively short-lived. Energy released by the hydration of the seal concrete
8 could raise the temperature of the concrete to approximately 53°C (127°F), and that of the
9 surrounding salt to approximately 38°C (100°F), one week after seal emplacement. Elevated
10 temperatures will persist for a short period of time, perhaps a few years or a few decades. The
11 thermal stresses from these temperatures and the temperatures in the concrete itself have been
12 calculated to be below the design compressive strength for the concrete. Thus, thermal stresses
13 should not degrade the long-term performance of the seals. In general, the various sources of
14 heat do not appear to be great enough to jeopardize the performance of the disposal system.

15 The original FEP descriptions have been changed slightly to include the effects of water release
16 during carbonation of the backfill, and the effects of formation of metastable hydrated carbonate
17 minerals.

18 SCR-6.3.4.1.3 Screening Argument

19 **Thermally Induced Stress** could result in pathways for groundwater flow in the DRZ, in the
20 anhydrite layers and marker beds, and through seals, or it could enhance existing pathways.
21 Conversely, elevated temperatures will accelerate the rate of **Salt Creep** and mitigate fracture
22 development. Thermal expansion could also result in uplift of the rock and ground surface
23 overlying the repository, and thermal buoyancy forces could lift the waste upward in the salt
24 rock.

25 The distributions of thermal stress and strain changes depend on the induced temperature field
26 and the **Differing Thermal Expansion of Components** of the repository, which depends on the
27 components' elastic properties. Potentially, **Thermal Effects on Material Properties** (such as
28 permeability and porosity) could affect the behavior of the repository.

29 **Radioactive decay** (W13), **Nuclear Criticality** (W14), and **Exothermic Reactions** (W72 and
30 W73) are three possible sources of heat in the WIPP repository. According to the new inventory
31 data, the total radionuclide inventory decreases increases from 7.44×10^6 (DOE 1996b) to 6.66
32 $\times 10^6$ curies (Appendix DATA, Attachment F), about a 10 percent decrease. Such a small
33 change will not result in a significant deviation from the possible temperature rise predicted in
34 the CCA. Exothermic reactions in the WIPP repository include MgO hydration, MgO
35 carbonation, Al corrosion, and **Cement Hydration** (Bennett et al. 1996). Wang (1996) has
36 shown that the temperature rise by an individual reaction is proportional to \sqrt{VM} , where V is
37 the maximum rate of brine inflow into a waste panel for a reaction limited by brine inflow (or a
38 specified maximum reaction rate for a reaction limited by its own kinetics) and M is the quantity
39 of the reactant. MgO hydration, cement hydration, and Al corrosion are assumed to be limited by
40 brine inflow, because they all consume water and have high reaction rates. For these reactions,
41 the calculated temperature rises need to be updated for the changes in both brine inflow rate and

1 waste inventory. According to the CRA-2004 PA calculations, the average brine inflow rate
 2 upon a human intrusion is 156 m³/year (204 yd³/year), with a maximum value of 332 m³/year
 3 (434 yd³/year). In the CCA, the maximum brine inflow rate was assumed to be 200 m³/year (261
 4 yd³/year). With the new rate of 332 m³/year (434 yd³/year), it is estimated that the temperature
 5 rise by each exothermic reaction is increased by 29 percent if the quantity of reactant remains the
 6 same. Changes in the amounts of reactants are tabulated in Table SCR-6.

7 **Table SCR-6. Changes in Inventory Quantities from the CCA to the CRA**

Inventory	CCA	CRA	Change
MgO (tons)	85,600 ¹	72,760 (because of the elimination of mini-sacks) ^a	-15%
Cellulosics (tons)	5,940 ²	8,120 ³	37%
Plastics (tons)	3,740 ²	8,120 ³	117%
Rubber (tons)	1,100 ²	1,960 ³	78%
Aluminum alloys (tons)	1,980 ²	1,960 ³	-1%
Cement (tons)	8,540 ²	9,971 ⁵	17%

¹ U.S. DOE (2001)

² U.S. DOE (1996b). Only CH wastes are considered. Total volume of CH wastes is 1.1 × 10⁵ m³. This is not scaled to WIPP disposal volume.

³ Appendix DATA, Attachment F. Only CH wastes are considered. Total volume of CH waste is 1.4 × 10⁵ m³. This is not scaled to WIPP disposal volume.

⁴ This estimate is derived from data in Leigh (2003b) includes both reacted and unreacted cement. (1.2e7 kg x 1.4e5/168485 /1000 kg/ton = 9971 tons cement)

8 Similarly, MgO carbonation, which consumes *Carbon Dioxide*, is limited by *Carbon Dioxide*
 9 generation from microbial degradation. Given a biodegradation rate constant, the total CO₂
 10 generated per year is proportional to the total quantity of biodegradable materials in the
 11 repository. The inventory of biodegradable materials has been changed from 13,398 (5,940 + 1.7
 12 × 3,740 + 1,100)1 tons to 23,884 (8,120 + 1.7 × 8,120 + 1,960)1 tons of equivalent cellulosics
 13 (Wang and Brush 1996a and 1996b). This increase in biodegradeable materials corresponds to a
 14 proportional increase in CO₂ generation. For MgO carbonation and microbial degradation, the
 15 calculated temperature rises have been updated for the changes in both microbial gas generation
 16 and waste inventory and are presented in Table SCR-7.

17 Temperature rises (°C) by exothermic reactions are revised as follows:

18 **Table SCR-7. CCA and CRA Exothermic Temperature Rises**

Reactant	CCA ¹	CRA1
MgO hydration	< 4.5	< 4.7
Backfill Carbonation	< 0.6	< 0.7
Microbial degradation	< 0.8	< 1.4
Aluminum corrosion	< 6.0	< 6.8
Cement hydration	< 2.0	< 2.5

¹ All values are shown in degrees Celsius

¹The 1.7 molar conversion rate for plastic is based on analyses presented in Wang and Brush (1996a and 1996b).

1 For the CCA conditions following a drilling event, aluminum corrosion could, at most, result in a
 2 short-lived (two years) temperature increase of about 6°C (10.8°F) above ambient room
 3 temperature (about 27°C (80°F)) (Bennett et al. 1996). A temperature rise of 6°C (10.8°F)
 4 represented the maximum that could occur as a result of any combination of exothermic
 5 reactions occurring simultaneously. Revised maximum temperature rises by exothermic reactions
 6 for CRA-2004 are still less than 10°C (18°F) (as shown in Table SCR-7). Such small temperature
 7 changes cannot affect material properties. Thus, *Thermal Effects on Material Properties* in the
 8 repository have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the
 9 performance of the disposal system.

10 **SCR-6.3.5 Mechanical Effects on Material Properties**

11 SCR-6.3.5.1 FEP Number: W32, W36, W37 and W39
 12 FEP Title: Consolidation of Waste (W32)
 13 Consolidation of Seals (W36)
 14 Mechanical Degradation of Seals (W37)
 15 Underground Boreholes (W39)

16 SCR-6.3.5.1.1 Screening Decision: UP

17 *Consolidation of Waste is accounted for in PA calculations. Consolidation of Seals and*
 18 *Mechanical Degradation of Seals are accounted for in PA calculations. Flow through isolated,*
 19 *unsealed Underground Boreholes is accounted for in PA calculations.*

20 SCR-6.3.5.1.2 Summary of New Information

21 No new information has been identified for these FEPs; however, because they are accounted for
 22 (UP) in PA, the implementation may differ from that used the CCA). No information has been
 23 identified that would change the screening decision of UP. Changes in implementation (if any)
 24 are described in Chapter 6.0.

25 SCR-6.3.6.1.3 Screening Argument

26 *Consolidation of Waste is accounted for in PA calculations in the modeling of creep closure of*
 27 *the disposal room (Section 6.4.3.1).*

28 *Mechanical Degradation of Seals and Consolidation of Seals are accounted for in PA*
 29 *calculations through the permeability range assumed for the seal system (Section 6.4.4).*

30 The site investigation program has also involved the drilling of boreholes from within the
 31 excavated part of the repository. Following their use for monitoring or other purposes, these
 32 *Underground Boreholes* will be sealed where practical, and *Salt Creep* will also serve to
 33 consolidate the seals and to close the boreholes. Any boreholes that remain unsealed will
 34 connect the repository to anhydrite interbeds within the Salado, and thus provide potential
 35 pathways for radionuclide transport. PA calculations account for fluid flow to and from the
 36 interbeds by assuming that the DRZ has a permanently enhanced permeability that allows flow
 37 of repository brines into specific anhydrite layers and interbeds. This treatment is also
 38 considered to account for the effects of any unsealed boreholes.

1 SCR-6.3.5.2 FEP Number: W33
2 FEP Title: *Movement of Containers*

3 SCR-6.3.5.2.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

4 *Movement of Containers* has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
5 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

6 SCR-6.3.5.2.2 Summary of New Information

7 *Movement of Containers* has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
8 consequence to the performance of the disposal system. The FEP description has been updated to
9 reflect new waste inventory data (waste density).

10 SCR-6.3.5.2.3 Screening Argument

11 *Movement of Waste Containers* placed in salt may occur as a result two buoyancy mechanisms
12 (Dawson and Tillerson 1978): (1) the density contrast between the waste container and the
13 surrounding salt, and (2) the temperature contrast between a salt volume that includes a heat
14 source and the surrounding unheated salt. When the density of the waste container is greater
15 than the density of the surrounding salt, the container sinks relative to the salt; whereas when the
16 salt density is greater than the container density, the container rises relative to the salt. Similarly,
17 when a discrete volume of salt within a large salt mass is heated, the heat raises the temperature
18 of the discrete volume above that of the surrounding salt thereby inducing density contrasts and
19 buoyant forces that initiate upward flow of the heated salt volume. In a repository setting, the
20 source of the heat may be radioactive decay of the waste itself or exothermic reactions of the
21 backfill materials and waste constituents, e.g., MgO hydration, MgO carbonation, aluminum
22 corrosion, cement hydration, and calcium oxide hydration.

23 For the CCA, the density of the compacted waste and the grain density of the halite in the Salado
24 were assumed to be 2,000 kg/m³ and 2,163 kg/m³, respectively. Because this density contrast is
25 small, the movement of containers relative to the salt was considered minimal, particularly when
26 drag forces on the waste containers were also considered. In addition, vertical movement
27 initiated in response to thermally-induced density changes for high-level waste containers of a
28 similar density to those at the WIPP were calculated to be approximately 0.35 m (1 ft) (Dawson
29 and Tillerson 1978, p. 22). This calculated movement was considered conservative given that
30 containers at the WIPP will generate much less heat and will, therefore, move less. As a result,
31 container movement was eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequences to
32 the performance of the disposal system.

33 The calculations performed for DOE (1996a) were based on estimates of the waste inventory.
34 However, with the initiation of waste disposal, actual waste inventory is tracked and future waste
35 stream inventories have been refined. Based on an evaluation of these data, two factors may
36 affect the conclusions reached in DOE (1996a) concerning container movement.

37 The first factor is changes in density of the waste form. For the most part, waste density will
38 remain as assumed in the CCA. According to new *inventory* data (Appendix DATA, Attachment
39 F), the revised waste density has changed by at most 10 percent (lower). Some future waste

1 streams may however be more highly compacted, perhaps having a density roughly three times
 2 greater than that assumed in the CCA. In calculations of container movement, Dawson and
 3 Tillerson (1978, p. 22) varied container density by nearly a factor of three (from 2,000 kg/m³
 4 (125 lb/ft³) to 5,800 kg/m³ (362 lb/ft³)) and found that an individual dense container could move
 5 vertically as much as about 28 m (92 ft). Given the geologic environment of the WIPP, a
 6 container would likely encounter a dense stiff unit (such as an anhydrite stringer) that would
 7 arrest further movement far short of this upper bound; however, because of the massive thickness
 8 of the Salado salt, even a movement of 28 m (92 ft) would have little impact on performance.

9 The second inventory factor that could affect container movement is the composition of the
 10 waste (and backfills) relative to its heat production. Radioactive decay, ***Nuclear Criticality***, and
 11 exothermic reactions are three possible sources of heat in the WIPP repository. According to the
 12 new inventory data, the total radionuclide inventory decreases from 7.44×10^6 (CCA) to $6.66 \times$
 13 10^6 curies (Appendix DATA, Attachment F), about a 10 percent decrease. Such a small change
 14 will not result in a significant deviation from the possible temperature rise predicted in the CCA.
 15 As shown in Section SCR.6.3.4 (FEPs W72 and W73), temperature rises from exothermic
 16 reactions are quite small (see Table SCR-7). Note that the revised maximum temperature rises
 17 by exothermic reactions are still less than 10°C (18°F).

18 Based on the small differences between the temperature and density assumed in the CCA
 19 compared to those determined using *new inventory* data (Appendix DATA, Attachment F), the
 20 conclusion about the importance of container movement reported in the CCA will not be
 21 affected, even when more highly compacted future waste streams are considered. Also, the
 22 effects of the revised maximum temperature rise and higher density future waste streams on
 23 container movement are competing factors (high density waste will sink, whereas the higher
 24 temperature waste-salt volume will rise) that may result in even less movement. Therefore,
 25 ***Movement of Waste Containers*** has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
 26 consequence.

27 SCR-6.3.5.3 FEP Number: W34
 28 FEP Title: ***Container Integrity***

29 SCR-6.3.6.3.1 Screening Decision: SO-C Beneficial

30 ***Container Integrity*** has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial
 31 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

32 SCR-6.3.5.3.2 Summary of New Information

33 No new information has been identified relating to this FEP. Editorial changes have been made
 34 to the FEP screening argument.

35 SCR-6.3.5.3.3 Screening Argument

36 ***Container Integrity*** is required only for waste transportation. As in the CCA, the CRA-2004
 37 calculations show that a significant fraction of steel and other Fe-base materials will remain
 38 undegraded over 10,000 years (see Helton et al. 1998). For all undisturbed cases, at least 30
 39 percent of the steels will remain uncorroded at the end of 10,000 years. In addition, it is assumed

1 in both CCA and CRA-2004 calculations that there is no microbial degradation of plastic
 2 container materials in 75 percent of PA realizations (Wang and Brush 1996). All these
 3 undegraded container materials will (1) prevent the contact between brine and radionuclides; and
 4 (2) decrease the rate and extent of radionuclide transport due to high tortuosity along the flow
 5 pathways and, as a result, increase opportunities for metallic iron and corrosion products to
 6 beneficially reduce radionuclides to lower oxidation states. Therefore, the **Container Integrity**
 7 can be eliminated on the basis of its beneficial effect on retarding radionuclide transport. Both
 8 **CCA** and CRA-2004 assume instantaneous container failure and waste dissolution according to
 9 the source-term model.

10 SCR-6.3.5.4 FEP Number: W35
 11 FEP Title: **Mechanical Effects of Backfill**

12 SCR-6.3.5.4.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

13 *The **Mechanical Effects of Backfill** have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of*
 14 *low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

15 SCR-6.3.5.4.2 Summary of New Information

16 In 2001, MgO mini-sacks were eliminated from the repository, which decreases the backfill to
 17 waste volume ratio (EPA 2001). Although the backfill will provide additional resistance to creep
 18 closure, most of the resistance will be provided by the waste. Therefore, inclusion of backfill
 19 would not significantly reduce the total **Subsidence** in the waste rooms, and screening based on
 20 low consequence is appropriate. The screening argument has been updated to reflect the
 21 elimination of minisacks.

22 SCR-6.3.5.4.3 Screening Argument

23 The chemical conditioners or backfill added to the disposal room will act to resist creep closure.
 24 However, calculations have shown that because of the high porosity and low stiffness of the
 25 waste and the high waste to potential backfill volume, inclusion of backfill does not significantly
 26 decrease the total subsidence in the waste emplacement area or disposal room (Westinghouse
 27 1994). Since 2001, DOE has eliminated MgO mini sacks from the repository reducing the total
 28 inventory from 85,600 short tons to 74,000 short tons, which further reduces the potential
 29 backfill volume (EPA 2001). Therefore, the **Mechanical Effects of Backfill** have been
 30 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
 31 disposal system.

32 SCR-6.3.5.5 FEP Number: W38
 33 FEP Title: **Investigation Boreholes**

34 SCR-6.3.5.5.1 Screening Decision: NA

35 SCR-6.3.5.5.2 Summary of New Information

36 The effects of **Investigation Boreholes** (whether sealed or not) that penetrate the disposal
 37 horizon but do not intersect the waste panels are encompassed by the arguments made in **Natural**

1 **Borehole Fluid Flow** (H31) and **Flow Through Undetected Boreholes** (H33). FEP W38 has
2 been deleted from the FEPs baseline because it is redundant. The effects of drillholes drilled
3 from the underground are accounted for in PA by assumptions about the permeability of the
4 DRZ. **Natural Borehole Fluid Flow** (H31) and **Flow Through Undetected Boreholes** (H33)
5 encompass the effects of W38. Therefore, W38, **Investigation Boreholes**, has been deleted from
6 the FEPs Baseline.

7 **SCR-6.4 Subsurface Hydrological and Fluid Dynamic Features, Events, and Processes**

8 **SCR-6.4.1 Repository-Induced Flow**

9 SCR-6.4.1.1 FEP Number: W40 and W41
10 FEP Title: **Brine Inflow (W40)**
11 **Wicking (W41)**

12 SCR-6.4.1.1.1 Screening Decision: UP

13 *Two-phase brine and gas flow and capillary rise (wicking) in the repository and the Salado are*
14 *accounted for in PA calculations.*

15 SCR-6.4.1.1.2 Summary of New Information

16 No new information has been identified related to these FEPs. No changes have been made to
17 the screening decisions or screening arguments.

18 SCR-6.4.1.1.3 Screening Argument

19 **Brine Inflow** to the repository may occur through the DRZ, impure halite, anhydrite layers, or
20 clay layers. Pressurization of the repository through gas generation could limit the amount of
21 brine that flows into the rooms and drifts. Two-phase flow of brine and gas in the repository and
22 the Salado is accounted for in PA calculations (Section 6.4.3.2).

23 Capillary rise (or **Wicking**) is a potential mechanism for liquid migration through unsaturated
24 zones in the repository. Capillary rise in the waste material could affect gas generation rates,
25 which are dependent on water availability. Potential releases due to drilling intrusion are also
26 influenced by brine saturations and therefore by **Wicking**. Capillary rise is therefore accounted
27 for in PA calculations (Section 6.4.3.2).

28 **SCR-6.4.2 Effects of Gas Generation**

29 SCR-6.4.2.1 FEP Number: W42
30 FEP Title: **Fluid Flow Due to Gas Production**

31 SCR-6.4.2.1.1 Screening Decision: UP

32 *Fluid flow in the repository and Salado due to gas production is accounted for in PA*
33 *calculations.*

1 SCR-6.4.2.1.2 Summary of New Information

2 No new information has been identified related to this FEP. Only editorial changes have been
3 made.

4 SCR-6.4.2.1.3 Screening Argument

5 Pressurization of the repository through gas generation could limit the amount of brine that flows
6 into the rooms and drifts. Gas may flow from the repository through the DRZ, impure halite,
7 anhydrite layers, or clay layers. The amount of water available for reactions and microbial
8 activity will impact the amounts and types of gases produced (W44 through W55). Gas
9 generation rates, and therefore repository pressure, may change as the water content of the
10 repository changes. Pressure changes and **Fluid Flow Due to Gas Production** in the repository
11 and the Salado are accounted for in PA calculations through modeling the two-phase flow
12 (Section 6.4.3.2).

13 **SCR-6.4.3 Thermal Effects**

14 SCR-6.4.3.1 FEP Number: W43
15 FEP Title: **Convection**

16 SCR-6.4.3.1.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

17 **Convection** has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the
18 performance of the disposal system.

19 SCR-6.4.3.1.2 Summary of New Information

20 No new information has been identified relative to the screening of this FEP. The FEP
21 description has been updated and modified for editorial purposes.

22 SCR-6.4.3.1.3 Screening Argument

23 Temperature differentials in the repository could initiate **Convection**. The resulting thermally-
24 induced brine flow or thermally-induced two-phase flow could influence contaminant transport.
25 Potentially, thermal gradients in the disposal rooms could drive the movement of water vapor.
26 For example, temperature increases around waste located at the edges of the rooms could cause
27 evaporation of water entering from the DRZ. This water vapor could condense on cooler waste
28 containers in the rooms and could contribute to brine formation, corrosion, and gas generation.

29 **Nuclear Criticality** (W13), **Radioactive Decay** (W14), and **Exothermic Reactions** (W72) are
30 three possible sources of heat in the WIPP repository.

31 The characteristic velocity, V_i , for convective flow of fluid component I in an unsaturated porous
32 medium is given by (from Hicks 1996);

33
$$V_i \approx -\frac{k_i}{\mu_i}(\alpha_i \rho_i g \Delta T), \quad (11)$$

1 where α_i (per degree) is the coefficient of expansion of the i^{th} component, k_i is the intrinsic
2 permeability (square meters), μ_i is the fluid viscosity (pascal second), ρ_{i0} (kilograms per cubic
3 meter) is the fluid density at a reference point, g is the acceleration of gravity, and ΔT is the
4 change in temperature. This velocity may be evaluated for the brine and gas phases expected in
5 the waste disposal region.

6 For a temperature increase of 10°C (18°F), the characteristic velocity for convective flow of
7 brine in the DRZ around the concrete shaft seals is approximately 7×10^{-4} m (2.3×10^{-3} ft) per
8 year (2×10^{-11} m (6.6×10^{-11} ft) per second), and the characteristic velocity for convective flow
9 of gas in the DRZ is approximately 1×10^{-3} m (3.2×10^{-3} ft) per year (3×10^{-11} m (9.8×10^{-11}
10 ft) per second) (Hicks 1996). For a temperature increase of 25°C (45°F), the characteristic
11 velocity for convective flow of brine in the concrete seals is approximately 2×10^{-7} m ($6.5 \times$
12 10^{-7} ft) per year (6×10^{-15} m (1.9×10^{-14} ft) per second), and the characteristic velocity for
13 convective flow of gas in the concrete seals is approximately 3×10^{-7} m (9.8×10^{-7} ft) per year
14 (8×10^{-15} m (2.6×10^{-4} ft) per second) (Hicks 1996). These values of Darcy velocity are much
15 smaller than the expected values associated with **Brine Inflow** to the disposal rooms of fluid
16 flow resulting from gas generation. In addition, the buoyancy forces generated by smaller
17 temperature contrasts in the DRZ, resulting from backfill and **Concrete Hydration** and
18 **Radioactive Decay**, will be short-lived and insignificant compared to the other driving forces for
19 fluid flow. The short-term concrete seals will be designed to function as barriers to fluid flow for
20 at least 100 years after emplacement, and seal permeability will be minimized (Wakeley et al.
21 1995). Thus, temperature increases associated with **Concrete Hydration** will not result in
22 significant buoyancy driven fluid flow through the concrete seal system. In summary,
23 temperature changes in the disposal system will not cause significant thermal **cConvection**.
24 Furthermore, the induced temperature gradients will be insufficient to generate water vapor and
25 drive significant moisture migration.

26 Temperature effects on fluid viscosity would be most significant in the DRZ surrounding the
27 hydrating concrete seals (where temperatures of approximately 38°C (100°F) are expected). The
28 viscosity of pure water decreases by about 19 percent over a temperature range of between 27°C
29 (80°F) and 38°C (100°F) (Batchelor 1973, p. 596). Although at a temperature of 27°C (80°F),
30 the viscosity of Salado brine is about twice that of pure water (Rechard et al. 1990, a-19), the
31 magnitude of the variation in brine viscosity between 27°C (80°F) and 38°C (100°F) will be
32 similar to the magnitude of the variation in viscosity of pure water. The viscosity of air over this
33 temperature range varies by less than seven percent (Batchelor 1973, p. 594) and the viscosity of
34 gas in the waste disposal region over this temperature range is also likely to vary by less than
35 seven percent. The Darcy fluid flow velocity for a porous medium is inversely proportional to
36 the fluid viscosity. Thus, increases in brine and gas flow rates may occur as a result of viscosity
37 variations in the vicinity of the concrete seals. However, these viscosity variations will persist
38 only for a short period in which temperatures are elevated, and, thus, the expected variations in
39 brine and gas viscosity in the waste disposal region will not affect the long-term performance of
40 the disposal system significantly.

41 For the CCA conditions following a drilling event, aluminum corrosion could, at most, result in a
42 short-lived (two years) temperature increase of about 6°C (10.8°F). A temperature rise of 6°C
43 (10.8°F) represented the maximum that could occur as a result of any combination of

1 ***Exothermic Reactions*** occurring simultaneously. Revised maximum temperature rises by
2 ***Exothermic Reactions*** for CRA-2004 are still less than 10 °C (18°F) (as shown in Table SCR-7).
3 Such small temperature changes cannot affect material properties.

4 In summary, temperature changes in the disposal system will not cause significant thermally-
5 induced two-phase flow. Thermal ***cConvection*** has been eliminated from PA calculations on the
6 basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

7 **SCR-6.5 Geochemical and Chemical Features, Events, and Processes**

8 **SCR-6.5.1 Gas Generation**

9 SCR-6.5.1.1 FEP Number: W44, W45, and W48
10 FEP Titles: ***Degradation of Organic Material (W44)***
11 ***Effects of Temperature on Microbial Gas Generation (W45)***
12 ***Effects of Biofilms on Microbial Gas Generation (W48)***

13 SCR-6.5.1.1.1 Screening Decision: UP

14 *Microbial gas generation from degradation of organic material is accounted for in PA*
15 *calculations, and the ***Effects of Temperature and Biofilm Formation on Microbial Gas****
16 ****Generation*** are incorporated in the gas generation rates used.*

17 SCR-6.5.1.1.2 Summary of New Information

18 No new information has been identified related to the screening of these FEPs. Editorial changes
19 have been made to the screening argument. The screening decision remains unchanged.

20 SCR-6.5.1.1.3 Screening Argument

21 Microbial breakdown of cellulosic material, and possibly plastics and other synthetic materials,
22 will produce mainly CO₂, but also nitrogen oxide, nitrogen, hydrogen sulfide, hydrogen, and
23 methane. The rate of microbial gas production will depend upon the nature of the microbial
24 populations established, the prevailing conditions, and the substrates present. Microbial gas
25 generation from ***Degradation of Organic Material*** is accounted for in PA calculations.

26 The following subsections discuss the effects of temperature, pressure, radiation, and biofilms on
27 gas production rates via their control of microbial gas generation processes.

28 SCR-6.5.1.1.3.1 *Effects of Temperature on Microbial Gas Generation*

29 Calculations and experimental studies of induced temperature distributions within the repository
30 have been undertaken and are described in FEPs W29, W30, and W31. Numerical analysis
31 suggests that the average temperature increase in the WIPP repository caused by radioactive
32 decay of the emplaced CH- and RH-TRU waste is likely to be less than 3 °C (5.4°F) (FEP W13).

33 Temperature increases resulting from ***Exothermic Reactions*** are discussed in FEPs W72 and
34 W73. Potentially the most significant ***Exothermic Reactions*** are ***Concrete Hydration***, backfill

1 hydration, and aluminum corrosion. Hydration of the seal concrete could raise the temperature
2 of the concrete to approximately 53°C (127°F) and that of the surrounding salt to approximately
3 38°C (100°F) one week after seal emplacement (W73).

4 As discussed in FEPs W72 and W73, the maximum temperature rise in the disposal panels as a
5 consequence of backfill hydration will be less than 5.3°C (9.5°F), resulting from **Brine Inflow**
6 following a drilling intrusion into a waste disposal panel. Note that active institutional controls
7 will prevent drilling within the controlled area for 100 years after disposal. By this time, any
8 heat generation by radioactive decay and concrete seal hydration will have decreased
9 substantially, and the temperatures in the disposal panels will have reduced to close to initial
10 values.

11 Under similar conditions following a drilling event, aluminum corrosion could, at most, result in
12 a short-lived (two years) temperature rise of about 7.9°C (14.2°F) (see W72). These calculated
13 maximum heat generation rates resulting from aluminum corrosion and backfill hydration could
14 not occur simultaneously because they are limited by brine availability; each calculation assumes
15 that all available brine is consumed by the reaction of concern. Thus, the temperature rise of
16 10°C (18°F) represents the maximum that could occur as a result of any combination of
17 exothermic reactions occurring simultaneously.

18 Relatively few data exist on the **Effects of Temperature on Microbial Gas Generation** under
19 expected WIPP conditions. Molecke (1979, p. 4) summarized microbial gas generation rates
20 observed during a range of experiments. Increases in temperature from ambient up to 40°C
21 (104°F) or 50°C (122°F) were reported to increase gas production, mainly via the degradation of
22 cellulosic waste under either aerobic or anaerobic conditions (Molecke 1979, p. 7). Above 70°C
23 (158°F), however, gas generation rates were generally observed to decrease. The experiments
24 were conducted over a range of temperatures and chemical conditions and for different
25 substrates, representing likely states within the repository. Gas generation rates were presented
26 as ranges with upper and lower bounds as estimates of uncertainty (Molecke 1979, p. 7). Later
27 experiments reported by Francis and Gillow (1994) support the gas generation rate data reported
28 by Molecke (1979). These experiments investigated microbial gas generation under a wide
29 range of possible conditions in the repository. These conditions included the presence of
30 microbial inoculum, humid or inundated conditions, cellulosic substrates, additional nutrients,
31 electron acceptors, bentonite, and initially oxic or anoxic conditions. These experiments were
32 carried out at a reference temperature of 30°C (86°F), based on the average temperature
33 expected in the repository. Gas generation rates used in the PA calculations have been derived
34 from available experimental data and are described in Section 6.4.3.3. The effects of
35 temperature on microbial gas generation are implicitly incorporated in the gas generation rates
36 used.

37 SCR-6.5.1.1.3.2 *Effects of Biofilms on Microbial Gas Generation*

38 The location of microbial activity within the repository is likely to be controlled by the
39 availability of substrates and nutrients. Biofilms may develop on surfaces where nutrients are
40 concentrated. They consist of one or more layers of cells with extracellular polymeric material
41 and serve to maintain an optimum environment for growth. Within such a biofilm ecosystem,

1 nutrient retention and recycling maximize microbe numbers on the surface (see, for example,
2 Stroes-Gascoyne and West 1994, pp. 9 – 10).

3 Biofilms can form on almost any moist surface, but their development is likely to be restricted in
4 porous materials. Even so, their development is possible at locations throughout the disposal
5 system. The *Effects of Biofilms on Microbial Gas Generation* may affect disposal system
6 performance through control of microbial population size and their effects on radionuclide
7 transport.

8 Molecke (1979, p. 4) summarized microbial gas generation rates observed during a range of
9 experimental studies. The experiments were conducted over a range of temperatures and
10 chemical conditions and for different substrates representing likely states within the repository.
11 However, the effect of biofilm formation in these experiments was uncertain. Molecke (1979, p.
12 7), presented gas generation rates as ranges, with upper and lower bounds as estimates of
13 uncertainty. Later experiments reported by Francis and Gillow (1994) support the gas generation
14 rate data reported by Molecke (1979). Their experiments investigated microbial gas generation
15 under a wide range of possible conditions in the repository. These conditions included the
16 presence of microbial inoculum, humid or inundated conditions, cellulosic substrates, additional
17 nutrients, electron acceptors, bentonite, and initially oxic or anoxic conditions. Under the more
18 favorable conditions for microbial growth established during the experiments, the development
19 of populations of halophilic microbes and associated biofilms was evidenced by observation of
20 an extracellular, carotenoid pigment, bacterioruberin, in the culture bottles (Francis and Gillow
21 1994, p. 59). Gas generation rates used in the PA calculations have been derived from available
22 experimental data and are described in Section 6.4.3.3. The *Effects of Biofilms on Microbial*
23 *Gas Generation* rates are implicitly incorporated in the gas generation rates.

24 Biofilms may also influence contaminant transport rates through their capacity to retain and thus
25 retard both the microbes themselves and radionuclides. This effect is not accounted for in PA
26 calculations, but is considered potentially beneficial to calculated disposal system performance.
27 Microbial transport is discussed in FEP W87.

28 SCR-6.5.1.2 FEP Number: W46
29 FEP Title: *Effects of Pressure on Microbial Gas Generation*

30 SCR-6.5.1.2.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

31 *The Effects of Pressure on Microbial Gas Generation has been eliminated from PA calculations*
32 *on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

33 SCR-6.5.1.2.2 Summary of New Information

34 The FEP screening argument has been updated, however the screening decision has not changed.

35 SCR-6.5.1.2.3 Screening Argument

36 Directly relevant to WIPP conditions, the gas generation experiments with actual waste
37 components at Argonne National Laboratory provide no indication of any enhancement of
38 pressured nitrogen atmosphere (2150 psia) on microbial gas generation (Felicione et al. 2001). In

1 addition, microbial breakdown of cellulosic material, and possibly plastics and other synthetic
2 materials in the repository, will produce mainly CO₂ and methane with minor amounts of
3 nitrogen oxide, nitrogen, and hydrogen sulfide. The accumulation of these gaseous species will
4 contribute the total pressure in the repository. Increases in the partial pressures of these reaction
5 products could potentially limit gas generation reactions. However, such an effect is not taken
6 into account in WIPP PA calculations. The rate of microbial gas production will depend upon
7 the nature of the microbial populations established, the prevailing conditions, and the substrates
8 present. Microbial gas generation from *Degradation of Organic Material* (W44) is accounted
9 for in PA calculations.

10 Chemical reactions may occur depending on, among other things, the concentrations of available
11 reactants, the presence of catalysts and the accumulation of reaction products, the biological
12 activity, and the prevailing conditions (for example, temperature and pressure). Reactions that
13 involve the production or consumption of gases are often particularly influenced by pressure
14 because of the high molar volume of gases. The effect of high total pressures on chemical
15 reactions is generally to reduce or limit further gas generation.

16 Few data exist from which the *Effects of Pressure on Microbial Gas Generation* reactions that
17 may occur in the WIPP can be assessed and quantified. Studies of microbial activity in deep-sea
18 environments suggest (for example, Kato et al. 1994, p. 94) that microbial gas generation
19 reactions are less likely to be limited by increasing pressures in the disposal rooms than are
20 inorganic gas generation reactions (for example, corrosion). Consequently, the *Effects of*
21 *Pressure on Microbial Gas Generation* have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis
22 of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

23 SCR-6.5.1.3 FEP Number: W47
24 FEP Title: *Effects of Radiation on Microbial Gas Generation*

25 SCR-6.5.1.3.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

26 *The Effects of Radiation on Microbial Gas Generation has been eliminated from PA*
27 *calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

28 SCR-6.5.1.3.2 Summary of New Information

29 The FEP screening argument has been updated to reflect the new radionuclide inventory,
30 although the screening decision has not changed.

31 SCR-6.5.1.3.3 Screening Argument

32 Radiation may slow down microbial gas generation rates, but such an effect is not taken into
33 account in WIPP PA calculations. According to the new *inventory* data, the total radionuclide
34 inventory decreases from 7.44×10^6 (DOE 1996b) to 6.66×10^6 curies (Appendix DATA,
35 Attachment F), about a 10 percent decrease. Such a small change will not affect the original
36 screening argument.

37 Experiments investigating microbial gas generation rates suggest that the effects of alpha
38 radiation from TRU waste is not likely to have significant effects on microbial activity (Barnhart

1 et al. 1980; Francis 1985). Consequently, the *Effects of Radiation on Microbial Gas*
2 *Generation* have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the
3 performance of the disposal system.

4 SCR-6.5.1.4 FEP Number: W49 and W51
5 FEP Title: *Gasses from Metal Corrosion*
6 *Chemical Effects of Corrosion*

7 SCR-6.5.1.4.1 Screening Decision: UP

8 *Gas generation from metal corrosion is accounted for in PA calculations, and the effects of*
9 *chemical changes from metal corrosion are incorporated in the gas generation rates used.*

10 SCR-6.5.1.4.2 Summary of New Information

11 No new information has been identified related to these FEPs. They have been modified only
12 from an editorial perspective, and have not changed since the CCA.

13 SCR-6.5.1.4.3 Screening Argument

14 Oxidic corrosion of waste drums and metallic waste will occur at early times following closure of
15 the repository and will deplete its oxygen content. Anoxic corrosion will follow the oxidic phase
16 and will produce hydrogen, while consuming water. *Gasses from Metal Corrosion* are accounted
17 for in PA calculations.

18 The predominant *Chemical Effect of Corrosion* reactions on the environment of disposal rooms
19 will be to lower the oxidation state of the brines and maintain reducing conditions.

20 Molecke (1979, p. 4) summarized gas generation rates that were observed during a range of
21 experiments. The experiments were conducted over a range of temperatures and chemical
22 conditions representing likely states within the repository. Later experiments reported by
23 Telander and Westerman (1993) support the gas generation rate data reported by Molecke
24 (1979). Their experiments investigated gas generation from corrosion under a wide range of
25 possible conditions in the repository. The studies included corrosion of low-carbon steel waste
26 packaging materials in synthetic brines, representative of intergranular Salado brines at the
27 repository horizon, under anoxic (reducing) conditions.

28 Gas generation rates used in the PA calculations have been derived from available experimental
29 data and are described in Section 6.4.3.3. The effects of chemical changes from metal corrosion
30 are, therefore, accounted for in PA calculations.

31 SCR-6.5.1.5 FEP Number: W50
32 FEP Title: *Galvanic Coupling* (within the repository)

33 SCR-6.5.1.5.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

34 *The effects of Galvanic Coupling have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low*
35 *consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

1 SCR-6.5.1.5.2 Summary of New Information

2 The original screening argument confused **Galvanic Coupling** internal and external to the
3 repository (see W95). As such, the original screening decision for **Galvanic Coupling** was
4 screened out on probability however, it is more appropriate to screen this FEP on consequence.
5 The screening decision has therefore been changes to SO-C and a clear distinction between
6 which FEP considers internal and external coupling was included in the FEP discussions.

7 Consideration **Galvanic Coupling** (W50), is restricted to consideration of effects between or
8 among materials within the repository. **Galvanic Coupling** with materials outside the repository
9 is considered in **Galvanic Coupling** (W95).

10 **Galvanic Coupling** (within the repository) is unlikely to occur on a large scale. On a very small
11 scale, **Galvanic Coupling** could occur whenever two dissimilar metals are in contact and a
12 conducting medium is present. However, the resulting corrosion would cause the same effects as
13 the other corrosion processes already included in the assessments. Thus, **Galvanic Coupling**, as
14 a distinct corrosion mechanism, would have negligible effects on repository performance.

15 **Galvanic Coupling** has been screened out on the basis of low consequence. No new information
16 has become available that affects the screening argument; the FEP screening argument and
17 screening decision remain unchanged.

18 SCR-6.5.1.5.3 Screening Argument

19 **Galvanic Coupling** (i.e. establishing an electrical current through chemical processes) could lead
20 to the propagation of electric potential gradients between metals in the waste form, canisters, and
21 other metals external to the waste form, potentially influencing corrosion processes, gas
22 generation rates and chemical migration.

23 Metallic ore bodies external to the repository are nonexistent (CCA Appendix GCR) and
24 therefore galvanic coupling between the waste and metals external to the repository would not
25 occur. However, a variety of metals will be present within the repository as waste metals and
26 containers, creating a potential for formation of galvanic cells over short distances. As an
27 example, the presence of copper could influence rates of hydrogen gas production resulting from
28 the corrosion of iron. The interactions between metals depend upon their physical disposition
29 and the prevailing solution conditions, including pH and salinity. Good physical and electrical
30 contact between the metals is critical to the establishment of galvanic cells.

31 Consequently, given the preponderance of iron over other metals within the repository and the
32 likely passivation of many nonferrous materials, the influence of these electrochemical
33 interactions on corrosion, and therefore gas generation, is expected to be minimal. Therefore, the
34 effects of **Galvanic Coupling** have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
35 consequence.

1 SCR-6.5.1.6 FEP Number: W52
 2 FEP Title: ***Radiolysis of Brine***

3 SCR-6.5.1.6.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

4 *Gas generation from **Radiolysis of Brine** has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis*
 5 *of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*


6 SCR-6.5.1.6.2 Summary of New Information

7 No new information is available relative to this FEP and screening decision. The screening
 8 argument has been modified for editorial purposes.

9 SCR-6.5.1.6.3 Screening Argument

10 ***Radiolysis of Brine*** in the WIPP disposal rooms, and of water in the waste, will lead to the
 11 production of gases and may significantly affect the oxygen content of the rooms. This in turn
 12 will affect the prevailing chemical conditions and potentially the concentrations of radionuclides
 13 that may be mobilized in the brines.

14 The overall reaction for the radiolysis of water in the waste and brine is



16 However, the production of intermediate oxygen-bearing species that may subsequently undergo
 17 reduction will lead to reduced oxygen gas yields. The remainder of this section is concerned
 18 with the physical effects of gas generation by radiolysis of brine.

19 Reed et al. (1993) studied radiolytic gas generation during experiments lasting between 155 and
 20 182 days. These experiments involved both synthetic brines similar to those sampled from the
 21 Salado at the WIPP repository horizon, and brines occurring in reservoirs in the Castile, as well
 22 as real brines sampled from the Salado in the repository workings. The brines were spiked with
 23 ²³⁹Pu(VI) at concentrations between 6.9×10^{-9} and 3.4×10^{-4} molal. During these relatively
 24 short-term experiments, hydrogen gas was observed as the product of radiolysis. Oxygen gas
 25 was not observed; this was attributed to the formation of intermediate oxygen-bearing species.
 26 However, given sufficient exposure to alpha-emission, oxygen production may reach 50 percent
 27 that of hydrogen.

28 An estimate of the potential rate of gas generation due to the radiolysis of brine, R_{RAD} , can be
 29 made by making the following assumptions:

- 30
- 31 • Gas production occurs following the reaction above, so that 1.5 moles of gas are
 generated for each mole of water consumed.
 - 32 • Gas production occurs as a result of the alpha decay of ²³⁹Pu.
 - 33 • ²³⁹Pu concentrations in the disposal room brines are controlled by solubility equilibria.

- 1 • All of the dissolved plutonium is ^{239}Pu .

2 R_{RAD} is then given by

$$3 \quad R_{\text{RAD}} = \frac{Y_g C_{\text{Pu}} S A_{\text{Pu}} \bar{E}_\alpha V_B}{N_D N_A} \quad (13)$$

$$4 \quad R_{\text{RAD}} = \frac{\left(\frac{1.5 \text{ molecule gas}}{\text{molecule H}_2\text{O}}\right) \left(3.15 \times 10^7 \frac{\text{sec}}{\text{yr}}\right) \left(3 \times 10^{-4} \frac{\text{mol}}{\text{L}}\right) \left(5.42 \times 10^{11} \frac{\text{Bq}}{\text{mol}}\right) \left(5.15 \times 10^6 \frac{\text{eV}}{\text{dis}}\right) \left(\frac{0.015 \text{ H}_2\text{O}}{100 \text{ eV}}\right) (4.36 \times 10^8 \text{ L})}{(8 \times 10^5 \text{ drums}) \left(6.022 \times 10^{23} \frac{\text{molecules}}{\text{mole}}\right)}$$

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(14)

- 8 R = rate of gas production (moles per drum per year)
9 Y_g = radiolytic gas yield, in number of moles of gas produced per number of water
10 molecules consumed
11 C_{Pu} = maximum dissolved concentration of plutonium (molar)
12 $S A_{\text{Pu}}$ = specific activity of ^{239}Pu (5.42×10^{11} becquerels per mole)
13 \bar{E}_α = average energy of α -particles emitted during ^{239}Pu decay (5.15×10^6 eV)
14 G = number of water molecules split per 100 eV of energy transferred from alpha-
15 particles
16 V_B = volume of brine in the repository (liters)
17 N_D = number of CH drums in the repository ($\sim 8 \times 10^5$)
18 N_A = Avogadro constant (6.022×10^{23} molecules per mole)

19 The value of G used in this calculation has been set at 0.015, the upper limit of the range of
20 values observed (0.011 to 0.015) during experimental studies of the effects of radiation on WIPP
21 brines (Reed et al. 1993). A maximum estimate of the volume of brine that could potentially be
22 present in the disposal region has been made from its excavated volume of $436,000 \text{ m}^3$
23 ($520,266 \text{ yd}^3$). This estimate, in particular, is considered to be highly conservative because it
24 makes no allowance for creep closure of the excavation, or for the volume of waste and backfill
25 that will be emplaced, and takes no account of factors that may limit brine inflow. These
26 parameter values lead to an estimate of the potential rate of gas production due to the **Radiolysis**
27 **of Brine** of 0.6 moles per drum per year.

28 Assuming ideal gas behavior and repository conditions of 30°C (86°F) and 14.8 MPa (lithostatic
29 pressure), this is equivalent to approximately 6.8×10^4 liters (1.8×10^4 gallons) per year.

30 Potential gas production rates from other processes that will occur in the repository are
31 significantly greater than this. For example, under water-saturated conditions, microbial
32 degradation of cellulosic waste has the potential to yield between 1.3×10^6 and 3.8×10^7 liters
33 (3.4×10^5 and 1.0×10^7 gallons) per year; anoxic corrosion of steels has the potential to yield up
34 to 6.3×10^5 liters (1.6×10^5 gallons) per year.

1 In addition to the assessment of the potential rate of gas generation by **Radiolysis of Brine** given
2 above, a study of the likely consequences on disposal system performance has been undertaken
3 by Vaughn et al. (1995). A model was implemented in BRAGFLO to estimate radiolytic gas
4 generation in the disposal region according to the equation above.

5 A set of BRAGFLO simulations was performed to assess the magnitude of the influence of the
6 **Radiolysis of Brine** on contaminant migration to the accessible environment. The calculations
7 considered radiolysis of water by 15 isotopes of Th, Pu, U, and Am. Conditional complementary
8 cumulative distribution functions (CCDFs) of normalized contaminated brine releases to the
9 Culebra via a human intrusion borehole and the shaft system, as well as releases to the
10 subsurface boundary of the accessible environment via the Salado interbeds, were constructed
11 and compared to the corresponding baseline CCDFs calculated excluding radiolysis. The
12 comparisons indicated that **Radiolysis of Brine** does not significantly affect releases to the
13 Culebra or the subsurface boundary of the accessible environment under disturbed or undisturbed
14 conditions (Vaughn et al. 1995). Although the analysis of Vaughn et al. (1995) used data that are
15 different than those used in the PA calculations, estimates of total gas volumes in the repository
16 are similar to those considered in the analysis performed by Vaughn et al. (1995).

17 Therefore, gas generation by **Radiolysis of Brine** has been eliminated from PA calculations on
18 the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

19 SCR-6.5.1.7 FEP Number: W53
20 FEP Title: ***Radiolysis of Cellulose***

21 SCR-6.5.1.7.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

22 *Gas generation from **Radiolysis of Cellulose** has been eliminated from PA calculations on the*
23 *basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

24 SCR-6.5.1.7.2 Summary of New Information

25 This FEP has been updated with new inventory data related to cellulose content. In addition, the
26 screening argument has been modified by the inclusion of gas generation information from the
27 WIPP transportation program.

28 SCR-6.5.1.7.3 Screening Argument

29 Molecke (1979) compared experimental data on gas production rates caused by **Radiolysis of**
30 **Cellulose** and other waste materials with gas generation rates by other processes including
31 bacterial (microbial) waste degradation. The comparative gas generation rates reported by
32 Molecke (1979, p. 4) are given in terms of most probable ranges, using units of moles per year
33 per drum, for drums of 0.21 m³ (0.27 yd³) in volume. A most probable range of 0.005 to 0.011
34 moles per year per drum is reported for gas generation due to radiolysis of cellulosic material
35 (Molecke 1979, p. 4). As a comparison, a most probable range of 0.0 to 5.5 moles per year per
36 drum is reported for gas generation by bacterial degradation of waste.

37 The data reported by Molecke (1979) are consistent with more recent gas generation
38 investigations made under the WIPP program, and indicate that radiolysis of cellulosic materials

1 will generate significantly less gas than other gas generation processes. Gas generation from
2 radiolysis of cellulose therefore can be eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
3 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

4 Radiolytic gas generation is controlled by the radioactivity of wastes and the waste properties.
5 According to the new *inventory* data, the total radionuclide inventory decreases from 7.44×10^6
6 (DOE 1996b) to 6.66×10^6 curies (Appendix DATA, Attachment F), about a 10 percent
7 decrease. Interestingly, the radionuclide inventory in the CH-TRU waste, which accounts for the
8 most volume of WIPP wastes, decreases from 6.42×10^6 (DOE 1996b) to 5.33×10^6 curies
9 (Appendix DATA, Attachment F). Such a small change will not affect radiolytic gas generation.
10 However, the new inventory data indicates a 7 percent increase in the density of cellulose in
11 waste materials (Appendix DATA, Attachment F). Because the additional cellulose component
12 is mainly derived from the Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Plant (AMWTP) wastes, which
13 have relatively low radioactivity, the increase in total cellulose quantity will not significantly
14 affect the prediction of total radiolytic gas generation.

15 Radiolytic gas generation is also limited by transportation requirements, which state that the
16 hydrogen generated in the innermost layer of confinement must be no more than five percent
17 over 60 days (DOE 2000). Thus, the maximum rate allowed for transportation is 0.201 m^3 per
18 drum \times five percent \times 1000 L/m^3 per 60 days \times 365 days per year = 61 L per drum per year,
19 smaller than the maximum microbial gas generation rate. Note that this estimate is very
20 conservative and the actual rates are even smaller. It is a general consensus within the
21 international research community that the effect of radiolytic gas generation on the long-term
22 performance of a low/intermediate level waste repository is negligible (Rodwell et al. 1999).

23 SCR-6.5.1.8 FEP Number: W54
24 FEP Title: **Helium Gas Production**

25 SCR-6.5.1.8.1 Screening Decision: SO-C


26 *Gas generation from helium production has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of*
27 *low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

28 SCR-6.5.1.8.2 Summary of New Information

29 The updated information for the WIPP disposal inventory indicates that the expected WIPP-scale
30 radionuclide activity (2.48 million curies of TRU isotopes) is less than previously estimated in
31 TWBIR Rev 3 (DOE 1996b). Thus, the **Helium Gas Production** argument for CRA-2004 is
32 conservatively bounded by the previous CCA screening argument. The FEP screening argument
33 and screening decision remain unchanged except for editorial changes.

34 SCR-6.5.1.8.3 Screening Argument

35 **Helium Gas Production** will occur by the reduction of α -particles (helium nuclei) emitted from
36 the waste. The maximum amount of helium that could be produced can be calculated from the
37 number α -particles generated during radioactive decay. The α -particles are converted to helium
38 gas by the following reaction:



For the screening argument used in the CCA, the inventory (I) that may be emplaced in the repository is approximately 4.07 million curies or 1.5×10^{17} becquerels (see CCA Appendix BIR). Assuming that the inventory continues to yield α -particles at this rate throughout the 10,000-year regulatory period the maximum rate of helium gas produced (R_{He}) may be calculated from

$$R_{\text{He}} = \frac{1 \left(\frac{1 \text{ He atom}}{\alpha - \text{decay}} \right)}{N_{\text{A}}} \quad (16)$$

R_{He} is the rate of **Helium Gas Production** in the repository (mole per second)

I is the waste inventory, 1.5×10^{17} becquerels, assuming that 1 becquerel is equal to 1 α -decay per second, and N_{A} is Avogadro constant (6.022×10^{23} atoms per mole). These assumptions regarding the inventory lead to maximum estimates for helium production because some of the radionuclides will decay by beta and gamma emission.

R_{He} is approximately 5.5×10^{-7} moles per second based on an alpha-emitting inventory of 4.07 million curies. Assuming ideal gas behavior and repository conditions of 30°C (86°F) and 14.8 MPa or 146 atm (lithostatic pressure), yields approximately 1.3 liters (0.34 gallons) per year.

Gas production rates by microbial degradation of organic materials and anoxic corrosion of steel are likely to be significantly greater than 1.3 liters per year. For example, anoxic corrosion of steels is estimated to yield 0 to 6.3×10^5 liters of hydrogen per year (Section 6.4, Appendix PA, Attachment MASS). Even if gas production by **Microbes** and corrosion was minimal and helium production dominated gas generation, the effects would be of low consequence because of the low total volume.

The effects of **Helium Gas Production** have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

SCR-6.5.1.9 FEP Number: W55
 FEP Title: **Radioactive Gases**

SCR-6.5.1.9.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

*The formation and transport of **Radioactive Gases** has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

SCR-6.5.1.9.2 Summary of New Information

No new information has become available that affects the screening argument; the FEP screening decision remains unchanged. Additional information has been added to the screening discussions.

1 SCR-6.5.1.9.3 Screening Argument

2 Based on the composition of the anticipated waste inventory as described in Appendix DATA,
3 Attachment F, the *Radioactive Gases* that will be generated in the repository are radon and
4 carbon-14 labeled CO₂ and methane (CH₄).

5 Appendix DATA, Attachment F indicates that a small amount of carbon-14, 0.73 grams, or 3.26
6 curies, will be disposed in the WIPP. This amount is insignificant in comparison with the 40
7 CFR § 191.13 cumulative release limit for carbon-14.

8 Notwithstanding this comparison, consideration of transport of *Radioactive Gases* could
9 potentially be necessary in respect of the 40 CFR § 191.15 individual protection requirements.
10 carbon-14 may partition into CO₂ and methane formed during microbial degradation of cellulosic
11 and other organic wastes (for example, rubbers and plastics). However, total fugacities of CO₂ in
12 the repository are expected to be very low because of the action of the MgO backfill which will
13 lead to incorporation of CO₂ in solid magnesite. Similarly, interaction of CO₂ with cementitious
14 wastes will limit CO₂ fugacities by the formation of solid calcium carbonate. Thus, because of
15 the formation of solid carbonate phases in the repository, significant transport of carbon-14 as
16 carbon dioxide-14 has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to
17 the performance of the disposal system.

18 Potentially significant volumes of methane may be produced during the microbial degradation of
19 cellulosic waste. However, volumes of methane-14 will be small given the low total inventory
20 of carbon-14, and the tendency of carbon-14 to be incorporated into solid carbonate phases in the
21 repository. Therefore, although transport of carbon-14 could occur as methane-14, this effect has
22 been eliminated from the current PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the
23 performance of the disposal system.

24 Radon gas will contain proportions of the alpha emitters ²¹⁹Rn, ²²⁰Rn, and ²²²Rn. All of these
25 have short half-lives, but ²²²Rn is potentially the most important because it is produced from the
26 abundant waste isotope, ²³⁸Pu, and because it has the longest half-life of the radon isotopes (≈ 4
27 days). ²²²radon will exhibit secular equilibrium with its parent ²²⁶Rn, which has a half-life of
28 1600 years. Consequently, ²²²Rn will be produced throughout the 10,000-year regulatory time
29 period. Conservative analysis of the potential ²²²Rn inventory suggests activities of less than 716
30 curies at 10,000 years (Bennett 1996).

31 Direct comparison of the estimated level of ²²²Rn activity with the release limits specified in 40
32 CFR § 191.13 cannot be made because the release limits do not cover radionuclides with half-
33 lives less than 20 years. For this reason, production of radon gas can be eliminated from the PA
34 calculations on regulatory grounds. Notwithstanding this regulatory argument, the small
35 potential radon inventory means that the formation and transport of radon gas can also be
36 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
37 disposal system.

1 **SCR-6.5.2 Speciation**

2 SCR-6.5.2.1 FEP Number: W56

3 FEP Title: **Speciation**

4 SCR-6.5.2.1.1 Screening Decision: UP – Disposal Room
5 UP – Culebra
6 SO-C – Beneficial – Shaft Seals

7 *Chemical **Speciation** is accounted for in PA calculations in the estimates of radionuclide*
8 *solubility in the disposal rooms, and the degree of chemical retardation estimated during*
9 *contaminant transport. The effects of cementitious seals on chemical **Speciation** have been*
10 *eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the performance of the*
11 *disposal system.*

12 SCR-6.5.2.1.2 Summary of New Information

13 No new information has been identified related to the screening of this FEP. It has been
14 modified for editorial purposes.

15 SCR-6.5.2.1.3 Screening Argument

16 Chemical **Speciation** refers to the form in which elements occur under a particular set of
17 chemical or environmental conditions. Conditions affecting chemical **Speciation** include the
18 temperature, pressure, and salinity (ionic strength) of the water in question. The importance of
19 chemical speciation lies in its control of the geochemical reactions likely to occur and the
20 consequences for actinide mobility.

21 SCR-6.5.2.1.3.1 *Disposal Room*

22 The concentrations of radionuclides that dissolve in any brines present in the disposal rooms
23 after repository closure will depend on the stability of the chemical species that form under the
24 prevailing conditions (for example, temperature, pressure, and ionic strength). The method used
25 to derive radionuclide solubilities in the disposal rooms (see Section 6.4.3.5) considers the
26 expected conditions. The MgO backfill will buffer pH values in the disposal room to between 9
27 and 10. Thus, chemical **Speciation** is accounted for in PA calculations in the estimates of
28 radionuclide solubility in the disposal rooms.

29 SCR-6.5.2.1.3.2 *Repository Seals*

30 Certain repository materials have the potential to interact with groundwater and significantly
31 alter the chemical **Speciation** of any radionuclides present. In particular, extensive use of
32 cementitious materials in the seals may have the capacity to buffer groundwaters to extremely
33 high pH (for example, Bennett et al. 1992, pp. 315 – 325). At high pH values, the **Speciation**
34 and adsorption behavior of many radionuclides is such that their dissolved concentrations are
35 reduced in comparison with near-neutral waters. This effect reduces the migration of
36 radionuclides in dissolved form. The effects of cementitious seals on groundwater chemistry

1 have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the
2 performance of the disposal system.

3 SCR-6.5.2.1.3.3 *Culebra*

4 Chemical ***Speciation*** will affect actinide retardation in the Culebra. The dependence of actinide
5 retardation on ***Speciation*** in the Culebra is accounted for in PA calculations by sampling over
6 ranges of distribution coefficients (K_{ds}). The ranges of K_{ds} are based on the range of
7 groundwater compositions and ***Speciation*** in the Culebra, including consideration of
8 nonradionuclide solutes. The methodology used to simulate sorption in the Culebra is described
9 in Section 6.4.6.2.1.

10 SCR-6.5.2.2 FEP Number: W57
11 FEP Title: ***Kinetics of Speciation***

12 SCR-6.5.2.2.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

13 *The effects of reaction kinetics in chemical speciation reactions have been eliminated from PA*
14 *calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

15 SCR-6.5.2.2.2 Summary of New Information

16 No new information that would change the screening argument has arisen since the submission
17 of the CCA. The original screening discussions have been edited for clarity of expression.

18 SCR-6.5.2.2.3 Screening Argument

19 Chemical ***Speciation*** of actinides describes the composition and relative distribution of dissolved
20 species, such as the hydrated metal ion, or complexes, whether with organic or inorganic ligands.
21 Conditions affecting chemical ***Speciation*** include temperature, ionic strength, ligand
22 concentration and pH of the solution. Some ligands, such as hydroxide, may act to decrease
23 actinide solubility, while others, such as citrate, frequently have the opposite influence, often
24 increasing actinide solubility.

25 SCR-6.5.2.2.4 Disposal Room Equilibrium Conditions

26 The concentrations of radionuclides that can be dissolved in brines within the disposal rooms
27 will depend on the thermodynamic stabilities and solubilities of the respective metal complexes.
28 The Fracture-Matrix Transport (FMT) calculations and database input used to determine the
29 brine solubilities of radionuclides takes into account the expected conditions, including
30 temperature, ionic strength, pH, and ligand concentration. The chemical ***Speciation at***
31 ***equilibrium*** is accounted for in PA calculations in the estimates of radionuclide solubility in the
32 disposal rooms.

33 SCR-6.5.2.2.5 Kinetics of Complex Formation

34 The waste that is emplaced within the WIPP contains radionuclides, including actinides or
35 actinide bearing materials in solid phases, e.g. metal oxides, salts, coprecipitated solids, and

1 contaminated objects. In the event of contact with brine, the solution phase concentration of
 2 dissolved radionuclides is controlled both by the solution composition, and by the kinetics of
 3 dissolution of the solid phases, effectively approaching equilibrium from undersaturation.
 4 Solution complexation reactions of most metal ions with common inorganic ligands, such as
 5 carbonate and hydroxide, and with organic ligands such as acetate, citrate, oxalate, and ethylene
 6 diamine tetra-acetate (EDTA) are kinetically very fast, reaching equilibrium in fractions of a
 7 second, an inconsequentially short time increment on the scale of the 10,000-year regulatory
 8 period. Reactions of these types are generally so fast that special techniques must be adopted to
 9 measure the reaction rates; as a practical matter, the reaction rate is limited by the mixing rate
 10 when metal solutions are combined with ligand solutions. As a result, the rate of approach to an
 11 equilibrium distribution of solution species takes place much more rapidly than dissolution,
 12 making the dissolution reaction the rate limiting step. The effects of reaction kinetics in aqueous
 13 systems are discussed by Lasaga et al. (1994) who suggest that in contrast to many
 14 heterogeneous reactions, homogeneous aqueous geochemical **Speciation** reactions involving
 15 relatively small inorganic species occur rapidly and are accurately described by thermodynamic
 16 equilibrium models that neglect explicit consideration of reaction kinetics.

17 For that reason, the rate at which solution species approach equilibrium distribution is of no
 18 consequence to repository performance. **Kinetics of Chemical Speciation** may be eliminated
 19 from PA calculations on the basis of no consequence.

20 **SCR-6.5.3 Precipitation and Dissolution**

21 SCR-6.5.3.1 FEP Number: W58, W59, and W60
 22 FEP Title: **Dissolution of Waste (W58)**
 23 **Precipitation of Secondary Minerals (W59)**
 24 **Kinetics of Precipitation and Dissolution (W60)**

25 SCR-6.5.3.1.1 Screening Decision: UP – W58
 26 SO-C Beneficial – W59
 27 SO-C – W60

28 *Waste dissolution and the release of radionuclides in the disposal rooms are accounted for in PA*
 29 *calculations. The formation of radionuclide bearing precipitates from groundwaters and brines*
 30 *and the associated retardation of contaminants have been eliminated from PA calculations on*
 31 *the basis of beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal system. The effect of*
 32 *reaction kinetics in controlling the rate of waste dissolution within the disposal rooms has been*
 33 *eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the performance of the*
 34 *disposal system.*

35 SCR-6.5.3.1.2 Summary of New Information

36 **Precipitation of Secondary Minerals** in the disposal room and in geologic units will lead to
 37 reductions in nuclide concentrations via the sequestration of radionuclides by coprecipitation and
 38 by encapsulation of radionuclide precipitates, and will retard radionuclide transport through
 39 sorption. Within the disposal room, metal oxides/oxy-hydroxides will form by corrosion of
 40 waste packages and waste components; brucite will form by hydration of MgO backfill;

1 carbonate minerals will form by carbonation of MgO backfill and cement phases; secondary
2 cement alteration phases will form through brine-cement waste form interactions; and chloride
3 and sulfate minerals will be precipitated due to water uptake during hydration and corrosion
4 reactions. In geologic units above the repository, iron oxides/oxy-hydroxides, carbonates,
5 sulfates may form as groundwaters mix. Mineral precipitation in geologic units above the
6 repository is assumed to be uniform, and in addition to sorbing or sequestering radionuclides,
7 will be beneficial by reducing permeability and slowing the groundwater flow.

8 During the original WIPP Certification, the EPA questioned the screening argument for ***Kinetics***
9 ***of Precipitation and Dissolution***. The EPA stated in EPA TSD Scope of Performance
10 Assessment regarding ***Kinetics of Precipitation and Dissolution***:

11 The screening argument in SCR.2.5.3 appears reasonable to EPA. Initially, EPA thought the
12 argument appeared questionable because the CCA assumed that precipitation reactions are always
13 rapid and complete. As a result, the EPA questioned the gas pressures in the repository, the
14 chemical conditions, and the actinide solubilities. The DOE has since submitted experimental
15 results indicating that the predicted reactions occur and time frames are somewhat rapid. The EPA
16 reconsidered this assessment and concluded that the precipitation assumptions are necessary (and
17 conservative), and are supported by experimental data.

18 Other than that stated above, no new information that would change the screening argument has
19 arisen since the submission of the CCA. The original text has been edited for clarity of
20 expression.

21 SCR-6.5.3.1.3 Screening Argument

22 ***Dissolution of Waste and Precipitation of Secondary Minerals*** control the concentrations of
23 radionuclides in brines and can influence rates of contaminant transport. Waste dissolution is
24 accounted for in PA calculations. The formation of radionuclide-bearing precipitates from
25 groundwaters and brines and the associated retardation of contaminants have been eliminated
26 from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal
27 system.

28 At low temperatures, precipitation and dissolution reactions are caused by changes in fluid
29 chemistry that result in chemical undersaturation or oversaturation (Bruno and Sandino 1987).
30 Precipitation can be divided into two stages: nucleation and crystal growth. Following
31 nucleation, growth rates depend on the rates of surface processes and the transport of materials to
32 the growth site. Mineral dissolution often depends on whether a surface reaction or transport of
33 material away from the reaction site act as the rate controlling process. The former case may
34 cause selective dissolution along crystallographically controlled features, whereas the latter may
35 induce rapid bulk dissolution (Berner 1981). Thus, a range of kinetic behaviors will be exhibited
36 by different mineral precipitation and dissolution reactions in geochemical systems.

37 SCR-6.5.3.1.3.1 Disposal Room

38 The waste that is emplaced within the WIPP contains radionuclides, including actinides or
39 actinide-bearing materials in solid phases, e.g. metal oxides, salts, coprecipitated solids, and
40 contaminated objects. In the event of contact with brine, the solution phase concentration of
41 dissolved radionuclides is controlled both by the solution composition, and by the kinetics of

1 dissolution of the solid phases, effectively approaching equilibrium from undersaturation.
 2 Solution complexation reactions of most metal ions with common inorganic ligands, such as
 3 carbonated and hydroxide, and with organic ligands such as acetate, citrate, oxalate, and EDTA
 4 are kinetically very fast, reaching equilibrium in less than one second, which is infinitesimally
 5 small on the time scale of the 10,000 year regulatory period. The rate at which thermodynamic
 6 equilibrium is approached between solution composition and the solubility controlling solid
 7 phases will be limited by rate of dissolution of the solid materials in the waste. As a result, until
 8 equilibrium is reached, the solution concentration of the actinides will be lower than the
 9 concentration that is predicted based upon equilibrium of the solution phase components with the
 10 solubility limiting solid phases. The WIPP actinide source term model, which describes
 11 interactions of the waste and brine, is described in detail in Section 6.4.3.5. The assumption of
 12 instantaneous equilibrium in waste dissolution reactions is a conservative approach, yielding
 13 maximum concentration estimates for radionuclides in the disposal rooms because a time
 14 weighted average resulting from a kinetically accurate estimate of solution compositions would
 15 have lower concentrations at early times. Waste dissolution at the thermodynamic equilibrium
 16 solubility limit is accounted for in PA calculations. However, the *Kinetics of Dissolution* within
 17 the disposal rooms has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial
 18 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

19 SCR-6.5.3.1.3.2 *Geological Units*

20 During groundwater flow, radionuclide precipitation processes that occur will lead to reduced
 21 contaminant transport. No credit is given in PA calculations to the potentially beneficial
 22 occurrence of *Precipitation of Secondary Minerals*. The formation of radionuclide-bearing
 23 precipitates from groundwaters and brines and the associated retardation of contaminants have
 24 been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to disposal system
 25 performance. As a result *Kinetics of Precipitation* also has been eliminated from PA
 26 calculations because no credit is taken for precipitation reactions.

27 **SCR-6.5.4 Sorption**

28 SCR-6.5.4.1 FEP Number: W61, W62, and W63
 29 FEP Title: *Actinide Sorption (W61)*
 30 *Kinetics of Sorption (W62)*
 31 *Changes in Sorptive Surfaces (W63)*

32 SCR-6.5.4.1.1 Screening Decision: UP – (W61, W62) In the Culebra & Dewey Lake
 33 SO-C – Beneficial – (W61, W61) In the Disposal Room,
 34 Shaft Seals, Panel Closures, Other Geologic Units
 35 UP – (W63)

36 *Sorption within the disposal rooms, which would serve to reduce radionuclide concentrations,*
 37 *has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the*
 38 *performance of the disposal system. The effects of sorption processes in shaft seals and panel*
 39 *closures have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the*
 40 *performance of the disposal system. Sorption within the Culebra and the Dewey Lake is*
 41 *accounted for in PA calculations. Sorption processes within other geological units of the*

1 *disposal system have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial*
2 *consequence to the performance of the disposal system. Mobile adsorbents (for example,*
3 *microbes and humic acids), and the sorption of radionuclides at their surfaces, are accounted for*
4 *in PA calculations in the estimates of the concentrations of actinides that may be carried. The*
5 *potential effects of reaction kinetics in adsorption processes and of **Changes in Sorptive***
6 ***Surfaces** are accounted for in PA calculations.*

7 SCR-6.5.4.1.2 Summary of New Information

8 No new information has been identified for these FEPs. Since these FEPs are accounted for
9 (UP) in PA, the implementation may differ from that used in the CCA, however the screening
10 decision has not changed. Changes in implementation (if any) are described in Chapter 6.0.

11 SCR-6.5.4.1.3 Screening Argument

12 Sorption may be defined as the accumulation of matter at the interface between a solid and an
13 aqueous solution. Within PA calculations, including those made for the WIPP, the use of
14 isotherm representations of *Actinide Sorption* prevails because of their computational simplicity
15 in comparison with other models (Serne 1992, pp. 238 – 239).

16 The mechanisms that control the *Kinetics of Sorption* processes are, in general, poorly
17 understood. Often, sorption of inorganic ions on mineral surfaces is a two-step process
18 consisting of a short period (typically minutes) of diffusion-controlled, rapid uptake, followed by
19 slower processes (typically weeks to months) including surface rearrangement, aggregation and
20 precipitation, and solid solution formation (Davis and Kent 1990, 202). Available data
21 concerning rates of sorption reactions involving the important radionuclides indicate that, in
22 general, a range of kinetic behavior is to be expected.

23 The relevance to the WIPP of sorption reaction kinetics lies in their effects on chemical
24 transport. Sorption of waste contaminants to static surfaces of the disposal system such as seals
25 and host rocks acts to retard chemical transport. Sorption of waste contaminants to potentially
26 mobile surfaces, such as colloids, however, may act to enhance chemical transport, particularly if
27 the kinetics of contaminant desorption are slow or the process is irreversible (nonequilibrium).

28 The following subsections discuss sorption in the disposal rooms, shaft seals, panel closures, the
29 Culebra, and other geological units of the WIPP disposal system. Sorption on colloids,
30 *Microbes*, and particulate material is also discussed.

31 SCR-6.5.4.1.3.1 *Disposal Room*

32 The concentrations of radionuclides that dissolve in waters entering the disposal room will be
33 controlled by a combination of sorption and dissolution reactions. However, because sorption
34 processes are surface phenomena, the amount of material that is likely to be involved in sorption
35 mass transfer processes will be small relative to that involved in the bulk dissolution of waste.
36 WIPP PA calculations therefore assume that dissolution reactions control radionuclide
37 concentrations. Sorption on waste, containers, and backfill within the disposal rooms, which
38 would serve to reduce radionuclide concentrations, has been eliminated from PA calculations on
39 the basis of beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

1 SCR-6.5.4.1.4 Shaft Seals and Panel Closures

2 Chapter 3.0 and CCA Appendix SEAL describe the seals that are to be placed at various
3 locations in the access shafts and waste panel access tunnels. The materials to be used include
4 crushed salt, bentonite clay, and cementitious grouts. Of these, the latter two in particular
5 possess significant sorption capacities. No credit is given for the influence of sorption processes
6 that may occur in seal materials and their likely beneficial effects on radionuclide migration
7 rates. The effects of sorption processes in shaft seals and panel closures have been eliminated
8 from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal
9 system.

10 SCR-6.5.4.1.4.1 *Culebra*

11 Sorption within the Culebra is accounted for in PA calculations as discussed in Section 6.4.6.2.
12 The model used comprises an equilibrium, sorption isotherm approximation, employing
13 constructed cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of distribution coefficients (K_{ds}) applicable
14 to dolomite in the Culebra. The potential effects of reaction kinetics in adsorption processes are
15 encompassed in the ranges of K_{ds} used. The geochemical speciation of the Culebra
16 groundwaters and the effects of *Changes in Sorptive Surfaces* are implicitly accounted for in PA
17 calculations for the WIPP in the ranges of K_{ds} used.

18 SCR-6.5.4.1.4.2 *Other Geological Units*

19 During groundwater flow, any radionuclide sorption processes that occur between dissolved or
20 colloidal actinides and rock surfaces will lead to reduced rates of contaminant transport. The
21 sorptive capacity of the Dewey Lake is sufficiently large to prevent any radionuclides that enter
22 it from being released to the accessible environment over 10,000 years (Wallace et al. 1995).
23 Thus, sorption within the Dewey Lake is accounted for in PA calculations as discussed in
24 Section 6.4.6.6. No credit is given to the potentially beneficial occurrence of sorption in other
25 geological units outside the Culebra. Sorption processes within other geological units of the
26 disposal system have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial
27 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

28 SCR-6.5.4.1.4.3 *Sorption on Colloids, Microbes, and Particulate Material*

29 The interactions of sorption processes with colloidal, microbial, or particulate transport are
30 complex. Neglecting sorption of contaminants on immobile surfaces in the repository shafts and
31 Salado (for example, the clays of the Salado interbeds) is a conservative approach because it
32 leads to overestimated transport rates. However, neglecting sorption on potentially mobile
33 adsorbents (for example, microbes and humic acids) cannot be shown to be conservative with
34 respect to potential releases, because mobile adsorbents may act to transport radionuclides
35 sorbed to them. Consequently, the concentrations of actinides that may be carried by mobile
36 adsorbents are accounted for in PA calculations (see Section 6.4.3.6).

1 **SCR-6.5.5 Reduction-Oxidation Chemistry**

2 SCR-6.5.5.1 FEP Number: W64 and W66

3 FEP Title: **Effects of Metal Corrosion**
4 **Reduction-Oxidation Kinetics**

5 SCR-6.5.5.1.1 Screening Decision: UP

6 *The effects of reduction-oxidation reactions related to metal corrosion on reduction-oxidation*
7 *conditions are accounted for in PA calculations. Reduction-oxidation reaction kinetics are*
8 *accounted for in PA calculations.*

9 SCR-6.5.5.1.2 Summary of New Information

10 No new information has been identified for these FEPs. The screening arguments have not
11 changed. Editorial changes have been made to the discussion.

12 SCR-6.5.5.1.3 Screening Argument

13 SCR-6.5.5.1.3.1 *Reduction-Oxidation Kinetics*

14 In general, investigation of the reduction-oxidation couples present in aqueous geochemical
15 systems suggests that most reduction-oxidation reactions are not in thermodynamic equilibrium
16 (Wolery 1992, 27). The lack of data characterizing the rates of reactions among trace element
17 reduction-oxidation couples leads to uncertainty in elemental speciation. This uncertainty in
18 **Reduction-Oxidation Kinetics** is accounted for in PA calculations in the dissolved actinide
19 source term model (see Section 6.4.3.5), which estimates the probabilities that particular
20 actinides occur in certain oxidation states.

21 SCR-6.5.5.1.3.2 *Corrosion*

22 Other than gas generation, which is discussed in FEPs W44 through W55, the main **Effect of**
23 **Metal Corrosion** will be to influence the chemical conditions that prevail within the repository.
24 Ferrous metals will be the most abundant metals in the WIPP, and these will corrode on contact
25 with any brines entering the repository. Initially, corrosion will occur under oxic conditions
26 owing to the atmospheric oxygen present in the repository at the time of closure. However,
27 consumption of the available oxygen by corrosion reactions will rapidly lead to anoxic
28 (reducing) conditions. These changes and controls on conditions within the repository will affect
29 the chemical **Speciation** of the brines and may affect the oxidation states of the actinides present.
30 Changes to the oxidation states of the actinides will lead to changes in the concentrations that
31 may be mobilized during brine flow. The oxidation states of the actinides are accounted for in
32 PA calculations by the use of parameters that describe probabilities that the actinides exist in
33 particular oxidation states and, as a result, the likely actinide concentrations. Therefore, the
34 **Effect of Metal Corrosion** are accounted for in PA calculations.

1 SCR-6.5.5.2 FEP Number: W65
 2 FEP Title: **Reduction-Oxidation Fronts**

3 SCR-6.5.5.2.1 Screening Decision: *SO-P*

4 *The migration of **Reduction-Oxidation Fronts** through the repository has been eliminated from*
 5 *PA calculations on the basis of low probability of occurrence over 10,000 years.*

6 SCR-6.5.5.2.2 Summary of New Information

7 Large-scale reduction-oxidation fronts have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of
 8 low probability of occurrence over 10,000 years. There is no new information that would change
 9 the screening decision. Editorial changes have been made to the FEP text to remove reference to
 10 other FEP descriptions, screening arguments and screening decisions.

11 SCR-6.5.5.2.3 Screening Argument

12 The development of **Reduction-Oxidation Fronts** in the disposal system may affect the
 13 chemistry and migration of radionuclides. **Reduction-Oxidation Fronts** separate regions that
 14 may be characterized, in broad terms, as having different oxidation potentials. On either side of
 15 a **Reduction-Oxidation Fronts**, the behavior of reduction-oxidation-sensitive elements may be
 16 controlled by different geochemical reactions. Elements that exhibit the greatest range of
 17 oxidation states (for example, uranium, neptunium, and plutonium) will be the most affected by
 18 **Reduction-Oxidation Fronts** development and migration. The migration of **Reduction-**
 19 **Oxidation Fronts** may occur as a result of diffusion processes, or in response to groundwater
 20 flow, but will be restricted by the occurrence of heterogeneous buffering reactions (for example,
 21 mineral dissolution and precipitation reactions). Indeed, these buffering reactions cause the
 22 typically sharp, distinct nature of reduction-oxidation fronts.

23 Of greater significance is the possibility that the flow of fluids having different oxidation
 24 potentials from those established within the repository might lead to the development and
 25 migration of a large-scale **Reduction-Oxidation Fronts**. **Reduction-Oxidation Fronts** have been
 26 observed in natural systems to be the loci for both the mobilization and concentration of
 27 radionuclides, such as uranium. For example, during investigations at two uranium deposits at
 28 Poços de Caldas, Brazil, uranium was observed by Waber (1991) to be concentrated along
 29 **Reduction-Oxidation Fronts** at the onset of reducing conditions by its precipitation as uranium
 30 oxide. In contrast, studies of the Alligator Rivers uranium deposit in Australia by Snelling
 31 (1992) indicated that the movement of the relatively oxidized weathered zone downwards
 32 through the primary ore body as the deposit was eroded and gradually exhumed led to the
 33 formation of secondary uranyl-silicate minerals and the mobilization of uranium in its more
 34 soluble uranium (VI) form in near-surface waters. The geochemical evidence from these sites
 35 suggests that the **Reduction-Oxidation Fronts** had migrated only slowly, at most on the order of
 36 a few tens of meters per million years. These rates of migration were controlled by a range of
 37 factors, including the rates of erosion, infiltration of oxidizing waters, geochemical reactions, and
 38 diffusion processes.

39 The migration of large-scale **Reduction-Oxidation Fronts** through the repository as a result of
 40 regional fluid flow is considered unlikely over the regulatory period on the basis of comparison

1 with the slow rates of **Reduction-Oxidation Fronts** migration suggested by natural system
 2 studies. This comparison is considered conservative because the relatively impermeable nature
 3 of the Salado suggests that **Reduction-Oxidation Fronts** migration rates at the WIPP are likely to
 4 be slower than those observed in the more permeable lithologies of the natural systems studied.
 5 Large-scale **Reduction-Oxidation Fronts** have therefore been eliminated from PA calculations
 6 on the basis of low probability of occurrence over 10,000 years.

7 SCR-6.5.5.3 FEP Number: W67
 8 FEP Title: **Localized Reducing Zones**

9 SCR-6.5.5.3.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

10 *The formation of **Localized Reducing Zones** has been eliminated from PA calculations on the*
 11 *basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

12 SCR-6.5.5.3.2 Summary of New Information

13 The FEP screening argument has been modified from that presented the CCA to include a more
 14 complete description of the description has been updated.

15 SCR-6.5.5.3.3 Screening Argument

16 The dominant reduction reactions in the repository include steel corrosion and microbial
 17 degradation. The following bounding calculation shows that molecular diffusion alone will be
 18 sufficient to mix brine chemistry over a distance of meters and therefore the formation of
 19 **Localized Reducing Zones** in the repository is of low consequence.

20 The diffusion of a chemical species in a porous medium can be described by Fick's equation
 21 (e.g., Richardson and McSween 1989, p.132):

$$22 \quad \frac{\partial C}{\partial t} = \frac{\partial}{\partial X} \left(D_{\text{eff}} \frac{\partial C}{\partial X} \right) \quad (17)$$

23 where C is the concentration of the diffusing chemical species; t is the time; X is the distance;
 24 and D_{eff} is the effective diffusivity of the chemical species in a given porous medium. D_{eff} is
 25 related to the porosity (ϕ) of the medium by (e.g., Oelkers, 1996):


$$26 \quad D_{\text{eff}} = \phi^2 D \quad (18)$$

27 where D is the diffusivity of the species in pure solution. The D values for most aqueous species
 28 at room temperatures fall into a narrow range, and 10^{-5} cm^2 ($1.5 \times 10^{-6} \text{ in}^2$) per second is a good
 29 approximation (e.g., Richardson and McSween 1989, p.138). From the WIPP PA calculations
 30 (Bean et al. 1996, p.7-29; WIPP PA Department, 1993, Equation B-8), the porosity in the WIPP
 31 waste panels after room closure is calculated to be 0.4 to 0.7. From Equation (19), the effective
 32 diffusivity D_{eff} in the waste is estimated to be $2 \sim 5 \times 10^{-6} \text{ cm}^2$ ($7 \times 10^{-7} \text{ in}^2$) per second ($= 6 \sim 16$
 33 $\times 10^{-3} \text{ m}^2/\text{year}$).

1 Given a time scale of T , the typical diffusion penetration distance (L) can be determined by
 2 scaling:

3
$$L = \sqrt{D_{eff} T} . \tag{19}$$

4 Using Equation (20), the diffusion penetration distance in the WIPP can be calculated as a
 5 function of diffusion time, as shown in Figure SCR-1.



6
 7 **Figure SCR-1. Diffusion Penetration Distance in the WIPP as a Function of Diffusion**
 8 **Time**

9 Direct brine release requires the repository gas pressure to be at least 8 MPA (Stoelzel et al.
 10 1996). The CRA calculations show that it will take at least 100 years for the repository pressure
 11 to reach this critical value by gas generation processes. Over this time scale, according to
 12 Equation (20) and Figure SCR-1, molecular diffusion alone can mix brine composition
 13 effectively at least over a distance of ~ 1 m (3.3 ft).

14 The above calculation assumes diffusion only through liquid water. This assumption is
 15 applicable to steel corrosion, the humid rate of which is zero. Note that microbial reactions can
 16 also consume or release gaseous species. The diffusion of a gaseous species is much faster than
 17 an aqueous one. Thus, molecular diffusion can homogenize microbial reactions even at a much
 18 large scale.

19 The height of waste stacks in the repository after room closure (h) can be calculated by:

$$h = \frac{h_0(1 - \phi_0)}{1 - \phi} \quad (20)$$

where h_0 and ϕ_0 are the initial height of waste stacks and the initial porosity of wastes, which are assumed to be 4 m and 0.88, respectively, in the WIPP PA. For $\phi = 0.4 - 0.7$, h is estimated to be 0.8 to 1.4 m. This means that molecular diffusion alone can homogenize redox reaction in the vertical dimension of the repository. Therefore, the formation of localized reducing zone is unlikely. The general repository environment will become reducing shortly after room closure, due to metal corrosion and microbial reactions. Therefore, **Localized Reducing Zones** can be eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the disposal system.

9 **SCR-6.5.6 Organic Complexation**

10 SCR-6.5.6.1 FEP Number: W68, W69, and W71
 11 FEP Title: **Organic Complexation (W68)**
 12 **Organic Ligands (W69)**
 13 **Kinetics of Organic Complexation (W71)**

14 SCR-6.5.6.1.1 Screening Decision: UP W68 and W69
 15 SO-C W71

16 *The effects of anthropogenic **Organic Complexation** reactions, including the effects of **Organic***
 17 ***Ligands**, humic, and fulvic acids, have been incorporated in the PA calculations. The kinetics of*
 18 *organic ligand complexation is screened out because the rate at which **Organic Ligands** are*
 19 *complexed to actinide is so fast that it has no consequence to repository performance.*

20 SCR-6.5.6.1.2 Summary of New Information

21 The **Organic Complexation** was screened out for the CCA PA, on the basis that transition metals
 22 (in particular **iron, nickel, chromium, vanadium, and manganese**, present in waste drum steel)
 23 would compete effectively with the actinides for the binding sites on the organic ligands, thus
 24 preventing significant complexation of actinides organics. Although the CRA-2004 calculations
 25 include the effects of **Organic Ligands** (acetate, citrate, EDTA, and oxalate) on actinide
 26 solubility calculations, based on a revised thermodynamic database, the rate at which **Organic**
 27 **Ligands** are complexed to actinides is of no consequence to repository performance. Kinetics of
 28 **Organic Ligands** complexation may be eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of no
 29 consequence.

30 SCR-6.5.6.1.3 Screening Argument

31 From a PA standpoint, the most important actinides are Th, U, Np, Pu, and Am. Dissolved
 32 thorium, uranium, neptunium, plutonium, and americium will speciate essentially entirely as
 33 Th(IV), U(IV) or U(VI), Np(IV) or Np(V), Pu(III) or Pu(IV), and Am(III) under the strongly
 34 reducing conditions expected due to the presence of Fe(II) and microbes. (Section SOTERM-33
 35 – SOTERM-36).

1 Some **Organic Ligands** can increase the actinide solubilities. An estimate of the complexing
2 agents in the transuranic solidified waste forms scheduled for disposal in WIPP is presented in
3 Appendix DATA, Attachment F Table DATA-F-3.2-24. Acetate, citrate, oxalate, and EDTA
4 were determined to be the only water-soluble and actinide complexing organic ligands present in
5 significant quantities in the TWBIR. These ligands and their complexation with actinides
6 (Th(IV), U(VI), Np(V), and Am(III)) in a variety of ionic strength media were studied at Florida
7 State University (FSU) (Choppin et al. 2001). The FSU studies showed that acetate, citrate,
8 oxalate, and EDTA are capable of significantly enhancing dissolved actinide concentrations.
9 Lactate behavior was also studied at FSU because it appeared in the preliminary inventory of
10 nonradioactive constituents of the TRU waste to be emplaced in the WIPP (Brush 1990); lactate
11 did not appear in the TWBIR, nor does it appear in the 2003 update to the TWBIR (Appendix
12 DATA, Attachment F).

13 The solubility of the actinides is calculated using FMT, a computer code for calculating actinide
14 concentration limits based on thermodynamic parameters. The parameters for FMT are derived
15 both from experimental investigations specifically designed to provide parameter values for this
16 model and from the published literature.

17 • Although the FSU experimental work on **Organic Ligands** complexation showed that
18 acetate, citrate, oxalate, and EDTA are capable of significantly enhancing dissolved
19 actinide concentrations, SNL did not include the results in the FMT calculations for the
20 CCA PA because (1) the thermodynamic database for **Organic Complexation** of
21 actinides was not considered adequate at the time, and (2) side-calculations using
22 thermodynamic data for low-ionic-strength NaCl solutions showed that transition metals
23 (in particular iron, nickel, chromium, vanadium, and manganese present in waste drum
24 steel) would compete effectively with the actinides for the binding sites on the **Organic**
25 **Ligands**, thus preventing significant complexation of actinides organics (Appendix PA,
26 Attachment SOTERM , Sections SOTERM-36 - SOTERM-41).

27 The CRA-2004 calculations include the effects of organic ligands (acetate, citrate, EDTA, and
28 oxalate) on actinide solubilities in the FMT calculations (Brush and Xiong 2003). The FMT
29 database includes all of the results of experimental studies (Choppin et al. 2001) required to
30 predict the complexation of dissolved An(III), An(IV), and An(V) species by acetate, citrate,
31 EDTA, and oxalate (Giambalvo 2002a, 2002b).

32 Solution complexation reactions of most metal ions with common inorganic ligands, such as
33 carbonate and hydroxide, and with organic ligands, such as acetate, citrate, oxalate, and EDTA,
34 are kinetically very fast, reaching equilibrium in fractions of a second, an inconsequentially short
35 time increment on the scale of the 10,000-year regulatory period. Reactions of these types are
36 generally so fast that special techniques must be adopted to measure the reaction rates; as a
37 practical matter, the reaction rate is limited by the mixing rate when metal solutions are
38 combined with ligand solutions.

39 For that reason, the rate at which **Organic Ligands** are complexed to actinide is of no
40 consequence to repository performance. **Kinetics of Organic Complexation** may be eliminated
41 from PA calculations on the basis of no consequence.

1 SCR-6.5.6.2 FEP Number: W70
2 FEP Title: ***Humic and Fulvic Acids***

3 SCR-6.5.6.2.1 Screening Decision: UP

4 *The presence of **Humic and Fulvic Acids** is incorporated in PA calculations.*

5 SCR-6.5.6.2.2 Summary of New Information

6 No new information has been identified for this FEP. Editorial changes have been made to the
7 discussion.

8 SCR-6.5.6.2.3 Screening Argument

9 The occurrence of **Humic and Fulvic Acids** is incorporated in PA calculations in the models for
10 radionuclide transport by humic colloids (see Section 6.4.6.2.2).

11 **SCR-6.5.7 Chemical Effects on Material Properties**

12 SCR-6.5.7.1 FEP Number: W74 and W76
13 FEP Title: ***Chemical Degradation of Seals (W74)***
14 ***Microbial Growth on Concrete (W76)***

15 SCR-6.5.7.1.1 Screening Decision: UP

16 *The effects of **Chemical Degradation of Seals** and of **Microbial Growth on Concrete** are*
17 *accounted for in PA calculations.*

18 SCR-6.5.7.1.2 Summary of New Information

19 No new information has been identified for these FEPs. Since these FEPs are accounted for
20 (UP) in PA, the implementation may differ from that used in DOE (1996a); however the
21 screening decision has not changed. Changes in implementation (if any) are described in
22 Chapter 6.0.

23 SCR-6.5.7.1.3 Screening Argument

24 The concrete used in the seal systems will degrade due to chemical reaction with the infiltrating
25 groundwater. Degradation could lead to an increase in permeability of the seal system. The
26 main uncertainties with regard to cement degradation rates at the WIPP are the effects of
27 groundwater chemistry, the exact nature of the cementitious phases present, and the rates of brine
28 infiltration. The PA calculations take a conservative approach to these uncertainties by assuming
29 a large increase in permeability of the concrete seals only a few hundred years after closure.
30 These permeability values are based on seal design considerations and consider the potential
31 effects of degradation processes. Therefore, the effects of **Chemical Degradation of Seals** are
32 accounted for in PA calculations through the CDFs used for seal material permeabilities.

1 Concrete can be inhabited by alkalophilic bacteria, which could produce acids, thereby
2 accelerating the seal degradation process. Nitrification processes, which will produce nitric acid,
3 tend to be aerobic, and will be further limited at the WIPP by the low availability of ammonium
4 in the brines (Pedersen and Karlsson 1995, 75). Because of the limitations on growth because of
5 the chemical conditions, it is likely that the effects of *Microbial Growth on Concrete* will be
6 small. The effects of such microbial activity on seal properties are, therefore, implicitly
7 accounted for in PA calculations through the CDFs used for seal material permeabilities.

8 SCR-6.5.7.2 FEP Number: W75
9 FEP Title: *Chemical Degradation of Backfill*

10 SCR-6.5.7.2.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

11 *The effects on material properties of the **Chemical Degradation of Backfill** have been*
12 *eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence.*

13 SCR-6.5.7.2.2 Summary of New Information

14 As MgO degrades chemically, its physical properties change. Previously, DOE provided a paper
15 by Bynum et al. (1997), which summarizes the experimental results pertaining to chemical
16 degradation of backfill acquired by 1997. The most current MgO data, obtained after the CCA,
17 are summarized in the 2001 MRS Proceedings paper by Snider (2001). The current data show
18 that new MgO will essentially behave as it was designed. Changes have been made to the FEP
19 discussion to reference new experimental results and for editorial purposes.

20 SCR-6.5.7.2.3 Screening Argument

21 Degradation of the chemical conditioners or backfill added to the disposal room is a prerequisite
22 of their function in buffering the chemical environment of the disposal room. However, the
23 chemical reactions (Snider 2001) and dissolution involved will change the physical properties of
24 the material. Because the mechanical and hydraulic characteristics of the backfill have been
25 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
26 disposal system, the effects of the *Chemical Degradation of Backfill* on material properties have
27 been eliminated from PA calculations on the same basis.

28 **SCR-6.6 Contaminant Transport Mode Features, Events, and Processes**

29 *SCR-6.6.1 Solute and Colloid Transport*

30 SCR-6.6.1.1 FEP Number: W77
31 FEP Title: *Solute Transport*

32 SCR-6.6.1.1.1 Screening Decision: UP

33 *Transport of dissolved radionuclides is accounted for in PA calculations.*

1 SCR-6.6.1.1.2 Summary of New Information

2 No new information has been identified for this FEP. Since this FEP is accounted for (UP) in
 3 PA, the implementation may differ from that used in the CCA, although the screening decision
 4 has not changed. Changes in implementation (if any) are described in Sections 6.4.5.4 and
 5 6.4.6.2.1.

6 SCR-6.6.1.1.3 Screening Argument

7 **Solute Transport** may occur by advection, dispersion, and diffusion down chemical potential
 8 gradients, and is accounted for in PA calculations (Sections 6.4.5.4 and 6.4.6.2.1).

9 SCR-6.6.1.2 FEP Number: W78, W79, W80, and W81
 10 FEP Title: Colloidal Transport (W78)
 11 Colloidal Formation and Stability (W79)
 12 Colloidal Filtration (W80)
 13 Colloidal Sorption (W81)

14 SCR-6.6.1.2.1 Screening Decision: UP

15 *Formation of colloids, transport of colloidal radionuclides, and colloid retardation through*
 16 *filtration and sorption are accounted for in PA calculations.*

17 SCR-6.6.1.2.2 Summary of New Information

18 No new information has been identified for these FEPs. Since these FEPs are accounted for
 19 (UP) in PA, the implementation may differ from that used in the CCA, however the screening
 20 decision has not changed. Changes in implementation (if any) are described in Sections 6.4.3.6
 21 and 6.4.6.2.2.

22 SCR-6.6.1.2.3 Screening Argument

23 Colloids typically have sizes of between 1 nm and 1 μm and may form stable dispersions in
 24 groundwaters. **Colloid Formation and Stability** depends on their composition and the prevailing
 25 chemical conditions (for example, salinity). Depending on their size, **Colloid Transport** may
 26 occur at different rates than those of fully dissolved species. They may be physically excluded
 27 from fine porous media, and their migration may be accelerated through fractured media in
 28 channels where velocities are greatest. However, they can also interact with the host rocks
 29 during transport and become retarded. These interactions may be of a chemical or physical
 30 nature and include electrostatic effects, leading to **Colloid Sorption**, and sieving leading to
 31 **Colloid Filtration** and pore blocking. **Colloid Formation and Stability** is accounted for in PA
 32 calculations through estimates of colloid numbers in the disposal room based on the prevailing
 33 chemical conditions (Section 6.4.3.6). Colloid sorption, filtration, and transport in the Culebra
 34 are accounted for in PA calculations (Section 6.4.6.2.2).

1 **SCR-6.6.2 Particle Transport**

2 SCR-6.6.2.1 FEP Number: W82, W83, W84, W85, and W86
 3 FEP Title: Suspension of Particles (W82)
 4 Rinse (W83)
 5 Cuttings (W84)
 6 Cavings (W85)
 7 Spallings (W86)

8 SCR-6.6.2.1.1 Screening Decision: DP W82, W84, W85, W86
 9 SO-C W83

10 *The formation of particulates through **Rinse** and subsequent transport of radionuclides in*
 11 *groundwater and brine has been eliminated from PA calculations for undisturbed conditions on*
 12 *the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system. The transport of*
 13 *radionuclides as particulates (**Cuttings**, **Cavings**, and **Spallings**) during penetration of the*
 14 *repository by a borehole, is accounted for in PA calculations.*

15 SCR-6.6.2.1.2 Summary of New Information

16 ***Suspensions of Particles** larger than colloids are generally unstable and do not persist for very*
 17 *long. The **Rinse** process likely cannot occur under undisturbed conditions because brine flow*
 18 *would not be rapid enough to create a suspension of particles and transport them to the accessible*
 19 *environment. The only reasonable conditions under which suspensions could be formed would*
 20 *be during a drilling event with particles of waste suspended in the drilling fluid are carried to the*
 21 *surface. This effect is covered in PA. Editorial changes have been made to the discussion.*

22 SCR-6.6.2.1.3 Screening Argument

23 ***Suspensions of Particles** that have sizes larger than colloids are unstable because the particles*
 24 *undergo gravitational settling. It is unlikely that brine flow will be rapid enough within the*
 25 *WIPP disposal rooms to generate particulate suspensions through **Rinse** and transport under*
 26 *undisturbed conditions. Mobilization of suspensions would effect a local and minor*
 27 *redistribution of radionuclides within the room and would not result in increased radionuclide*
 28 *transport from the repository. The formation of particulates through **Rinse** and transport of*
 29 *radionuclides in groundwater and brine has been eliminated from PA calculations for*
 30 *undisturbed conditions on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal*
 31 *system.*

32 *Inadvertent human intrusion into the repository by a borehole could result in transport of waste*
 33 *material to the ground surface through drilling-induced flow and blowouts (FEPs H21 and H23).*
 34 *This waste could include material intersected by the drill bit (**Cuttings**), material eroded from the*
 35 *borehole wall by circulating drilling fluid (**Cavings**), and material that enters the borehole as the*
 36 *repository depressurizes (**Spallings**). Transport of radionuclides by these materials and in brine*
 37 *is accounted for in PA calculations and is discussed in Section 6.4.7.1.*

1 **SCR-6.6.3 Microbial Transport**

2 SCR-6.6.3.1 FEP Number: W87
3 FEP Title: **Microbial Transport**

4 SCR-6.6.3.1.1 Screening Decision: UP

5 *Transport of radionuclides bound to microbes is accounted for in PA calculations.*

6 SCR-6.6.3.1.2 Summary of New Information

7 No new information has been identified for this FEP. Since this FEP is accounted for (UP) in
8 PA, the implementation may differ from that used in the CCA, although the screening decision
9 has not changed. Changes in implementation (if any) are described in Chapter 6.0.

10 SCR-6.6.3.1.3 Screening Argument

11 Microbes will be introduced into the disposal rooms during the operational phase of the
12 repository and will also occur naturally in geological units throughout the disposal system.
13 Because of their colloidal size, microbes, and any radionuclides bound to them, may be
14 transported at different rates than radionuclides in solution. **Microbial Transport** of
15 radionuclides is accounted for in PA calculations (Section 6.4.6.2.2).

16 SCR-6.6.3.2 FEP Number: W88
17 FEP Title: **Biofilms**

18 SCR-6.6.3.2.1 Screening Decision: SO-C Beneficial

19 *The effects of **Biofilms** on microbial transport have been eliminated from PA calculations on the*
20 *basis of beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

21 SCR-6.6.3.2.2 Summary of New Information

22 The effects of **Biofilms** on **Microbial Transport** have been eliminated from PA calculations on
23 the basis of beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal system. The discussion of
24 this FEP has been updated with recent experimental work.

25 SCR-6.6.3.2.3 Screening Argument

26 Microbes will be introduced into the disposal rooms during the operational phase of the
27 repository and will also occur naturally in geological units throughout the disposal system.

28 **Biofilms** may influence microbial and radionuclide transport rates through their capacity to
29 retain, and therefore retard, both the microbes themselves and radionuclides. The formation of
30 **Biofilms** in deep subsurface environments such as in the WIPP is controversial. Since the
31 microbial degradation experiments at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) bracket expected
32 repository conditions, the potential effect of **Biofilms** formation on microbial degradation and
33 transport, if any, has been captured in the PA parameters derived from those experiments

1 (Francis and Gillow 1994; Francis et. al 1997; Francis and Gillow 2000; Gillow and Francis
2 2001a; Gillow and Francis 2001b; Gillow and Francis 2002a; Gillow and Francis 2002b). As a
3 matter of fact, no apparent formation of stable biofilms was observed in the BNL experiments.
4 The formation of *Biofilms* tends to reduce cell suspension and mobility. This effect has been
5 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the performance of the
6 disposal system.

7 **SCR-6.6.4 Gas Transport**

8 SCR-6.6.4.1 FEP Number: W89
9 FEP Title: *Transport of Radioactive Gases*

10 SCR-6.6.4.1.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

11 *The Transport of Radioactive Gases has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of*
12 *low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

13 SCR-6.6.4.1.2 Summary of New Information

14 This FEP discussion has been updated to include recent inventory information. The screening
15 decision has not changed.

16 SCR-6.6.4.1.3 Screening Argument

17 The production and potential *Transport of Radioactive Gases* are eliminated from PA
18 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.
19 Transportable radioactive gases are comprised mainly of isotopes of radon and carbon-14.
20 Radon gases are eliminated from PA because their inventory is small (<20 Ci; Appendix DATA,
21 Attachment F) and their half-lives are short (<4 days), resulting in insignificant potential for
22 release from the repository. The updated information for the WIPP disposal inventory of carbon-
23 14 (Appendix DATA, Attachment F) indicates that the expected WIPP-scale quantity (3.3 Ci) is
24 70 percent lower than previously estimated (~13 Ci) in the TWBIR Rev 3 (DOE 1996b). Thus,
25 all CRA-2004 screening arguments for carbon-14 are conservatively bounded by the previous
26 CCA screening arguments.

27 **SCR-6.7 Contaminant Transport Processes**

28 **SCR-6.7.1 Advection**

29 SCR-6.7.1.1 FEP Number: W90
30 FEP Title: *Advection*

31 SCR-6.7.1.1.1 Screening Decision: UP

32 *Advection of contaminants is accounted for in PA calculations.*

1 SCR-6.7.1.1.2 Summary of New Information

2 No new information has been identified for this FEP. Since this FEP is accounted for (UP) in
 3 PA, the implementation may differ from that used in the CCA, although the screening decision
 4 has not changed. Changes in implementation (if any) are described in Chapter 6.0.

5 SCR-6.7.1.1.3 Screening Argument

6 **Advection** (that is, the transport of dissolved and solid material by flowing fluid) is accounted for
 7 in PA calculations (Sections 6.4.5.4 and 6.4.6.2).

8 **SCR-6.7.2 Diffusion**

9 SCR-6.7.2.1 FEP Number: W91 and W92
 10 FEP Title: **Diffusion** (W91)
 11 **Matrix Diffusion** (W92)

12 SCR-6.7.2.1.1 Screening Decision: UP

13 *Diffusion of contaminants and retardation by **Matrix Diffusion** are accounted for in PA*
 14 *calculations.*

15 SCR-6.7.2.1.2 Summary of New Information

16 No new information has been identified for this FEP. Since this FEP is accounted for (UP) in
 17 PA, the implementation may differ from that used the CCA, although the screening decision has
 18 not changed. Changes in implementation (if any) are described in Chapter 6.0.

19 SCR-6.7.2.1.3 Screening Argument

20 **Diffusion** (that is, the movement of molecules or particles both parallel to and transverse to the
 21 direction of advection in response to Brownian forces) and, more specifically *matrix diffusion*,
 22 whereby movement is transverse to the direction of advection within a fracture and into the
 23 surrounding rock matrix, are accounted for in PA calculations (Section 6.4.6.2).

24 **SCR-6.7.3 Thermochemical Transport Phenomena**

25 SCR-6.7.3.1 FEP Number: W93
 26 FEP Title: **Soret Effect**

27 SCR-6.7.3.1.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

28 *The effects of thermochemical transport phenomena (the **Soret Effect**) have been eliminated*
 29 *from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

30 SCR-6.7.3.1.2 Summary of New Information

31 There is no new information available that affects the screening decision; only minor editorial
 32 changes have been made to the FEP discussion.

1 SCR-6.7.3.1.3 Screening Argument

2 According to Fick's law, the diffusion flux of a solute is proportional to the solute concentration
3 gradient. In the presence of a temperature gradient there will also be a solute flux proportional to
4 the temperature gradient (the *Soret Effect*). Thus, the total solute flux, J , in a liquid phase may
5 be expressed as

$$6 \quad J = -D\nabla C - ND\nabla T, \quad (21)$$

7 where C is the solute concentration, T is the temperature of the liquid, D is the solute diffusion
8 coefficient, and

$$9 \quad N = S_T C(1-C), \quad (22)$$

10 in which S_T is the Soret coefficient. The mass conservation equation for solute diffusion in a
11 liquid is then

$$12 \quad \frac{\partial C}{\partial t} = \nabla \cdot (D\nabla C + ND\nabla T). \quad (23)$$

13 When temperature gradients exist in solutions with both light and heavy solute molecules, the
14 heavier molecules tend to concentrate in the colder regions of the solution. Typically, large
15 temperature gradients are required for Soret diffusion to be significant compared to Fickian
16 diffusion.

17 **Radioactive Decay, Nuclear Criticality, and Exothermic Reactions** are three possible sources of
18 heat in the WIPP repository. The DOE (1980) estimated that radioactive decay of CH-TRU
19 waste will result in a maximum temperature rise at the center of the repository of 1.6°C (2.9°F)
20 at 80 years after waste emplacement. Sanchez and Trelue (1996) have shown that the total
21 thermal load of RH-TRU waste will not significantly affect the average temperature increase in
22 the repository. Temperature increases of about 3°C (5.4°F) may occur at the locations of RH-
23 TRU containers with maximum thermal power (60 W). Such temperature increases are likely to
24 be short-lived on the time scale of the 10,000 year regulatory period because of the rapid decay
25 of heat-producing nuclides in RH-TRU waste, such as ¹³⁷Cs, ⁹⁰Sr, ²⁴¹Pu, and ¹⁴⁷Pm, whose half-
26 lives are approximately 30, 29, 14, and 3 years, respectively. Soret diffusion generated by such
27 temperature gradients will be negligible compared to other radionuclide transport mechanisms.

28 Temperature increases resulting from exothermic reactions are discussed in W72. Potentially the
29 most significant exothermic reactions are **Concrete Hydration**, backfill hydration, and
30 **Aluminum Corrosion**. Hydration of the seal concrete could raise the temperature of the
31 concrete to approximately 50°C (122°F) and that of the surrounding salt to approximately 38°C
32 (100°F) one week after seal emplacement.

33 However, the concrete seals will act as barriers to fluid flow for at least 100 years after
34 emplacement, and seal permeability will be minimized (Wakeley et al. 1995). As a result, short-
35 term temperature increases associated with concrete hydration will not result in significant Soret
36 diffusion through the seal system.

1 The maximum temperature rise in the disposal panels will be less than 5°C (9°F) as a
2 consequence of backfill hydration. Note that active institutional controls will prevent drilling
3 within the controlled area for 100 years after disposal. Heat generation by radioactive decay and
4 concrete seal hydration will have decreased substantially after 100 years, and the temperatures in
5 the disposal panels will have decreased nearly to the temperature of the undisturbed host rock.

6 If the repository were to be inundated following a drilling intrusion, aluminum corrosion could,
7 at most, result in a short-lived (two years) temperature increase of about 6°C (10.8°F). These
8 calculated maximum heat generation rates resulting from aluminum corrosion and backfill
9 hydration could not occur simultaneously because they are limited by brine availability; each
10 calculation assumes that all available brine is consumed by the reaction of concern. Thus, the
11 temperature rise of 6°C (10.8°F) represents the maximum that could occur as a result of a
12 combination of exothermic reactions occurring simultaneously. Temperature increases of this
13 magnitude will not result in significant Soret diffusion within the disposal system.

14 The limited magnitude and spatial scale of temperature gradients in the disposal system indicate
15 that Soret diffusion will be insignificant, allowing the effects of thermochemical transport (*Soret*
16 *Effect*) to be eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the
17 performance of the disposal system.

18 ***SCR-6.7.4 Electrochemical Transport Phenomena***

19 SCR-6.7.4.1 FEP Number: W94

20 FEP Title: ***Electrochemical Effects***

21 SCR-6.7.4.1.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

22 *The effects of electrochemical transport phenomena caused by electrochemical reactions have*
23 *been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the*
24 *disposal system.*

25 SCR-6.7.4.1.2 Summary of New Information

26 No new information relating to this FEP has been identified. The FEPs discussion has been
27 modified for editorial purposes.

28 SCR-6.7.4.1.3 Screening Argument

29 The variety of waste metals and metal packaging in the repository may allow galvanic cells
30 spanning short distances to be established. The interactions among the metals depend upon their
31 physical characteristics and the chemical conditions in the repository. For example, good
32 physical and electrical contact, which is critical to the establishment of galvanic cells, may be
33 impeded by electrically nonconductive waste materials. Additionally, in order to establish a
34 galvanic cell, it is necessary that the metals have different values for standard reduction
35 potentials. For example, a galvanic cell is not expected to be formed by contact of two segments
36 of metals with identical compositions. As a result, galvanic cells can only be established by
37 contact of dissimilar metals, as might happen due to contact between a waste drum and the
38 contents, or between contents within a waste package. The localized nature of electrochemical

1 transport is restricted to the size scale over which galvanic cells can develop, i.e., on the order of
2 size of waste packages. Since the possible range of transport is restricted by the physical extent
3 of galvanic activity, ***Electrochemical Effects*** cannot act as long-range transport mechanisms for
4 radionuclides and therefore are of no consequence to the performance of the repository.

5 SCR-6.7.4.2 FEP Number: W95
6 FEP Title: ***Galvanic Coupling***

7 SCR-6.7.4.2.1 Screening Decision: SO-P

8 *The effects of ***Galvanic Coupling*** between the waste and metals external to the repository on*
9 *transport have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability of*
10 *occurrence over 10,000 years.*

11 SCR-6.7.4.2.2 Summary of New Information

12 No new information relating to this FEP has been identified. The FEPs discussion has been
13 modified for editorial purposes.

14 SCR-6.7.4.2.3 Screening Argument

15 With regard to the WIPP, ***Galvanic Coupling*** refers to the establishment of galvanic cells
16 between metals in the waste form, canisters, and other metals external to the waste form.

17 Long range electric potential gradients may exist in the subsurface as a result of groundwater
18 flow and electrochemical reactions. The development of electric potential gradients may be
19 associated with the weathering of sulfide ore bodies, variations in rock properties at geological
20 contacts, bioelectric activity associated with organic matter, natural corrosion reactions, and
21 temperature gradients in groundwater. With the exception of mineralization potentials associated
22 with metal sulfide ores, the magnitude of electric potentials is usually less than about 100
23 millivolts and the potentials tend to average to zero over distances of several thousand feet
24 (Telford et al. 1976). Metals external to the waste form can include natural metallic ore bodies
25 in the host rock. However, metallic ore bodies and metallic sulfide ores do not exist in the region
26 of the repository (CCA Appendix GCR). As a result, galvanic coupling between the waste and
27 metallic materials outside the repository cannot occur. Therefore, ***Galvanic Coupling*** is
28 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability of occurrence over 10,000 years.

29 SCR-6.7.4.3 FEP Number: W96
30 FEP Title: ***Electrophoresis***

31 SCR-6.7.4.3.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

32 *The effects of electrochemical transport phenomena caused by ***Electrophoresis*** have been*
33 *eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the*
34 *disposal system.*

1 SCR-6.7.4.3.2 Summary of New Information

2 No new information relating to this FEP has been identified. The FEPs discussion has been
3 modified for editorial purposes.

4 SCR-6.7.4.3.3 Screening Argument

5 Long range (in terms of distance) electric potential gradients may exist in the subsurface as a
6 result of groundwater flow and electrochemical reactions. The development of potentials may be
7 associated with the weathering of sulfide ore bodies, variations in rock properties at geological
8 contacts, bioelectric activity associated with organic matter, natural corrosion reactions, and
9 temperature gradients in groundwater. With the exception of mineralization potentials associated
10 with metal sulfide ores, the magnitude of such potentials is usually less than about 100 millivolts
11 and the potentials tend to average to zero over distances of several thousand feet (Telford et al.
12 1976, p. 458). Short range potential gradients due to corrosion of metals within the waste may
13 be set up over distances that are restricted to the size scale of the waste packages.

14 A variety of metals will be present within the repository as waste metals and metal packaging,
15 which may allow electrochemical cells to be established over short distances. The types of
16 interactions that will occur depend on the metals involved, their physical characteristics, and the
17 prevailing solution conditions. Electrochemical cells that may be established will be small
18 relative to the size of the repository, limiting the extent to which migration of contaminants by
19 **Electrophoresis** can occur. The electric field gradients will be of small magnitude and confined
20 to regions of electrochemical activity in the area immediately surrounding the waste material.
21 As a result, **Electrophoretic Effects** on migration behavior due to both long and short range
22 potential gradients have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence
23 to the performance of the disposal system.

24 **SCR-6.7.5 Physiochemical Transport Phenomena**

25 SCR-6.7.5.1 FEP Number: W97
26 FEP Title: Chemical Gradients

27 SCR-6.7.5.1.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

28 *The effects of enhanced diffusion across **Chemical Gradients** have been eliminated from PAs on*
29 *the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

30 SCR-6.7.5.1.2 Summary of New Information

31 No new information relating to this FEP has been identified. The FEPs discussion has been
32 modified for editorial purposes.

33 SCR-6.7.5.1.3 Screening Argument

34 **Chemical Gradients** within the disposal system, whether induced naturally or resulting from
35 repository material and waste emplacement, may influence the transport of contaminants.
36 Gradients will exist at interfaces between different repository materials and between repository

1 and geological materials. Distinct chemical regimes will be established within concrete seals and
2 adjoining host rocks. Similarly, **Chemical Gradients** will exist between the waste and the
3 surrounding rocks of the Salado. Other **Chemical Gradients** may exist due to the juxtaposition
4 of relatively dilute groundwaters and brines or between groundwaters with different
5 compositions. Natural gradients currently exist between different groundwaters in the Culebra.

6 Enhanced diffusion is a possible consequence of **Chemical Gradients** that occur at material
7 boundaries. However, the distances over which enhanced diffusion could occur will be small in
8 comparison to the size of the disposal system. Processes that may be induced by **Chemical**
9 **Gradients** at material boundaries include the formation or destabilization of colloids. For
10 example, cementitious materials that will be emplaced in the WIPP as part of the waste and the
11 seals contain colloidal-sized materials, such as calcium-silicate-hydrate gels, and alkaline pore
12 fluids. **Chemical Gradients** will exist between the pore fluids in the cementitious materials and
13 the less alkaline surroundings. Chemical interactions at these interfaces may lead to the
14 generation of colloids of the inorganic, mineral fragment type. Colloidal compositions may
15 include calcium and magnesium oxides, calcium hydroxide, calcium-aluminum silicates,
16 calcium-silicate-hydrate gels, and silica. Experimental investigations of the stability of
17 inorganic, mineral fragment colloidal dispersions have been carried out as part of the WIPP
18 colloid-facilitated actinide transport program (Papenguth and Behl 1996). Results of the
19 investigations indicate that the salinities of the WIPP brines are sufficient to cause destabilization
20 of mineral fragment colloidal dispersions. Therefore, concentrations of colloidal suspensions
21 originating from concrete within the repository are expected to be extremely low, and are
22 considered in PA calculations.

23 SCR-6.7.5.2 FEP Number: W98
24 FEP Title: ***Osmotic Processes***

25 SCR-6.7.5.2.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

26 *The effects of **Osmotic Processes** have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of*
27 *beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

28 SCR-6.7.5.2.2 Summary of New Information

29 No new information relating to this FEP has been identified. The FEPs discussion has been
30 modified for editorial purposes.

31 SCR-6.7.5.2.3 Screening Argument

32 **Osmotic Processes**, i.e., diffusion of water through a semi permeable or differentially permeable
33 membrane in response to a concentration gradient, may occur at interfaces between waters of
34 different salinities. **Osmotic Processes** can occur if waters of different salinities and/or
35 compositions exist on either side of a particular lithology such as clay, or a lithological boundary
36 that behaves as a semipermeable membrane. At the WIPP, clay layers within the Salado may act
37 as semi permeable membranes across which **Osmotic Processes** may occur.

38 In the absence of a semipermeable membrane, water will move from the more dilute water into
39 the more saline water. However, the migration of dissolved contaminants across an interface

1 may be restricted depending upon the nature of the membrane. A hydrological gradient across a
2 semi permeable membrane may either enhance or oppose water movement by osmosis
3 depending on the direction and magnitude of the gradient. Dissolved contaminants that cannot
4 pass through a semi-permeable membrane may be moved towards the membrane and
5 concentrated along the interface when advection dominates over osmosis and reverse osmosis
6 occurs. Thus, both osmosis and reverse osmosis can restrict the migration of dissolved
7 contaminants and possibly lead to concentration along interfaces between different water bodies.
8 The effects of *Osmotic Processes* have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of
9 beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

10 SCR-6.7.5.3 FEP Number: W99
11 FEP Title: *Alpha Recoil*

12 SCR-6.7.5.3.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

13 *The effects of Alpha-Recoil Processes on radionuclide transport have been eliminated from PA*
14 *calculations on the basis of low consequence to performance of the disposal system.*

15 SCR-6.7.5.3.2 Summary of New Information

16 No new information relating to this FEP has been identified. The FEPs discussion has been
17 modified for editorial purposes.

18 SCR-6.7.5.3.3 Screening Argument

19 Alpha particles are emitted with sufficiently high energies that daughter nuclides recoil
20 appreciably to conserve system momentum. For example, ^{238}U decays to ^{234}Th with emission of
21 a 4.1 MeV alpha particle. The law of conservation of momentum requires that the daughter
22 nuclide, ^{234}Th , recoils in the opposite direction with an energy of approximately 0.07 MeV. The
23 energy is great enough to break chemical bonds or cause ^{234}Th to move a short distance through
24 a crystal lattice. If the ^{234}Th is close enough to the surface of the crystal, it will be ejected into
25 the surroundings. ^{234}Th decays to ^{234}Pa which decays to ^{234}U with respective half-lives of 24.1
26 days and 1.17 minutes. The recoil and decay processes can lead to the apparent preferential
27 dissolution or leaching of ^{234}U relative to ^{238}U from crystal structures and amorphous or adsorbed
28 phases. Preferential leaching may be enhanced due to radiation damage to the host phase
29 resulting from earlier radioactive decay events. Consequently, ^{234}U sometimes exhibits
30 enhanced transport behavior relative to ^{238}U .

31 The influence of *Alpha-Recoil* processes on radionuclide transport through natural geologic
32 media is dependent on many site-specific factors, such as mineralogy, geometry, and
33 microstructure of the rocks, as well as geometrical constraints on the type of groundwater flow,
34 e.g., porous or fracture flow. Studies of natural radionuclide-bearing groundwater systems often
35 fail to discern a measurable effect of alpha-recoil processes on radionuclide transport above the
36 background uncertainty introduced by the spatial heterogeneity of the geological system.
37 Consequently, the effects of the *Alpha-Recoil* processes that occur on radionuclide transport are
38 thought to be minor. These effects have therefore been eliminated from PA calculations on the
39 basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

1 SCR-6.7.5.4 FEP Number: W100
2 FEP Title: *Enhanced Diffusion*

3 SCR-6.7.5.4.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

4 *Enhanced Diffusion is a possible consequence of **Chemical Gradients** that occur at material*
5 *boundaries. However, the distances over which **Enhanced Diffusion** could occur will be small*
6 *in comparison to the size of the disposal system. Therefore, the effects of **Enhanced Diffusion***
7 *across **Chemical Gradients** at material boundaries have been eliminated from PAs on the basis*
8 *of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.*

9 SCR-6.7.5.4.2 Summary of New Information

10 **Enhanced Diffusion** only occurs where there are higher than average chemical gradients. The
11 spatial extent of chemical gradients should be quite limited and as enhanced diffusion occurs, it
12 will tend to reduce the chemical gradient. Thus, the driving force for the enhanced diffusion will
13 be reduced and eventually eliminated as the system approaches steady state or equilibrium
14 conditions. Due to the limited spatial extent of enhanced diffusion, its effect on radionuclide
15 transport should be small.

16 The effects of *Enhanced Diffusion* across *Chemical Gradients* at material boundaries have been
17 eliminated from PAs on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.
18 Changes have been made to the FEP discussion for clarity and editorial purposes.

19 SCR-6.7.5.4.3 Screening Argument

20 Processes that may be induced by *Chemical Gradients* at material boundaries include the
21 formation or destabilization of colloids. For example, cementitious materials, emplaced in the
22 WIPP as part of the waste and the seals, contain colloidal-sized phases such as calcium-silicate-
23 hydrate gels, and alkaline pore fluids. *Chemical Gradients* will exist between the pore fluids in
24 the cementitious materials and the less alkaline surroundings. Chemical interactions at these
25 interfaces may lead to the generation of colloids of the inorganic, mineral fragment type.
26 Colloidal compositions may include calcium and MgOr, calcium hydroxide, calcium-aluminum
27 silicates, calcium-silicate-hydrate gels, and silica. Concentrations of colloidal suspensions
28 originating from concrete within the repository are considered in PA calculations even though
29 expected to be extremely low.

30 Distinct interfaces between waters of different salinities and different densities may limit mixing
31 of the water bodies and affect flow and contaminant transport. Such effects have been
32 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
33 disposal system.

34 **SCR-6.8 Ecological Features, Events, and Processes**

35 **SCR-6.8.1 *Plant, Animal, and Soil Uptake***

36 SCR-6.8.1.1 FEP Number: W101, W102, and W103
37 FEP Title: *Plant Uptake (W101)*

1 *Animal Uptake (W102)*
2 *Accumulation in Soils (W103)*

3 SCR-6.8.1.1.1 Screening Decision: SO-R
4 SO-C for 40 CFR 191.15

5 *Plant Uptake, Animal Uptake, and Accumulation in Soils have been eliminated from*
6 *compliance assessment calculations for 40 CFR § 191.15 on the basis of low consequence.*
7 *Plant Uptake and Animal Uptake in the accessible environment have been eliminated from PA*
8 *calculations for 40 CFR § 191.13 on regulatory grounds. Accumulation in Soils within the*
9 *controlled area has been eliminated from PA calculations for 40 CFR § 191.13 on the basis of*
10 *beneficial consequences.*

11 SCR-6.8.1.1.2 Summary of New Information

12 DOE has stated that FEPs related to *Plant Uptake, Animal Uptake, and Accumulation in Soils*
13 *have been eliminated from the compliance assessment calculations on the basis of low*
14 *consequence. DOE indicated that the screening of these FEPs is justified based upon the results*
15 *of PA calculations, which show that releases to the accessible environment under undisturbed*
16 *conditions are restricted to lateral migration through anhydrite beds within the Salado Formation.*
17 *PAs for evaluating compliance with the EPA’s cumulative release requirements in 40 CFR*
18 *§ 191.13 need not consider radionuclide migration in the accessible environment. Therefore,*
19 *FEPs that relate to Plant Uptake and Animal Uptake in the accessible environment have been*
20 *eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.*

21 SCR-6.8.1.1.3 Screening Argument

22 The results of the calculations presented in Section 6.5 show that releases to the accessible
23 environment under undisturbed conditions are restricted to lateral releases through the DRZ at
24 repository depth. Thus, for evaluating compliance with the EPA’s individual protection
25 requirements in 40 CFR § 191.15, FEPs that relate to *Plant Uptake, Animal Uptake, and*
26 *Accumulation in Soils* have been eliminated from compliance assessment calculations on the
27 basis of low consequence.

28 Performance assessments for evaluating compliance with the EPA’s cumulative release
29 requirements in 40 CFR § 191.13 need not consider radionuclide migration in the accessible
30 environment. Therefore, FEPs that relate to *plant uptake and animal uptake* in the accessible
31 environment have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds. *Accumulation*
32 *in Soils* that may occur within the controlled area would reduce releases to the accessible
33 environment and can, therefore, be eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial
34 consequence.

35 **SCR-6.8.2 Human Uptake**

36 SCR-6.8.2.1 FEP Number(s): W104, W105, W106, W107, and W108
37 FEP Title(s): *Ingestion (W104)*
38 *Inhalation (W105)*
39 *Irradiation (W106)*

1 **Dermal Sorption (W107)**

2 **Injection (W108)**

3 SCR-6.8.2.1.1 Screening Decision: SO-R
4 SO-C for 40 CFR § 191.15

5 *Ingestion, Inhalation, Irradiation, Dermal Sorption, and Injection have been eliminated from*
6 *compliance assessment calculations for 40 CFR § 191.15 and Subpart C of 40 CFR Part 191 on*
7 *the basis of low consequence. FEPs that relate to human uptake in the accessible environment*
8 *have been eliminated from PA calculations for 40 CFR § 191.13 on regulatory grounds.*

9 SCR-6.8.2.1.2 Summary of New Information

10 The DOE stated in the CCA that the results of the PA calculations indicate that releases to the
11 accessible environment under undisturbed conditions are restricted to lateral migration through
12 anhydrite beds within the Salado Formation. The DOE further stated that based upon the
13 bounding approach taken for evaluating compliance with EPA's individual protection
14 requirements in 40 CFR § 191.15 and the groundwater protection requirements in Subpart C of
15 40 CFR § 191, these abovementioned exposure pathways were found to be of low consequence.
16 However, the analysis did not include analysis of doses from other potential exposure pathways
17 such as stock consumption or irrigation. These weaknesses were remedied by DOE's submittal
18 of a more detailed dose analysis, which included all of the appropriate additional pathways (DOE
19 1997c).

20 In both the PAVT and the CCA calculations (DOE 1997a, 1997b, 1997c) a very conservative
21 bounding-analysis approach was used to estimate potential doses. Using this approach, the
22 calculated maximum potential dose (millirems) to any internal organ due to beta particle and
23 photon radioactivity from man-made radionuclides in drinking water was 2.9×10^{-4} in the PAVT
24 and 4.2×10^{-3} for the CCA. Further, the annual effective dose equivalent to the total body due to
25 beta particle and photon radioactivity is 1.5×10^{-5} in the CCA and 2.3×10^{-4} for the CCA. All
26 of these values are well below the acceptable standard of 4 millirems per year as specified in 40
27 CFR § 141.16(a). Finally, the calculated maximum potential doses (millirems) to an individual
28 due to meat consumption, vegetable consumption, and inhalation of resuspended irrigated soil
29 are 2.7×10^{-7} , 0.031, and 2.1×10^{-5} , respectively, in the PAVT and 3.3×10^{-8} , 0.46, 3.1×10^{-4} ,
30 respectively, in the CCA. All of these values are well below the individual protection standard,
31 an annual committed effective dose of 15 millirems as specified in 40 CFR § 191.15(a).
32 Therefore, the original screening decisions remain valid, and no changes have been made to the
33 FEP screening arguments or decisions.

34 SCR-6.8.2.1.3 Screening Argument

35 As described in Section 8.1.1, releases to the accessible environment under undisturbed
36 conditions are restricted to lateral migration through anhydrite interbeds within the Salado.
37 Because of the bounding approach taken for evaluating compliance with the EPA's individual
38 protection requirements in 40 CFR § 191.15 and the groundwater protection requirements in
39 Subpart C of 40 CFR Part 191 (see Sections 8.1.2.2 and 8.2.3), FEPs that relate to human uptake

1 by ***Ingestion, Inhalation, Irradiation, Dermal Sorption, and Injection*** have been eliminated
2 from compliance assessment calculations on the basis of low consequence.

3 Performance assessments for evaluating compliance with the EPA's cumulative release
4 requirements in 40 CFR § 191.13 need not consider radionuclide migration in the accessible
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